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ABSTRACT 
This PhD thesis is the outcome of three-year doctoral study of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) and stakeholder engagement in the water sector. This study contributes to new 
knowledge about water companies formed as hybrid organisations in the aftermath of the new 
public management (NPM) era worldwide. Today we see different hybrid organisations of water 
companies around the world that have either been fully privatised or quasi-privatised. Quasi-
privatisation in Denmark means that water utilities are still perceived as natural monopolies, 
which has not made them into for-profit driven companies. Instead a simulated market and state 
regulation has been introduces with annual, national benchmarking to set a price cap as an upper 
limit for the consumer-price of water. Similar systems are seen in fully privatised water compa-
nies in the United Kingdom, the United States, and partially in South Africa. However, here the 
water companies are typically owned by private companies and not established as municipality-
owned limited liabilities1 as in Denmark and elsewhere in Scandinavia. This PhD thesis propos-
es new models and principles and corporate social responsibility and stakeholder engagement of 
these water companies. The findings of the study suggest a new definition of a colonising logic 
of CSR competing and coexisting with the regulators’ colonising logic of NPM. Through the 
study and definition of these logics as colonising the water sector this PhD theisis provides an 
understand of new perspectives of how CSR is enacted through stakeholder engagement and 
how the logic of CSR frames the top managers’ claim: ”We are CSR!” (Interview B, March 
2011) and the consequences of this logic. Both the logic of CSR and the logic of NPM is found 
to be based on the materials that the water companies are organised around, namely water. Wa-
ter is perceived as a natural good that should ideally be free and plentiful for all citizens around 
the world. However, the competition between the two colonising logics stems from another ma-
terial, namely the money or price that providing clean and pure water for all are allowed to cost 
the citizens. Through the dialectical interaction of these in terms of material practices between 
producing water and infrastructure to distribute it and collecting money as a payment for it and 
the regulation of this, this PhD thesis proposes a new definition of the role of materials and ma-
terial practices underlying several institutional logics such as the institutional logic of capital-
ism, state, democracy, family, religion/science, profession, and corporation (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Thornton et al., 2012; Friedland, 2013). 
                                                
1
 also called publicly owned enterprises 
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ABSTRAKT 
Denne afhandling er resultatet af tre års ph.d. studie af virksomheders sociale ansvar (CSR)2 og 
involvering af deres interessenter heri i vandsektoren. Denne undersøgelse bidrager til ny viden 
om hybride organisationer såsom vandselskaber, der er blevet dannet i kølvandet på den nye 
offentlige forvaltnings bevægelse (NPM)3 verden over. I dag ser vi forskellige hybride organisa-
tioner af vandselskaber rundt om i verden, der enten er blevet fuldt privatiseret eller kvasi-
privatiseret. Ved sidstnævnte menes, at vandselskaberne i Danmark fortsat opfattes som naturli-
ge monopoler, hvilket har gjort at de kun er blevet kvasi-privatiseret med en simuleret marked 
gennem et årligt nationalt benchmarking system som indstiller et prisloft som en øvre grænse for 
prisen på vand. Lignende systemer ses i de fuldt privatiserede vandselskaber i Storbritannien, 
USA og delvist i Sydafrika, men her er det vandselskaberne typisk ejet af private virksomheder 
og ikke etableret som en kommunalt ejet aktieselskab som i Danmark og andre steder i Skandi-
navien. Denne Ph.d. afhandling foreslår nye principper og modeller for CSR og interessentin-
volvering gennem studiet af disse virksomheder, og af resultaterne foreslås ny definition af en 
koloniserende CSR-logik som konkurrerer og sameksisterer med regulators koloniserende 
NPM-logik. Gennem studiet og definitionen af disse logikker som værende koloniserende i 
vandsektoren, kommer vi til at forstå nye perspektiver på, hvordan CSR er implementeret gen-
nem interessentinvolvering, og hvordan CSR-logikken genfindes i vandselskabernes topledelses 
påstand: "Vi er CSR" (interview B, marts 2011), og konsekvenserne af denne logik. Både CSR-
logikken og NPM-logikken er vist baseret på de materialer som vandselskaberne er organiseret 
omkring, nemlig vand, der opfattes som et naturlig gode som ideelt set bør være gratis og i rige-
lige mængder for alle borgere i hele verden. Men konkurrencen mellem de to koloniserende lo-
gikker stammer fra et andet materiale, nemlig penge eller pris for at levere rent vand til alle hvad 
dette skal koste for borgerne. Gennem denne dialektiske interaktion i form af materielle praksis-
ser mellem det at producere vand og infrastruktur for at distribuere det og at indsamle penge 
som betaling for det og selve regulering af dette, er der denne forskning foreslået en ny definiti-
on af rollen af materialer og materielle praksisser som underligger flere institutionelle logikker 
såsom de institutionelle logikker omkring kapitalisme, stat, demokrati, familie, religi-
on/videnskab, profession, og virksomhed ( Friedland & Alford, 1991 ; Thornton et al., 2012; 
Friedland, 2013). 
                                                
2
 corporate social responsibility 
3
 new public management 
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1INTRODUCTION 
This PhD thesis is the outcome of my intensified work over the last three years of studying cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) in the water sector. I have worked as a practitioner in the 
Danish water sector since 2000 as a project manager, however, it was from 2003 I became inter-
ested especially in CSR and began collecting data, which I continued with after enrolling as a 
PhD student in 2011 at Copenhagen Business School. 
This PhD thesis is paper based and consists of eight papers. The first two are published; the 
third, fourth, and fifth are in press; and the sixth, seventh, and eighth paper are in ongoing re-
view processes. The papers are placed in chronological order so the reader can follow my PhD 
‘journey’ through my publication order.  
Knowing that this thesis contains more papers than a traditional paper based thesis, I have in-
cluded all papers because they together form a holistic contribution to my study of CSR in the 
water sector as an institution. Omitting some of the papers from this thesis would to my opinion 
harm my overall academic contribution. My study encompasses an entire institution and has for 
me taken a comprehensive study to present what is in- and outside it.  
Thus, I ask my PhD committee to bear over with me having to read so many papers, and I hope 
that they will excuse this due to the coherence and consistency of my thesis. However, in order 
to reduce the amount of reading for my PhD committee, I have chosen not to include extensive 
literature reviews for every underlying theory or field used in my overall kappa4. The reader is 
referred to the proper reviews already stated in the papers to learn more about these subtheories 
and fields. My academic contributions prioritises my literature reviews to the field of CSR in-
formed by stakeholder theory and the institutional logics’ perspective. See “Objective of the 
thesis: academic contribution” page 4. 
My study of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the water sector begins with the Danish 
Structural Reform in 20075. This reform marks the point of departure for my thesis through its 
seminal entrance of Danish water companies in the epoch of (Post-) New Public Management. 
This choice makes these companies comparable internationally to other (quasi-) privatised pub-
                                                
4
 Kappa is used as a term for what is known as introductory chapter in English speaking countries. The kappa forms 
and surrounds my collection of papers. It is typical for Danish paper based PhD theses that the kappa includes an 
introduction, description of the field, theory, philosophy of science, methodology, overall findings, and conclusion, 
and afterwards the papers are presented as individual contributions to the PhD thesis. 
5
 http://www.sum.dk/Aktuelt/Publikationer/Publikationer/~/media/Filer%20-
%20Publikationer_i_pdf/2004/Strukturaftale.ashx, retrieved 26 August 2013 
2lic companies. This landmark is chosen specifically in order to highlight that this thesis is not a 
historical survey of institutional changes6. It aims to be a cross-geographically comparative, in-
stitutional study of water companies. These companies are both local/national Danish compa-
nies, and geographically and culturally diverse water companies from Scandinavia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and South Africa. At the same time the project is positioned in an 
era of economic turbulence since the 2007/2008 financial crisis leading to the current recession, 
which has challenged the stability-change dichotomy of organisations in general (Van Wart, 
2012, p. 230). Thus, this project naturally will deal with the global context as an environmental 
frame impacting the organisations I examine.  
I initiated my study by a curious observation regarding the field of the Danish water sector. 
Many top managers were obviously furious about the new Structural Reform in 2007, which 
introduced a stricter regulation of them as seen abroad. They explained that this regulation 
“harmed our entire work with social responsibility” (interview A, March 2011). This conflict 
became crucial to me in the direction and snowball effect of my study. I wondered all through 
my investigation what was underlying this anger and its identification with the concept of CSR 
and used this as a guide for my further study. My research questions are: 
To embrace such complexity in my study of CSR in water companies I have found theoretical 
interest in the theory of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012).  
Institutional logics consist of “a set of material practices and symbolic constructions” (Fried-
land & Alford, 1991, p. 248), which are “symbolically grounded, organisationally structured, 
politically defended, and technically and materially constrained, and hence have specific his-
torical limits” (Ibid., pp. 248-249). This definition initiated the literature of institutional logics 
                                                
6
 although critical historical events will be mentioned 
How is corporate social responsibility interpreted and enacted in the 
water sector? 
o What role does CSR play in this sector? 
o Which institutional logics underlie this role? 
o How do materials and material practices constitute the logic of CSR 
in this sector’s and its engagement with its stakeholders? 
3in a reaction to institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and its macro-oriented 
approach to organisational change and agency explained by coercive, normative, and mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio, 1988; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2005; 
Thornton et al., 2012). The institutional logic’s perspective is thus claimed to be more inclusive 
of micro-  and meso-processes of action (Thornton et al., 2012). As my investigation of CSR 
and stakeholder engagement in water companies developed, I wondered how the object or the 
material product of these companies might have framed their perception of CSR and stakeholder 
engagement.  
Managers of water companies clearly perceived their identity as providers of a crucial consumer 
good to the public such as clean water and furthermore treat and clean the end product of 
wastewater before diffusing it back to nature. It has to my research clearly become a part of their 
institutional logics driven by their material practices and defended in their logic of CSR. This 
logic has shown to be capable of colonising multiple institutional logics existing in the water 
sector such as the institutional logic of capitalism, the state, bureaucracy, religion/science, pro-
fession, and corporation (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). My interest was to 
find out to which degree the claim: “we are CSR” is embedded in the organisational culture of 
diverse water companies and what was possible to learn about CSR by participating in the eve-
ryday life in such companies.  
The institutional logics perspective frequently refers to the term culture and how materials and 
material practices are embedded in this. According to scholars of  institutional logics’ perspec-
tive, logics consist of cognitive schemas, normative expectations, and material practices (Jones 
et al., 2013, p. 52; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). Since the literature of 
institutional logics’ perspective lacks studies and descriptions of materials or material practices 
(Jones et al. 2013, p. 51) my study of how water companies work with CSR and stakeholder 
engagement sets out to contribute to filling this gap. To contribute to the understanding of the 
role of materials and material practices in institutional logics I will utilise my findings of study-
ing agents working with corporate social responsibility in the water sector and show how this 
work related to the object or material product of water and how the logic of CSR is traversing or 
bridging different institutional logics. I conclude that the material practices and its physical and 
symbolic meaning forms what I term a colonising logic of CSR in the water sector due to its 
historical roots as a public service company.  
4To explore the logic of CSR and its enactment through the water companies’ stakeholder en-
gagement has meant that I had to think very broad in order to capture the institutional logics 
flowing in the field. I had to determine which (other) logics are in flow (entering and passing), 
which are sedimented (permanent), and which are in-between (potential of becoming permanent 
or disappearing). I have identified a logic of economy, a logic of environment, a logic of new 
public management, and most importantly, the logic of corporate social responsibility. These are 
all more or less permanently sedimented through the period of the observation study in the Dan-
ish water companies. Research has recognised that multiple logics typically exist in organisa-
tions (e.g. Binder, 2007) and they may compete, coexist, or be hybridised in different ways (e.g. 
Reay & Hinnings; Westenholz, 2012).  
However, it has for me been more interesting to find new descriptors of what constitutes a cer-
tain logic that seems to dominate, compete or coexist (or both) with other logics (Jones et al., 
2013), and which role do materials and material practices play in constituting a colonising logic. 
Therefore I have tried continuously to cover as large a range of agents in the field as possible 
without exhausting myself in data overflow, which is more specifically explained in the section 
on ”Philosophy of science” and ”Methodology” page 48 and 55 respectively. Next, I will ex-
plain the overall objectives of my thesis and state my academic contribution as well as how the 
thesis is structured. 
Objective of the thesis: academic contribution 
Since my thesis is based upon eight different papers relating to the field of CSR and stakeholder 
engagement in the water sector it naturally explores different theories and quasi-theories. Some 
of the theories and fields are more pervasive than others throughout my thesis. Those theories 
and fields that contribute more specifically to my overall academic contribution are prioritised 
as my academic contribution: 
• Primary academic contribution to the field of corporate social responsibility seen from 
a stakeholder perspective (Freeman, 1984/2010; Freeman et al., 2010). 
• Secondary academic contribution to the institutional theory of the institutional logics’ 
perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012).  
This prioritisation informs the thesis as a whole. It is therefore also displayed in the composition 
of the kappa starting the field of CSR and stakeholder engagement and followed by the theorisa-
tion into the institutional logics perspective. 
5Structure of thesis 
After this introduction the “Contextual background” for my study is provided consisting of a 
description of how a water company works and its overall contextual frame within the New Pub-
lic Management field. It is crucial to understand this contextual background especially since 
CSR developed from the private sector (Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011) and is emerging in the 
public sector, in which the water sector in question originates. Next, the field of corporate social 
responsibility seen from a stakeholder approach is examined in the section called “Field”. Both 
the field of CSR and stakeholder theory have separate, but entangled trajectories, and therefore 
the main contribution to the field of CSR will be informed by stakeholder theory.  
In the following section, the theoretical basis of the thesis is elaborated in the institutional lo-
gics’ perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). Hereafter I reflect upon the 
philosophy of science, which plays an important role in the way research studies are performed 
(Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2008). I explain how my own background in respectively positivism 
and humanism has made my choice of philosophical stance blurred. I took initially a typical so-
ciological stance in social constructivism, and I struggled with its general counter-reaction 
against positivism or neopositivistic approaches, which I found a little bit odd. I had a hard time 
reconciling with the social constructivism’s deontological stance explaining every phenomenon 
only in epistemological terms.  
For instance, physical phenomena are only perceived and interpreted and thereby constructed by 
human beings (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). That physical objects only means something to hu-
mans through our knowledge about it and does not have a meaning outside this epistemological 
conception was hard for me to grapple with. As one follows my papers, the readers may recog-
nise that I move towards a stance of critical realism, which shares some parts with social con-
structivism since it too criticises positivism severely. However, it also recognises the ontological 
part of philosophy of science acknowledging that physical objects do have a meaning that may 
be beyond our knowledge of it (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2008).  
This section is followed by the methodology part of my thesis, which shows the same movement 
from constructivism towards critical realism. I have been relatively consistent in my choice of 
analytical method by using James Spradley’s (1979, 1980) ethnosemantic method as an instru-
6ment for analysis (see especially paper #3, #4, and #6)7. Next, I assemble my findings from re-
spectively the papers and the kappa respectively in the section called “Finding”, and finally I 
conclude my thesis in the “Conclusion” before the papers are presented. 
Limitations 
Since my PhD thesis is mainly based upon a qualitative study of seven Danish water companies, 
my contribution is working on the premise of being analytically generalisable (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Kvale, 2007; Yin, 2009). I have carried out participant observations in one main host organisa-
tion and to a minor degree in another, interviewed managers and stakeholders of all seven com-
panies, followed seven case study pipeline installations and sustainable project management in 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and collected thousands of documents from Danish, British, 
American, and South African water companies. This means that my conclusions are 
generalisable to the specific situations studied and can due to its cross-geographical character be 
seen as proposing generalisable findings to inform the literature, academic fields, and theories 
chosen in this thesis. 
  
                                                
7
 Although paper #3 and paper #6 are informed by critical theory I do not see the inappropriateness neither towards 
constructivism nor critical realism since both concepts claim to include this approach as well (Buch-Hansen & 
Nielsen, 2008) 
7CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
The water sector 
The examined water companies have at least two main distinct functions8: 1) abstraction, purifi-
cation, and distribution of fresh water and 2) transportation and purification9 of wastewater. Ab-
straction of water means collecting the water from the natural resource available. In Denmark 
almost all freshwater stems from groundwater deposits, and only in a few locations10 freshwater 
is still abstracted surface water. In general the Danish groundwater is free of contaminants that it 
almost without any processing is available for distribution (Andersen et al., 2006). This is not a 
typical setting in other countries. Groundwater deposits may be depleted and polluted that puri-
fication of fresh water is needed no matter which source the raw water is abstracted from (Gray, 
2010).  
Processing fresh water prior to distribution consists of different techniques due to the purity of 
the raw water abstracted. In Denmark uncontaminated fresh water is only processed through two 
steps: i) a sand and gravel filter to detach iron particles from it (ocher) mainly due to create a 
good taste (and not a taste of iron) of the water, and ii) an oxidation process in order to re-
oxgenate it and make it taste well (Karlby & Sørensen, 1998). In many other nations additional 
processing is needed before the fresh water is ready for distribution. A typical process to elimi-
nate bacteria and other contaminants is to add a chlorine solvent in order to reduce health related 
risks of drinking freshwater. This affects the taste of water eventually (Gray, 2010).    
Distribution of water as well as the transportation of wastewater happens through networks of 
pipelines, storage, and pressure systems to reach or leave the consumers. Water distribution is 
typically done by pressure systems in order to provide running water in the taps of a certain 
pressure. Wastewater transportation typically consist of two distinct but combined techniques: a) 
a gravitation systems, where wastewater gravitate (run downwards due to the force of gravita-
tion), which saves a lot of energy and b) pumping systems, where wastewater is pumped from A 
to B (Karlby & Sørensen, 1998). There are many different ways to process the purification of 
wastewater. Different methods are preferred according to the condition of the wastewater, which 
may locally differ from each other even in the same city. The typical overall processing consists 
of a separation of fluids, lipids, and hard material through first a grating process followed by a 
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 typically around Copenhagen 
8sedimentation process. After this different biological processes follow in a flow of a combina-
tion of aerobe, anaaerobe, and sedimentation processes. These processes respectively detach 
nitrogen, phosphorus, ammonium, and derived/combined chemical compounds and furthermore 
they sediment sludge for reprocessing. Finally, a chemical process detach the remaining con-
taminants that the biological part could not process. Parallel to this ‘fluid’ process is running a 
sludge process of dewatering it to a level where it can be utilised either for energy making (bio-
fuel) or as fertiliser on farmlands (see e.g. Tchobanoglous et al., 2003 for a more in depth de-
scription).  
The above describes very shortly the main processes of a water company. Besides these opera-
tions, renewal and maintenance of the infrastructure of pipe systems, pumping stations, basins 
and reservoirs as well as buildings and processing assets is also part of the companies to take 
care of. Although the above seems to encompass most of the work a water company does, the 
short description of this part of the work does not leave a full impression of how much the work 
actually entails. The processing is run almost automatically by computers and machines (mainly 
pumps) in a water company, whereas the work of the people is concerned with operation, main-
tenance, renewal, rehabilitation, creating new pipeline systems and administration (Lenton & 
Muller, 2009), which I will not describe in further detail here, but leave readers to read more in 
the papers of the PhD thesis.  
New Public Management 
The study of the water sector gained relevance in Scandinavia and especially in Denmark when 
it in 2003 was announced in a Danish ministerial report that a major institutional change was 
underway (Spenner & Wacker, 2003). Here a thorough service investigation of the Danish water 
sector was announced in order to find ways and potentials for making the sector more efficient 
and effective. Although no names of international movements nor intergovernmental bodies 
were mentioned in this report, it was clear that this was not an invention manufactured by the 
Danish state. It was a part of a larger New Public Management (NPM) trajectory going on 
worldwide induced by the OECD into its member states and slowly introduced (Greve, 2009; 
Torfing, 2008) to the Danish water sector. To understand what was going on in the Danish water 
sector from the Structural Reform in 200711 it is necessary to understand this movement and its 
implications. 
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 see http://oim.dk/media/58904/UK-overhead-august-2004.pdf (in English), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
9New Public Management is an umbrella term for a global movement consisting of neoliberalis-
tic economic ideas initiated in the 1930s (O. K. Pedersen, 2011), which gained political momen-
tum in the late 1980s through prominent figures such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
(see Hood, 1991, 1998; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Lynn, 2006). Neoliberalism arose after the 
Great Depression as an academic discussion of how to prevent a similar situation from happen-
ing again. Figures such as Milton Friedman, Frederick von Hayek, and Joseph Schumpeter were 
among those, who in the post-war period led a discussion as to how to connect economic theo-
ries with theories of democracy into a new synthesis of individual freedom away from the totali-
tarian regimes seen during the World Wars (O. K. Pedersen, 2011).  
In the neoliberalist approach people were perceived as utility maximising for their own sakes. 
Theories such as rational choice and agency theory were established to explain how people first 
and foremost were characterised by rational, but egoistic thinking about their own benefit before 
others’ and how to cope with these traits. Theories of the market as an equilibrating system grew 
emphasising a system of freedom and competitiveness and agency theories were developed to 
combine this with systems of fair, political control, such as principal-agent relations, contract-
establishments, monetarism, and other rational behavioural theories. 
“While post-war international economies were built upon states’ objectives of 
national protection of “domestic markets” and national welfare-states’ com-
pensation for their workforce12, today’s international competition rests on as-
sumptions regarding that nations compete through opening their economies 
and mobilising their material and immaterial resources in competition with 
others” (O. K. Pedersen, 2011, p. 31-32, my translation). 
These neoliberal ideas laid the foundation for the political lines of thinking that characterised 
New Public Management from the 1980s and later. It is debatable whether today after 20-30 
years of implementation it should still be termed New Public Management rather than Post-
NPM, Public Governance or just Public Management (Kettl, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; 
Torfing, 2008; Greve, 2009, 2011). I have chosen to continue naming it New Public Manage-
ment as initially, since many of the initial ideas and instruments within the international trajec-
tory of NPM are new to the water sector. These instruments used in this sector are derived from 
both the first and second international waves of NPM from respectively the 1990s and 2000s. 
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The first wave of NPM changes in the public sector was inspired by neoliberal economic ideas 
that minimised and streamlined the public sector by introducing managerial instruments and 
techniques from the private business sphere to save money and create more welfare through pri-
vatisation (Hood, 1991; O. K. Pedersen, 2011). This idea was explained in the New Right policy 
movement adopted by the Niskanen-inspired Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan and taken 
up in the Anglo-Saxon and Amerian public administrations in the late 1980s as a reaction to the 
financial crisis in the 1970s and the following massive inflations that had stalled the global 
economy in many countries (Niskanen, 1973; Kettl, 2000; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011).  
One of the first nations to implement this change was New Zealand, who faced an economic 
collapse already in 1984. The experiences from stabilising this nation’s economy formed what 
came to be international reform strategies induced by the OECD and diffused to many other 
nations as New Public Management (Pallot, 1998; de Vries, 2011; O. K. Pedersen, 2011). The 
overall idea behind NPM was to save money by improving performance in the public sector, or 
to ‘do more with less’ to prepare nations for the global competitiveness that governments faced 
(O. K. Pedersen, 2011).  
Instruments to improve the Three E’s; economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector 
were soon adopted from the private business sector (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; J. S. Pedersen, 
2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2010) such as budgeting and accounting, Total Quality Manage-
ment, benchmarking, performance auditing, LEAN management, outsourcing, and privatisation. 
Some countries suffered severely from financial depletion, and this strategy proved to have a 
certain effect of stabilising its national economies, such as in New Zealand (see Whitcombe, 
2008). However, not all instruments proved to be viable to ‘do more with less’.  
The quality of public service–privatised or not–did not improve everywhere, but was creating a 
new massive bureaucracy, which only counted quantitatively how many was serviced but not 
how well they were serviced. Especially in the human relation part of public services such as 
hospitals, nursing homes, child care, and schools, sending more individuals through the system 
with less ‘warm hands’ did not improve the quality the citizens experienced (see Gustafsson & 
Szebehely, 2009). To count the quality performed in quantitative measurements through per-
formance auditing was also hard to do in Denmark. For instance, patients, elderly, children, and 
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their relatives feel that a nurse having only 15 minutes to serve ones relatives in nursing houses 
a day is rather inhuman (see NetAvisen, 03/04-201313).   
The second wave of NPM was initiated in the late 1990s and tried to improve the quality of pub-
lic service in new ways by moving away from the rigid counting of quantities. Instead this wave 
went into defining qualities that could be measured both by counting but also by more descrip-
tive ways. Meeting qualitative objectives was typically measured by client surveys or described 
as annually overall qualitative goals (Pallott, 1998). For instance, in hospitals new ideas of resti-
tution at home supported by hospital facilities, supervision from general practitioners or munici-
pal services allowed patients, instead of lying in hospital beds for several weeks, to recover 
faster by being more physically active (e.g. Wind et al., 2006; Kehlet & Wilmore, 2008; Peder-
sen & Huniche, 2011). In this way hospitals could improve patient frequency, rehabilitation, and 
reduce waiting lists as their primary objectives by sending the patients to other public service 
areas near their own home. 
The Danish state–as well as other Scandinavian countries–has in general been reluctant to adopt 
the instruments from the first wave of NPM. Typically the privatisation momentum did not have 
the same effect here as in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Budgeting and accounting as well as per-
formance contracting was adopted in some state offices in the beginning of 1990s (personal 
communication with official from the Financial Ministry, February 2012). Privatisation or quasi-
privatisation of the oil and gas sectors (mid 1980s14), the airports (1990)15, telecommunication 
(1991), postal service (1995)16, the electricity sector (1999)17 as well as cultural institutions 
(2002)18 also happened. Seeing the effects from early adopters of NPM and how they changed 
into less counting and more descriptive measurements of quality in public service, the first dec-
ade of the 2000s inspired a series of reforms in Denmark. Danish reforms have during the last 
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 http://navisen.dk/blog/minuttyranniets-afskaffelse-er-en-succes/ (In Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
14
 for instance Dong Energy A/S has roots back to 1972 as Dansk Naturgas A/S, but begins producing oil and gas in 
1984, merges with other state-owned companies in 2002, and is fully liberalized in 2006, see 
http://www.dongenergy.com/EN/About%20us/dong%20energy%20in%20brief/Pages/history.aspx, and Vagtborg 
and Langfrits (2008) 
http://studenttheses.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10417/334/snjezana_m_vagtborg_og_marianne_t_langfrits.pdf?sequen
ce=1, retrieved June 13th 2013.  
15
 see http://www.cph.dk/CPH/UK/ABOUT+CPH/Organisation/, retrieved June 13th 2013 
16
 see http://www.postdanmark.dk/en/Om%20os/Virksomheden/Historie/Pages/home.aspx, retrieved June 13th 
2013 
17
 see http://www.co-industri.dk/Lists/Pjecer/Attachments/134/Elsektor.pdf (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
18
 see http://www.smk.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumenter/om-museet/organisation/rammeaftale_2002-2005.pdf
(in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
12
decade been implemented in the sectors of education; higher education (2002)19, secondary edu-
cation (2007)20, the police service (2007)21, the tax institution (2005/2013)22 and the water, 
wastewater (2007/2009)23 and waste sectors (2007/2010)24. The typical NPM instruments used 
in Denmark up till today are the creation of independent boards, budgeting and accounting, per-
formance contracts between owners and operators, outsourcing and contracting out services to 
private companies, performance auditing (benchmarking) and evaluations, and in some institu-
tions and companies LEAN management tools.  
However, debates of quality in the Danish public sector are still going on, and diverse opinions 
of the quality of public service have and will always take place. Quality is often converted to 
measures of more quantities in the statements of the politicians, regulators and other public deci-
sion makers, while the receivers of public service such as citizens and the media often claim that 
the quality of the provided service may be impaired (Lægreid & Christensen, 2010; Pollitt & 
Bouckaert, 2011). Especially in times of financial crisis, where instruments such as the above 
may be further tightened into more economic savings, these services and instruments may be 
used to squeeze the lemon further and may have a hard time ‘doing more with less’25.  
Throughout the last 20 years, innovation seems to be the word the public sector continously has 
been looking for by adopting business sector management tools to renew the sector and create 
more ‘value for money’ (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000). J. S. Pedersen (2010) analysed Danish 
reforms during this period and found no evidence that there has been more innovation in the 
Danish public sector after the introduction of NPM than before. The new innovation of the Dan-
ish water sector seems not to come from structural reorganisations and introduction of new 
business instruments as mentioned above, but merely from the incentives inherited within the 
idea of ‘doing more with less’ despite of the structure facilitated to create it. The Danish water 
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 see https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=96204 (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
20
 see http://www.cser.dk/fileadmin/www.cser.dk/5074_gymnasier_der_rykker.pdf (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 
2013. 
21
 see. http://www.fm.dk/publikationer/2008/1678_aftaler-om-finansloven-for-2009/gennemfoerelse-af-
politireformen/ (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
22
 see http://www.fm.dk/publikationer/2008/1678_aftaler-om-finansloven-for-2009/gennemfoerelse-af-
politireformen/ (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
23
 see https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=125346 (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
24
 see 
http://www.mst.dk/Virksomhed_og_myndighed/Affald/organisering_affaldssektoren/den_nye_affaldssektor/Affald
sbekendtgoerelsen/ (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
25
 See the new Danish debate on outsourcing prison-management to private agents in Politiken, June 13th 2013 
http://politiken.dk/indland/ECE1995576/danske-faengsler-er-dyre-i-drift/  (in Danish), retrieved June 13th 2013. 
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sector now works under a new Water Sector Act26, which is created with inspiration from the 
UK water sector especially in regard to economic regulation27. In spite of important structural 
and operational differences between Danish and UK water companies such as respectively 
working under the cost-recovery principle versus profit/surplus with interest to private investors, 
the UK institutional water regulation system have with its 20 years of experiences adopted in-
centives for UK water companies to invest in sustainability initiatives and keep their economic 
improvements in their coming price cap reviews28. This idea has being adopted by the Danish 
water regulators in January 201329. These are some of the issues this PhD is grounded in, and in 
the next the reader will be introduced to the field of CSR and to the dilemmas inherited by it in 
relation to the contextual settings of the water sector.
                                                
26
 https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=125346 , retrieved June 13th 2013. 
27
 http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/ , retrieved June 13th 2013. 
28
 see for instance http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/climatechange/pap_pos_climatechange.pdf page 15, 
retrieved June 13th 2013. 
29
 see https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=145200, (in Danish) retrieved June 13th 2013. 
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FIELD 
The Danish water sectors’ transformation from typically a municipality driven public service 
into a hybrid of public and private organisational forms alongside the emerging debates of CSR 
and sustainability in the sector soon became part of a new agenda among leading water company 
managers. Stakeholders such as customers, landowners, and citizens were implicitly connected 
to the way that these managers talked about CSR alongside environmental issues such as ‘miti-
gating the climate change’ and ‘substitution for green energy’. Following these observations I 
chose to focus on the stakeholder approach to corporate social responsibility.  
The Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility 
The Stanford Research Institute (SRI) initially developed stakeholder theory in connection with 
strategic management in the 1960s as a part of their corporate planning process. It was based on 
the works of for instance Abrams (1951), Cyert & March (1963), Rhenman (1964), Ansoff 
(1965), Ackoff (1974), and Mitroff & Mason (1982). A stakeholder was by SRI defined as 
“those groups without whose support the organisation would cease to exist” (Freeman et al., 
2010, p. 26). However, according to this term the stakeholders were perceived as the most 
friendly groups that could support the firm in question and not external groups such as the me-
dia, NGOs, or other more peripheral groups (Ibid., p. 38). 
It was not until R. E. Freeman published his seminal book Strategic Management: A Stake-
holder Approach (1984), which emphasised the importance of organisations and managers in-
vesting in the relationships with all those, who have a stake in the firm and not only, as Milton 
Friedman (1970) argued, the stockholders of the firm, that the literature around stakeholder the-
ory was established as an academic field of its own (Steurer, 2006). A ‘stakeholder’ according to 
Freeman’s definition is: 
“Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the firm’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 25). 
Freeman stated that the world had moved away from the input-output mode of the production 
view of the firm seen as suppliers delivering resources to the company, which it made into prod-
ucts for sales to customers (see Freeman, 1984, p. 5). It was in 1984 even moving beyond a 
managerial view of the firm regarding the suppliers, owners, employees and customers as not 
the only salient stakeholders of the firm (Ibid., p. 6). Now it had moved towards an entire net-
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work of equally important stakeholders from the external sphere, whose risks and claims in a 
global context were as viable as the internal stakeholders (Freeman, 1984, pp. 11-24).  
FIGURE 1: FREEMAN'S EXHIBIT 1.5 STAKEHOLDER VIEW OF THE FIRM (FREEMAN, 1984/2010, P. 25) 
Freeman’s stakeholder view of the firm placed a long but not infinite range of stakeholder 
groups around the firm having equal salience in their eventual claims upon the firm. This model 
set a whole new agenda of business responding to multiple stakeholders. Figure 1 shows only 
the principle of the model. Each company may have a long network of different stakeholders 
interrelated in a network, which may be unique for each company in question. The core point of 
Freeman’s stakeholder model is that stakeholders are not divided into different hierarchies or 
degrees of importance. They are treated according to the type of stake they justifiably have. 
However, none are neglected if the company wants to succeed (see Freeman, 1984, pp. 74-80).  
This idea of promoting the company’s engagement with its total stock of stakeholders in order to 
make a company strategically successful has been one of most important approaches to the con-
ceptualisation of CSR (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008; Valor, 2005; Crane 
& Matten, 2007; Fassin, 2009). It has even initiated the discursive gap between the proponents 
of respectively the ‘economic’ versus ‘social’ responsibilities of the corporation. 
Ever since, Freeman has inspired stakeholder theorists to supplement his model (e.g. Donaldson 
& Preston, 1995), develop it (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Wartick & Wood, 1998; Wood, 2008; 
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Fassin, 2008, 2009) or make new stakeholder concepts and perspectives (e.g. Rowley, 1997; 
Jensen, 2002; Fassin, 2009). All of which have made the literature of stakeholder theory vast 
and diverse (Buchholtz & Carroll, 2009; Crane & Matten, 2007). I have chosen to follow the 
line from Freeman through elaborations of his initial ideas by authors like Mitchell et al. (1997), 
Wartick & Wood (1998) towards contemporary and new developments like Fassin’s (2009) 
stakeholder model.  
I argue for this streamlining of ideas and its appropriateness to understand stakeholder relation-
ships in water companies, which is seen especially in Paper #2. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) and Wartick & Wood (1998) emphasised the importance of power in the 
relations between the company and its stakeholders. They claimed that the salience of the stake-
holders depends on power, legitimacy and urgency. Stakeholders, they claim, are holding three 
types of power (Wartick & Wood, 1998): formal (shareholders, directors), economic (employ-
ees, customers, suppliers, creditors), political power (pressure groups, activists, governments 
and the community), or multiple power bases of the former (King, 2000). This emphasis on the 
power of diverse stakeholders divided them into a kind of hierarchy (e.g. primary and secondary 
stakeholders (Carroll, 1989). At the top of the hierarchy were especially those who possess all 
three kinds of power. It is not necessarily the stockholders or investors that in all cases host the 
most salient power. For instance, the consumer boycott of French products during the nuclear 
testing initiated by the French state in the South Pacific in 1995-96 had severe economic conse-
quences for the French market agents long time after the testing had taken place and was politi-
cally abandoned after six out of eight announced testings (Thakur, 1996).   
Fassin (2009) continued this line in his Stake Model and defined three types of stakes: the stake-
holder who holds a stake (i.e. stockholder, owner), the stakewatcher who watches the stake (i.e. 
pressure groups) and the stakekeeper (i.e. regulators) who keeps the stake (Fassin, 2009). Stake-
holder engagement, however, is not discussed by Fassin, who focused on mapping out different 
kinds of stakeholders and their connections in a network as well as their internal-external rela-
tionships (see also Rowley, 1997). However (unlike Rowley) Fassin’s model is illustrated not 
only by ties (relationships) and knots (actors) but also by circles interacting with each other 
(Fassin, 2009). See Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
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It is not hard to see why stakeholder theory has had a success as an approach to frame corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). As Freeman claims (Freeman, 2010, Preface to the 2010 reissue), it 
is almost unnecessary to talk about CSR because ideally stakeholder theory contains it all. If all 
stakeholders literally were satisfied with business conduct, why bother engaging in corporate 
social responsibility? Stakeholder theory is framed around the process of how to interact with 
stakeholders regardless of their claim, and corporate social responsibility is framed around the 
issues of concern, which the stakeholder theory does not offer an answer to. My claim is thus 
that the match of stakeholder theory and corporate social responsibility is successful due to its 
dual purposes of linking a kind of issues management with stakeholder engagement. 
Corporate social responsibility 
The CSR literature credits the earliest contribution to Bowen (1953) with his book Social Re-
sponsibilities of the Businessman (e.g. Caroll, 1999; Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011) and how 
these businessmen should run their businesses (e.g. Barnard, 1938; Clark, 1939; Kreps, 1940; all 
cited in Carroll, 1999, p. 269). Bowen’s landmark book claimed that the largest companies had a 
vital power due to their impact upon society and the lives of citizens in many ways (Carroll, 
1999, p. 269). Therefore these businessmen must “pursue those policies, ... make those deci-
sions, or ...follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values 
of our society” (Bowen, 1953, p. 6; cited in Carroll, 1999, p. 270). Although Bowen did not 
define social responsibility as a term, his work set forth a literature in the 1960s that tried to 
come around to such a definition, for instance Davis (1960):  
“[B]usinessmen’s decisions and actions [are] taken for reasons at least par-
tially beyond the firm’s direct economic or technical interests” (Davis, 1960, p. 
70; cited in Carroll, 1999, p. 271). 
 Frederick was in line with these ideas, but offered a more concise definition: 
 “[Social responsibilities] mean that businessmen should oversee the operation 
of an economic system that fulfills the expectations of the public....in such a 
way that production and distribution should enhance total socio-economic wel-
fare“ (Frederick, 1960, p. 60; cited in Carroll, 1999, p. 271).  
It is from this time clear that the seeds for contemporary understanding of corporate social re-
sponsibilities were initiated although they had a hard time suppressing the economic profit mo-
tive of business. Possessing such power, scholars said, did not prevent them from having social 
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responsibilities and moral obligations toward the society, who had allowed them to enact their 
business in a rather free and unconditioned market (e.g. Votaw, 1964; Epstein, 1969). However, 
since most corporations did not necessarily take these responsibilities per se a debate was initi-
ated about what were the actual social responsibilities businesses had.  
The literature hereafter was divided into economic and social viewpoints. Some claimed that a 
business’ only social responsibilities were to create jobs and make profit (e.g. Ansoff, 1965; 
Friedman, 1970; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Others argued that businesses had more responsi-
bilities than solely towards their stockholders and complying minimally with the law (Davis, 
1973). These responsibilities were, for instance, to integrate their social responsibilities with 
their economic objectives (e.g. Ackerman & Bauer, 1976), to engage in public issues and bal-
ance stakeholders interests (Post, 1978; Preston & Post, 1981; Sethi, 1975), and eventually to be 
overseen by others in terms of stakeholder audits or corporate social audits (e.g. Bauer & Fenn, 
1972; Hargreaves & Dauman, 1975). According to this divide, the economic school emphasising 
stockholder and shareholder wealth and the normative, ethical school emphasising societal and 
stakeholder welfare initiated future debates around CSR. In this historical period a third ap-
proach, which later came to intervene in the CSR debate, is the environmental issues framed in 
the sustainability literature (e.g. Lovelock & Margulis, 1974; Lovelock, 1979). I will postpone 
this issue a little but return to this movement and how it came to influence CSR later in this re-
view.  
In the late 1970s, some of the most influential concepts of CSR were published such as Freder-
ick’s (1978/1994) CSR1 and CSR2 and Carroll’s (1979, 1991) Pyramid of CSR. Although Sethi 
(1975) discussed the terms CSR1 and CSR2 before Frederick, the latter did a more intensive job 
in questioning CSR1 referring to the debatable normative responsibilities of businesses. Freder-
ick defended the concept of CSR2 that otherwise describes how businesses must be responsive 
towards stakeholder needs and expectations instead of vaguely defining what CSR really is:  
“The CSR2 approach simply sidesteps the issue of defining ‘social betterment’ 
[or CSR1]...it takes, as given, that social pressures exist and that businesses 
must respond to them. In one sense it puts business in a passive role of simply 
responding to a society that actively expresses its wishes” (Frederick, 1994, p. 
160).  
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This shortcoming in the concept of CSR2 as purely managerial responsiveness to others, who 
have to define what CSR1 is, it is suggested, necessitates a managerial approach to CSR, which 
departs from the moral values of for instance stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory assumes 
that the responsible company impacting the society should be morally and ethically grounded 
and prior to its decisions take stakeholders’ and society’s needs into consideration instead of 
waiting for a claim to respond to. Frederick’s description of social responsiveness is therefore 
prone to be interpreted as an economic response to business managers just to let others deter-
mine if their conduct is good enough and then adjust to these demands afterwards. This is a kind 
of optimization and value creation by acting first and then later apologizing and seeking for-
giveness if the business conduct was not accepted by society or groups within it.  
Later, however, Frederick (1998) concretised his own visions about CSR framed as Social Is-
sues in Management (SIM) and framed a third movement, CSR3, as corporate social rectitude 
meaning adopting a business culture of ethics and moral consciousness (Frederick, 1986). Fi-
nally, he focused upon corporate social performance and actions taken by businesses involving 
stakeholder engagement in an ethical manner of recognizing their rights and justice, and focus-
sing upon what managers actually do when they work and operate their businesses and make 
decisions. This was now called CSR4 (Frederick, 1998). 
Frederick had in his CSR4 concept integrated responsiveness (CSR2) with the ethical and moral 
rectitude (CSR3) approach by a new focus away from the company as the centre (Frederick, 
1986). With his CSR4 concept the issues and those holding the risks related to those issues (the 
stakeholders) were emphasised by framing corporate social performance as the main output 
(Frederick, 1998). This rather long journey of Frederick’s suggests that his original standpoint 
has moved from an economic school (Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011) to a more ethical school 
over twenty years from the ‘70s till the end of the ‘90s. 
Back in the late 70s, however, it was not a problem for Carroll (1979/1991) to provide an early 
proactive way for business managers to address such integrated issues in terms of societal and 
stakeholder concerns prior to decision making. He provided a simple, but ethical business model 
addressing the economic, legal, ethical and discrete/philanthropic responsibilities of businesses 
(reproduced in Figure 4).  
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argued that CSR should be seen as a kind of corporate governance tool seeing business in the 
context of public life and thus consider the consequences of business actions for final judgement 
(Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011). This view made Donaldson argue that CSR should be framed in 
terms of a social contract between business and society (see also Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). 
This social contract consists of economic morality, ethical norms specified by local economic 
communities grounded in informed consent buttressed by a right of exit that are compatible with 
hyper-norms. These hyper-norms framed several concrete social and environmental issues such 
as:  
• adopting adequate health and safety standards for employees;  
• granting employees the right to know about job related health hazards;  
• respecting the rights of all persons to life, liberty, security and privacy;  
• controlling specific operations that contribute to pollution of air, water, and soils,  
• respecting core human rights such as freedom, physical security and well being, political 
participation, informed consent, property ownership, the right to subsistence; and the ob-
ligation to respect the dignity of each human person.  
“In case of conflicts among norms satisfying (these) Principles, priority must 
be established through the application of rules consistent with the spirit and 
letter of the macrosocial contract” (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994, p. 269).  
This specification, which inherently is the core issue message of CSR since the idea developed 
initially, made Wartick & Cochran (1985) interpret Carroll’s (1979 version of the) Pyramid of 
CSR as an ethical principle, social responsiveness as a process, and social issues management as 
a kind of policy (Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011, p. 533). Wood (1991) followed these ideas into 
a model of corporate social performance as: 
“..a business organisation's configuration of principles of social responsibility, 
processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs, and observable 
outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships.” (Wood, 1991, p. 
693). 
To assess a company's social performance Wood found it crucial to examine to which degree the 
company’s actual principles of social responsibility motivate actions. By motivation she meant 
how they make use of socially responsive processes, how their policies and programmes actu-
ally are designed to manage the firm's societal relationships, and which social impacts these ac-
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question. These descriptions or models of Carroll’s, Wartick & Cochran’s, and Wood’s thus 
become normative seen from a managerial point of view. Caroll’s Pyramid of CSR has also 
been equally credited and famed for its simplicity and assembling arguments between the eco-
nomic school and the ethical stakeholder school by both authors of CSR and CSP (see Visser, 
2006). However, it was later criticised by Schwarz & Carroll (2003) for its unintended focus on 
the top of the pyramid for philanthropic giving (charity) as the simplest solution for businesses 
to claim to be socially responsible while continuing doing business as usual.    
The Pyramid of CSR, however, was among the strongest models of CSR, which stood almost 
unquestioned for two decades during the ‘80s and ‘90s. All the while global scandals by multi-
national corporations such as sweatshop scandals by sports manufacturers (e.g. Nike, Adidas) 
and retailers (e.g. Walmart), environmental pollution incidents or resource depletion scandals 
(e.g. British Petrol, the Brent Spar case, the Shell case in Nigeria, and Coca Cola in India) 
proved that CSR was more paper work than actually embedded in business behaviour. Despite 
the vast literature of the stakeholder approach to CSR in both academia and the professional 
literature and the re-manifestation of the Sustainability Movement by the Brundtland Report 
(United Nations, 1989) focusing upon the severe harm to human capital and the environment 
created by centuries of industrialization, several problems of the globalization in the ‘90s oc-
curred.  
The economic welfare among as well multinational companies as well as individuals had lifted 
off the shadows of the oil crisis in the 1970s and the financial crises in the 1980s. The end of the 
Cold War initiated an economic growth that paved the way for the rich to become wealthier at 
the expense of others and the environment. The state of the art of nature including the climate, 
the divide between rich and poor, and the exploitation of poor working forces including child 
labour as well as natural resources such as water, oil and cheap labour in Third World were 
more severe than ever before. Ecological and poverty crises had taken over where economic 
crises and international tensions had left off (Crane et al., 2009; Buchholz & Carroll, 2009). The 
response from these multinational companies was in the first place to add philanthropic money 
to the refurbishment of the inflicted area and pay off by building schools for children, hospitals, 
and regenerating the natural resources these companies had exploited. However, alongside this 
move the critique of CSR and especially of Carroll’s Pyramid of CSR and its top positioning of 
philanthropic giving as the primary part of CSR during the ‘90s, Carroll chose to revise his 
model with Schwartz in 2003 to correct this misunderstanding (Matten & Crane, 2005; Visser, 
2006).  The Three-domain Approac
CSR due to Carroll’s (self) critique
his Pyramid as the most salient fac
p. 505).  
This way of perceiving CSR as vol
Europe and elsewhere. However, in
this voluntary part is much discusse
A parallel stream of CSR literatur
Jensen, 2002, continuing Friedman
(Kaufman, 2002). Coupled with th
ceived interesting especially after t
nesses had a hard time adopting the
of the Millennium. In strategic man
pillars voicing how businesses cou
business policies, and a literature ar
and corporate financial performanc
Kramer claimed that strategic phila
FIGURE 5: THE THREE-DOMAIN MODEL OF
(SCHWARTZ & CARROLL, 2003, P. 509)
25
h (illustrated in Figure 5) was a revision of
 of the companies, who interpreted the phila
tor in being socially responsible (Schwartz &
The new Three-domain Mo
the philanthropic part into o
now more aligned parts, albe
ethical part of the Venn diag
The model consists of seven
number VII, the simult
nomic/legal/ethical, is the m
Schwartz & Carroll (20
Schwartz & Carroll’s mode
main premises for CSR tha
and discretionary for comp
in.  
untary is widely recognised not only in Ame
 Europe and especially in these days of fin
d (e.g. Karnani, 2011a+b, see also Paper #5)
e has evolved around economic and politic
’s (1970) ideas in his value maximization a
e stakeholder literature the business case o
he many corporate scandals revealing how m
 normative ideas of CSR during the 1990s an
agement the work of Porter & Kramer (2002
ld get a competitive advantage by adopting
ound the comparison of corporate social per
e (CFP) was initiated (e.g. Orlitzky et al., 
nthropy (corporate giving/funding targetted i
 CSR 
 the Pyramid of 
nthropic part of 
 Carroll, 2003, 
del has merged 
ther three other 
it mainly in the 
ram.
 parts of which 
aneously eco-
ost salient  to 
03, p. 518). 
l still hosts the 
t it is voluntary 
anies to engage 
rica, but also in 
ancial recession, 
.
al theories (e.g. 
pproach to CSR 
f CSR was per-
ultination busi-
d the beginning 
, 2006) stood as 
 CSR into their 
formance (CSP) 
2003). Porter & 
ssues in society)
26
and cause-related marketing would pay off eventually for the company by enhanced earnings 
due to strengthened reputation (Porter & Kramer, 2002, p. 16):  
“If systematically pursued in a way that maximizes the value created, context-
focused philanthropy can offer companies a new set of competitive tools that 
well justifies the investment of resources”.  
Later they modified their claim (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 4) into “the reputation argument 
seeks that strategic benefit, but rarely finds it”, and suggested that “both business decisions and 
social policies must follow the principle of shared value” (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 5) between 
business and society. Business should identify those areas of greatest strategic value for their 
social investments in order to create a competitive advantage for themselves that at the same 
time benefits society best. Orlitzky et al. (2003) analysed 52 studies with a total sample size of 
33,878 observations of CSP-CFP30 relationships among different business sectors and found that 
although it was possible to find a positive CSP-CFP in some issues of CSR, it was not found in 
businesses’ environmental performances. Another approach to the business case of CSR was the 
Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP) initiated by Prahalad and colleagues (Prahalad & Hart, 1999; Pra-
halad & Hammond, 2002). This model suggested that multinational companies operating in 
economies at the bottom of the pyramid could make a fortune while improving the lives of mil-
lions by moving their production to the world’s poorest areas: 
“They [the MNCs] need only to act in their own selfinterest, for there are 
enormous benefits to be gained by entering developing markets” (Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002, p. 4).  
Surely, many multinationals had been aware of this fortune, but mainly for themselves and not 
for the societies in which they moved in, who perhaps did receive the benefit of more jobs in 
local areas. However, at the same time they realised that multinationals did not do much good to 
their society’s resources other than to deplete and pollute them (e.g. the Coca Cola adventure in 
India and the recent fashion adventure in Bangladesh). After the global financial crisis in late 
2007 researchers have blamed the business case argument of CSR (or CSP) for not being as ef-
fective as promised. This critique of the economic approach to CSR (e.g. Porter & Kramer, 
2002, 2006; Karnani, 2011a+b) made Porter & Kramer (2011) claim that businesses had misun-
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derstood the entire idea of shared value and continued business as usual without following up on 
the good intentions of CSR at all. 
As shown in Paper #5, the ideas behind the CSR models initiated by the normative and non-
business case claiming literature such as Carroll’s models has for many reasons survived and 
passed on into the contemporary literature of CSR. It has also found its way into institutional 
understanding of CSR supported by intergovernmental bodies such as the UN Global Compact 
and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies31. This PhD thesis builds upon the ideas 
initiated by Carroll (1979/1991) and Schwartz & Carroll (2003) in which I try to analyse what is 
needed for future CSR models and how upcoming businesses in the intersection of the private 
and public sphere such as (quasi-) privatised water companies can contribute to this knowledge 
and development of the CSR concept. It is clear that the mind of homo economicus (Mill, 1836, 
1874; Persky, 1995) in business life has had a hard time being integrated with the idea of serv-
ing society and the stakeholders inhabiting it. The global problems seen lately explicitly in the 
financial sector needs an understanding of how CSR might have failed in this matter, but the 
CSR concept in Europe and Scandinavia needs also to be reviewed before it is possible to un-
derstand how companies created out of former public service agencies can serve as models for 
new conceptualization of stakeholder engagement and CSR. 
CSR IN EUROPE
Although CSR had had much more attention in America long before the agenda reached the 
European Continent, it does not mean that European business life was not socially responsible 
due to the absence of academic literature before the 1990s. Matten & Moon (2004a32, p. 1) re-
ferred to the early signs of CSR in Europe in the 1980s with a major British business coalition 
Business in the Community (BITC) and in 1996 with the industry organisation CSR in Europe. 
The aim of these programmes were to foster and promote CSR among European businesses 
prior to the European Commission’s embedding CSR into its policies (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2001, 2002). According to Matten & Moon it was not until the multi-
stakeholder organisation the European Academy of Business in Society (EABiS) was founded in 
2002 focusing on CSR in business education and research that the European academic literature 
took speed (Matten & Moon, 2004a, p. 1). To understand the academic literature gap between 
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American and European contributions Matten & Moon (2004a+b, 2008) researched the socio-
economic premises current on both continents and suggested a new term called ‘explicit’ and 
‘implicit’ CSR. Matten & Moon (2008, p. 405) set up the research question:  
“Why have U.S. corporations long made explicit their attachment to CSR, 
whereas European business responsibility to society has tended to be more im-
plicit such that few specific corporate claims have been made?”  
Their findings suggested that the answer was to be found through institutional and cultural dif-
ferences related to how businesses work in these two continents. In America there was relative 
less business regulation and more institutional incentives for businesses to provide benefits for 
employees such as health insurances, pensions, educational financial support, and charities of 
various kinds. In Europe, businesses act in a system based upon a much larger national welfare 
system funded through citizen and business tax systems and not to the same degree upon direct 
business paid welfare (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). Matten & Moon defines the derived 
kinds of CSR as: 
“By “explicit CSR,” we refer to corporate policies that assume and articulate 
responsibility for some societal interests. They normally consist of voluntary 
programs and strategies by corporations that combine social and business 
value and address issues perceived as being part of the social responsibility of 
the company.... The point remains that explicit CSR rests on corporate discre-
tion, rather than reflecting either governmental authority or broader formal or 
informal institutions”.  
“By “implicit CSR,” we refer to corporations’ role within the wider formal and 
informal institutions for society’s interests and concerns. Implicit CSR nor-
mally consists of values, norms, and rules that result in (mandatory and cus-
tomary) requirements for corporations to address stakeholder issues and that 
define proper obligations of corporate actors in collective rather than individ-
ual terms. While representative business associations would often be directly 
involved in the definition and legitimization of these requirements, individual 
corporations would not normally articulate their own versions of such respon-
sibilities.” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). 
Since these definitions became pop
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Compared to the former part of this literature review, it has through Matten & Moon’s contribu-
tion become easier to see why the stream of corporate social responsiveness and corporate social 
performance–i.e. that businesses should be judged by their stakeholders due to its action and 
adjust their actions as a response to stakeholder claims–had been more flourishing in America 
throughout the ’80s and the ’90s. In Europe during these decades, the CSR literature had been 
almost absent perhaps due to a more institutionally controlled (and regulated) governance of 
businesses in terms of how they should live up to stakeholder concerns (see also Doh & Guay, 
2006). Due to this stronger institutional foothold on business life in Europe another trend mak-
ing businesses less prone to object towards institutional control is suggested by Doh & Guay 
(2006, p. 51): 
”Interest groups have a formal, institutionalized place in the policymaking 
process of many European countries (Wilson, 2003). For reasons ranging from 
history (Italy) to economic efficiency (Germany) to the maintenance of social 
peace (Austria), most West European governments regularly include business, 
labour, and other significant interest groups in the policy making process”. 
This means, that the way businesses had influence in public policy making was not to promote 
CSR as explicit, but to actively engage in the policy making on national level (lobbyism) that 
promoted implicit CSR. This was much less visible for the external audience such as citizens 
and other interest groups than it was to the directly involved politicians and businesses in the 
game. 
As we saw in the former review of the history and movement of New Public Management 
(NPM) being more and more embedded in a European context33, it makes more sense that dur-
ing the last two decades the evolvement of a specific European CSR literature has grown paral-
lel with the detachment and deregulation of its institutions (see Hiss, 2009; Meyer & Höllerer, 
2010; Höllerer, 2012; Paper #1 and Paper #3). However, the NPM trajectory cannot necessarily 
explain why European business life has become more explicit in its CSR approach. For this rea-
son it is more likely that Matten & Moon’s (2008) institutional analysis of the globalization and 
their use of the theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) may explain 
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this development. CSR has been diffused from the multinational companies (MNC)34 down to 
small and medium sized companies due to imitation, branding, reputation management and oth-
er marketing related issues in order to compete in a globalised society (see also Habisch et al., 
2005; Steurer, 2010; Steurer et al., 2012; and Paper #3).  
CSR IN SCANDINAVIA
The high trust in institutions in Europe is especially viable in Scandinavia (e.g. Korhonen & 
Seppala, 2005; Morsing, 2005; Willums, 2005; Strand, 2009). In Finland companies are found 
to be less trusted than state institutions but still trusted more highly than elsewhere in the Euro-
pean Union (Korhonen & Seppala, 2005, p. 14). In Norway the ”social responsibility of family-
owned companies has been far more important than any religious drivers or family traditions 
that can be found in other countries” (Willums, 2005, p. 40). In Sweden, where large multina-
tional companies such as IKEA, H&M, and Volvo are based, it has been possible to make a 
business case out of their CSR implementation (Strand, 2009). And in Denmark, although ex-
posed to strong environmental regulation since the 1980s, Morsing (2005, p. 23) reports that 
”many Danish managers also claim that ethics and social responsibility always have been an 
inherent way of doing business” due to social initiatives implemented implicitly to local stake-
holders’ expectations and demands (see also Strand, 2009).  
Morsing gives an example of why the framing of corporate social responsibility has been absent 
in a Danish context with reference to the Danish social legislation from 1933, where it is clear 
that the Danish state is the sole provider of all social services (Strand, 2009). This clear divide in 
responsibilities between the state and businesses and the strong environmental regulation and 
traditional negotiations with trade unions in questions means that the debate about CSR was 
perhaps absent in explicit terms. However, it has been framed into other academic fields such as 
social and political research areas of social welfare. The Nordic Welfare Model grants its citi-
zens extensive social rights (e.g. Berghmann, 1997; cited in Morsing, 2005, p. 24), and due to 
the high tax level in Nordic countries for both citizens and businesses it has been and still is pos-
sible to continue this divide between state and business responsibilities (see also Paper #1). 
Scandinavian companies perform disproportionately well in the major sustainability indices in 
comparison to other regions, including U.S. companies (Gjølberg, 2009; cited from Strand, 
2012, p. 96). The management in Scandinavian companies typically involve employees in dia-
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logue and strategy making as well as them cooperating with their local communities and other 
external stakeholders prior to decision making (Morsing et al., 2007, p. 89; Lauesen, 2012). This 
may be partly in order to avoid delegitimation, scams and public harassment, which might make 
a company operating in small countries with approximately five million citizens more vulnera-
ble than it would be for multinationals placed in distant and areas abroad more disconnected to 
their local stakeholders in Scandinavia.  
However, many Scandinavian managers favour the sustainability approach to CSR due to these 
strong institutional settings securing the stakeholder engagement with companies. This stream is 
growing also within the institutionalised CSR concepts promoted by the OECD Guidelines and 
UN Global Compact as well. It is even said, that CSR in Europe and Scandinavia especially is 
much more focused upon environmental issues than other social issues (Visser, 2010a+b). This 
may be due to the still strong involvement of implicit CSR in legislation and institutional norms 
and values concerning social issues in Europe. This leads me to the final part of the literature 
review taking the special field of Sustainability as an approach to corporate social responsibility 
into consideration as well. 
SUSTAINABILITY AS A CONCEPT ADOPTED IN CSR 
The Sustainability literature, which also has inspired my understanding of CSR, is partly an in-
dependent stream initiated in the late ‘60s and beginning of the ‘70s (e.g. Lovelock, 1969; Love-
lock & Margulis, 1974). Since then, it has become part of a broader CSR conceptualization es-
pecially after the Brundtland Report adopted in 1989 by the World Commission on Environment 
and Development (WCED) initiated by the United Nation’s General Assembly chaired by the 
then Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland.  
This report had a great impact on the world’s international and national policies (Schubert & 
Láng, 2005) since it recognised that human poverty, gender inequity, and wealth eschewed re-
distribution, and were endemic alongside environmental deterioration due to the economic 
growth in industrialised and industrialising societies in general (United Nations, 1989). This 
report introduced the term ‘sustainable development’, but did not offer any concrete solution to 
the problems at hand. Alongside the development of CSR concepts–especially institutionalised 
CSR promoted by the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact, and by the European Com-
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mission–the sustainability idea was directly adopted into recommendational ‘soft law’ and dif-
fused into the globalised business sphere at the beginning of the Millennium35.  
Contemporary academic literature inclusion of sustainability within the concept of CSR re-
viewed organisational activities and asked managers to revise their company processes to live up 
to stakeholder’s expectations and behave in a sustainable, responsible way (e.g. Aras & Crow-
ther, 2007, 2008, 2010). Sustainability refers to several issues and how they can be sustained for 
future generations (United Nations, 1989). Environmental sustainability recognises that on a 
finite Earth the depreciation of natural capital cannot go on endlessly (Lovins et al., 1999, p. 
146; cited in Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002, p. 133). Some natural capital such as wood, fish, and 
culturally grown seed is renewable while others such as fossil fuels and biodiversity is non-
renewable.  
Social sustainability “includes the quality of public services, such as a good educational system, 
infrastructure or a culture supportive of entrepreneurship” (Dyllick & Hockerts, 2002, p. 134). 
Economic capital may be able to substitute some natural and social capital due to technological 
innovations. However, not all natural capital can be substituted by economic capital due to the 
irreversibility of natural depletion or climate change. However, despite new agendas such as the 
introduction of reporting instruments of environmental, social, and financial bottomlines such as 
the Triple Bottom Line (Elkington, 1997), Aras & Crowther critically point to the theoretical 
dilution of the term ‘sustainability’ (2008, p. 434). They suggest instead a view based on the 
initial definitions of the Gaia Hypothesis (Lovelock & Margulis 1974; Lovelock 1979): 
”[The Gaia Hypothesis is] a model in which the whole of the ecosphere, and all 
living matter therein, is co-dependant upon its various facets and formed a 
complete system...interdependent and equally necessary for maintaining the 
Earth as a planet capable of sustaining life” (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  
From this departure they have developed four core issues of sustainability of equal importance: 
(1) societal influence, defined as a measure of the impact that society makes upon the corpora-
tion in terms of the social contract and stakeholder influence; (2) environmental impact, defined 
as the effect of the actions of the corporation upon its geophysical environment; (3) organisa-
tional culture, defined as the relationship between the corporation and its internal stakeholders, 
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particularly employees; and (4) finance, understood in terms of an adequate return for the level 
of risk undertaken (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  
The sustainability term was not only about how the business sphere should change its behaviour 
in order to mitigate human poverty, inequality, and environmental depletion and pollution, but 
evolved into a concept that also framed business financial objectives in a sustainable mode inte-
grated in a holistic, managerial framework. According to Aras & Crowther, the impact that soci-
ety makes upon the corporation reflects the whole interest of society, its multiple stakeholders, 
and the possible conflicts inherited when expectations of the corporations meet the expectations 
of society at large.  
If corporations impact the environment, they do not sustain themselves in the long run. They 
must take care of the environment in order to make it possible for the corporation to exist and to 
exploit the natural resources in a way that preserves and gives back to nature what has been 
taken (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Lauesen, 2012). In order to make the corporation sustainable in 
itself, it must preserve the employees and their interests in staying and working for it and pro-
vide incentives for the employees and thereby the corporation itself to create good labour condi-
tions for making the corporation productive.  
”Sustainability is focused on the future and is concerned with ensuring that the 
choices of resource utilisation are not constrained by decisions taken in the 
present.” (Aras & Crowther, 2008, p. 438).  
The emphasis on long-term financial returns in Aras & Crowther’s sustainability concept does 
not neglect the pending short-term financial expectations of most corporations. However, the 
risk undertaken does not necessarily match the idea of sustainability investments if this short-
term financial focus continues (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Lauesen, 2012). The focus upon sus-
tainability has become a vigilant part of CSR and many use the terms interchangeably (Van 
Marrewijk, 2003).  
Sustainability has for instance become a part of what has become intergovernmental through the 
UN Global Compact and OECD Guidelines. This is understood as something inherent in the 
very idea of CSR alongside its vast focus upon stakeholder engagement. However, as my litera-
ture review in Paper #5 shows, the Global Compact (GC) definition of CSR is not without cri-
tique either (e.g. Cernic, 2008). Although the GC definition of the ten principles of CSR covers 
human rights, labour conditions including avoidance of child labour, environmental sustainabil-
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ity, and anti-corruption36, it has been criticised for its inability as a ‘soft law’ of voluntariness to 
ensure adaptability, controllability, and effect (Ibid.).  
As Paper #5 shows from the literature review and the consequences of CSR in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis in 2007/2008, the ideas behind CSR and stakeholder engagement have 
changed relatively little. They are still primarily based on the intersection between what Carroll 
suggested already in 1979: economy, the legal, the ethical, and the discretionary (Carroll, 1979, 
1991; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003).  
I have used these basic ideas combined with Aras & Crowther’s ideas of sustainability to de-
velop a new Four ‘E’ Principle (Economy, L/Egal, Environment, and Ethics) for the develop-
ment of future CSR models. This principle takes into consideration the historical events of the 
current recession as well as the scandals of sweatshops, oil spills, and violations of human right 
and labour conditions, and the financial scandals impoverishing everyday people all around the 
globe. 
SUMMING UP.... 
Corporate social responsibility has developed as an academic field throughout the last 70 years 
into many different streams. The stakeholder approach to CSR and the focus upon how well 
businesses can and should contribute to society in order for both to be sustainable in the long run 
has been one of the strongest approaches surviving especially in Europe and Scandinavia. Liv-
ing side by side in a globalised society steered mainly by economic interests, contemporary re-
searchers argue that CSR should no longer be an add-on to business management. It should be 
an integrated, stakeholder-oriented part of business leadership that avoids the Fallacy of the 
Separation Thesis (Freeman, 2010) between a business’s economic and social responsibilities 
and interests.  
CSR has been very differently integrated in business life; some sectors have adopted it success-
fully (e.g. Strand, 2009); others have not (see Paper #5); again others have always thought of 
CSR as something that they ‘are’ (e.g. Lauesen, 2012); and European businesses that never 
questioned why it was necessary to be explicit about it before now (e.g. Hiss, 2009; Meyer & 
Höllerer, 2010). Thus, it was to me interesting to analyse the mindset of public service compa-
nies to understand their former implicit CSR and how it has been transformed into explicit CSR. 
Through an analysis of the institutional logics in water companies it has been possible to con-
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tribute to the academic field of CSR and at the same time to the theoretical field of institutional 
theory, which suggests a direction of how CSR can become integrated with financial sustainabil-
ity in daily business management.     
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THEORY
The institutional logic’s perspective 
As my research revealed more and more information of what was going on in the water sector, I 
became interested in finding out which dichotomies existed in the logics in the Danish water 
companies. Not surprisingly, I found that several logics were at stake simultaneously, and that 
these logics had their conflicts and compromises in the new situation after the Structural Reform 
in 2007. The implementation of the Water Sector Act37 and the Price Cap Notice38 forced the 
agents to think in other terms than they were used to (Lauesen, 2011).  
On the one hand I followed some discourses that unfolded both on the organisational level and 
interorganisationally. For instance where water companies consulted each other, cooperated and 
raised several issues at professional conferences, and through hearing letters from their branch 
organisation to the lawmakers. At the same time a flow of discourses showed how the water 
sector sought to stabilise them while at the same time they also seeking to change the uncertain 
situation they found themselves positioned in.  
The apparent motive underlying the neoliberal ideas of NPM in the regulation of the water com-
panies accentuated structure in order to control the perceived utility maximizing agents that 
were placed in influential public positions. The answer to why NPM inflicted seemingly oppo-
site ideas and motives on CSR were not to be sought in an institutional theory that supported the 
structure argument. It was to look for a theory that focused upon institutions as well as on agen-
cy, but at the same time did not reject the impact of structure to serve as an explanatory guide to 
address the underlying motives and logics behind the articulated CSR schism (see Paper #1, 
page 83). 
I chose to work with the institutional logic’s perspective to find out, how institutions form and 
are formed by the agency of their inhabitants such as organisations and individuals (Scott, 1987; 
Binder, 2007). The institutional logic’s perspective offers a way to analyse the interrelationships 
among institutions, organisations, and individuals including a micro-  and meso-perspective of 
institutional agency (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2). My last Paper #8, page 261 goes in depth into 
the institutional logics perspective, so I will use this chapter to form an argument based upon the 
theory’s prospects and shortfalls to contribute to the field of corporate social responsibility. 
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Friedland & Alford (1991, p. 248) coined the term The Logic of Institutions based upon their 
idea that the most important institutional orders such as capitalism, state, democracy, family, 
and religion/science each has a central logic consisting of material practices and symbolic con-
structions as principles of how to organise these institutions. These institutions were defined not 
as a kind of organisation or a thing, but as ”supraorganisational patterns of human activity by 
which individuals and organisations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and or-
ganize time and space” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 243). It becomes crucial to understand 
that institutional logics should be understood as patterns that are voluntary and possible to 
elaborate and understand in different contexts. From institutional logics being patterns of how to 
organise institutions Thornton & Ocasio (1999) elaborated these ideas further and defined insti-
tutional logics as:  
”The social constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material 
practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and 
organisations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, 
and reproduce their lives and experiences” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2).  
This new understanding has twisted Friedland & Alford’s initial ideas a little, because in Thorn-
ton et al.’s understanding institutional logics are no longer patterns of how to organise institu-
tions, but patterns of cultural symbols and material practices by which agents find meaning 
through their daily activities. This shift in emphasis, although hardly recogniseable, frames a 
difference in perspective and has come to form a recent discurse between Friedland (2013) and 
Thornton et al. (2012). In Thornton et al.’s perspective it is clear that they have sought a specific 
agency alternative to the initial structure argument in institutional theory in general (e.g. institu-
tional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)).  
Thus their interpretation goes far to include a long range of perspective theories both from insti-
tutional theory (e.g. institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006), organisation studies, and social psychology (e.g. Carnegie School 
theories of attention, decision making, interests and motives, and power, strategy and negotia-
tion; as well as different perspectives of social interactionism and sensemaking) (Mead, 1934; 
Mills, 1940; Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Goffman, 1967; 
Blumer, 1969; Weick, 1969, 1995; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; March & Olsen, 1976, 1994; 
Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Vannini, 2008; Collins, 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Miller, 
2009).   
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TABLE 3: DEVELOPMENT IN INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC'S CATEGORIES FROM FRIEDLAND & ALFORD (1991) (LIGHT 
GREY FIELDS) TO THORNTON, OCASIO, & LOUNSBURY (2012) (WHITE FIELDS) 
In Table 3 I have categorised and hybridised the institutional logics according to Friedland & 
Alford (1991) and Thornton and colleagues (1999, 2004, 2008, 2012) to show how they have 
developed and stand together. 
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From this departure, agency, interests, values, and assumptions became primary in cognitive, 
social psychological approaches in the institutional logics perspective as a reaction to the former 
very powerful institutional theory of institutional isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio, 1983;
Thornton & Ocasio, 2012, p. 6). However, the institutional logic’s perspective does not neglect 
nor discounts macrostructures and institutional isomorphism because it want to show ”how ac-
tion depends on how individuals and organisations are situated within and influenced by the 
spheres of different institutional orders” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 10).  
This argument has become salient to my curiosity of the discourse of CSR in the water sector. 
The apparent anger against new Danish Water Sector Act and its strict regulation of prices and 
costs clearly formed the discourse of CSR. It was no surprise that the individuals and organisa-
tions were situated anew in an entirely different institutional order than when they were a part of 
the municipality office. Trying to explain complex institutional phenomena through one per-
spective often attracts criticism. Thornton et al. have tried to mitigate this through the adoption 
of multiple perspectives into one. As mentioned in Paper #8, Binder (2007) and Friedland 
(2013) provide a critique not so much upon the ambitiousness of Thornton et al.’s (2012) 
framework of the institutional logics’ perspective, but more against the promises it makes but 
does not accomplish.  
Friedland & Alford (1991) were initially interested in how power, divinity, and love were nested 
symbolically in other institutions and practices than that of religion. They saw religion as a 
cross-institutional virtue replicated in non-religious states, bureaucracies, market states etc. In 
other words; how the domain of religion had crept into the domain of nationalism and policy 
making in state bureaucracies, democracies, and markets (Friedland, 2013, p. 27) illuminated by 
a kind of (quasi-) religion. These other logics have their own ‘gods’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘illumina-
tions’, ‘enchantments’ and ‘values’ that the subjects adhering to them ‘love’.  
The rationalities behind these other logics are worshipped (or celebrated) as inherent ‘gods’ be-
hind these orders. The values such as salvation to religion, aestetics to arts, power to politics, 
property to capitalism, and knowledge to science is a logical, teleological consistency exercizing 
power over man. The cultural content is a “substantive value with a ‘determinant content’ which 
derives its authority from the will of those who value it, known through the particular discourse 
and practices through which it and its constituting conflict with other values is effected” (Fried-
land, 2013, p. 28).  
41
What anchors these values into the institutional logic is in Friedland’s conceptualization is not 
explained so much as ‘gods’ but as ‘substances’ (Friedland, 2013, p. 34). Substances cannot be 
reduced to arbitrary properties nor to materiality but is a kind of state to which one has instru-
mental or possessional relation towards. A property is not a thing according to Friedland: it is a 
state of relations, which means that the human can do something with objects and things through 
the state of ownership.  
Thornton et al.’s (2012) perception that institutional logics posits “different interpretations of 
how to use power” (Friedland, 2013, p. 35) is in Friedland’s mind wrong. He emphasises that 
power is relational, which is constituted in each institutional logic rather than a matter of behav-
iour or cognition. Thus, (see also Binder, 2007) institutional logics do not blindly steer human 
agency but they bind different values, material practices and observable objects through the sub-
stance inherited in it (Friedland, 2013, p. 36):  
“I think of institutional substance as the ground of many of the dimensions that 
Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury elaborate in their micro and organisational 
specification of institutional logics, as the X-axis of the ideal types in the inter-
institutional system, certainly the source of legitimacy, but also the basis of 
strategy and source of identity.” 
Substances are a kind of morality or ethics inherent in each social order enabling and forming 
agents. The agents can either voluntarily accept or reject them, in which sense substances’ 
bridge voluntariness (agency) with that of contingent structure through the institutional logics 
(Friedland, 2013, p. 38). My reading of Friedland implicitly argues for not making institutional 
logics into a kind of model as if these logics works as institutions themselves in the old macrop-
erspective sense of controlling human agency or dividing it into different institutional spheres. 
They function as value binding substances in which human agency voluntarily can jump back 
and forth as it suits it.  
Seeing institutional logics as containing ethical substances that guides human behaviour in a 
voluntary way in which they form their material practices and create meaning out of them, the 
above Table 3 becomes an analytic tool that I can use to analyse material practices of CSR in 
water companies and their stakeholder engagement. The ideational content of the institutional 
logics is now clear. However, it still leaves an open question of how to link the material prac-
tices into the value binding substances. For that purpose Jones et al. (2013, p. 65) recommend 
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that scholars should not “shy away from trying to specify how material underpin practices”. 
They should try to analyse how material practices instantiate the ideas or symbolic forms of the 
objects, how they change, and impact role relations and change of practices, and in that way 
how material may connect ideation and practices (Jones et al., p. 66). They suggest that scholars 
should look into the literature of cultural theory or science and technology studies in order to 
find bases from which material practices might be more elaborated.  
I have followed that quest in Paper #8 for the specific aim of finding a theoretical basis for con-
tributing to the literature of the institutional logics’ perspective from a cultural perspective on 
the role of material practices. This paper frames an overall analysis of my empirical material 
from the 28 water companies studied in Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, and South Africa. 
However, for material practices to be considered a part of a logic it is necessary that these pat-
terns of material practices are dominant to a certain degree in the form of shared values and be-
liefs. These may be symbolised through the material practices and manifestations in order to 
make meaning out of everyday life. In this way the logics are collective and shared at least with 
someone else. They are not just going on inside these collective people’s heads to be termed a 
logic: they also have to be enacted into cultural manifestations that carry a symbolic measure 
that these people understand and talk about.  
For instance from the logic of CSR and the logic of NPM, which are central in Paper #8, we get 
the idea that stakeholders do not believe or trust that organisations really enact CSR or NPM 
until it is proven in symbolic or material form. This symbolic/material form can for instance be 
measurements in company reports accredited by independent third parties or visual and material 
practices concretised into physical objects that may impact stakeholders in either positive or 
negative ways. I have thus in this kappa claimed that such strong logics as respectively the logic 
of CSR and the logic of NPM respectively have characteristics of being colonising institutional 
logics, and before I elaborate further upon this point, I will define what I mean by it. 
DEFINITION OF A ‘COLONISING’ LOGIC
When a certain logic of pervades an organisation or an institution but is not to be characterised 
as an institutional logic itself, although it bridges many existing institutional logics, I propose to 
call it a colonising logic. That a logic is colonising means: drawing on a Habermasian (1987) 
connotation of ‘colonisation’; that it ressembles an external (institutional) pressure penetrating 
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into the genetic code of an entity (organisation) (Laughlin, 1991; Rothstein et al., 2006). That is, 
it is translated down and across the matrix of institutional logics and across individual, organisa-
tional, and societal instantiations (Clegg, 2011, p. 171) that is eventually enacted and objecti-
vated into symbolic and physical manifestations (Habermas’ (1987), see ‘instrumental rational-
ity’) of ideational, physical and agentic value.  
The colonisation metaphor is used because it indicates that such a logic is not native to (all) the 
institutional logics. For instance, Glynn & Raffaeli (2013, p. 177) suggest that a CSR logic may 
suit both the institutional logic of community and of the market (or capitalism). They found 
among Fortune 500 companies that these two institutional logics were typically separated in two 
different organisational divisions: the foundation versus the marketing departments. In the water 
companies this division is not apparent: instead the logic of CSR is located across the entire or-
ganisation crossing several institutional logics. In this way, the logic of CSR in the water com-
panies becomes a colonising logic as shown in Paper #8, page 261. 
The water companies provide a necessary, life supporting natural good such as delivering drink-
ing water and purifying the wastewater again to a clean it for an acceptable quality to diffuse 
back into nature. In this way the material in terms of water is driving its material practices, 
which forms the basis of the colonising logic of CSR in the water companies. 
In spite of material and sectorial benefits for adopting and enacting the colonising logic of CSR 
in the water sector, other research shows a similar potential for the logic of CSR bridging sev-
eral logics in other sectors (e.g. Meyer & Höllerer, 2010; Höllerer et al., 2013). The strength of 
the logic of CSR compared to for instance the logic of economy is not that the logic of economy 
is not relevant as another kind of colonising logic: the logic of CSR39 includes the logic of econ-
omy, whereas the logic of economy does not necessarily include the logic of CSR. Therefore, 
that the logic of CSR is a colonising logic does not mean that it is negative, which most adjec-
tives of colonisation typically refer to (e.g. Habermas, 1987; Laughlin, 1991; Rothstein et al., 
2006): it is in this connotation only aligned with the effect of the diffusion and powerfulness of 
the concept, whereas the ethical worth is disconnected from the term colonisation as such and is 
attached solely to the concept of CSR itself being seen as positive, societal-embracing business 
ethics. 
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44
A question arises as to what makes the difference between a colonising logic and for instance 
‘bricolage’? For instance, Christiansen & Lounsbury (2013) define ‘bricolage’ using Levi-
Strauss’ (1962/66) notion referring to a ‘bricoleur’. A bricoleur “constructs an artifact by using 
whatever is available, within a restrictd environment to get the job done” (Christiansen and 
Lounsbury, 2013, p. 203). In institutional theory the notion of bricoleur has been used to de-
scribe the construction of organisations and organisational identities (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Strandgaard Pedersen & Dobbin, 2006; Glynn, 2008) using bricks and bits from the past to form 
their identities and ideational values. It does not take into account how a permanent logic also 
depends upon physical materials and objects and their integration into daily practices.    
In this kappa I focus upon the institutional logic’s perspective as a framing theoretical perspec-
tive linking my papers together. I show with documentation from my empirical material in Paper 
#8 through my Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 how materials and material practices can provide 
the institutional logics’ perspective with a deeper understanding of the role of materials and ob-
jects and material practices in living organisations (Binder, 2007). Through the framing of CSR 
as a colonising logic that bridges multiple institutional logics and showing how this logic is de-
pendent upon symbolic and physical meanings of materials and objects enacted alive in water 
companies I suggest a model for colonising logics and how it brings new methods of observing 
materials and objects within the frame of institutional logics as in Figure 7:
FIGURE 7: HOW COLONISING LOGICS TRAVERSE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
For instance, Colonising Logic 1 could be ‘regulation’ based on a traversing logic that competi-
tion should guarantee that prices for consumers are as low as possible, in which Object 1 could 
be money or monetary allocation. Colonising Logic 2 could be ‘environment’ based on the as-
Institutional 
logic 1 
Institutional 
logic 2 
Institutional 
logic 3 
Colonising Logic 1 (based on) Object 1 
Colonising Logic 3: (based on) Object 3 
Colonising Logic 2: (based on) Object 2 
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sumption that the environment is at risk and therefore agents must behave with minimum impact 
upon it, of which Object 2 would be Nature. A third Colonising Logic 3 could be ‘corporate 
social responsibility’ based on the idea that our company serves the public with fresh water and 
therefore we are a sustainable business in terms of taking the multiple concerns of all people 
and the planet, and running our business in an acceptable financial way, of which Object 3 
could be clean water.  
This model sees individuals and collectives as agentic, creative sensemakers that use multiple 
institutional logics and combine them into an aggregate of their different vocabularies of mo-
tives, personal interests, local meaning formed by material practices for which they make deci-
sions and engage in actions consequently that are consistent with the logic(s) they share (Fine, 
1984; Fligstein, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Scully & Segal, 2002; Lounsbury et al., 
2003; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006, p. 213; Binder, 2000, 2002, 2007, p. 547, 549, 551). The rec-
ognition that institutions are not steered by only one or two institutional logics, but multiple lo-
gics, in which some may be institutional and others colonising logics combined in unique ways 
for each institution in question, acts in accordance with Friedland’s initial concept of institu-
tional logics: that they are relational and available for use voluntarily by the inhabitants of insti-
tutions (Friedland, 2013, p. 38; Binder, 2007).
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS UNDERLYING THE COLONISING LOGICS OF ‘NEW PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT’ AND ‘CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY’ 
How can the institutional logics’ perspective explain the apparently dichotomous relationship 
between the logics behind the New Public Management movement and the Corporate Social 
Responsibility concept in the water sector as mentioned in Paper #1 as the schism of CSR? The 
institutional logics’ perspective offers in Thornton et al.’s (2012) and Friedland’s (2013) theori-
zations a possibility to analyze and derive explanations of why certain other logics–for instance 
the logic of CSR and the logic of NPM–traverse across them (Clegg, 2011) either in competi-
tion, one dominating the other, or in quasi-harmonic coexistence. From the chapter “Contextual 
background”, “New Public Management”, page 8, and also elaborated further in Paper #4, page 
167 we see that within the many theories underlying the concept of New Public Management 
(NPM) the logic of economy is prevalent over other logics. Whereas under the concept of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility (CSR) the logic of environment supercedes other logics especially 
in the water sector.  
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The logic of economy in NPM includes the ideas that states, governments, and public admini-
strations should follow the institutional logic of the capitalism/market and be more efficient and 
effective and save money while improving (or sustaining) the quality of the services it provides 
in ‘doing more with less’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Some of the suggested instruments to 
accomplish these ideas are taken directly from the private business sector following most of the 
categories within the institutional logic of capitalism/market. At the same time this logic of 
economy serves the purpose of the institutional logic of the state/bureaucracy trying to minimise 
this sector in general.  
In the water sector the overlap between the logic of democracy/community and the logic of the 
state/bureaucracy has thus been split by the logic of capitalism/market in the creation of quasi-
private organisations working in new hybrid formations guided by rational choice theories such 
as principal-agent theory, agency theory, and transaction economy theory (Williamson, 1973). 
Crudely said, through the idea of forming new privatised companies out of former public bu-
reaucracies, the state could serve the purpose as a principal guided by the institutional logic of 
the state/bureaucracy, leave the institutional logic of democracy/community to elected politi-
cians, and let the new company as agent largely follow the institutional logic of capitalism while 
being watched over by the other two served by the principals: respectively the state regulator 
and the politicians. Principal-agent relationships in NPM are suggested in Figure 8. 
FIGURE 8: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS INHERENT IN NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 
Voters/citizens
• Principals over 
policy-makers
• Agents under 
operators
Policy-makers
• Principals over 
regulators
• Agents under 
voters
Regulators
• Principals over 
operators
• Agents under 
policy-makers
Operators
• Principals over 
voters/citizens
• Agents under 
regulators
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The above model in Figure 8 is a rough sketch of the logics within the logic of NPM and does 
not give the concept of NPM full credit. However, it shows how different institutional logics are 
allocated to different principals and agents and how these are comprised more or less in the total 
pillars of Thornton et al.’s institutional logics. 
This is contrary to the logic of CSR, which combines and bridges several institutional logics 
including a logic of economy. According to the ideas within CSR, for instance as developed by 
Schwartz & Carroll (2003), we see how the ideal of the logic of CSR is in the core of the Venn 
diagram based on economic, legal and ethical issues, which can be found in all seven institu-
tional logics in turn. Even though Schwartz & Carroll’s idea of the economy could be allocated 
mainly in the institutional logic of capitalism/market, the idea of the legal in that of the 
state/bureaucracy, and the idea of the ethical in both the democracy/community and the religion, 
the core of the idea of CSR is not (any longer) stratified into pillars or layers in the logic of 
CSR: it is intertwined. 
This thesis has set out to investigate the complexity of the logic of CSR in the water sector, and 
the result of this is to be found in the sections ”Findings”, page 68, and ”Conclusion” page 80 
respectively. This means that the explanation of the schism of CSR–in other words the competi-
tion and coexistence between the logic of environment and logic of economy found in Paper #4 
and the logic of CSR and the logic of NPM found in Paper #8–are grounded in the institutional 
logics they traverse and the materials they work with in their material practices underlying these 
logics.
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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
My writing of this PhD thesis is characterised by a journey from one paper to another, which is 
assembled as a whole. Through my three years of writing I have struggled with a clear position 
in regard to philosophy of science, which finally can be said to in overall terms to adhere mainly 
to critical realism. When reading my papers separately the reader may implicitly follow my 
journey as fluctuating between a positioning in social constructivism, critical theory, and lately 
to be more consistent with critical realism.  
This journey can be explained through my frustration with the deontological stance of social 
constructivism, which I did not know how to handle in an overall philosophy of science until 
late in my process. I learned that critical realism might be the position I had actually taken due 
to my former educations in both the natural and the human sciences. I am in great debt to Pro-
fessor Eva Boxenbaum from CBS, Department of Organisation, for enlightening me throught 
her interpretation of my papers and suggesting that this position might be where I was standing 
as a result of these struggles of mine. This was billiantly clarified for me through her reading of 
my Paper #4 and Paper #5. 
Afterwards I read into the philosophy of science of critical realism, and I realised that if I had 
discovered this perspective earlier, I might have been able to address this more clearly in my 
papers. Nevertheless, I do not regret that in some of my papers I suggest that my position in the-
se particular papers was that of social constructivism, since they were written from a humanistic 
perspective and did not contain reflections upon issues of natural science. In Paper #7, however, 
it is clear when speaking of engineering management I could not escape any longer the idea that 
my position had to reflect upon how to handle natural sciences. In this respect, Eva’s enligthen-
ment of what she read me to be tacitly thinking has been very helpful, since I could here address 
a way of dealing with a kind of realism that was critical and a kind of knowledge about reality 
that was still in accord with social constructivism. From here, I will shortly describe what is 
meant by critical realism and how I have used these thoughts in my overall kappa of my PhD 
thesis and in the papers as well.  
Critical realism as overall perspective in my PhD 
The philosophy of science of critical realism (not to be confused with Karl Popper’s critical ra-
tionalism; Popper, 1959, 1996) is based on the ideas of Roy Bhaskar, and further developed by 
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Margaret Archer, Norman Fairclough, Andrew Sayer, Steve Fleetwood, Justin Cruickshanck, 
and other postmarxist writers.  
Bhaskar’s seminal writings, A Realist Theory of Science (1975) and The Possibility of Natural-
ism (1979) in particular, have initiated critical realism as a philosophy of science with an anti-
positivistic approach. It developed in parallel with postmodernism and social constructivism and 
shares many similarities with these perspectives as well, though not altogether (Buch-Hansen & 
Nielsen, 2008). 
Critical realism is based on a certain realist ontology, which unlike positivism is based on the 
belief that reality exists independently of human knowledge of it. In this sense critical realism is 
rooted in a Kantian philosophy–especially Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which rejects 
David Hume’s empiricism (1739) or rationalism–which is later followed by Karl Popper in his 
critical rationalism (1959, 1996) based on a causality of “when event A happens, then event B 
follows” (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2008). In other words, Bhaskar rejects that reality can be 
obtained by human senses when they happen as empirical regularities and thereby forms a scien-
tific ‘truth’ of reality. On the other hand critical realists believe in rational judgement, which 
means that this kind of realism is not relativistic, but believes in an intransitive reality, upon 
which statements can be judged upon objectively (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2008). 
The ontology that critical realism defends is tiered into different levels, where human knowl-
edge does not have access to all levels of the intransitive reality (see Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 
2008, p. 35): 
• Besides facts and empirical observations of reality, a deeper level of reality is not under-
stood by human knowledge (the Kantian heritage). 
• Reality is tiered into lower (the physical nature) and higher (the social) levels, but cannot 
be reduced to these levels. 
• Events are contingent upon multiple combinations of underlying structures and mecha-
nisms, which does not necessarily appear as empirical regularities, which means that one 
cannot predict the future from these events; at best one can explain them to a certain de-
gree. 
• Reality consists of objects of multiple causal potentials and tendencies. 
50
Bhaskar and critical realists therefore defend an epistemology comparative to that of  postmod-
ernism and social constructivism based upon the belief that knowledge about reality is socially 
constructed and thereby fallible and impermanent or transitive and coloured by non-neutral re-
flections made by human beings. Knowledge is contingent upon historical time and events 
(Bhaskar, 1975, 1989, 1997) and can never be objective and neutral since it is rooted in circum-
scribed and prior beliefs, which may be stated, rejected, and continuously refined. This stance, 
though, is slightly different from postmodern and social constructivistic stances, which take an 
even more relativist stance than that of critical realism.  
Although social constructivists would agree upon the epistemological idea of transistivity, they 
are less absolute than critical realists (Collin, 2009; Buch-Hansen & Nielsen, 2008) even in mat-
ters of knowledge. Some social constructivists even claim ambiguity as their main standpoint–
i.e. total individuality–as explained in Paper #6. However, this radical standpoint is not taken in 
this PhD. When I write in social constructivist terms, I rely on a very moderate version of it, 
which is more in line with the epistemology of critical realism. 
Critical realism is in spite of its controversies with the deontological frame of social constructiv-
ism mainly critical of empiricism and especially positivism and its suggestions of a ‘truth’ and 
belief that every kind of science should be treated methodologically equally. Bhaskar rejects the 
idea that social science in every case can and should be treated the same as natural sciences 
(Bhaskar, 1979).  
Social science contains several various objectives where some–e.g. relations–can be treated as 
durable and permanent such as in institutions of families, healthcare, education, bureaucracies 
etc. in what Bhaskar call positions. Individuals in these institutions may have different positions 
such as a father, a patient or a student, and in this instance this relation (or structure) can be 
treated with the same methodology as used in the natural sciences based on empirical regulari-
ties, for instance by using statistical methodologies as an explanandum. 
On the other hand human agency cannot be said to adhere strictly to or be totally determined by 
the social structures or relations in which the human participates. This dialectical relationship 
between structure and agency is one of the main points in critical realism, which Margaret 
Archer (1995) has elaborated upon much more in her Realist Social Theory–The Morphogentic 
Approach. Human agency, social interaction, sensemaking, and meaningful interpretation of this 
is best described in qualitative and reflective methodologies, which cannot be reduced to em-
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pirical regularities. Individual always operate and make sense of their world participating in 
multiple relations and institutions, which never solely determine the participants’ actions. How-
ever, they make an objective influence upon them (Archer, 1995). The explanation is here 
sought through mapping out into various and sometime contradictory meanings of human sen-
semaking, agency, and interaction. In this way critical realists also recognise that although insti-
tutions provide a certain influence upon human agency, human agency also develops the struc-
tures and kinds of thought underlying the institutions over time. Bhaskar as well as other critical 
realists suggest that each science or field should be treated methodologically as best suitable, 
and especially in the social sciences, the qualitative methodologies are often preferred (Buch-
Hansen & Nielsen, 2008). 
In response to this duality between structure and agency I have chosen to focus on the latter and 
am more inspired by Margeret Archer and critical reflexivity than by structure. Although I in 
Paper #3, Paper #4, and Paper #6 as well as in the overall kappa I work with institutional logics, 
I do not adhere to the idea that these logics are determinant over human agency. Therefore I do 
not wish to prove such. Methodologically I use qualitative methods, which are inspired by cul-
tural studies of human agency and position this in institutional theories that have defined certain 
institutional logics to see whether and how the observed human agency suits these institutional 
logics or not. I also arrive at a conclusion in the kappa that CSR in the water sector has a ten-
dency towards making CSR a colonising logic of its own, crossing already defined institutional 
logics.   
In all my papers except for Paper #2, which is a theory development in relation to stakeholder 
theory alone, I take a critical stance, which is especially significant in Paper #6, where I use 
critical theory and critical discourse analysis. This is typical for the social constructivist para-
digm, but the paper has also been inspired by critical realists (e.g. Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 
1999; Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough, 2005) as well as by critical reflexivity (Archer, 2007, 2010, 
2012). I thus find the perspective of critical realism very suitable for an overarching position of 
philosophy of science in this project in spite of my lack of acknowledgement and realisation of 
this during my writing of most of the papers. 
In the next section I will describe how I have used some ideas in line with critical realist ap-
proaches such as Margaret Archer’s concept of reflexivity and compare it to the definition of the 
social constructivist Mats Alvesson’s concept of the same. 
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Reflexivity, defined by Archer and Alvesson respectively 
In Reconceptualizing socialization as reflexive engagement (Archer & Maccarini, 2013), critical 
realism and reflexivity is interconnected through Mead’s ideas of the ‘inner conversation’–how 
the individual and society is intertwined–in Archers reflexive imperative of social conditioning 
and relational realism and her theory of relational socialisation going on in a morphogenetic 
society (Archer, 2012). Archer’s thesis is “that the emergence of a new conjuncture between the 
cultural order (ideationally based) and the structural order (materially based) is shaping new 
situational contexts in which more and more social subjects find themselves and whose variety 
they have to confront–in a novel manner”. This is the “practical consequence and manifestation 
of nascent morphogenesis” (Archer, 2012, p. 1).  
All individuals have to draw on their socially contingent (morphostasis = reproduction of socie-
tal/institutional traditions/form) but personal power of reflexivity, because society is so rapidly 
changing now (morphogenesis = changing a system’s given form) (Archer, 2012, p. 4). The pri-
or slowness of institutional evolution has speeded up into shorter and shorter timespans, which 
Archer now calls the Morphogenetic Millennium (Archer, 2012). In this way Archer shows a 
way of continuity with Mead’s interaction between the individual and the ‘generalised other’ 
through an ‘inner conversation’, which is phrased as mere reflexivity. Reflexivity is defined by 
Archer as “the regular exercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider 
themselves in relation to their (social) contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 2003, 2007, and 2012, 
p. 1).  
By recognising her indebtedness to the Chicago School of Pragmatism Archer argues that the 
early pragmatists did not consider the historical contingency but only inner dialogue as an ahis-
torical, mental activity. Archer corrects this in terms of acknowledging the cultural, historical 
and structural (societally determined) contribution to the term of reflexivity (Archer, 2012, p. 
11+15): “We all receive and use extenal information, we all engage in external as well as inter-
nal conversation and, above all, being human refers to a quintessentially relational being”
(Archer, 2012, p. 15).  
Archer defines how today’s multiple societal contexts “give rise to distinctive situational logics 
of action for the realisation of subject’s personal concerns” (Archer, 2012, p. 18): 
• “At all times and in all places subjects acquire  their personal identities through the con-
stellation of concerns that they endorse” (Archer, 2012, pp. 21-22) 
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• “..by virtue of their concerns, they have required a vested interest in ‘contextual continui-
ty’ itself”, which gives them “a generic interest in social reproduction” (Archer, 2012, p. 
22) 
• “Those, whose interests are vested in ‘contextual continuity’ must pursue a situational 
logic of ‘correction’ or ‘protection’ in order to defend (the conditions of) what they care 
most about” (Ibid.). 
This situational logic reveals how Archer is pursuing a relational realism in the ‘if/then’ state-
ment linked to what might seem as an utilitarian notion of interests, which is neither positivistic 
nor neoclassical, but should merely be seen as motivational. That human interests are driven by 
motives is not new and it in Archer’s vocabulary is not linked to a rational choice perspective, 
which she rejects severely (see Archer, 1995), it is more in line with C. Wright Mills’ notion of 
vocabularies of motives inspired by Kenneth Burke, which is a theme I take up in my writing of 
Paper #4 Archer’s argument is that structural and cultural conditions “lie behind today’s trend 
in reflexivity” and stand in opposition to institutionalised individualism (Archer, 2012, p. 32), 
which she rejects40: 
• The new Morphogenetic Millennium is a morphogenesis of the cultural and structural 
domains where varieties in agency stimulate even more varieties into more and more 
contextual discontinuity. 
• Critical realism has to change the concept of structure from ”relatively enduring” into 
shorter and shorter timespans, which means that reflexivity both on the individual and 
collective level becomes more and more crucial due to new forms of agency and con-
texts that change more rapidly than before. 
This metareflexivity or communicative reflexivity that Archer defends in her argumentation that 
social engagement is not founded solely upon interactions but, as Bhaskar emphasised, upon 
social relations, is virtually very much in line with both Alvesson’s (1999), Alvesson & 
Sköldberg’s (2009) and Alvesson & Kärreman’s (2011) social constructivist approach to a so-
cial theory of science and methodology. Alvesson proposed a reflexivity paradigm with regard 
to qualitative inquiry based on ”moving beyond neopositivism and in-between romantic (social 
interactionism) and hypersceptical (postmodernism) understanding of empirical value..”
(Alvesson, 1999, p. 3, my interpretation in brackets). Although Alvesson (and later with his col-
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 (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMpJ5wnuB64 ) 
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leagues Kaj Sköldberg and Dan Kärreman) himself writes mainly in the discipline of qualitative 
methodology, he emphasises a great deal of theory of science in this discipline. With Sköldberg 
Alvesson defines reflexivity in relation to interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 269): 
”Reflection41 means thinking about the conditions for what one is doing, inves-
tigating the way in which the theoretical, cultural and political context of indi-
vidual and intellectual involvement affects interaction with whatever is being 
resarched, often in the ways that are difficult to become conscious of.” 
Used in research conditions, reflexivity means paying attention respectively to the constructed 
object, the constructing subject, and the social context that constructs the researcher without 
letting any of these dominate in order to avoid empiricism, narcissism, and social and linguistic 
reductionism (Ibid.). Although Alvesson & Sköldberg clearly adhere to the social constructivist 
paradigm here, they admit the pitfall of pushing social constructionism too far 
(oversocialisation, where everything is reduced to social constructions) and instead refer to the 
critical realist tradition (e.g. Danermark, 2002). 
There seems to be no mutual exclusiveness between Alvesson & Sköldberg’s and Archer’s defi-
nitions of the term reflexivity. I read Archer’s definition of reflexivity as a capacity inherited in 
all normal human beings and Alvesson and Sköldberg’s definition as an instantiation of that 
capacity towards interpreting the researched field, its objects, subjects, and the researcher herself 
into that contextual constellation etc. Alvesson & Sköldberg (2009) suggest avoiding emphasis-
ing social constructivism so firmly that the researcher descends into so much selfreflection that 
too little energy is left for empirical studies:  
”The whole idea of reflexivity, as we see it, is the very ability to break away 
from a frame of reference and to look at what it is not capable of saying” 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 270).  
In other words, to allow for alternative interpretations of what is directly seen, suggested, or 
taken as representations or given of the reality investigated. This advice is used in the next ses-
sion regarding the methodology utilised in this thesis. The next chapter should be seen not in 
isolation from the papers but linked to the specific methodology chapters presented in each pa-
per as well framing the overall perspective suggested in this thesis. 
                                                
41
 ’reflection’ is here used interchangeably with ’reflexivity’ 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter I opt to frame a metadescription of how in general I have conducted my method-
ology and link this when approapriate to the ideas of critical realism and social constructivism 
respectively. I will go through how I came to decide upon the design of the project; the hurdles 
and bumps along the way; and how I came to realise my project eventually through the snowball 
effect (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982). I have travelled through my PhD ‘journey’ using a pathway 
from the contextual to the concrete–from macro to micro if you will–in order to frame my over-
all research question and collect empirical material for my overall contribution regarding an-
swering this question. 
In order to achieve a holistic understanding of how to answer my research question I have had in 
my mind the idea of framing CSR in an institutional perspective, which calls for a broad, but 
also deep investigation of multiple levels. This means–following the institutional logics’ per-
spective–to be capable of both framing the macro-, meso-, and microlevel in spite of the institu-
tional ambidexterity, complexity (Greenwood et al., 2011), or pluralism (Kraatz & Blocks, 
2008) it encapsulates. 
Some have argued that trying to frame what CSR means in an entire sector is too broad in scope. 
However, I wanted to be able to analytically generalise from an extensive study of one specific 
sector using qualitative methods mainly, and to do this I chose to go along the path of framing 
an ethnography of a community or an institutional field, which meant that I had to collect a rich 
description (Geertz, 1994) while having a limited amount of time (3 years). This has created the 
leitmotive of broadening the scope using various qualitative and mixed methods in order to 
complete something almost similar to a traditional, albeit a social constructivist/critical realist 
account of an ethnography (Van Maanen, 1988; Goodall, 2000; Spradley, 1979, 1980; Charmaz, 
2006). 
Design of the project 
From the beginning my PhD project was to be designed as a twofold investigation; a contextual 
investigation of the water sector and how it interprets and works with corporate social responsi-
bility and stakeholder engagement, and a concrete examination of projects performed by agents 
in the water sector to analyse the impact that these projects have upon society at large respec-
tively.  
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Initially I thought that the contextual investigation should be made through a large quantitative 
survey of approximately 600 members of one of my host organisations, the Scandinavian Socie-
ty of Trenchless Technology (SSTT). However, I soon found out from an initial very small test 
survey sent to a small group within this society that results from such an electronic survey were 
going neither to fulfil my purpose nor reveal enough responses to continue with a quantitative 
methodology. People are busy and overburdened with e-surveys and can hardly find the time or 
motivation to fill these in, and this was also the situation in this society. Another hindrance was 
the superficial depth of the survey and the long distance between respondents, which made it 
hard to raise additional travelling funding for doing qualitative research afterwards among these 
participants. 
Thus, a qualitative pilot study among four Danish water companies was set up, which was in the 
range of my travelling budget and revealed deep insight in many details of how the companies 
works with corporate social responsibility in their everyday organisational life. These results 
made me decide to shift methodology from quantitative to qualitative methods and work more in 
depth with fewer organisations (seven Danish companies in total of which one company was the 
main host for observation and interviews studies) and instead use the annual meetings at SSTT 
for a large focus group (Demant, 2006) and in this way interact with a broader Scandinavian 
audience. 
The concrete examination of pipeline projects from Scandinavia, however, was from the begin-
ning planned to be executed as case studies of entire projects as much as possible. Although this 
idea suited both qualitative and quantitative (mixed) methods (see Paper #7) these projects took 
a very long time to establish. SSTT was very helpful in trying to establish contact with pipeline 
projects from various places in Scandinavia, and many members of this organisation were soon 
willing to make their projects available for a deeper investigation. As it turned out, this initial 
benevolence was to be filled with motivational, economic, and timing problems, which made 
many good intentions fade away really quickly.  
My restricted travelling budget did not allow me to travel around and collect the data needed 
myself, which made this examination dependent upon the participants in the project to collect 
the data, which not many had time or money to do. Though some data from projects in Den-
mark, Norway and Sweden were already collected and generously sent to me to use in my work, 
I still needed additional projects that could fill in the gaps. At one point in time after approxi-
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mately a year into my study, I still needed two to three more projects in order to be able to say 
something valid about how pipeline installation impacted society in various ways. 
Here, SSTT showed their capacity once more. The board sent out a request for more projects, 
and three Danish projects nearby were established for me to follow more closely, which I was 
more than thankful for. These last three projects were driven by energetic project managers and 
supported by the top management of the organisations in question, which meant that I gathered 
rich data from these projects, which made the outcome of this part of the project possible as de-
scribed in Paper #7. 
In the next section, I will describe how the different stages in my PhD were carried out more 
specifically and refer to the literature of qualitative and quantitative methodology in order to 
explain the choices made throughout the PhD thesis.
INTERVIEWS
In my initial pilot study I conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with top managers and 
middle managers of four chosen water companies in Denmark; two medium size and two large 
size. I wanted to capture both similarities and differences in the ways these managers perceived 
corporate social responsibility and stakeholder engagement in differently sized organisations 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). In these cases especially a double interview was conducted with two inter-
viewees and me interviewing the top manager and a middle manager in order to study the limita-
tion of the political ’correctness’ of skilled directors speaking (Alvesson, 1999). I had the idea 
that choosing wisely whom to interview and creating a discussion among them might reveal 
more insight in interactions between managers, hierarchy among colleagues, debates or strug-
gles for interpretation; something that I would not get if I interviewed them separately.  
These interviews were initiated through an interview-guide with topics of relevance (Kvale, 
2007) sent by email prior to our meeting for preparation of all in the situation. However, it 
turned out to be more like an open, less structured interview, which I had hoped for, so I could 
follow what my interviewees had in mind and still keep the topic in hand (Spradley, 1979). This 
strategy seemed to work well in three of the settings, but did not work in the fourth since no 
duellant was present to compete with the political speach of the top manager. In the first three 
interviews, which all lasted around one hour, the dialogue and discussions worked well, and the 
interviewees did not have problems taking part in the debate and questioning each others’ view-
points. The fourth interview had–as I expected–the character of a political correct speach of how 
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vigorous, exemplary, and visionary the organisation was in general, and how the top manager 
set the direction which all would follow. In spite of this difference in quality between the first 
three and the fourth interview, I had the luck that we had arranged another meeting with some 
middle managers right afterwards, who were very curious about what their superior had said in 
the interview. I had emphasised to the interviewees that anonymity was guaranteed for both re-
spondents and company name in both interview and observation situations in order to secure 
honesty and to avoid pressures of producing politically correct explanations to the questions. I 
did not reveal much of what had been said except for than some of the ideas I knew were official 
in the organisation.  
The response from the middle managers in the following meeting, however, was peculiar: they 
told me that the top manager used to keep his ideas to himself just until the launch of new com-
pany policies and action plans. Therefore, to my surprise, these middle managers knew nothing 
about how the director wanted them to get on with the visions and missions he had planned for 
in the company plan, which had just been released. Although I did not reveal what he had said 
specifically, it was interesting information that it was not coincidental that I could not get a dou-
ble interview in this company: the top manager wanted to control his organisation by restricting 
others in the company from information until the board was sworn in. Thus he could thus not 
announce what he (and the board) had agreed for the organisation to do earlier. 
After this experience of collecting rich information from the pilot study I decided to enlarge to 
range of case companies for the contextual part of my thesis into seven Danish water companies 
in total. From here I continued to interview middle managers and project managers and came 
back to some of the top managers later on for a continuation of our conversations. Again I invit-
ed the same persons for double interviews with regard to the top managers and a close middle 
manager, but after that single interviews with project managers, administrators, workers, suppli-
ers, and citizens were made afterwards. All subordinates to the general management were cho-
sen to be interviewed one by one since I feared that these kinds of employees would be 
frigthened to speak up in front of their superior. However, most interviewees expressed loyalty 
to their organisation and management, and some used the session to critique the management of 
their organisation or colleagues either inside or outside their own organisation.  
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In this respect, my interviews followed what Alvesson has expressed about qualitative42 inter-
views: interviewees tend to focus on local accomplishments, establish and perpetuate a story-
line, use the interview as a kind of personal identity work, and be guided by cultural standards 
for interview accounts (cultural scripts). They wanted to please the interviewer, to reveal a mor-
al storytelling as a kind of impression management, talk in contexts of (personal or organisa-
tional) interest and power (the political speach), use language as construction work, and to play 
for the power of discourses (Alvesson, 1999, p. 20). 
This does not mean that the interviews reveal no value, but the pitfalls of all kinds of interviews 
must be managed either interpretively afterwards or more directly at the scene of the interview 
by using more and different angles within the conversation between the interviewer and the in-
terviewee(s). Awareness of the vocabularies of motives (Mills, 1940) was especially important 
to me when analysing the interviews afterwards (Alvesson, 1999, p. 22). These experiences of 
my interviews and their outcomes made me realise that interviews alone were not enough to 
capture the cultural diversity within the organisations in relation to corporate social responsibil-
ity and stakeholder engagement. I will take this lead up in the next section. 
The interviews were all taped and transcribed afterwards. However, due to the constructedness 
of the interviews, their local situatedness, the inflictions of emotions and immediate impressions 
(Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011) I decided not to send the transscriptions back to the interviewees 
to correct them. Some, Alvesson (1999) as well as some of my colleague researchers, have ex-
perienced that interviewees take everything they have said back when seeing their statements on 
paper, fearing that their superiors or others might come to know what they have said. One of my 
respondents even told me that if I quoted anything from our conversation, the PR department of 
the organisation should be able to censor everything before publishing. Thus nothing is quoted 
from this particular person. 
By reflecting carefully on what is being said and the many ways spoken language and motives 
can be interpreted, I have not been frightened to use interviews as a method of inquiry. Howev-
er, I found it necessary to combine this method with other kinds of qualitative methods such as 
observation and document studies in order to capture the potential insights and ideas cultivated 
through a proper self-critique and reflexivity (Mills, 1959; Weick, 1989; Alvesson & Kärreman, 
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 as well as quantitative surveys or interviews for that matter 
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2011, p. 35). A full overview over the interviews and meetings conducted is displayed in Ap-
pendix 1: Table A, page 289.
OBSERVATION STUDIES
Very early in my study–and of course due to my former employer’s interest in my work–I was 
granted full access to my host organisation. This open access was a wonderful opportunity to 
continue interacting with my (former) colleagues alongside my participant observation studies 
of what was going on for the next three years of study. In order not to embarrass my colleagues 
by observing them directly, which I guessed would have made them feel awkward, I chose to 
stay a few days a week in the open-plan office and have a few assignments of relevance to work 
with in order to interact as a normal working colleague. Soon, however, I had to limit my time in 
the organisation due to the amount of tasks at hand for my study. I was then desk-sitting and 
operating now two to four hours two days a week, which I felt was enough to continue follow-
ing the everyday interactions and the more longitudinal development of the organisation. 
Many ways of participant observation techniques have been proposed in the literature. However, 
I felt inclined to follow what John Van Maanen, Harold Lloyd Goodall, Jr. , and James P. 
Spradley did in their studies respectively of a police unit (Van Maanen, 1975), a touring 
rockband (Goodall, 2000) and a tramp society (Spradley, 1980), where the researchers interacted 
as participants in the situation at hand having a concrete role to fulfil while observing alongside. 
The pitfall of participating so closely as these researchers as well as I have done is to forget to 
observe or to become too close with the people that the researcher is interacting with (Van 
Maanen, 1988) so that one forgets to reflect about what is going on or comes to interfere with 
what is going on (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011).  
On the other hand by working so closely with one’s observation field yield there are so many 
other benefits, and it opens many more doors that outsiders normally are prohibited from enter-
ing. This meant that I found the problems of going fully native (Silverman, 2001) was more mi-
nor than the benefits it revealed. How could I be anything but native after having worked more 
than twelve years in the sector and most years in such a company? I agree with many qualitative 
theorists that knowledge is co-constructed and produced in the direct interaction (Gubrium & 
Holstein, 2004), so why should I not participate in constructing the ’reality’ as I had before? The 
other way round sounded really artificial to me, and perhaps it would have too for my col-
leagues. 
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Thus, it was a matter of finding a way of managing my observations and narrowing them down  
(Silverman, 2001) rather than trying not to get too involved. Therefore I found a way to make 
my work efficient without having to write everything down constantly making my colleagues 
feeling awkward by me notetaking43 about their (and my) behaviour all the time: when I came 
home, I used my iPhone to record the impressions and important events that occurred to me dur-
ing the day. Later I transcribed this e-diary and discovered that since a certain amount of time 
had passed from the taping to my transcribing, I saw the event more from an outside view, 
which was interesting although I could of course still recall all feelings. I also saved special 
emails in a box for future analysis. I asked politely if I could interview some of my colleagues 
now and then, which they found interesting for their own work as well as a kind of time for re-
flection with a colleague. 
My task at hand when making observations in my host organisation was to carry out the annual 
CSR report of the organisation. This task was typically located with a preferred deadline at the 
end of April44 alongside the Annual Report, which other colleagues would make. This time from 
New Year till the end of April was a busy period for the company, but  also a very insightful 
period with a lot of talk, with different people knowing and having different data that told many 
organisational stories about performativity, problems, visions, and cross-departemental collabo-
ration. In this period people that did not normally collaborate in daily operations came to work 
together in a CSR Task Force or in smaller subgroups appropriate for the situation. This gave 
me an opportunity to study how people in general were working together and how different sub-
cultures evolved, clashed, or solved their problems by either innate or innovative ways of coping 
with or getting around them. I could not help feeling frustrated as I would had it been a normal 
situation when deadlines were upcoming and tasks not fulfilled. Therefore, my e-diary also 
served as a purpose of gathering my own feelings and emotions and seeing them from a 
macroperspective later on in my PhD process. 
I had the opportunity to hang around (Goodall, 2000) in another water company as much as time 
allowed me to, and I used this opportunity now and then especially when something interesting 
for my study was coming up. This company was also a former workplace of mine where I had 
worked as a project manager, which meant that I still knew a lot of people and had their confi-
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 I am also awful at taking notes – I get tired after 5 minutes of writing by hand, so a written diary was out of the 
question – I would never have finished it. 
44
 although the first year was postponed as late as November due to a recent merger with another company and the 
second year was postponed till June due to my workload 
62
dentiality from previously. This company also provided me with access to documents that I 
needed from my former projects, and it served as a great mirror for seeing both similarities and 
differences in my host organisation. A third water company was also very open and collabora-
tive, but since this was placed farther away from me, I only visited it 1-2 times a year. The last 
four companies in my case studies were used mainly for interviews and not for observation stud-
ies as such. My time as participant-observer lasted effectively for two and a half year of my 
three-year study, while the last year observation time became more sparse due to my workload 
in order to complete my PhD thesis. The observation studies along with my interviews laid the 
empirical grounds for Paper #4 and Paper #6 and also served sporadically in Paper #2 and Paper 
#3. See Appendix 1: Table A, page 289.
DOCUMENT STUDIES
As mentioned above, my access to necessary documents was almost unlimited regarding my 
host organisation. The second water company was also very helpful in giving me access to doc-
uments I needed for my study. This intensive access combined with a large number of public 
documents from the water companies’ branch organisation DANVA and the public authorities 
made a world of material open for investigation (especially for Paper #1). It was rather a matter 
of limiting the documents needed for my study than struggling for access.  
Another benefit from document studies is that they often are based upon published material, 
which means that agents rarely can refuse ever having said so. The meaning, however, is quite 
another issue. Meaning can be interpreted in various ways and is not necessarily logically 
bounded to the language and vocabulary as such. Thus, it is not the document itself but the rele-
vant institution’s authorisation of the document, which is relevant and salient (Dahler-Larsen, 
2005, p. 236). Document studies surmount one of the problems with interviews and interview 
statements since they eliminate the reactivity from the subjects, who typically react to being 
researched (Kvale, 2007). 
Documents are also important in the sense of relation and intertextuality (Atkinson & Coffey, 
2004), since most published documents are not stand alone documents, but themselves relate to 
other documents such as legal texts or communications such as hearing letters assembled in a 
larger document-network. Thus it is typically important to dissect more documents than the ones 
at hand in order to interpret meaning, especially when interested in discourse analysis (Justesen 
& Mik-Meyer, 2010). 
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Due to my insight into CSR reporting at my host organisation, I chose to study these types of 
documents from a discursive perspective, which allowed me to compare CSR reports from the 
Danish companies with that of other Scandinavian water companies as well as with water com-
panies from the UK, the US and South Africa.  
These nationalities’ water companies and their CSR reports were carefully chosen for Paper #3 
and Paper #6 for several reasons. From my interviews I learned that Danish water companies 
were very much inspired by the way UK companies worked and carried out their CSR reporting. 
This was also apparent for the idea behind the new (2007) Danish Water Sector Act, which ac-
cording to the legislators had been inspired, but not all copied from the UK economic regulation 
model. Therefore, it seemed convenient to compare Danish water companies’ CSR reporting 
style with that of the UK. From my intense reading of UK water companies CSR reports, I 
found that these had been influenced by the US model, which was my next choice of nations for 
water companies’s CSR reports.  
Moving from a country as small as Denmark to the UK and then towards the largest and for 
some the most Western country, the USA, I found it necessary to include a nation with another 
history and culture than the Western. I found interest in South Africa although it is too regarded 
as a Western country in many respects due to the dominant European influence from the coloni-
sation/Apartheid regime (Ndebele, 1987). By limiting the scope of document collection for re-
spectively Paper #3 and Paper #6 respectively to these nations I maintained a cross-
geographical/cultural comparison of countries of maximum variety from small (Denmark) to 
large (USA) (Flyvbjerg, 2006) looking for institutional patterns of similarities and differences in 
ways of perceiving corporate social responsibility.
QUANTITATIVE DATA COLLECTION
Going in depth with the study of how water companies enact CSR in daily practice I studied 
cases from Scandinavian pipeline installation projects with member companies of SSTT in Pa-
per #7. I collected quantitative data of different materials and energy consumption from these 
cases, and calculated these data into their emission impacts of various greenhouse gases into 
carbon dioxide equivalents45 (CO2e). I will here describe specifically the conditions of this data 
                                                
45
 CO2e means ’carbon dioxide equivalent’ and frames more greenhouse gases. CO2e is estimated from raw data into 
their CO2 impact by various calculation factors provided by the Defra/DECC every year, which make these differ-
ent gases comparable as regards climate impact. See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69554/pb13773-ghg-conversion-
factors-2012.pdf  
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collection and honestly declare where deficits and lack of knowledge about the co-construction 
of some of the data has become apparent and how this has been treated in this thesis. 
As mentioned before, I did not have the capacity to collect these data myself and had to rely 
upon the honesty and rigorous performance of other persons directly related to the projects in 
question and their explanations of how they collected the data. This kind of data will still be 
considered primary data sampled directly from field projects. However, the methods used can-
not be said to be totally consistent due to the differences in time these data were collected and 
the difference in the rigour with which the different collectors collected them. 
In general I instructed the collectors that I wanted information of how much energy was used 
directly in the projects divided into certain subcategories made in each project due to the possi-
bility of making a cross-comparison afterwards. These instructions were followed rigorously in 
all projects although in some of the projects few variables and in others many variables were 
counted either due to what was present or going on or due to what the capacity of data collection 
was in the different projects. I later calculated respectively estimated the CO2 impact of all the 
data. 
For instance, in two Norwegian projects, data of pipeline size, lenght, volume, installation 
method, fuel, water, and waste consumption were collected for pipeline installations made with 
trenchless technologies (hereafter named No Dig). Materials other than pipe-materials were not 
present. The data collectors had theoretically estimated the same projects as if it was done with 
traditional trenching methods (hereafter named excavation). However, these data were excluded 
from my data collection since they were unverified and could be interpreted as overly negative 
eventually. 
In two Swedish projects the above data was collected in one No Dig project and another excava-
tion project, and here the data collectors (entrepreneurs) added their own theoretical estimations 
of how much material was used based upon archival and experiential knowledge from their oth-
er excavation projects from earlier. Although the latter is conceived as secondary data, they 
were included in my project due to the trustworthiness of both the collectors’ calculations and 
the archival findings and sources I researched myself. 
In one Danish case I had the opportunity to receive secondary data from an entrepreneur, who 
had collected these data from their own organisation for an earlier master thesis calculating a 
Life Cyclus Analysis (LCA) at the Danish Technical University. These data are considered vali-
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dated at this university and are used in a different way in this thesis since the scope differs very 
much. In my work I did not use or calculate a LCA, but needed raw data for estimation of CO2
from the installation method and production of the pipeline. Therefore I have not referred to this 
specific master’s thesis, because it presents data that is moulded for other purposes and does not 
display the raw data, which I afterwards received directly from the company, that had collected 
them initially. Due to the need for anynomity for this company I will refer to this company as 
”company J”, see Appendix 1: Table A, page 289. 
Data from pipe and hose factories were all classified, which meant that I have used theoretical 
data from European LCA testings of similar products as estimates for calculating the CO2 emis-
sion from the production46.  
I was directly involved in the data collection design of the last three projects carried out in 
Denmark, where we produced data templates for various variables to collect. This meant that we 
were able to collect not only impacts upon society from energy, material, and waste consump-
tion as firsthand data, but also had the opportunity to interview citizens living around the pro-
jects, which we have published in SSTT’s magazine No Dig Info no. 3/201247. In this as well as 
in the other projects I had to use theoretical factors for the emission calculations, but here we 
were fortunate to receive the direct, firsthand emission factor from a pipeline factory (”company 
N”), which willingly would share their knowledge with us under non-exposure of the factor due 
to the need to prevent other competitors from knowing this factor. Thus, in my presentation of 
data in Paper #7 these factors are hidden, but used in the calculations without possibility of 
recognition. The actual calculation factors used in this PhD thesis may be retrieved by permis-
sion from the author, which will only be to independent researchers under confidentiality due to 
the protection of the sources, who provided me the raw data. 
All the above mentioned cases were selected due to the snowball method and range from differ-
ent No Dig methods compared to excavation from different parts of Scandinavia, and are chosen 
to include a broad spectrum of exemplars among the typical types of pipeline installation meth-
ods used in this area. This choice has been made in order to have as many different pipe sizes, 
pipe materials, and pipe installation methods under each of the two categories (No Dig and ex-
cavation) as possible due to the limitations of the projects we had access to regarding data col-
lection. This means, that the typical pipe materials used in water and sewers in Scandinavia, 
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 (see www.teppfa.com ). 
47
 (in Danish, see http://www.sstt.dk/da-dk/nodiginfo/nodigarkiv.aspx ). 
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such as variants of polymer and concrete, are represented due to their typical pipe size in every-
day projects.  
We did not have the opportunity to include steel pipes since these were not at hand, but this type 
of pipe material is also more rarely found in Scandinanvian water/sewer projects according to 
oral explanations gathered from members of the SSTT. The range of pipe sizes typically used is 
from a nominal diameter48 of 90 mm till 1,600 mm, which is covered in these selected cases as 
well. Pipe sizes above 1,600 mm will also be used occasionally in larger projects, and can be 
made for both No Dig and excavation methods, but these are found more rarely than the range 
chosen for everyday projects, and therefore excluded from our samples. 
The cases are treated as physical experiments since in each case the developer and entrepreneur 
had volunteered in juxtaposing two different methods in the same neighbourhood or site, which 
is unusual, but practical for our direct comparison of the two methods. In our overall design we 
had agreed in SSTT that it was optimal to have both No Dig and excavation in the same geolog-
ical/geographical area if possible since variables such as soil material, traffic, urban area versus 
rural area normally would determine which of the two types of methods would be preferred. For 
ease of comparison we tried to limit the physical variances in soil material, traffic situation, and 
urban/rural area as much possible. The projects are therefore chosen all to be installations in 
urban areas with middle level traffic and in soft soils (i.e. not rock material) such as clays, sand 
and mixtures hereof (moraines). 
A bias such as if the causal explanation to the variation observed is explained by choice of pipe 
material are avoided owing to the following explanation: all projects are chosen in natural set-
tings and from the typical range of traded pipe materials that a developer would have chosen in 
everyday situations on economical and technological grounds.  
Due to the cases’ physical, technical and economic causal characteristics I have used descriptive 
statistics since these types of cases are not expected to be a stocastic process;  meaning that it is 
not arbitrary how they are performed: it is caused by optimisation of variables such as how 
many machines are needed to perform the task at hand and how much material is used, trans-
ported, and replaced due to geological, technical and physical demands, and what is the optimal 
(often lowest) economic cost involved in these choices. The cases are thus somewhat unique 
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 nominal diameter = name of traded good, which may differ according to whether it is expressed in terms of inner 
or outer diameter. Typically concrete pipes are named for their inner diameter and polymer pipes for their outer 
diameter. 
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from locality to locality, but are still comparable when limiting the uncertain variables that may 
severely effect the outcome of my calculation as mentioned above.  
What we want to explain from our cases is not statistical variance between arbitrary samples, 
but variance between different samples grouped in a No Dig cluster and an excavation cluster. 
We want to explain if we can see a specific difference in CO2 emission from trenched methods 
(excavation) compared to trenchless methods (No Dig) all else being equal. If we can see this 
tendency in these two groups consisting of these heterogenous samples, then we–based on these 
two causalities (trenching versus non-trenching)–will generalise analytically that there is a dif-
ference, and argue that if these cases were made in the exact same way under the exact same 
conditions in another country, the same results would be found.  
Using Bent Flyvbjerg’s theory described in his paper Five Misunderstandings About Case Stud-
ies (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 221) he argues that if cases are unique enough, covering (representing) 
the range of differences expected in the field (maximum variety), then we are able to generalise 
analytically upon whatever may be found. Maximum variation cases are especially useful ”to 
obtain information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and out-
come (e.g., three to four cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of organisa-
tion, location, budget)” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 203). 
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FINDINGS 
Findings of the papers 
PAPER #1: CSR IN DANISH WATER COMPANIES–OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS
This paper is a study and analysis of CSR and the current legal regulatory framework of the 
Danish water companies. CSR in these hybrid organisations, which are privatised but politically 
driven, is found to face various challenges in getting to the same level as private organisations. 
This paper shows that there are opportunities and barriers in CSR in these types of companies 
that in spite of–or maybe because of–their structural hybridity from private to political organisa-
tions makes these companies attractive in the arena of CSR.  
The opportunities for CSR in water companies seems more beneficial than for normal private 
businesses, since these organisations due to their structural hybridity are more closely connected 
to the decision makers of the local government and the city council where some of the local 
politicians sit on the board of the companies. The barriers to CSR are found in the legal regula-
tory framework that diminishes the action radius of CSR in terms of efficiencies, price and cost 
reductions, and tight rules on which kinds of investments the companies can legally make.  
The argument in the paper is that the state and local government influence and the stakeholders 
derived from them both yield and limit the freedom of publicly owned enterprises to deal with 
CSR initiatives. This is also called a schism of CSR. The paper contributes to the CSR literature 
in its research into opportunities and barriers in CSR in hybrid organisations as a structural mix 
of private (business) and public administrations. 
PAPER #2: STAKEHOLDER RISK MANAGEMENT IN ETHICAL DECISION MAKING–AN 
ORGANIC MODEL
This paper develops a dynamic stakeholder model that can explain the complexities of the inter-
action between a corporation and its stakeholders. The ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ is based on 
decision-making theory, risk assessment and adaptation to a rapidly changing world combined 
with appropriate stakeholder theory for ethical purposes in decision-making processes in busi-
nesses.  
This new concept is derived from observational studies of water companies from 2004 - 2011. 
The Model is based on case studies, but the limited scope of the length of the paper did not leave 
room to show the empirical evidence, but only the theoretical study. However, this is presented 
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in this thesis as an extension of the model, which offers a new way of combining risk manage-
ment with ethical decision-making processes by the inclusion of multiple stakeholders.  
The conceptualisation of the model enhances business ethics in decision making by managing 
and balancing stakeholder concerns with the same concerns as the traditional risk management 
models has for the sake of the wider social responsibilities of the businesses and its stake-
holders. The argument is that decision making in organisations is tied to stakeholder relation-
ships in the types of hybrid organisations found in Danish water companies, and the ‘Organic 
Stakeholder Model’ can and will be used in many kinds of organisations, purposefully or uncon-
sciously. 
PAPER #3: HOW WELL ARE WATER COMPANIES ENGAGED IN CSR? A CRITICAL 
CROSS-GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how well water companies in four different nationali-
ties and political cultures are engaging with the CSR discourse. This question is relevant after 
more than 20 years of privatisation of the public administration’s bureaucracy and its adoption 
of management styles, behaviours and thinking from the private business sphere. This paper 
critically examines how water companies take part in the CSR discourse, by which institutional 
mechanisms this managerial thinking in terms of institutional logics has come about, and which 
adopted meanings lie behind it.  
The paper shows a qualitative investigation and discourse analysis of privatised water compa-
nies from four different political and market economy nations; small and medium sized water 
companies from the socialdemocratic state of Denmark; large companies from the conservative 
and liberal market economy of the UK; large and multinational companies from the US; and 
medium, large, and multinationals from South Africa. Seven companies are chosen in each 
country from the smallest to the largest in order to obtain maximum variety to derive analytical 
generalisations across nations and company sizes if possible. 
The findings of the cross-geographical, political, and market-economical study of a maximum 
variety of companies shows how institutional logics are transferring from implicit CSR towards 
explicit CSR through coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. Companies that are only 
engaged in coercive isomorphic implicit CSR show a hesitant and resistant engagement, 
whereas companies engaging in normative and mimetic isomorphic explicit CSR translate their 
discourses in a more authentic way. However, the findings also question the credibility of this 
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authenticity when most CSR reports from the water companies are made without third-
partyaccreditation, without performance indicators and only through narratives that are hard to 
scrutinise.  
The research has limitations regarding the discourse analysis, which in Denmark was possible to 
conduct from both oral texts such as interviews, observation studies and document analysis. 
Whereas in the UK, US and South Africa the discourse analysis is based on written texts from 
documents, CSR reports, annual reports and written communications between regulators and 
companies to see if the study from Denmark can be replicated here as well. The research impli-
cations suggest a further replication of the findings from a more in-depth analysis of the institu-
tional logics in such companies worldwide. 
The practical implications of this study suggest a transformation of political instrumentation 
from rule setting to incentives making to make public water service companies even more en-
gaged in explicit CSR in order to obtain more authenticity and a higher level of legitimacy in the 
field compared to the strong tradition of explicit CSR seen in the private business sphere. 
The originality and value of this research is shown by the empirical findings of the theoretical 
suggestions by Matten & Moon (2008) as to how implicit CSR is transferred to explicit CSR in 
the privatisation of public service companies in the water sector across nations, cultures, politi-
cal and market economical spheres. It shows through the discourse analysis of institutional lo-
gics how institutional isomorphism is prevalent in this sector and how New Public Management 
systems need to change from instrumental rule making to incentive making to make public ser-
vices adopt CSR in a more authentic way. 
The paper concludes that institutional logics are transferring implicit CSR towards explicit CSR 
through coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism. Companies that are only engaged in 
coercive isomorphic implicit CSR show a hesitant and resistant discursive engagement. When 
social responsibilities are regulated in a formative way, the logic of CSR shows a relatively high 
compliance, the so-called coercive isomorphism, which the local (national), regional (union 
level such as the EU and the USA) and international (such as the OECD) levels promote.  
However, regulation does not determine to which degree CSR issues should be met and how 
they are to be met. The regulation replicates a type such as for instance the OECD expectations 
of multinational enterprises, which means that what is regulated, is that the companies should 
make plans, follow them and be evaluated according to them by the regulators. Whereas, when 
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companies engage in normative and mimetic isomorphism, explicit CSR translates their legiti-
macy in a more authentic way when they use third-partyevaluated performance indicators. The 
normative isomorphism is then seen when a non-regulated part of CSR is diffused as an expecta-
tion from the regulation to the sector. In this way the normative isomorphism can be said to in-
clude implicit as well as explicit CSR. 
PAPER #4: STAKEHOLDER DISSONANCE: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
VERSUS REGULATION. A STUDY OF A TRUST RECOVERY PROCESS. 
This paper investigates the research question: “How does the process of trust recovery play out 
for organisations, who experience a trust breakdown in the area of corporate social responsibil-
ity and which mechanisms are involved in the trust building processes?”  
After the recent financial crisis issues of trust breakdown in various business sectors and the 
public sector have occurred. The question of whether corporate social responsibility can be used 
as a link of trust between business and society is the issue that this paper wants to explore. This 
paper investigates how trust in businesses and institutions can be recovered and which role if 
any corporate social responsibility plays in this. A study of a process from trust breakdown to 
trust recovery in the Danish water sector from 2003 till 2013 is revealed, which can be used to 
inform other kinds of trust recovery processes in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
From this study trust recovery is found to depend on stakeholders’ mutual engagement with 
each other and their willingness to share knowledge and learn from each other’s professional 
and institutional cultures and languages. An alignment of vocabularies of motives between regu-
lation and voluntary corporate social responsibility is found to be useful for building trust be-
tween the conflicting parties. The findings have implications greater than its local context and 
can be used in processing trust recovery in other sectors that suffer from severe trust break-
downs in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, such as governance systems in both the 
public and private sectors.  
In conclusion I suggest a theoretical extension of Bogenschneider & Corbett’s (2010) Commu-
nity Dissonance Theory to embrace multiple stakeholders each having their own complex and 
unique culture and communication modus based on their institutional, professional or individual 
comprehensive language universes. This includes the knowledge sharing and educative diffusion 
each language universe’s vocabulary holds including its important nouns, verbs, terminologies, 
semantics, taxonomies, and axioms. I also suggest incorporating the vocabularies of motives and 
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logics, which I have shown, are closely linked to the language universes and cultures of the dif-
ferent professional and institutional communities. The more these languages, motives and logics 
can coexist, the more trust can be recovered as seen in the relationship between the water com-
panies and the local authorities. 
PAPER #5: CSR IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The purpose of the paper is to examine the literature of CSR before and in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 2008. The aim of the research question is to map out the consequences upon 
CSR derived from the crisis and to derive new principles of future CSR models to be consistent 
with the consequences of the financial crisis, and to suggest new research as well as policy mak-
ing possibilities to highlight the importance and necessary survival of CSR as an instrument for 
sustainable and financial progress.  
The paper uses a literature review of CSR prior to and after the financial crisis 2008 with an 
emphasis on academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals. The findings of the paper 
reveal that post-crisis CSR models do not articulate anything that has not been mentioned be-
fore; however they do strengthen former values of CSR, but still lack an overall formula of how 
the financial sector can adopt CSR in the core of their businesses, transparently display their 
products and risks adhering to them.  
The paper proposes a new Four ‘E’ Principle that may guide new CSR models to accomplish 
this deficit and guide the development of new CSR models based upon the core of Schwartz & 
Carroll’s Three-domain CSR model, which the Principle extends and revises to: Economy, 
L/Egal, Environment, and Ethics. This Principle disentangles the dialectic relationship be-
tween economic and social responsibility; takes financial products into consideration; re-
fines the definitions of good stakeholder engagement without the illusions of corporate 
‘Potemkinity’49; and considers the benefit of replacing the semiotic meaning of the ‘C’ in CSR 
from ‘corporate’ to ’capitalism’s’ social responsibility in order to extend the concept to a broad-
er range of market agents.  
The paper calls for a discussion on ways in which governments and businesses can enhance so-
cial responsibility through balancing the requirements for more engagement from businesses as 
well as public sector companies regarding CSR. The paper suggests some instrumental mecha-
                                                
49
 ’Potemkinity’ is defined in the paper based on the myth of ’Potemkin Villages’ and used to criticize corporate 
social performance and the lack of transparency in corporate reporting displaying corporate illusions.
73
nisms of how governments can engage not only multinational companies but also smaller com-
panies and other kinds of organisations acting in the market to make them engage more in CSR. 
The paper concludes that the comparison of the literature and CSR models before and after the 
financial crisis shows that the answer to the research question is not that CSR has changed: it is 
that CSR has been strengthened, but not really different. D’Anselmi’s introduction of the con-
cern for the ‘unknown stakeholder’ is only a clearer articulation of what former CSR models 
already had emphasised (e.g. Carroll, 1991; Wood & Jones, 1995; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; 
Garriga & Melé, 2004; Freeman & Velamuri, 2008). The de-emphasis of philanthropy happened 
already before the crisis.  
This, however, has not prevented businesses from continuing to juxtapose philanthropic spon-
soring with CSR. The sustainability turn was also prominent before the crisis (Lovelock, 1979; 
United Nations, 1989) and had included not only environmental concerns but also financial con-
cerns (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 2009, 2010). The surviving attributes of various CSR concepts 
and ideas are therefore assembled in the proposed Four ‘E’ model, which includes the financial 
sector’s products as well. 
PAPER #6: THE CULTURE OF CSR REPORTING: HOW ORGANISATIONAL TEXTS 
CHANGE AN ORGANISATION
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what CSR reporting does to an organisation in terms 
of how such texts create micro changes in the everyday life of the organisation regarding its re-
sponsibilities towards society. 
The methodology consisting of multiple discursive methods is used for analysing the organisa-
tional behaviour and micro changes in a Danish water company and used for analysing the 
meaning that can be derived from corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports of 28 water 
companies from Denmark, the UK, the US, and South Africa respectively. A maximum of vari-
ety is sought across companies and nations in terms of sizes and market-economic settings 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006), whereas the institutional setting of water companies is sought to be similar. 
The organisational culture is perceived as being hybridised of multiple cultures that coexist or 
are blended (Gertsen, Søderberg and Zølner, 2012). Critical discourse analysis consisting of 
vocabularies of motives within texts (Mills, 1940; Spradley, 1979, 1980), critical visual analysis 
of images (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2006; Kress, 2010), and reflexive, contrasting analysis 
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(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009) from a close observation study and interviews within a water 
company in Spring 2013, is carried out.  
The findings show that critics may be right in their claim that (some) corporations exploit their 
corporate texts and inherent authorship in voicing a political manifesto of corporate branding as 
‘window-dressing’ and ‘greenwashing’. However, these texts impact the text-producing organi-
sation itself through the cultural meaning that it communicates. Thus these texts and their crea-
tion become important both for the organisation and its inhabitants in terms of their understand-
ing of (their) organisational culture, how it changes, which political messages and meanings it 
carries, how the motives and intentions frame and impact the multiplicity of culture(s) within the 
organisation, and how this framing can be culturally productive or counter-productive. 
The research is conducted through an ethnographic in-depth method limited to 28 cross-
geographical/national CSR reports chosen from different sized nations in terms of population, 
different market-economic settings, but similar institutional settings of managing water compa-
nies. This means that the research shows analytically, but non-statistically, generalisability due 
to the maximum variety of companies, which make similarities and differences between compa-
nies salient, which can be tested statistically in future research. 
The paper includes practical implications for practitioners in their reporting of corporate social 
responsibility in enhancing their reflexive understanding the agency inherent problems underly-
ing the production of corporate texts and their publication and exposure to critique. The paper 
also includes analytical implications for ethnographic researchers in the presentation of a multi-
method practice providing analytical generalisability without adopting a positivistic, scientific, 
quantitative method but rather a qualitative field of inquiry. 
The originality and value of the paper is that it offers a unique way of strengthening the triangu-
lation between an ethnographic close observation and interview study in one organisation with a 
document study of similar organisations’ corporate social responsibility reports across geogra-
phy, nationality, and cultural boundaries. In this way the research is both an in-depth study and a 
study of breadth. 
The paper concludes that the comparison of texts and visual images of CSR reports with ob-
served organisational everyday life in water companies expresses several ambiguities based on 
the incommensurability especially between the integration perspective within the reports’ texts 
and the multiplicity of organisational cultures, which have to be negotiated to fit the format of 
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these texts. The CSR reports are written as if there exists an archetypal culture within the organ-
isation, and this message is expected to ‘do’ something to the organisation or be unnoticed.  
The observation study revealed what these types of corporate reports ’do’ to the inhabitants of 
the organisation; it framed in terms of how they are supposed to work, which values they are to 
value, and what purposes they are to follow in the future, which is clearly described in the CSR 
report. Thus the integration perspective of the CSR reports is partly decoupled from the multi-
plicity of cultures practicing in organisations. This study proposes that the CSR reports persist as 
institutionally representation of ‘a’ typified reporting culture, which is accepted by sectorial 
peers, governmental regulators, intergovernmental bodies and organisational fields in general 
(Berger & Luckman, 1967).  
The meanings that the CSR reporting culture have created for the everyday life of organisations 
can be interpreted as constructed on behalf of elitist members of an organisational community 
celebrating the dominant view of their culture (Deetz, 1992). This view offers identity and legit-
imacy for the members of the dominant, enhancing, and partly orthogonal subcultures of the 
organisational community (Martin & Siehl, 1990). For counter cultures and critical stakeholders 
it may serve as a means too: by taking the text literally seriously, these stakeholders can–if they 
possess enough power–either hold the organisation responsible for the text and the inherent 
promises it offers or use the text as a springboard for further negotiation suiting their own pur-
poses.  
In other words, multiple cultural meanings, motives, and expectations may be enacted in the 
organisation transmitted through the corporate texts and the stakeholders’ diverse reactions to-
wards it. In this way the meaning of corporate reports for organisational everyday life may not 
necessarily be negative for subcultures that do not agree with the style of the reports, the imme-
diate stories within it, and the consequences or lack of them. Elaborated from Mill’s terminolo-
gy (1940) I suggest that this could be called the ‘enactment of motives’ behind the reports. The 
enactment of motives is what these corporate texts ‘do’ to the organisation; how they come to 
implicate the enactment of organisational everyday life. This makes CSR reports bridge the mul-
tiple cultures in organisations by its enactment of motives; both the motives of the management, 
but also the multiple motives of diverse stakeholders reacting to them.  
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PAPER #7: MITIGATING THE CLIMATE CHANGE IN EXERCISING SUSTAINABLE 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING: CASE STUDIES FROM SCANDINAVIA. 
This paper shows a practical outcome of the PhD project, where case studies of pipe rehabilita-
tion were established in Scandinavia in search for sustainability and corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) practices in project management. The case studies all compared traditional trenching 
with trenchless technologies in water and wastewater pipe installations in different cities and 
geographical and geological contexts. The outcome of this comparative study revealed that to 
exercise corporate social responsibility in these engineering and construction practices needed a 
great deal of leadership at all levels from top management to self-management in order to suc-
ceed. This have lead to a proposal of a CSR model for engineering practices containing faith, 
bravery, love and leadership as a pathway to enact sustainability in project management. The 
research question is: ”What is the difference in climate impact (CO2) between installing pipe line 
systems with excavation versus trenchless (No Dig) technologies?”
The paper concludes with my suggestion of a rule of thumb for managerial decision making 
concerning which technology to choose considering the climate impact that the difference be-
tween using No Dig and excavation in terms of CO2 emission in kg CO2 per m3 inner pipe vol-
ume would make. I suggest that excavation provides a median emission that is twice as high as 
No Dig ranging from the largest difference of factor 4.71 in comparing pure excavation with 
pure No Dig (CIPP) to 0.30 in mixed No Dig-excavation methods. The largest emissions were 
seen in the small dimensions, where No Dig (HDD) in ø90/110 mm (Fig. 3, no. 1) showed 5,950 
kg CO2/m3 versus excavation of ø90 mm (Fig. 3, no. 3) 18,933 kg CO2/m3 with a difference of 
factor 3.18.  
Other important findings during the case studies were that the examined cases only succeeded 
due to the faith, bravery, care and leadership managed in an inside-out manner by the organisa-
tions, which had these ideas anchored from the top management to the workers on the 
“shopfloor”. From these findings a CSR model for managing sustainable project management 
was developed based on these concepts. The paper does not claim that the cases managed to 
enact a fully sustainable project that was fully socially responsible in every instance: it only 
suggests a way to proceed with such an idea and some tools usable for sustainable project man-
agement.  
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PAPER #8: THE ROLE OF MATERIALS AND MATERIAL PRACTICES IN INSTITUTIONAL 
LOGICS
This paper is a result of a three-year study of institutional logics in the water sector and it’s 
grounding in material practices. It is based upon a cross-geographical case study of 28 water 
companies from Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa from 2011 
- 2013. It contains a reference to a qualitative analysis of 50 interviews and meetings with man-
agers and regulators of Danish water companies and an archival study from 2000 - 2013 of wa-
ter companies from the above nations.  
The paper identifies how a logic based on corporate social responsibility in the water companies 
both competes and coexists with a logic based on new public management ideas from their regu-
lators, and how the institutional logics inherent in these logics are grounded in the materials and 
material practices of these companies and regulators. Materials are found to be symbolic carriers 
of ideas and physical manifestations of value in institutional logics, and material practices 
within institutional logics are found to be the creation and/or manifestation of ideas and values 
into materials and objects and the reciprocal exchange or symbolic exhibition of them in social 
interaction. 
The paper concludes that the juxtaposition of the institutional logics of respectively the water 
companies’ logic of CSR and their regulator’s logic of NPM50 shows how these ideas and their 
inherent competition and coexistence is grounded in materials and material practices and the 
consequences these practices have upon society. It shows how materials and objects can carry 
symbols of ideas and in themselves are physical manifestations of values intrinsic in different 
institutional logics and how material practices consist of the creation and/or manifestation of 
ideas and values into materials and objects. It also shows their reciprocal exchange or symbolic 
exhibition in social interaction grounded in different institutional logics whether they compete 
or coexist with other stakeholders’ logics. 
The study of the role of materials and material practices within institutional logics, however, 
needs much more in-depth studies from different institutions to evaluate the validity of Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2. The paper recommends future research in historical and longitudinal 
studies to test these propositions in other sectors to see if generalisation of these propositions is 
possible.  
                                                
50
 derived from New Public Management literature (e.g. Christensen & Lægreid, 2011) 
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Findings of the overall thesis 
The overall research question of this PhD thesis was: How is corporate social responsibility 
interpreted and enacted in the water sector?
The answer to this question is that in the water sector CSR has a role as a colonising logic that 
bridges several underlying institutional logics such as that of capitalism (market logic), the state 
(bureaucracy logic), democracy (community logic), the family (nuclear), religion (Christian), 
the profession, and the corporation (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). The CSR 
logic is derived and articulated as an ideational relegitimisation of water companies as trustwor-
thy public service providers from their past as an integrated part of the municipal public service. 
This logic is enacted in the organisations with multiple cultures, multiple interdependent stake-
holder relationships, and in a highly regulated institutional framework, in which certain parts of 
CSR are more difficult to enact than others, for instance philanthropy. However, since contem-
porary CSR models de-emphasise philanthropy and emphasise stakeholder engagement and 
companies enhancing the better livelyhood of stakeholders by the very way that the companies 
operate, the CSR logic has a fertile ground in the water sector, working alongside their eco-
nomic objectives of being efficient and effective. 
CSR and stakeholder engagement in complex organisations such as water companies seems to 
have a future possibility of becoming role models and ambassadors of CSR as an inspiration for 
other business sectors, since they have shown that in spite of economic constraints and struggles 
with permissions and allowances due to dichotomous regulation, it is not impossible to be so-
cially responsible while optimising one’s economic potential. Even though the interview state-
ment: “We are CSR!” (Interview B, March 2011) may sound foolish and hollow in other busi-
ness sectors, this PhD thesis has shown that if water companies truly believe in the logic of CSR 
and accordingly act socially responsibly seen from the standpoint of their multiple stakeholders, 
they really are ‘CSR’. 
The findings also reveal an instantiation of the material practices of institutional logics exempli-
fied througout the analysis of the colonising CSR logic. From Paper #8, my Proposition 
1:“Materials and objects are symbolic carriers of ideas and physical manifestations of value in 
institutional logics”; and Proposition 2:“Material practices in institutional logics consist of the 
creation and/or manifestation of ideas and values into materials and objects and the reciprocal 
exchange or symbolic exhibition of them in social interaction”; have both been shown to be 
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viable for Danish water companies but are also likely to be viable in other countries under other 
cultural constituencies due to the global diffusion of New Public Management and privatisation 
strategies.  
In water companies the object of water and the materiality of this and objects according to 
which water has to be distributed to the end consumers has been shown to be deeply embedded 
in the CSR logic as both symbolic carriers of ideas and physical manifestations (the ‘proofs’) of 
values. Water is in Paper #6 symbolised in CSR reports as carriers of meaning such as ‘life’, 
‘health’, the soundness of ‘nature’, and the necessity for future generations symbolised by ‘chil-
dren drinking water’ to survive on our planet. The physical manifestation of delivering clean 
water is enacted, objectified, and manifested as material practices in the water companies’ daily 
work as a basis premise of their livelihood.  
The material practices of creating or manifesting ideas and values into the material of water (e.g. 
cleaning it before diffusing it back to nature) and the objects of the pipeline for transportation of 
water to the consumers have been shown to be in touch with the CSR logic and concrete enact-
ment of sustainable engineering working methods. These material practices work in both sym-
bolic as well as in physical manifestations since water is the basic material for exchange to con-
sumers and through this exchange the symbol of a means for extending life. This is taken for 
granted especially in the Western world but is more visible in parts of the world, where people 
do not have adequate amounts of clean water, which means early death and environmental deg-
radation. This is physically present in these parts while not in others such as in Denmark, the 
UK, the US, and the richer parts of South Africa. 
This claim–that the material produced induces physical and symbolically meaning for the stance 
or logic of CSR in different industrial sectors–is not only linked to producers of water for con-
sumption; it is also viable in other industries such as the oil industry, where the CSR logic may 
seem different due to the material and symbolic practices of oil extraction (see Misutka et al., 
2013). Oil is an object of energy, which is a condition of life similar to water. However, oil 
spills may produce severe environmental disasters, which symbolically and physically may trig-
ger another way of dealing with CSR. Water too may be contaminated, but water itself usually 
does not contaminate other environments. However, water in extremes may too be dangerous. 
This is considered in water companies’ striving for mitigating and solving the problems occur-
ring from the climate change in the form of flooding. Thus, Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in 
Paper #8 it is suggested may be common to other industries as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
Corporate social responsibility in the water sector has been found to be a colonising logic de-
rived and articulated as an ideational relegitimisation of water companies as trustworthy public 
service providers. It is enacted through their policies and guiding texts and dispersed throughout 
these organisations into material practices of stakeholder engagement. Hybrid organisations 
such as these water companies seems to have a future possibility to become role models and 
ambassadors of CSR and stakeholder engagement (see also Haigh et al., 2012) as an inspiration 
for other business sectors. They have shown that in spite of economic constraints and struggles 
with permissions and allowances due to dichotomous regulation, it is not impossible to be so-
cially responsible while optimising one’s economic potential.  
The interview statement: “We are CSR!” (Interview B, March 2011) needs to be anchored in 
material practices if stakeholders are to have faith in such claims and trust the water companies, 
which is easier said in texts than done in practice. Instantiations of the material practices of insti-
tutional logics exemplified througout the analysis of the colonising CSR logic has both been 
shown to be viable for Danish water companies but also as likely to be viable for other organisa-
tions in other countries under other cultural constituencies due to the global diffusion of New 
Public Management and the privatisation strategies of the public sector. In water companies the 
object of water and the materiality of this and objects through which water has to be distributed 
to the end consumers has been shown to be deeply embedded in the CSR logic as both symbolic 
carriers of ideas and physical manifestations (the proofs) of values. Material practices thus in-
duce physical and symbolical meaning for the logic of CSR.  
These conclusions suggests the following implications for academia and practitioners. 
Implications for academia 
This PhD thesis shows that research in corporate social responsibility should not be limited to 
private sector corporations, but invites a broader research spectrum of organisations in to inform 
CSR, models and empirical studies. This thesis has shown how former municipality offices qua-
si-privatised into water companies can contribute to the knowledge of CSR and suggest new 
ways of implementing CSR in practice, that might inform other sectors than the one studied. The 
field of public service and CSR has until now been very little researched (Paper #1 p. 83), but 
the results of this thesis show that there is much research to do in CSR in the public sector; es-
pecially after (quasi) privatisation of most parts of it (Christensen & Lægreid, 2010). Traditional 
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public administrations do not fall outside this recommendation. Since many Danish municipali-
ties and state offices and ministries are deeply engaged in CSR issues, as mentioned in this the-
sis through examples of municipalities and their climate policies to mitigate climate change 
among many other issues, this thesis suggests that CSR is no longer a relevant concept only for 
corporations, but for–as recommended in Paper #5 CSR in the aftermath of the financial crisis–
for “all kinds of organisations acting on the capitalist market ... both in industries, the financial, 
governmental, non-governmental and the public sector.” (see page 217). 
This thesis has also revealed other gaps in knowledge and in the theoretical framing of CSR in 
for instance the banking sector (Paper #5, p. 193), for which research has exploded after the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. This sector needs new CSR models that are actually capable of fram-
ing such financial products, in which the material practice of money transfer happens through 
other technologies and trust relationships that are hard to instantiate. 
Besides, this thesis has contributed to several new principles and models in the field of CSR and 
stakeholder engagement such as the Organic Stakeholder Model, Paper #2, p. 111), the The new 
Four ‘E’ Principle:  Economy, L/Egal, Environment, and Ethics to guide new developments of 
CSR models (Paper #5, p. 193), and a CSR model for project management in engineering and 
construction practices based upon the type of leadership that includes faith, bravery, care, and 
leadership as a pathway to enact sustainable project management (Paper #7, p. 245). 
Finally, this thesis has addressed a research gap concerning materials and material practices in 
the theory of institutional logics (Paper #8, p. 261). Through the study of CSR in the water sec-
tor it has found that materials, objects, and material practices are important carriers of both 
physical and ideational values which institutional logics are based upon. Creation and manifesta-
tion of ideas and values into materials and objects and the exchange of them or enactment of 
material practices is suggested to form the basis premise of the logic of CSR as well as it might 
be forming the basis in other kinds of logics eventually. 
Implications for practitioners 
What I hope practitioners reading this thesis will obtain is that corporate social responsibility 
has a vital function in companies working for or under the public sector. Although newly privat-
ised public service companies such as water companies in Denmark, Scandinavia, and elsewhere 
are beginning to adopt practices in line with the theoretical concepts of CSR and sustainability, 
this does not mean that they were not doing these practices before they began to name it CSR or 
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sustainability. It is rather a matter of these companies beginning to interpret that their everyday 
work, which they have practiced in some instance for centuries51, can be perceived as CSR and 
sustainability practices. The news for these companies through the findings of this thesis is, that 
this sector is somehow a novice in communicating its material practices of CSR and sustainabil-
ity to a wider stakeholder audience than those they are immediately surrounded by (see Paper 
#2), since only around 10 percent do so in countries like Denmark, the UK, the US and South 
Africa according to Paper #3 and Paper #6. It may strengthen the water companies’ stakeholder 
engagement if they enhance their communication with these wider stakeholder audiences about 
which ’CSR’ and ’sustainability’ (material) practices they actually work with and urge to engage 
in enhanced knowledge sharing with those groups of professionals they are not used to share a 
common vocabulary with, such as economists, jurists, and lawmakers as shown in Paper #4.  
This thesis also shows that it is sustainable for water companies to continue improving their in-
vestments in sustainable practices, CSR, and leadership. Sustainability is ensuring one’s organi-
sation acts on both a short-term and a long-term basis (Aras & Crowther, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
Making sustainable investments may be costly on a short-term basis, but will gain long-term 
benefits not only in terms of CSR but also in terms of sustainable financial returns.  
The financial crisis 2007/2008 is almost tangible evidence of the short-term market focus of 
business and individual agents’ personal, financial enrichment. Adopting CSR and sustainability 
in business policies and practice does not come easily. It is a long and meticulous journey since 
it takes the implementation of a total sustainable leadership from the top management to the 
bottom self-governance of workers at the bottom. However, as Paper #7 shows, going towards 
this path should reveal not only benefits for society but also for the companies enacting it and 
the consumers buying their products. 
                                                
51
 e.g. many Danish water companies have a history dating more than 100 years back of serving society with fresh 
water and sanitation. See for instance http://www.vcsdenmark.com/about%20us/facts%20and%20figures, retrieved 
18 September 2013. 
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PAPER #1 
CSR in Danish Water Companies–Opportunities and Barriers 
    	      
          
(This paper is an extended post-print52 version of the published version: “CSR in Publicly 
Owned Enterprises: Opportunities and Barriers”, Social Responsibility Journal (2011), 7 (4), pp. 
558-577). 
ABSTRACT
This paper is a study and analysis of CSR and the current legal regulatory framework of Danish 
water companies. CSR in these hybrid organisations, which are privatised but politically driven, 
has been found to face various challenges in reaching the same level as private organisations. 
This paper shows that there are opportunities and barriers for CSR in these types of companies 
that in spite of–or maybe because of–their structural hybridity between managing a private as 
well as a political organisation makes these companies attractive in the arena of CSR.  
The opportunities for CSR in water companies seems more beneficial than for normal private 
businesses, since these organisations due to their structural hybridity are more closely connected 
to the decision makers of local government and the city council where some of the local politi-
cians sit on the board of these companies. The barriers to CSR, found in the legal regulatory 
framework, diminishes the action radius of CSR in the light of efficiencies, price and cost reduc-
tions, and tight rules on which kinds of investments the companies can make.  
The argument in the paper is that the state and local government influence and the stakeholders 
both yield and limit the freedom of water companies to deal with CSR initiatives. This is also 
called a schism of CSR. The paper contributes to the CSR literature in its research in opportuni-
ties and barriers for CSR in hybrid organisations as a structural mix of private (business) and 
public administrations. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, governmental influence, hybrid organisations, role 
of politicians, water industry,  
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 see Emerald’s definition at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/authors/writing/author_rights.htm  
84
INTRODUCTION
This paper highlights the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Danish water companies, 
which, since 200753, are organised as hybrid organisations of mixed structures from the public 
and private sector. The CSR literature has for many years mainly been focusing on multinational 
companies. In later years research in CSR in SMEs has been done, but still there is little litera-
ture about hybrid organisations such as water companies. This research contributes to the CSR 
literature by addressing CSR in a niche of growing businesses as the privatisation of the state 
and local government functions occur as a part of in through New Public Management ideas 
(Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Greve, 2002, 2009).  
The paper focuses on the schism in the water companies’ organisational role because they are 
hybrids of a private and a political organisation. The schism of CSR in these companies arises 
from the fact that the Danish water companies are driven as hybrids between two known but 
very different institutions: a private company and a politically driven public administration of 
the municipality. This affects the CSR work of the organisation in many ways. This, and the 
governmental and political stakeholders’ influence on the corporate accountability, is the es-
sence of the paper. 
THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT TRAJECTORY
Many countries in the EU have been inspired by the governmental New Public Management 
(NPM) trends initiated in the UK and the USA under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan 
(Deakin & Walsh, 1996; Peters, 1996; Hall, 1998 (a)+(b); Rhodes, 1997, 2007; Lobina & Hall, 
1999, 2000; Pollitt & Bouchaert, 2004; Bakker, 2005). Since the 1990s, the Danish government 
as have many other states adopted NPM as means of a general reformation of the public sector. 
They wanted to gain benefits of efficiency and high quality of public services without raising 
taxes and prices (Pedersen, 2010; Greve, 2009, Politt & Bouckaert, 2004) as observed and de-
scribed in the early NPM models of f.x. Hood (1991), Osborne & Gaebler (1992), Rhodes 
(1994, 1996), Barzelay (2001), Kettl (2002), and Pollitt & Bouchaert (2004).  
The incentives of the reformation of the public sector in all its different forms including NPM 
models were to aim for savings while improving performance: a mix of paradoxes of demands 
or a “utopian quality” as noticed by Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004, p. 104) (Pedersen, 2010; Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2004). These incentives already showed some severe contradictions in the 1990s, 
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especially in the UK and South Africa (Hall, 1998 (a)+(b); Rhodes, 1997, 2007; Lobina & Hall, 
1999, 2000). Still the objectives have not changed in the reformation processes all over the 
world (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). The incentives for implementing New Public Management as 
an instrumental tool in the Danish public service of water and sewer management is indeed to 
save money while improving quality, performance, and deliverances. This was stated in the Wa-
ter Management Report from 2003 from the Danish Ministry of Economy and Business Affairs
prior to the implementation of the Structural Reform in 2007, which created the new water com-
panies as publicly owned enterprises (The Danish Competition Authority, 2003).  
The potential of savings of 207 million US $54 was the reason for the transformation of water 
utilities organised as a public service within the municipality into a hybrid organisation driven 
by market forces, competition, and managerial techniques from the private business sector. 
However, this sector was now to be controlled by the Competition Authority as a state regulator.
Performance auditing (as for instance ‘benchmarking’) as evaluation of the ‘Three Es’–
economy, efficiency and effectiveness–is the key to control seen more or less in many countries 
as a means to cost savings as the foremost objective (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Pedersen, 
2010; Greve, 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  
The results from the New Public Management during the last two decades have been mixed. 
Some results are good for particular groups and individuals (fx. politicians, public service man-
agers or customers (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, p. 166)), and some does not show higher quality 
or lower prices depending on where you look (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Pedersen, 2010; 
Greve, 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  
One of the subtle working tools within New Public Management to prevent bad positioning in 
benchmarking is the involvement of innovation in the public service. An analysis made by 
Pedersen (2010) of the degree of involvement of innovation in the former public administration 
in Denmark shows that there has been no significant higher level of innovation during the last 
two decades of New Public Management and other reformation strategies of the public service 
than before. Formalising innovation as an output measurement, which is benchmarked among 
public service bodies of similar status (Pedersen, 2010) has not yet been shown to improve.
Pedersen’s analysis shows that in the former Danish public Budget-Monopoly-Bureaucracy 
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 converted from 1.3 billion DKK, 26th May 2003 currency, see http://www.kfst.dk/Indhold-
KFST/Publikationer/Dansk/2003/~/media/KFST/Publikationer/Dansk/2003/20030526%20konkurrenceredegoerelse
%202003.pdf, page 101, retrieved 20th September 2013. 
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model innovation did take place although the impression among politicians was that innovation 
was one of the answers to gain more services of higher quality for less money.  
Still the belief of the political performance imperative to accomplish different incentives and to 
secure reelection stands (Pedersen, 2010; Greve, 2009). One of the ongoing political incentives 
in Denmark established by the then liberal-conservative government is the so-called ‘tax freeze’ 
started in 200255. However, New Public Management was introduced in other public service 
sectors (Postal Service, Airports, Telecommunication, and cultural institutions) a long time be-
fore under the socialdemocratic government from 1993-2002 (Ejersbo & Greve, 2008). The in-
spiration came from Thatcher and Reagan during the 1980s, when the conservatives were in the 
Danish government.  
However, no shift in NPM trends has appeared in spite of successive governments. More and 
more reforms have been introduced to make the public service cost effective. At the moment the 
Danish population’s highest birth rate (the year 1946) have reached the pension age (65 years in 
Denmark) and are retiring56 while the death rate is decreasing57. Fewer and fewer people in the 
workforce earn money to support the elder and younger generation through their tax payments. 
Since Denmark still has the highest tax rate in the world, incentives for reducing public expendi-
ture are naturally increasingly popular. Citizens do not want their tax level to rise, nor do they 
want a lower quality of public service (Pedersen, 2010). It is called ‘value for money’ (Pedersen, 
2010), or to ‘do more with less’ (Osborne, 1983).
Will New Public Management as part of the Danish public reformation strategy among other 
instruments provide value for money? This is still a good question. This paper does not intend to 
contradict these wishes and the methodologies within New Public Management: it will confront 
the possibilities and outcome opportunities of the instruments within the New Public Manage-
ment as means of overcoming the bias of doing more with less and creating value for money.
The critical perspective of this paper is to question these biases and their instruments to solve 
the aims of the New Public Management. 
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 See the Danish Financial Ministry report from 3rd April 2002: 
http://www.skm.dk/skatteomraadet/publikationer/publikationer/notater/592.html, re-retrieved and checked 20th 
September 2013.
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 http://www.information.dk/227758, re-retrieved and checked 20th September 2013. 
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 http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?article=879andpagetype=teknodebat, re-retrieved and checked 20th Septem-
ber 2013.  
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The consequences of the request for value for money are seen in the opportunities of public ser-
vice to take other demands into consideration: especially the issues of corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR). Although CSR is addressing the interests of the society (Garriga & Melé, 2004; 
van Marrewijk, 2003; Carroll, 1991) and thereby the citizens in order to overcome problems of 
climate change, environmental and other social issues, the political imperatives of New Public 
Management impedes the social incentives of corporate social responsibility through the de-
mands of doing more with less and the creation of value for money by demanding savings in 
economy through more efficiency and effectiveness. 
The transformation of the political administration from bureaucracy to private business such as 
into state private partnerships and state and publicly owned enterprises58 (Moon, 2001; Lobina & 
Hall, 2000, 1999; Moon & Vogel, 2008) has changed the responsibilities of these new privatised 
companies. Following from that CSR at the same time has consolidated as a “European” trend in 
Europe divergent from the US trend in which CSR was initiated (Van Luijk, 1990; Vogel, 1992, 
1998; Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008; Crane & Matten, 2004, 2007) and has impacted these new 
companies as well. Thus, the growth of CSR in Europe must also be understood in relation to 
the New Public Management movement and the aftermath of this context (Greve, 2009). The 
Danish Structural Reform in 200759 is an example of a late adoption of these NPM trends 
(Greve, 2009) and it is in this light the new Danish water companies must be understood. 
In Denmark the municipalities were aggregated into fewer but larger municipalities by the Local 
Government Reform60 effectuated the 1st of January 2007 by the Structural Reform61. A new 
Water Sector Act (WSA) instructed municipalities to separate operation from authority in their 
utilities by establishing new municipality owned companies as limited liabilities or privately 
limited companies62. The initiative for the WSA came from the Danish Competition Authority, 
which stated that "[a] 2003 study shows that there is potential for efficiency improvements of 
roughly 1 billion DKK” (DANVA, 2009, p. 8; Competition Report, 2003, ch. 4: The Water 
Market). 
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 Notice on the use of public-private partnership (PPP), partnering and information similar to ratios, Act on state 
construction expenses etc., LOV nr. 228 af 19/05/1971, Act on the water sector’s organisation and economic condi-
tions (hereafter called “The Water Sector Act”) (in Danish “Lov om vandsektorens organisering og økonomiske 
forhold”), LOV no.469 of 12/06/2009.  
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 See The Structural Reform and The Structural Agreement in the references. 
60Law amending the Local Government Act, Act on Regions and on the imposition of counties, the Greater Copen-
hagen and the Copenhagen Hospital Corporation and the Law on chartered and registered auditors, LOV nr. 510 af 
06/06/2007, (The Structural Reform). 
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 See The Structural Reform and The Structural Agreement in the references. 
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 The Water Sector Act, §2 and §15. 
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WATER COMPANIES IN DENMARK
With the Structural Reform in 2007 the new WSA stated that all Danish municipalities should 
create water companies as limited liabilities or other similar company structures. These compa-
nies should follow the Budget and Accounting Act as any other private company in Denmark63. 
The new water companies were created as service companies, which typically are owned by the 
municipalities64 in which they are located (Lobina & Hall, 2000, 1999; Hall, 1998(b)). The mu-
nicipalities had now become shareholders. The Danish water companies are organised and 
driven as a non-profit companies according to the Danish Companies Act65, which is made for 
private companies, and economically subjected to the Annual Accounts Act66.  
The WSA was very different from the way the old municipalities under the Weberian Budget-
Monopoly-Bureaucracy era (Pedersen, 2010) had ever managed their income from taxes and 
other user payments. Since the municipality no longer had the public water service as part of 
their internal governance, the Competition Authority had to control the water companies in mat-
ters of economy. This state authority has to control the marketisation process and secure the 
cheapest and best water service delivery on the market (The Danish Competition Authority, 
2003).  
A new Price Cap Notice67 was created and a national benchmarking among all Danish water 
companies was established. Not only should all assets and liabilities of each company be report-
ed: annual budgets and accountings were also to be reported to the new regulator. From all these 
reports a final price cap was set for each of the companies: a level for the highest price that wa-
ter consumption could cost as a result of the national benchmarking. Were the price to be set 
above this price cap, penalties would be given to the company in order to follow the regulators’ 
order (The Danish Competition Authority, 2003). 
The board of the water companies typically consists of local politicians from the city council68 of 
the municipality in question. The municipality develops guidelines for the company in terms of 
water and wastewater plans, municipal plans and regional plans, with which the company must 
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 See Act on municipal disposal of water supplies and sewage supplies, LBK nr 634 af 07/06/2010, and the Water 
Sector Act. 
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 The Water Sector Act §15. 
65
 The Water Sector Act §15. 
66
 The Water Sector Act §20.
67
 See The Price Cap Notice (in Danish “Bekendtgørelse om prisloftregulering m.v. af vandsektoren”), BEK nr 143 
af 09/02/2010 
68
 The Water Sector Act, LOV nr.469 af 12/06/2009. 
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comply69 according to the decisions made in the City Council. The principle of the company is 
to deliver drinking water and treat wastewater before returning the water to nature70 based on the 
cost-recovery principle71. The water companies are still acting in a market characterised as a 
natural monopoly unlike the sectors of for instance electricity, postal service, and telecommuni-
cation, which in Denmark have been privatised with a profit orientation.  
The Danish water company as a municipality owned non-profit company has unique stakeholder 
relationships that differ from traditional private businesses. The board of the water company is 
typically composed of politically elected council members together with employee representa-
tives, and the director represents the company’s governance. This gives a direct connection to 
local government (Crane & Matten, 2004, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008). Thus the deci-
sion makers of the water companies have power to change and affect the companies in matters 
of CSR (Moon, 2001). This gives some advantages but also some disadvantages.  
The main topics that managers of the Danish water companies reacted very badly to in the first 
place were the clear economic division between investments and operations. By and large, in-
vestments would make the price cap increase, and operation costs would make it decrease on the 
short-term. The idea was to force the water companies to become more and more efficient and 
effective by lowering the operation costs and securing the savings of the promised billion 
(DKK) per year for the public good for the long tern. To capture the Three E’s–economy, effi-
ciency and effectiveness–has been the Danish national mantra in nearly all public service since 
the 1990s (Pedersen, 2010; Greve, 2009), and the new regulation of the water sector as an insti-
tutional bureaucratic task drove managers of the water companies to claim that:  
“This constrains the environmental and sustainability purposes of our duties: 
for us to manage and secure a fresh and healthy water resource for future gen-
erations!” (Interview B, March 2011, my translation).  
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 The Danish Municipality Government (in Danish “Bekendtgørelse af lov om kommunernes styrelse”) LBK nr 
696 af 27/06/2008, and the Decree: Act on planning (in Danish “Bekendtgørelse af lov om planlægning”) LBK nr. 
937 af 24/09/2009. 
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 The Water Sector Act § 1. 
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 Law on Water Supply (in Danish “Bekendtgørelse af lov om vandforsyning m.v.”) LBK nr. 935 af 24/09/2009, 
and the Law on Payment Rules for Sewage Plants (in Danish “Bekendtgørelse af lov om betalingsregler  
for spildevandsanlæg m.v.”) LBK nr. 281 af 22/03/2007, and Law amending the Law on Environmental Protection, 
Law on Water, Law on the payment rules for sewage plants, etc. and various other laws (in Danish “Lov om æn-
dring af lov om miljøbeskyttelse, lov om vandforsyning, lov om betalingsregler for spildevandsanlæg m.v. og for-
skellige andre love) LOV nr. 460 af 12/06/2009.
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The above manager expresses that these values are inherent in the way the water resources are 
managed and kept sound and sustainable, and that many of these costs cannot be treated as eco-
nomic investments according to a price cap. It will be measured as operations in spite of the 
high investments the water companies have to accomplish, because it does not fit into this new 
legislative body of the budget and accounting model (Ejersbo & Greve, 2008; OECD, 2002). 
ARGUMENT
The argument of this paper is that the state and local governmental influence and the stake-
holders both yield and limit the freedom of the water companies to deal with CSR initiatives. As 
stakeholders of this organisation, the state and local governmental influences (Crane & Matten, 
2004, 2007; Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008) on the company accountability are paramount and 
untraditional compared to normal private businesses. Not only are the state and local govern-
ments dominant key stakeholders: the local government has also many stakeholder roles, which 
at first glance might seem controversial compared to normal business stakeholders. As we will 
see, CSR in water companies is characterised by the somewhat ambiguous and untraditional 
stakeholder roles a single stakeholder possesses, namely the city council politician and board 
member of the water company. This specific setup is crucial from the point of view of CSR in 
both beneficial and restrictive ways.  
METHODOLOGY
To reach an understanding and frame CSR in the Danish water companies as hybrid organisa-
tions the analysis is initiated by an empirical examination of the descriptive and normative CSR 
that the new WSA lays out for them. A newly formed institution and the premises behind this is 
written in this act, which is a combination of Matten & Moon’s (2004, 2008) concept ‘Implicit/ 
Explicit’ CSR. Thus this CSR concept is used to analyse the case of CSR in the water compa-
nies facing the legal, judicial, and managerial descriptive starting point of the WSA. It will be 
combined with the stakeholder concept of Wartick & Wood’s (1998) to understand CSR from 
an outside/inside view. The implicit/explicit approach to CSR explains the external (outside) 
view, and Wartick & Wood’s stakeholder approach to CSR explains the internal (inside) view.   
The analysis will face the legal and juridical status of the water companies. This will bring us to 
a discussion of the results and address the schism of CSR in the Danish water companies de-
rived from it. In this discussion the many roles of the politician as a key stakeholder is stressed 
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along with the tight regime of governmental regulation, that forms part of the schism of CSR in 
these companies. 
THEORETICAL APPROACH
Dirk Matten and Jeremy Moon coined the term ‘Implicit’ and ‘Explicit’ CSR as a normative, 
conceptual framework for understanding CSR in Europe and USA (Matten & Moon, 2004, 
2008). It has been quoted, compared, criticised, and used by many scholars and has therefore 
been seen as very relevant to the discussion of CSR especially in Europe (Boesby, Roepstorff, & 
Granerud, 2008; Amaeshi, 2008; Battaglia et al., 2008; Donaldson, 2008; Weberg, 2009; Kin-
derman, 2006, 2008; Broomhill, 2007; Williams & Aguilera, 2008; Masaka, 2008; Aytac, 2009; 
Benjnouh, 2009; Lockett, Moon, & Visser, 2006; Crane & Matten, 2004; Matten & Moon, 
2004a; Moon & Grafski, 2004; Louche & Lydenberg, 2006).  
”By explicit CSR we refer to corporate policies to assume responsibility for the 
interests of the society. Explicit CSR would normally consist of voluntary, 
selfinterest driven policies, programs and strategies by corporations address-
ing issues perceived as being part of their social responsibility by the company 
and/or its stakeholders.  
... 
By implicit CSR we understand the entirety of a country’s formal and informal 
institutions assigning corporations an agreed share of responsibility for soci-
ety’s interests and concerns. Implicit CSR normally consists of values, norms 
and rules which result in (mostly mandatory but also customary) requirements 
for corporations to address issues stakeholders consider a proper obligation 
upon corporate actors.” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 409). 
The ‘Implicit/Explicit’ clearly forms the external factors of CSR as a total framework in which 
the business and organisation is placed. To understand the internal factors of CSR the stake-
holder theory is a widely used approach. Stakeholder theory is an established field in strategic 
management as well as a well-known approach to CSR. It is continuing to produce tremendous 
debates, new theoretical approaches, and scholarly articles, and this paper cannot possibly ad-
dress all the relevant literature in this field. Most readers of CSR literature are familiar with the 
most important stakeholder theories and theorists like Freeman, Donaldson & Preston, Caroll & 
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Buchholz, Dunfee, Aguilera et al., Jensen, Mitchell et al., Wartick & Wood, Mahoney, and 
Rowley just to name a few. 
In this case Wartick & Wood’s (1998) stakeholder approach makes a very interesting point in 
stressing the term ‘power’ having a direct linkage to CSR. Wartick & Wood (1998) and before 
them also Mitchell et al. (1997) argue that there are three key attributes that defines the per-
ceived importance or salience of those stakeholders: power, legitimacy, and urgency. Those 
stakeholders that possess all three attributes will by most managers be perceived as the most 
important stakeholders and can be termed ‘definitive’ stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997; War-
tick & Wood, 1998). According to Wartick & Wood (1998) stakeholders hold three types of 
power: formal (shareholders, directors), economic (employees, customers, suppliers, creditors), 
and political power (pressure groups, activists, governments and the community) (King, 2000; 
Wartick & Wood, 1998).  
“Traditional stakeholders (shareholders, directors, executive managers) hold 
formal power within the corporation and can influence decisions via their vot-
ing rights. Stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, creditors and employees 
have economic power inasmuch as they are able to influence the cost and reve-
nue structure of a corporation; while pressure groups, activists, governments 
and the community hold political power by influencing the social and political 
conditions under which a corporation operates.” (Quoted from Wartick & 
Wood 1998, p. 100; in King, 2000, pp. 6-7) 
Wartick & Wood recognise that some stakeholders have multiple power bases (King, 2000). 
This is what we will next see in the analysis in the case of some of the key stakeholders in Dan-
ish water companies. 
ANALYSIS
Seen through the ‘Implicit/Explicit’ lens, CSR in hybrid organisations such as the Danish water 
companies is mostly embedded in the community (Donaldson, 2008; Moon & Vogel, 2008; 
Crane & Matten, 2007; Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Welford, 2004). CSR is taken care of 
through the national legislation (implicit CSR), negotiations with trade unions (e.g. statements 
on normal working hours, maximum overtime, fair wage structures (Welford, 2004)), industry 
associations and through other institutional agreements. This is also the case for almost all other 
businesses in the country (Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008; Crane & Matten, 2004, 2007; Morsing, 
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in Habisch et al., 2005; Welford, 2004). CSR lies partly in specific business policies and in the 
business strategies and initiatives (Matten & Moon, 2008). Where these parts of CSR are be-
yond legislation, it is to be called explicit CSR. 
Explicit CSR is typically seen in business paid training of staff72 (Boesby, Roepstorff, & 
Granerud, 2008; Matten & Moon, 2008), supplementing health insurances for staff members73, 
and investments in art acquisitions or donations to cultural institutions74. The state of Denmark 
encourages these investments with concessional deductions in corporate taxation75 (Morsing, in 
Habisch et al., 2005). This tendency, which is seen in many European countries, has been tre-
mendously criticised: the latest being in the BBC production of Ben Lewis, The Great Art Bub-
ble (Lewis, 2009)76. 
The environmental and climatic issues of CSR, according to the EU legislation and derived na-
tional laws77, are centrally administered and regulated (Vallentin & Murillo, 2009; Morsing, in 
Habisch et al., 2005) as implicit CSR. In this field business branding has an important stake in 
companies’ voluntary (explicit) disclosure of green accounting78, CSR reports, and ISO 14001 
and EMAS (Environmental Management and Auditing Scheme) certifications etc. (Moon & 
Matten, 2008; Moon, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane & Matten, 2004; Matten, 2002; Moon, 
2001). This is also evolving in small and medium sized enterprises in Denmark (Boesby, Roep-
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 Law on vocational training and higher education (further education for adults), see LBK nr. 1051 af 29 August 
2007. See also the Danish Statistics Newsletter: “Nyt fra Danmarks Statistik No. 1, 5th January 2010.   
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 Announcement of the Law on the allocation of income tax to the state (Assessment Act), LBK nr. 176 af 
11/03/2009 
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 Art critic and filmmaker Ben Lewis spent two years following the contemporary art market, from its heady peak 
in May 2008 until the crash and burn in October. Now, in a new and updated version of the film first broadcast in 
May 2009, he returns one year later, in October 2009, to discover a very different market. The last five years had 
witnessed an unprecedented craze for contemporary art, in which works of art by Andy Warhol, Francis Bacon, and 
Mark Rothko sold for record-breaking prices of 30 million pounds upwards. It all climaxed in September 2008, 
when Damien Hirst sold 111 million pounds' worth of his art at an unprecedented auction at Sotheby's - the very 
day Lehman Brothers collapsed bringing down the financial markets of the western world. The bubble did not burst 
the night of the Hirst sale - but it proved to be a last hurrah. The auctions in October and November 2008 were a 
disaster, and Ben was there too, filming the art world in shock. By early 2009, the contemporary art auction market 
was down 75 per cent, auction houses had recorded record losses and were rapidly downsizing. In October 2009, 
Ben returns to find out what has been happening. In this insider eye-witness journey into the art world, Ben visits 
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the greatest rise in financial value of art in history. He interviews leading dealers, art collectors and art market ana-
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siasm for art. (Documentary Review from BBC Four). 
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 E.g. implementation of the EU-directives  
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 LOV nr. 1403 af 27d December 2008 and Ordinance on Some Tier Firms Required to Prepare Green Accounts, 
BEK nr. 210 af 03/03/2010, LBK nr. 1757 af 22/12/2006 Announcement of Law on Environmental Protection (En-
vironmental Protection Act). 
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storff, & Granerud, 2008) and now also amongst some water companies in Denmark (DANVA, 
2009).  
In Denmark multinational companies are forced by law (implicitly) to carry out green account-
ing. Although it is mandatory but is framed as if it were voluntary, CSR reports are more ‘talk’ 
than ‘walking the talk’. The lack of numbers, which appear in those reports, show the necessity 
of standardising and streamlining of the reporting structure into measurable and comparable 
entities (Vogel, 2005, p. 68).  
Examples of explicit CSR in environmental initiatives of these businesses are seen in green pur-
chasing policies (Pedersen 2009, 2008) and in voluntary reductions of energy consumption and 
greenhouse emissions. Whether the explicit CSR is about caring, reputation, branding, or spin-
ning to earn more money depends on different company agendas (Vallentin and Murillo, 2009; 
Vogel, 2005), which sometimes can be hard to spot (Dunfee, 2008; Aguilera et al., 2007; Moon, 
2004; King, 2000). 
In many concrete cases the problem with implicit CSR in the EU is that it is often formulated as 
public policies formed through rules and laws and thereby not recognised as ‘real’ CSR. It is 
perceived as a ‘social contract’ between the company and society (Matten & Moon, 2008; 
Donaldson, 2008; Moon, 2001; Donaldson & Dunfee, 1999; Husted, 1999; Dunfee, 1998; 
Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). This is in comparisons with e.g. USA, where much more CSR is 
explicit and welfare is chosen and paid for by businesses for their staff, whereas welfare in the 
EU is paid by the EU states through taxes etc. (Matten & Moon, 2008; Crane & Matten, 2004). 
In conventional definitions CSR is regarded as incompatible with governmental regulation, 
which the term ‘implicit’ CSR reverses: 
“In Europe explicit CSR is a key issue for regulators. The general approach 
seems to facilitate a new trend in business and encourage companies to assume 
more responsibilities as most welfare states in Europe are increasingly facing 
limits to their capacities of tackling social issues in the way they traditionally 
did. This political activity can be observed on all levels: There are significant 
efforts by the European Commission, both in terms of funded projects as well 
as Green papers and other publications with the intent of defining and shaping 
CSR in a European context.” (Matten & Moon, 2004, p. 24). 
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This is seen in Denmark (Moon & Vogel, 2008; Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005) in several 
governmental initiatives starting from the 1990s. In these years record levels of unemployment 
in the country prompted the Social Democratic Minister for Social Affairs to encourage various 
forms of CSR (Vallentin & Murillo, 2009; Rosdahl, 2001; Jespersen, 2003). It was framed in 
terms of the Danish CSR Law for Multi National Companies79 as well as other initiatives, for 
instance initiatives originating from the The EU Green Papers (Vallentin & Murillo, 2009). The 
governmental promotion of CSR by exhortation, facilitation, and partnering (Vallentin & 
Murillo, 2009; Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2002; Fox, 2004) followed examples 
from the UK (Moon & Vogel, 2008). 
THE STAKEHOLDER APPROACH TO CSR 
The multiple stakeholders80 of the Danish water companies can explain the internal factors af-
fecting CSR, which is typical for any organisation in the EU (Pedersen, 2009; Crane & Matten, 
2004, 2007; King, 2000; Vogel, 1992, 1998; Van Luijk, 1990). The three types of power: for-
mal, economic and political (King, 2000; Wartick & Wood, 1998), include the following in the 
Danish water companies:  
1) The shareholder81 and owner (the municipality) is represented on the company’s board  
2) The employees of the company 
3) The customers of the company (the citizens of the municipality) underlying the monopoly of 
the institution 
4) The local and governmental authorities that represent the legal frames for the organisation82. 
Beyond these primary stakeholders more periphery stakeholders (Wartick & Wood, 199883) are 
present, such as suppliers, cooperating partners, neighbours, and NGOs etc. In the context of 
‘natural monopoly’ competitors do not formally84 exist (Buch-Hansen, 2008; Crane & Matten, 
2007; Friedman, 2002; Moon, 2001; Lobina & Hall, 2000, 1999). However, to some extent, in 
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 LOV nr. 1403 of 27th December 2008 and Ordinance on Some Tier Firms Required to Prepare Green Accounts, 
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 Including shareholders (Crane and Matten, 2007) 
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 seen in conjunction with the company management (directors and managers) 
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 The Danish Municipality Government Law 
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 about ’primary’ and ’secondary’ stakeholder influences 
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 Arguments about the consequences of the Water Sector Law could counteract this perspective, since the Price 
Cap Notice aims to create an ’artificial’ competition or market among the water- and sewer utilities. 
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smaller water companies the threat of being superseded by large water companies does exist85, 
and in this way it makes sense to talk about ‘competitors’ eventually. 
Compared to ‘normal’ businesses there is a clear dependency among the key stakeholders in the 
hybrid organisations of Danish water companies. In ‘normal’ private organisations there is a 
natural gap of interests in e.g. being a shareholder and an employee, or being a customer and 
being the authority, and vice versa (Crane et al., 2008; Crane & Matten, 2007). In the Danish 
water companies the key stakeholders are mixed up in dependencies, which we shall see later in 
the water companies governs both the opportunities and the barriers for CSR. 
A natural ‘logic’ of dependencies among the key stakeholders is that the shareholder and sole 
owner of the typical water company is the municipality, which is represented on the board by 
politicians from the city council86. The citizens of the municipality elect the politicians every 
fourth year87 to the city council, and therefore the politicians also represent the citizens of the 
municipality on the board of the water company. The citizens of the municipality are the con-
sumers of water and sewer supplies and therefore also the customers of the water company. 
Represented by the politicians on the board the customers are somehow implicitly the ‘owners’ 
of the company. Finally, the local authorities of the municipality represent the governmental 
legislation, and since the municipality owns the water company, the water company must be a 
role model, since eventual critique rebounds on the municipality. The dependency among the 
key stakeholders can affect the CSR of the water company both positively and negatively. This 
could be among the following explicit CSR features as shown in Figure 1: 
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 LOV nr. 460 af 12/06/2009 § 2 stk. 3, 4 and 5, § 3 stk. 24 
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 The Water Sector Act § 15 and Act on limited companies (Companies Act), LOV nr. 470 af 12/06/2009, §36, 
The Danish Municipality Government, LBK nr. 696 af 27th June 2008, Decree Law on planning, LBK nr. 937 af 
24/09/2009. 
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 Law on municipal and regional elections, see LOV nr. 585 af 23 June 2008 with the changes imposed by § 3 of 
LOV nr. 1347 af 19 December 2008. The published texts apply only fully from 1st April 2009. See § 4 of LOV nr. 
1347 af 19 December 2008.
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FIGURE 1: 'EXPLICIT' CSR IN THE DANISH WATER COMPANIES 
It is necessary to recognise that centrally governed implicit CSR in the Danish water sector is 
surrounded by rules, legislation, union negotiations etc. (Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane 
& Matten, 2004). Therefore, the above ‘explicit’ CSR means ‘beyond the implicit CSR’ (Moon 
& Matten, 2008).  
That Danish water companies are ‘natural monopolies’ (Friedman, 2002; Crane & Matten, 2007; 
Buch-Hansen, 2008; Lobina & Hall, 2000, 1999) that sell water under beneficial conditions 
means that they are typically regulated more toughly than ‘normal’ private companies due to the 
absense of ‘real’ competition (Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane & Matten, 2007). The 
effects of this is that they are thus limited in some aspects of CSR. 
The basic role of the Danish water companies is to serve the community in the best and cheapest 
way possible88. Basically business ethics in Danish companies follow the European/ Scandina-
vian model of value orientation (Crane & Matten, 2004, 2007). However, to navigate on a basis 
of ‘natural monopoly’ gives the opportunities for serving the customers while not risking going 
bankrupt. However, it comes alongside huge (social) responsibilities (Lobina & Hall, 2000, 
1999), which the municipal ownerships will and must secure89. National legislation regulates 
and controls the utilities90 even more than before because of the aim of keeping pricing down 
and efficiency and quality up91 (Crane & Matten, 2007). 
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Wartick & Wood (1998) and Mitchel et al. (1997) find it relevant to distinguish between key92
stakeholders, which, in the case of the Danish water companies, would be prioritised: 
1. National government (‘definitive’ qua law and legislation, state authorities) 
2. Local government (‘definitive’ qua municipal strategies/policies, local authorities) 
3. Customers (‘expectant’ qua service level, quality and pricing) 
4. Employees (‘expectant’ qua work environment, salaries and working welfare) 
5. Suppliers93 (‘latent’ qua necessity for construction work and goods supply) 
The decision makers of the Structural Reform, i.e. the national government, and the state au-
thorities as key shareholders play the most important role possessing both power, legitimacy, 
and urgency. As regulator, the national government shapes the existing conditions for the Dan-
ish water companies in the derived legislation of the Structural Reform: the Water Sector Act.  
The official rationale announced politically by the government is the expectation of great opera-
tional advantages as mentioned in the introduction. It is said, that there are huge possibilities for 
efficiencies on the local government scale and, derived from this, savings in the public admini-
stration by aggregation into larger municipalities from 271 to 9894   (Nannestad, 2007; The 
Structural Commission Report, 2004; The Structural Reform Agreement, 2004).   
This event or transformation is politically very relevant to our understanding of CSR in the Dan-
ish water companies and especially the resulting schism, since the next key stakeholder, the lo-
cal government as the shareholder represented by the city council politicians, is squeezed from 
four sides. The city council politicians represent:  
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trade unions in matters of employee relationships, NGOs in matters of branch politics (e.g. DANVA) or neighbours 
in matters of construction works, expropriation etc. That does in my prioritizing not mean, that they are less rele-
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all the time. In the case of political matters for the branch, the political negotiations of the content of the Water 
Sector Act, the NGO DANVA had top priority as stakeholder for all water company members since the political 
agreements between the government and the water companies were negotiated through DANVA (see hearing re-
sponses to the Water Sector Act and derived decrees (in Danish) at http://www.danva.dk/da-
DK/Medlemmer/Holdning/H%C3%B8ringssvar.aspx, re-retrieved 20th September 2013). 
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 We do not in this paper address the ’supplier’ (Crane and Matten, 2007) further than acknowledge them as key 
stakeholders in the business of Danish water companies. The ’supplier’ is relevant (and maybe regarded) as a key 
stakeholder – in terms of contractors, goods suppliers etc. – and they will be mentioned in the ”Perspectives” since 
these stakeholders are part of a forthcoming study.   
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 Law on regions and on the imposition of counties, The Capital Development Commision and Copenhagen Hospi-
tal Corporation, LOV nr. 537 af 24/06/2005.
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• The municipality as owners and sole shareholders of the company  
• The authorities and the national government through the national legislation 
• The company management 
• The customers who, in the end, have elected the politicians to the city council  
In all questions regarding CSR the politician must ask himself: Does this CSR initiative comply 
with all my representations or stakes for which I am responsible? (March & Olsen, 1989). 
Customers (consumers) are regarded as very important in the water companies95 (Greve 2009) as 
they are in most businesses (Pedersen, 2009, 2008; Smith, 2008; Vogel, 2005). Typical cus-
tomer-related CSR is met in the ‘code of ethics’ in the Strategy Plan of the company (Crane & 
Matten, 2007).  
However, when a politician sees the customers of the company, he also sees the future electors 
of himself as a politician (Andersen, 2001, 1994). Whose view should he take? He wants to sat-
isfy his employer, the municipality; the company; and the customers/voters for his own political 
sake (Greve, 2009; Andersen, 2001, 1994) and for the company that he represents. The integrity 
and trustworthiness of the politician as a person and his role in society follow him everywhere in 
his political life (Greve, 2009; Lund & Esbensen, 2009; Jakobsen, 2006; March & Olsen, 1989). 
Any CSR consideration that can benefit the customer, the citizen, the neighbour, and the elector 
in one and the same person will promote the politician and the company. 
The employees of the water company are especially valued at a time of low unemployment 
when competition among qualified staff is tough (Crane & Matten, 2007). This indeed was the 
situation in Denmark before the financial crisis (Danish Statistic News, 2009). Lack of qualified 
employees and existing qualified employees fleeing to other companies with better 
CSR/employee relationships was a huge problem. The Europeanisation of labour and the chang-
ing position of Europe are visible (Pedersen, 2009, 2008; Aagaard, Eriksson, & Westergaard-
Nielsen, 2004; Williams, Baláz, & Wallace, 2004). Typically employee related CSR is also met 
in the ‘code of ethics’ (Crane & Matten, 2007) of the company. 
As other modern European companies the water companies practice their daily corporate gov-
ernance with employee influences in the form of: 
• Employee participation on the board 
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• Employee participation on the main committee and other committees 
• Election to the board 
• Election to the committees 
For all the above purposes the politician will represent the company management, and according 
to this view the company development towards attractive employee related CSR is important 
(Pedersen, 2009, 2008; Vogel, 2005). In this regard we speak of explicit CSR beyond what is 
stated by the Danish legislation and negotiations with trade unions (Crane & Matten, 2004). The 
politician recognises that qualified and engaged staff in the company will help him navigate 
through multiple stakeholder interests as well as general management (Greve, 2009; Buchholz, 
Brown, & Shabana, 2008; Barnard & Deakin, 2002). 
This setup makes the Danish water companies very closely linked to the possessors of the politi-
cal power in the local government qua the city council politicians on the board. This gives some 
benefits indirectly to the corporation in the local society and makes the water company a ‘politi-
cal actor’ in the community for better or for worse96.  
THE LEGAL AND JURIDICAL STATUS OF DANISH WATER COMPANIES 
The WSA, which also relates to other legislation, sets the upper framework for the legal and 
juridical status of the Danish water companies. This is why this law must be seen as a backdrop 
for to understand the premises of CSR. The environmental objectives are for example nationally 
stated according to the Law on Environmental Objectives derived from the EU Water Frame 
Directives. The local government then states the service level in The Municipal Plans, The Wa-
ter Plans and The Waste Water Plans. This is thus implemented in the Water Sector Law as a 
kind of implicit CSR issue that all water companies must obey. 
On the other hand the European Commission enforces the trend of ‘ecological sustainability’ 
thinking in terms of multiple stakeholder participation in corporate governance (Winsor, 2008). 
This is present in both voluntary forums97 (explicit) and in The EU Directives (implicit) (Matten, 
2002). National legislation in Denmark, as well as stakeholder relationship with NGOs, 
strengthens these implicit forces of putting the environment and the climate change on the CSR 
agenda (Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Matten, 2002) in the water companies.   
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 i.e. the European Alliance for Corporate Social Responsibility.
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CSR in terms of service and environmental objectives, whatever means and ends are used, the 
EU, the national government (Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane & Matten, 2004; Matten, 
2002), and the local government regulate it implicitly. The explicit CSR is exemplified in the 
company-driven green, sustainable, and climate friendly procurement as ethical examples of 
company behaviour (Pedersen, 2009, 2008). Danish water companies have CSR incorporated in 
their climate policies and/or sustainability strategies. This area is not as restricted98 and regula-
tory as e.g. water plans, which are very precise in means and ends, and do not leave much room 
for explicit CSR99. Green and climate friendly procurement is widely addressed in policy issues, 
like buying FSC certified wood, non-GMOs or visionary statements like ‘becoming CO2 neutral 
in 2014’ (e.g. VCS Denmark, the municipalities of Aarhus100, Frederiksberg and Hillerød, The 
Partnership of the Public Green Procurement101). 
VOLUNTARY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN DANISH WATER 
COMPANIES 
The Danish Water and Waste Water Association (DANVA) organises members from 139 Dan-
ish water and sewer utilities and represents 90 percent of the Danish population of water con-
sumers (DANVA, 2009). Encouraged to show transparent efficiency in the water sector, 
DANVA has collected data in benchmarking from their members since 1999 (DANVA, 2007)
102
.  
Examples from benchmarking in 2007 (and 2009103) include 78 (75) suppliers, which means that 
approximately 45 percent of the Danish consumers are represented in this survey. It covers 44 
percent of drinking water and 48 (50) percent of wastewater (DANVA, 2007, (2009)). The re-
ports from 2007 and 2009 also show a range of key figures from years before the systemic 
benchmarking began.  
One key figure from 1997-2006 shows that water consumption has fallen 18.5 % during those 
ten years (DANVA, 2007, p. 4) and increasing a little two years after (DANVA, 2009). Other 
                                                
98
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http://www.danva.dk/Files/Filer/Udgivelser/Benchmarking/POP_UK_Benchmarking_2007.pdf re-retrieved 20th 
September 2013. 
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key figures show interesting variations of maintenance costs, electricity consumption per cubic 
meter water produced, and general quality conditions of the infrastructure of the utilities104
(DANVA, 2007 (2009)). These figures made DANVA implement a campaign in 2008:  
“The water sector must do its bit for the environment and to ensure lower CO2
emissions. At the moment, the sector’s electricity consumption corresponds to 
2.4 % of total electricity consumption in Denmark. The water sector uses 
approx. 800 GWh each year. In our view, the potential exists for a 20 - 25 % 
reduction, says Carl-Emil Larsen, Managing Director of DANVA.” (DANVA, 
2007, p. 20, my translation).  
The potential for increased energy efficiencies adds up to 200 Giga Watt hours (GWh) a year, 
which corresponds to 25 % of the total annual consumption of the water sector. Which in turn 
corresponds to 100,000 tonnes of CO2, DANVA claims. The means to reach the ends, DANVA 
suggests (DANVA, 2007, p. 21): 
Drinking water supply  
25 - 30 GWh: Pumps account for a large part of electricity consumption. A new generation of 
pumps are developed every five to ten years, which are 10 % more energy effective than the 
previous generation. The average age of the pumps in the water sector is 10 – 20 years.  
Approx. 10 GWh: New drilling technology, adapting pump sizes, speed regulation of pumps and 
rinsing pipes.  
Drinking water supply total saving potential: 35 - 40 GWh.  
Sewerage  
Approx. 30 GWh: New technology in the form of e.g. frequency controlled pumps for transport-
ing wastewater to the treatment plants.  
Approx. 8 GWh: New technology for transporting wastewater internally at the water treatment 
plants.  
30 - 75 GWh: New technology for stirring and aerating wastewater at the water treatment plants.  
15 - 40 GWh: Improved control of stirring in the process tanks.  
Sewerage supply total saving potential: 83 - 153 GWh. 
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103
The voluntary aim of this explicit environmental CSR is to encourage members to implement 
the best working procedures and methods in one’s own unit by comparing the key figures. Every 
year the benchmarking process begins afresh (DANVA, 2007).  
THE SCHISM OF CSR: MOVING BACKWARDS FROM ‘EXPLICIT’ TO ‘IMPLICIT’ CSR 
From 2010 most of this explicit CSR has turned into implicit CSR, controlled by the Danish 
Competition Authority, The Supply Secretariat, according to the national benchmarking legis-
lated by the Water Sector Law. This part of New Public Management, as this model represents 
(Greve, 2009), is seen in many other places such as New Zealand, UK, Germany, and the Neth-
erlands etc. (Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000; Greve, 2002, 2009). While criticism of the 
New Public Management era in the 1990s and its aftermath has been raised in Denmark (Greve, 
2009), the fact is that the models created in this NPM era are there to stay.  
Many bemoan the return of the bureaucracy within this regulatory regime (Klausen & Ståhlberg 
1998; Greve 2002, 2009) while others–especially in the UK, France, and South Africa (Shaoul, 
1997; Bakker, 2005; Prasad, 2006; Hall, 2001; Hall et al., 2004, 2009, 2010) that have tried the 
full effect of profit maximising privatisation of the water sector– welcome the model (Bakker, 
2005). 
Former experiences from the UK regarding fully privatised and London stock exchange listed 
water sectors since 1989 and during the 1990s show some aspects of transformation to market 
conditions (neoliberalisation). Profit making in this kind of privatised water sector has had se-
vere backlashes (Shaoul, 1997; Bakker, 2005; Prasad, 2006; Hall, 2001; Hall et al., 2004, 2009, 
2010), which are now rectified (Crane & Moon, 2007). 
DISCUSSION
DOES THE ‘IMPLICIT’/‘EXPLICIT’ CSR CONCEPT WORK?  
One of the notable critiques105 of the Matten & Moon (2004, 2008) definitions of ‘implicit’ and 
‘explicit’ CSR is the unification of notions. No model or concept will fit any situation totally 
(Moon & Matten, 2008). However, the notions of ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ are still valuable as 
external frameworks for the description of CSR in Danish water companies. It is especially de-
scriptive when a situation turns from explicit to implicit as in the example above.  
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However, as this paper shows, the concept is best for describing external factors affecting CSR, 
which I mean is general to any organisation in Denmark. We need other models to describe the 
internal factors affecting CSR, which is well demonstrated by stakeholder theory.  
In this case the stakeholder model is supposed to suit an organisation that is both politically and 
professionally driven. Therefore a model of a traditional business organisation without the po-
litical aspect would not suit the Danish water company as a hybrid organisation. The Wartick & 
Wood (1998)/Mitchel et al. (1997) model focusing on different levels of power–formal, eco-
nomic, and political–does fit this hybrid organisation more than other models. This is explained 
below. 
MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDER ROLES 
One of the challenges in CSR in Danish water companies is that the politician possesses four or 
more different roles. Will he be able to distinguish them? Probably he will in most cases. We 
also saw earlier that compared to ‘normal’ businesses there is a clear dependency among the key 
stakeholders in the hybrid organisation of the Danish water companies, which is unlike ‘normal’ 
private organisations that have a natural difference of interests among stakeholders (Crane et al., 
2008; Crane & Matten, 2007). In the Danish water companies the key stakeholders are mixed up 
in dependencies and especially the politician with multiple roles could meet issues where he is 
disqualified to make decisions.  
The citizens and implicitly the customers of the water company are also the future electors of 
the politicians (Andersen, 1994, 2001). The employees are the productivity of the company. The 
municipality is one of the company’s authorities. Whose view shall the politician take, it has 
been asked. He cannot suit the municipality, the company, the customers/voters and employees 
equally well in every instance. Compromises must be made. Perhaps this is what he is good at as 
a politician! 
GOVERNMENTAL INFLUENCE IN CSR 
As shown in the examples earlier, the typical dominant stake(holder) in European CSR is the 
presence of governmental influence in CSR (Vallentin & Murillo, 2009; Matten & Moon, 2004, 
2008; Crane & Matten, 2004; Donaldson, 2008; Vogel, 1992, 1998; Van Luijk, 1990). This is 
one aspect of the total picture of CSR in the Danish water companies. The other aspect is the 
‘normal’ CSR in private organisations in Denmark, and this is the CSR we see a huge amount of 
literary descriptions about, from both US and European models (Matten & Moon, 2004, 2008; 
Crane & Matten, 2004; Donaldson, 2008; Vogel ,1992, 1998; Van Luijk, 1990). The benefits of 
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the Danish water companies being a part of a strong governmental and political system, though 
being juridically separated from the municipality and the authorities, is best shown by the re-
verse situation. 
Privatisation of the utilities in the water sector into Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has created 
the 1990s failures in efficiency, profit making and savings for the customers, and has sent the 
utilities back to the municipal ownership organised in non-profit companies all over the world 
(Hall, Lobina, & Corral, 2010; Hall & Lubina, 2009; Hall et al., 2009; Lobina & Hall, 2000, 
1999; Hall, 1998 (a)+(b)). The criticism of Veolia and Suez and other multinational water com-
panies as privatised operators in several countries, including the developing countries, has 
shown the failure of fully privatisation of the water sector and profit maximisation. The result in 
terms of the return of the operating companies to the former municipal and transfer back to non-
profit organisations has shown a clear picture.  
The official rationale of Structural Reform in Denmark and the WSA changes nothing of the 
above. The governmental and political rationale is still efficiency-making and savings for the 
customers through non-profit making by the Danish water companies106. We also saw earlier that 
these companies are ‘natural monopolies’ and thus centrally governed by legislation and regu-
lated more toughly than ‘normal’ private companies (Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane & 
Matten, 2007) and thereby limited to some aspects of CSR. 
Other utilities sectors have been privatised with various degrees of success. A recent study of 
the privatisation of the electricity sector in Denmark shows that prices have not declined as ex-
pected107. The only non-profit infrastructural sectors still on monopoly in Denmark108 are the 
water, sewer, and waste sectors, and they have not yet reached the privatisation with a profit-
making agenda like others in the energy sector109.  
What relevance has efficiency, savings for the customers etc. to do with CSR? If the ‘project’ of 
efficiency of the water sector succeeds and the quality increases when prices decrease, the eco-
nomical winners are likely to be the customers and society. The interesting part of the notion is 
the ‘quality’. What is meant by ‘quality’ and who/what benefits from it? We don’t know yet. 
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The term of ‘service and environmental objectives’ is not stated in the legislation yet: we know 
only that it will be stated by the minister in the future. 
However, as long as the legislation is fulfilled, explicit CSR exemplified in green, sustainable 
and climate friendly procurement and company policy-making could be possible as long as the 
company does not spend more money on this, which could raise the prices of water. Showing 
good ethical examples in its overall behaviour towards stakeholders and the environment 
(Pedersen, 2009, 2008) is what we are looking for. 
CONCLUSION
IT IS ALL ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability towards multiple stakeholders of all kinds shapes a company’s reputation. The 
company is what it accomplishes more than what it says it will accomplish. As Clive Crook 
points out in his ‘Special Report on CSR’ in the Economist (2005): 
“The proper guardians of the public interests are governments, which are ac-
countable for all citizens. It is the job of the elected politicians to set goals for 
regulators, to deal with externalities, to mediate among different interests, to 
attend to the demands of social justice, to provide the public goods (…) and to 
organize resources accordingly” (Crook, 2005; quoted in Crane & Matten, 
2007). 
The schism of CSR in the Danish water companies compared to other businesses lies in the role 
of the hybrid organisation being placed between a private company and a municipal administra-
tion. We must not be blind to the pros and cons these close political bonds and relationships in 
the political arena that the Danish water companies are entitled to qua the municipal ownership. 
To an important extent this represents the schism of CSR in this sector.  
‘With power comes responsibility’ (and ‘with great power comes great responsibilities)’ are 
popular quotes from the cartoon of Spiderman (Stan Lee, 1961) also used in CSR as well as in 
sustainability matters (e.g. ECCJ, 2008; Nolan, 2005). In regard to the Danish water companies 
it is not the point that the company possesses great power, but that with the power or indirect 
power it actually possesses, comes responsibility and that this responsibility ought to be greater 
than that of other businesses without the same political power. This means that the Danish water 
companies have an obligation to be role models from CSR perspectives, as do other public busi-
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nesses. Several difficulties are met in the fulfilment of this aim, and the governmental regulation 
of the water sector is one. 
The objective of this paper was to show the schism of CSR in Danish water companies. Hope-
fully, the above statement is not far from the existing conditions for CSR in hybrid pri-
vately/politically governed organisations of water companies in Denmark. The schism of CSR is 
not to forget to cope with the barriers when opportunities appear right ahead. 
As Vogel (2005) states:  
“Some managers sincerely want their companies to promote civic purposes as 
well [as financial]. Their ability to achieve nonfinancial objectives can be con-
strained by competitive pressure, but this does not make their personal com-
mitments unimportant or inconsequential: they can and do matter.” (Vogel, 
2005, p. 13).  
In this case the competitive pressure and inherent constraints in opportunities for CSR are dic-
tated from the governmental legislation within the Water Sector Act and its Price Cap Notice. 
On the other hand the government encourages businesses to voluntarily adopt CSR free of gov-
ernmental regulation110 (Vallentin & Murillo, 2009). The dependencies of the municipality and 
the political movements in the local society are shown to be both beneficial (Vogel 2005) and 
inappropriate or restrictive in the name of CSR. This, along with the other examples, represents 
the schism of CSR in the Danish water companies.  
In a highly implicit CSR nation, it is easy to on the one hand to lean back and comply only with 
what legislation demands and let others (i.e. the government) do all the good thinking. On the 
other hand the overall purpose of the Danish governmental CSR policy is confusing. Is it to be 
voluntary or to be regulated or both? Streams go both ways, but to go beyond the legal (Vogel, 
2005) (as explicit CSR) and make a difference in the Danish water sector is a big CSR challenge 
because of the strong governmental regulation. In the next years, the interesting question, when 
all legislation is implemented, will be the success of the implementation: did it work at all and if 
it did, how well? 
The apparent necessity in the public regulation of the Danish water companies (Vallentin & 
Murillo, 2009; Morsing, in Habisch et al., 2005; Crane & Matten, 2004, 2007) affects the free-
dom to choose among CSR possibilities as a consequence of government interference. ‘Normal’ 
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private companies are free to choose among explicit CSR elements as philanthropy, environ-
mental and climatic issues, benefits for customers, employees and local society (Matten & 
Moon, 2008; Crane et al., 2008; Carroll, 2008). To what extent this will be worsen or improve 
for Danish water companies, time will show. 
According to Crane & Matten (2007) the effect of the British privatisation of the water industry 
has now reached its goals after governmental and legal adjustments and a tight regulatory re-
gime. This means that privatisation after being taken over by the public sector  generally has 
been a success in the UK in improving, enhancing efficiency and keeping pricing down (Crane 
and Matten, 2007, p. 76). What we will see during the next years is the actual ‘effect’ of the 
Danish publicly owned privatisation of the water and sewer utilities both economically, but, in 
our interest certainly, in CSR. 
PERSPECTIVES
The next years’ CSR work for Danish water companies is both wide open and uncertain depend-
ing on the developments in the national legislation. Further research should focus on the possi-
bilities of incorporating and positively affecting CSR in Danish water companies and other such 
hybrid organisations in general all over the world. These are service agents of the society and 
they have a great opportunity to put CSR standards on the agenda and bringing other SMEs to 
the table because of the public value they provide and the publicity they get.  
Shifting focus from internal CSR to external CSR where public service is a value in society is 
also a topic of interest. The role of a public builder and public purchaser does make a major con-
tribution to society and especially to the behaviour of good business ethics in the bigger perspec-
tive: road building, public housing, new hospitals, schools, nursing homes etc. 
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(Published as a shortened version under the headline “Ethical Decision Making–an Organic 
Stakeholder Model” in the Multidisciplinary Journal of Applied Ethics (2012), 1 (1), pp. 6-20. 
This paper is an extended post-print version that has been presented at the 11th International 
Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility, Lahti 6-8 May 2012, Finland.) 
ABSTRACT
Stakeholder management has for the last three decades been concerned either with strategic 
business management or with business ethics, values, and quality. Many models have been de-
veloped, but recently the literature demands more dynamic models instead of the staticism that 
characterises some models. This paper offers an ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ based on deci-
sion-making theory, risk assessment, and adaption to a rapidly changing world combined with 
an appropriate stakeholder theory for ethical purposes in decision-making processes in business-
es.  
The ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ is grounded in empirical evidence from hybrid organisations 
such as Danish water companies, which are mixes of private corporations and political admin-
istrations. The model offers a new way of combining risk management with ethical decision-
making processes by the inclusion of multiple stakeholders. Not only does the model apply to 
these kinds of hybrid organisations, but it is easily adopted and tested for other private business 
models too.  
The findings and the conceptualisation of the model enhances business ethics in decision mak-
ing by managing and balancing stakeholder concerns with the same concerns as the traditional 
risk management models do for the sake of the wider social responsibilities of businesses for 
their stakeholders. 
Keywords: Stakeholder Management, Organic Systems, Business Ethics, Decision Making and 
‘Time’/’Cost’ variables. 
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INTRODUCTION
Stakeholder theory has been canvassing for the betterment of the world and the applicability of 
business ethics, moral values, and qualities for more than three decades since the term was 
coined by R. Edward Freeman (1984) in his Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach
(Freeman, 1984). A vast literature of theoretical and empirical analyses has been written. Con-
ceptualising theories that support Freeman’s theory has been written for scholars and managers 
in all kinds of businesses and administrations of organisations in general. This paper is designed 
to contribute to this literature in designing a model meeting the needs of stakeholder manage-
ment theories in adapting a more organic view of stakeholder management and overcoming the 
staticity of stakeholder models (Fassin, 2010). This way stakeholder theory can better meet the 
complexities and irrationalities of the world and business arenas we meet in organisations when 
dealing with multiple stakeholders.  
First, the paper reviews very succinctly the most relevant stakeholder theory and models sup-
porting the proposed model. Thereafter, it presents ideas from the literature of organic versus 
mechanistic structures in organisation (Burns & Stalker, 1961) as well as ideas of risk manage-
ment and decision making in complex organisations with multiple actors and stakeholders 
(March, 1994): more precisely the ‘Garbage Can’ model of decision making (Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972). From these theoretical insights from Burns & Stalker’s (1961) ’organic’ structures 
combined with Cohen et al.’s (1972) Garbage Can model of decision making and March’s 
(1994) ideas of organisational theory and risk management I derive my Organic Stakeholder 
Model seen from the stakeholder perspective.  
The model initially reverses the objectives for stakeholder management in the traditional way, 
and instead takes Mead’s view of ‘the other’ (Cook, 1993) and tries to view risk management 
from the viewpoint of the stakeholders in order to accomplish decision making that reduces risks 
for stakeholders and eventually for the business itself. Rational decision makers sometimes see 
risks as something that we should ‘do away’ with (March, 1994) which sometimes is impossi-
ble. Then, when reversing the viewpoint of for whom and for what businesses are operating, by 
seeing risk management for stakeholders and implicitly for us all, the management of risks re-
veals more knowledge about uncertainties just by stretching the network of knowers to include 
stakeholders in the process of decision making.  
As March points out: it is impossible to know everything relevant prior to decision making, and 
irrationalities are certain kinds of unmanageable entities as well as knowledge consumption that 
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is cognitively limited by the participants in the known setting. So when we try to reduce the 
risks that we know either from our own experiences or through others’, we still have a range of 
unknowable risks, that we experience only from the outcomes of decision making retrospective-
ly (March, 1994; Weick 1995). So what do managers do? They enhance knowledgeability, they 
bring in more and more knowledge in order to ‘rationally’ reduce risks and uncertainties till the 
point where cognitive limits of information capabilities reach a point where known knowledge is 
no longer used, experiences are forgotten, and rational choices can become irrational in the 
sensemaking of the outcome of the decision making (March 1994). We only know if we have 
made a good decision after we have implemented it. As Weick says: “How do I know what I 
think till I see what I say?” (Weick, 1979). No risk model has yet proven to be safe enough. We 
can only learn and learn from others in order to be able by our limited rationality to estimate 
rational choices without lulling ourselves into the idea of risk avoidance and risk elimination, 
March points out (March, 1994). This involves risk taking. 
Choosing this view of the stakeholder involves the environment or society in risk management 
of business decision making. I will show through empirical examples that this ’ethical turn’ can 
create a business case with mutual benefits that promote and assist the decision maker even 
more than classical risk management seen from a self-fulfilment perspective ultimately. It can-
not eliminate risks and it cannot ‘do away’ with uncertainties. It will build a consensus of priori-
tising risks from a broader view and eventually reduce the risk taking of both businesses and 
stakeholders.  
From here I draw analytically conceptual points to build the Organic Stakeholder Model and 
show how stakeholder risk management for ethical decision making can deliver a business case 
out of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. These consist of certain amounts of 
philanthropy and altruism combined with mutual benefits for both the environment and busi-
nesses: a so-called durable model (Aras & Crowther, 2009). The methodology of the research 
and the development of the model are described in the next. 
METHODOLOGY
The Organic Stakeholder Model has been created through by participant-observations done in 
Danish water companies from 2004 – 2011. I was working first as a practitioner from 2004 -
2010 and afterwards as an ongoing and retrospective researcher. I used my prior projects and 
ongoing case studies and was a participant-observer in a large and medium sized water company 
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respectively. The projects, in which stakeholder involvement was intense and multiple, con-
tained the following construction projects described in Table 1: 
Project name and locality Project description Project type 
1) Stormwater pipe basin in 
Odense Habour  
3 km pipeline basin of 11,000 m3 water 
installed under a protected and 300 years 
old cultural heritage forest to reduce con-
taminations through discharges to scarce 
water bodies 
Mega project with 
multiple stakehold-
ers 
2) Stormwater pipe basin in 
Dalum/Odense 
1.5 km pipeline basin of 4,000 m3 water 
installed under a protected forest to re-
duce contaminations through discharges 
to a protected river 
Mega project with 
multiple stakehold-
ers 
3) Stormwater basin in San-
derum/Odense 
A natural stormwater basin installed in an 
urban area where repeatedly overflow of 
stormwater destroyed 9 houses under ex-
treme rain events. 7 out of 9 houses were 
bought and removed for the optimal re-
placement of the stormwater basin 
Controversial pro-
ject. Happy ending 
of a seemingly un-
solvable problem 
by untraditional but 
legal methods  
4) Energy/additives reduc-
tion in WWTPs in 
Svendborg 
Implementation of a new IT system of 
online measuring in 3 wastewater treat-
ment plants (WWTP) for energy and ad-
ditive reduction and total rearrangements 
of control systems to operate the WWTPs 
Change project. 
The adaption of a 
new operation 
style. 
5) Energy reduction of dis-
tribution of freshwater in 
Svendborg 
Experimental project of reducing pres-
sures in freshwater pipelines and pump-
ing stations for better and more consistent 
water delivery and energy efficient out-
come 
Experimental pro-
ject with a surpris-
ing outcome. 
6) Construction of a new 
500 m2 building in 
Svendborg 
A traditional construction of a building 
but inclusion of a total substitution of 
fossil energy for ‘green’ energy. The pro-
ject had strong intentions of being sus-
tainable, however the traditional building 
failures resulted in a stakeholder riot be-
fore the problems were solved. 
Controversial pro-
ject. 
A success with 
many failures and 
stakeholder riots 
during the process. 
TABLE 1: PROJECTS FROM THE DANISH WATER SECTOR INVOLVING MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENTS. 
The above projects in Table 1 are described in detail in the chapter on empirical evidence. So 
are the concepts and categories for the projects (megaprojects, controversial, experimental and 
change projects). The research methodology used in the above case studies was qualitative par-
ticipant-observations, interviews, and document studies during and ex post the realisation of the 
projects. My role as participant-observer was in all cases except in case 5) to be one out of sev-
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eral decision makers. This gave me the opportunity to observe while negotiating with other 
managers such as top managers, project managers, employees, and various external stakeholders 
such as regulators, authorities, neighbours, unions, property owners, land owners, NGOs, shop-
keepers, advocates, schools, road users, workers, citizens, and many more.  
The cases number 1) to 2) had multiple (more than 100) stakeholders while stakeholders in case 
3), 4) and 5) had a limited of stakeholders, but they were very intense. In case 6) I had the expe-
rience of being a project manager among several (more than 50) close stakeholders of the water 
company, who ordered a new office building. I was sitting in the same office with those stake-
holders, since they were my colleagues and chiefs executives. This project was the first project, 
I had as project manager, where the majority of stakeholders constantly (every day) claimed 
legitimacy for their demands during the whole construction period. In the other projects the 
stakeholders were more absent and only present from time to time in times of relevance. Case 5) 
had some of the same features since all stakeholders were the employees and the operation man-
ager–all my colleagues–although they were physically present in another building than the one I 
was working in. Here, my role was substituted by the operation manager, who during the project 
of installation of a new IT system had to rearrange all operations at three wastewater treatment 
plants while he was surrounded by a majority of close stakeholders: his employees. 
The observations and documentation of all projects contains a vast amount of documents con-
sisting of written emails, reports, minutes, press material, books and videos, and written notes, 
in some of the cases thousands of pages. Interviews have been few and limited to only case 4) 
and 5), where I made in-depth interviews with the operation manager and project managers in 
charge of these projects. On the basis of these cases the ‘Organic Stakeholder Model’ will be 
proposed. 
My qualitative work takes its departure from a constructivist paradigm stemming from symbolic 
interactionism. The viewpoint here is that individuals make sense of decision making and under-
stands its meaning of it retrospectively (Weick, 1995).  This perspective is elaborated more in 
the section on theory and is combined with the chosen perspectives of ‘organic structures’ 
(Burns & Stalker, 1961), the theory of ‘limited rationality’, the ‘garbage can’ model of decision 
making (Cohen et al., 1972), and risk management (March, 1994) respectively. 
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Before continuing to the theoretical review and the conceptualisation, I will dedicate a small 
amount of the story to the contextual setting of the hybrid organisations of Danish water compa-
nies. 
ORGANISATIONAL SETTING
The organisational setting of the hybrid organisations of Danish water companies is a mix of 
private sector companies and public administrations. The term ‘hybrid’ should be understood in 
the organisational structure, which is explained next. The structure of the hybrid organisations 
has deep connections to the privatisation of public service administration that has taken place 
more or less worldwide. In this respect, the structure of hybrid organisations of Danish water 
companies looks much like state owned enterprises (Lauesen, 2011).  
The Danish water companies are constructed as private limited liabilities and the municipality 
typically holds all shares in these specific cases. Some state owned enterprises have been privat-
ised fully and have been listed on the stock exchanges, and the shares that the state owns vary 
from company to company. This is not the case with the water companies in Denmark. The 
company shares are not listed but formally owned by the municipality. In many companies the 
board members and the Chairman are typically held by local politicians appointed by the City 
Council (Lauesen, 2011).  
Since the companies’ core activities have not been changed, and the fact that the municipality is 
ultimately responsible for the delivery of water and wastewater services, the hybrid of former 
public administration influencing the companies activities at the same time as the managerial 
‘freedom to act’ have changed decision-making paths. Decisions have been translated into the 
New Public Management system of limited freedom surrounded by a vast amount of new legis-
lation and a new regime of regulation according to the Water Sector Act.  
However, within the law and regulation, which yields both juridical and economic limitations, 
the managerial freedom to act is present, and from here the structure is very similar to that in the 
private sector. We will from the chosen cases see examples of how this hybrid structure of Dan-
ish water companies forms a new kind of ethical decision making model mainly from the way 
that these organisations are constructed. The limitations of their freedom to act from within this 
‘blackbox’ (Latour & Woolgar, 1986) we will see how social, environmental, and ethical con-
cerns formally and informally thrive. 
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sure groups), and the stakekeeper (i.e. regulators), who keeps the stake (Fassin, 2009). This 
stakeholder approach has some special benefits compared to the traditional stakeholder models: 
1) it (still) contains the typology of Mitchell et al.’s (1997) definition of the stakeholder (power, 
legitimacy, and urgency) but in a new mix that accepts stakeholders having different roles and 
not always real stakes, i.e. regulatory control (Fassin, 2009), and 2) it acknowledges the 
Freemanian cognitive power between stakeholders that binds them together (Fassin, 2009). 
Fassin sketches his model, which is (like Rowley’s (1997)) inspired by social network analysis 
(SNA), but–unlike Rowley–illustrated not only by ties (relationships) and knots (actors) (Free-
man, 2006), but also by circles interacting with each other (Fassin, 2009). The left side is 
Fassin’s stakeholder relation as a 3D chart (Figure 1), and the right side is the Stake Model of 
the firm seen in a 2D version (Figure 2).   
This model is illustrated visually with traditional SNA parameters shown directly (actors, ties, 
connections, closeness, bridges, centrality etc.) and carefully adapts these parameters into a dia-
gram. In this way it does not depend only upon a traditional SNA linguistic frame, which needs 
a discursive interpretation. The interpretation lies implicitly in the visuality of the model (Fassin,
2009). Lately Fassin has commented on his own model and asked for the necessity of the inclu-
sion of a more dynamic view of stakeholder relationships: 
 “[The] stakeholder literature has acknowledged the need to complement the 
extant theory on stakeholder management by more dynamic perspectives” (Fas-
sin, 2010, p. 39).  
Fassin addresses this task by including another category borrowed from Holzer (2008): the 
stakeseekers, who are characterised “by (the) role of ... various forms of activism, from share-
holders, NGOs and government, in the stakeholder mobilisation process (and)... how 
stakewatchers and stakeseekers can profoundly affect stakeholder salience, especially in cri-
ses.” (Holzer, 2008, p. 52). Fassins concludes that the “activist salience increases in crises, 
when management’s decisions do not sufficiently take into consideration stakeholders interests”
(Fassin, 2010, p. 48) and that this dynamism is clear when using graphical means to analyse 
stakeholder influence or salience. The problem with static models is that they contradict their 
own intentions, which Fassin shows through his various cases. A single model cannot predict 
dynamism in real life by using a static visual model anyway. The dynamism, that Fassin wants 
to show, is how the model ‘moves’ and what is meant by this movement. 
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Similarly, Freeman (2010) has departed from the visualisation of stakeholder relationships in his 
new version of his 1984 book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Freeman wants 
to show in pure wording “who and what really counts” (Freeman, 1984, 2010). To understand 
that complex matters, such as the examples by Fassin (2010) as well as Freeman’s (2010) work 
generally, this paper acknowledges the various concepts addressed in this literature review. 
However, it tries to show from another angle how dynamism might be captured in an ‘organic’ 
way, that has the same limitations as Fassins (2010) model when illustrating a static text. Like 
other theorists, it tries to compensate by claiming that the model offers no static illustrative 
model that can encompass all or even similar cases. It offers a framing of the concept of ethics 
addressed by Freeman (2010), but attaches it to two dependent variables, that determine the out-
come of the ethics in decision making through the involvement of various stakeholders, of 
which some are determinant stakeholders and others are less determinant stakeholders. 
THEORY OF ’ORGANIC STRUCTURES’ AND ’GARBAGE CAN’ PROCESSES. 
This theory-building for the Organic Stakeholder Model involves ideas from Burns & Stalker’s 
(1961) definitions of ’organic structures’ in organisations. This is a structure that I will argue is 
based upon empirical evidence, which is present when dealing with multiple stakeholders. I will 
argue, that decision making in organisations is tied to stakeholder relationships in these types of 
hybrid organisations, and that these ideas can and will be used in many kinds of organisations, 
purposefully or unconsciously.  
In this respect I draw my ideas from Cohen, March, & Olsen’s (1972) Garbage Can Model and 
adapt it to decision making and combine it with March’s ideas expressed in his book, A Primer 
on Decision Making (March, 1994). In this book March elaborates these ideas to organisational 
management in general. The basis of combining these ideas is not foreign for either of these 
theorists, since the glue of their observations is based on the way that Weick later described 
’sensemaking’ (Weick, 1995). March refers to this concept and Burns & Stalker (1961) use it 
unconsciously in their observations and interviews with actors of companies. I will shortly re-
view the main features of the three theories before describing the Organic Stakeholder Model, 
which is substantiated by these theoretical ideas. 
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Organic structures (Burns & Stalker, 1961) 
Tom Burns and G. M. Stalker (1961) conducted a study of 20 different industrial organisations 
finding themselves in an environment of continual change in both market situation and technical 
information. These companies all struggled with tasks that constantly were new and unfamiliar, 
and Burns & Stalker observed how these organisations tried to stabilise this ambiguity into op-
erational and practicable conditions (p. vii). They categorised and compared managerial systems 
as either ’mechanistic’ or ’organic’. With ’management’ they understood ”directing, coordinat-
ing and controlling the operations of a working community” (p. 13). ’Mechanistic’ systems 
were found in traditional bureaucracies defined by the functions, methods, responsibilities, and 
power in a highly structured organisation with clear boundaries such as vertical hierarchies, 
clear duties and procedures to execute the necessary task (Ibid.). ’Organic’ systems were found 
in organisations and defined by interactions in both lateral and vertical levels in the organisa-
tional structure rather than vertical command systems as in a traditional bureaucracy (Burns & 
Stalker 1961, p. 5). Organic systems were as were bureaucracies also stratified, but not hierar-
chical in the same way (p. 122).  
Their conclusions were, that ’organic’ systems adapt better to unstable conditions (p. 11) be-
cause ”problems and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and distribut-
ed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy” (p. 8). ”The individuals have to 
perform their special tasks in the light of their knowledge of the tasks of the firm as a whole”
(Ibid.). Knowledge to adapt to the changing conditions was to be sought and negotiated at all 
levels of the company in order for the company to survive in a competitive and rapidly changing 
environment (p. 11).  
’Change’ was according to Burns & Stalker both related to the use of technology, performance, 
and interaction among the individuals in the organisations. In order to make changes both in 
choices of the most adaptive and efficient technology for the tasks as well as changes in human 
interactions and in the technology, the amount of knowledge and how this was found, decided, 
applied, implemented, and stored as memory in these organisations, was no longer hierarchically 
determined, but multi-layered inside and outside the organisations, they found. Burns & Stalker 
found that no single set of principles could be said to be applicable to good organising or to an 
ideal type of management system or administrative practice generally. However, mechanistic 
systems were better adapted under stable conditions, whereas organic systems were best suited 
for the adaptation to a rapidly changing environment (p. viii + 11). 
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The question is, what is meant by ’unstable conditions’ or ’rapid environmental changes’?  
Here, Burns & Stalker explains that the concept of ’novelty’ is related to ’risk taking’ in order to 
reduce harm when ”an enormous numbers of random possibilities are eliminated by rational 
choice (which means that) the chances of harm rather than good resulting are reduced, not 
eliminated” (p. 21). Similarly they find, that when environments or conditions are rapidly 
changing ”the person or the organisation is itself changing, so that even to maintain the same 
degree of fitness for survival, people and institutions may have to change their ways (so the) 
risks attendant upon change may have to be weighted against other risks arising from maintain-
ing the same state of affairs” (p. 21). This indicates, that the operation of an organic system of 
management is dependent on effective communication (p. 252) across departments, individuals, 
workers, consumers, i.e. stakeholders in general and finally linked to the decisions made for 
these necessary changes to be made. 
Garbage Can Model (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972) 
The organic management system, as Burns & Stalker (1961) described it, is the most adaptive 
management system for changing environments. This leads me to examine how decisions are 
made under conditions that continually are changing in everyday business  practice. For this 
purpose the Garbage Can Model explained by Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. 
Olsen (1972) is appropriate.  
Cohen et al. described organisations characterised by problematic preferences, unclear technol-
ogy, and fluid participation as ’organised anarchies’ and found by computer simulations of 324 
examples of how decisions were made in this flux of uncertainties and described it with the met-
aphor of the ’garbage can’. These definitions will be presented in the next section in order to 
understand exactly what is meant by the categories and the model and how these ideas can be 
linked to the organic system of management explained earlier. ’Organised anarchy’ is not a def-
inition by which Cohen et al. characterise a whole institution or organisation: any organisation 
can be characterised as such ”in part or part of the time” (p. 1). The process occurs precisely 
when the preconditions of more normal rational models are not met (p. 16). 
Cohen et al. define the first premise, ’problematic preferences’, as general for the anarchistic 
organisation operating in changing environments, because no preferences are stable enough at 
any time-span from decision making to implementation or action upon the preferences. They 
argue that ”(t)he organisation operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined 
preferences. It can be described better as a loose collection of ideas than as a coherent struc-
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ture; it discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the basis of preferences” (p. 
1).  
Their second premise, ’unclear technology’, is to be understood when members of the organisa-
tion are exposed to changes, they do not fully understand the (new) technology they use, and 
therefore the organisation operates ”on simple trial-and-error procedures, the residue of learn-
ing from past experience, and pragmatic inventions of necessity” (Ibid.). Because how should 
individuals be able to consume the rapid changes of environment and technology when time is a 
limitation to knowledge and experience gathering? If we acknowledge that knowledge building 
takes time, and that technology maybe changes more rapidly than the consumption of 
knowledge about it–which we know from some IT systems, where we did not get to use it very 
well before the system was changed to another novel system–the trial-and-error is rapid enough 
to make us understand what we are to do about it if the risk of new changes are present. The 
third premise, ’fluid participation’, which Cohen et al. define as participants and their involve-
ments and efforts varying over time, makes the boundaries of the organisation uncertain and 
changing. This also means, that decision makers and audiences may change as rapidly as every-
body and everything else (p. 1).  
Two premises, that also characterise the ’anarchistic organisation’, are ’goal ambiguity’, mean-
ing ”the manner in which organisations make choices without consistent, shared goals”, and 
’actor attention’, meaning ” how occasional members become active and how attention is di-
rected toward, or away from, a decision”. Cohen et al. find these premises in every complex 
organisation (p. 1-2). The classical citation of the results of the decision-making process in or-
ganisational anarchies speaks for itself, and this quote is one of the most used in decision-
making theory ever since its presentation: 
“From this point of view, an organisation is a collection of choices looking for 
problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they 
might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, 
and decision makers looking for work.” (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 2) 
The above changes the focus of meaning of choices and how this changes over time (p. 2). The 
emphasis on timing and time pattern linked with ’energy’, which I understand to be quality and 
value for whom and for what, will become crucial in decision making (Ibid.). The definition of 
the ’garbage can’ is a metaphor for and linked to the opportunities of choices. In these different 
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problems and solutions are mixed and unstructured, and found relevant or not relevant in the 
timing of their appearance in the setting of time during the decision-making process.  
It is also loosely coupled with the attention of participants acting fluidly and non-coherently 
during the whole process of decision making (Ibid.). This makes organisational decision making 
dependent on a ”relatively complicated interplay among the generation of problems in an or-
ganisation, the deployment of personnel, the production of solutions, and the opportunities for 
choice.” (p. 2). Cohen et al. define the way decision making is done under these premises in 
four streams: a stream of 1) choices, 2) problems, 3) solutions, and 4) energy allocated. All 
streams depend more or less on their entry time (calendar time), decisional structure (who is 
allocate to make decisions), energy requirement (how difficult is it, how many resources must 
we activate, what implications or harm is there), and access structure (a list of choices to which 
the problem can be assessed). These streams are tested in the computer simulation of the 324 
examples, which leads Cohen et al. to the following findings of decision-making processes in 
organised anarchies: 
1) Resolution: Some choices solve some problems after an amount of time of working with 
them. 
2) Oversight: If new choices become available for problems, that may be connected to other 
choices, and because this new choice limits the time and energy to solve the problem, it 
is chosen. 
3) Flight: A more attractive choice comes along after some time working with the problem 
and with other choices, then the problem is removed from these other choices and is at-
tached to the new one because of the apparent attractiveness of outcome. 
Cohen et al. find an interesting connection from their simulations: ’resolution’ is not the most 
common decision-making style, although many problems are sought to be solved in this manner 
from the beginning. ’Oversight’ and ’flight’ are more common in the process in general (p. 9). 
The process is also found to be very sensitive to variations in energy load. If the energy load is 
heavy, then problem activity and decision-making activity are increased, and the decision mak-
ing gets more difficult. This leads to the choice characterised from oversight and flight, and 
much time is spent with problems not being solved thoroughly or eliminated entirely (Ibid.).  
Decision makers and problems tend to track each other with different choices that do not elimi-
nate the problem or ultimately solve it. Attention is paid to the importance of problems and the 
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timing of their entrance so that early problems are resolved more likely than late problems. The 
prioritisation of problems is typically made on the basis of importance. However, in this respect, 
the importance of choices does not follow the same feature: 
“Important choices are less likely to resolve problems than unimportant 
choices. Important choices are made by oversight and flight. Unimportant 
choices are made by resolution. These differences are observed under both of 
the choice entry sequences but are sharpest where important choices enter 
relatively early.” (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 11). 
The findings of Cohen et al. show that problems are not typically resolved by a resolution, 
which could solve the problem and neutralise it. In organised anarchies they found much more 
evidence for choices made by oversight and flight, which were more important than the choices 
of resolution. These characteristics of organised anarchies opposed to more rational choices and 
linked to resolutionary choices seem to support Burns & Stalker’s ideas of better adaptability of 
organic management systems to changes in all levels of and for all issues found in modern, 
complex organisations with multiple stakeholder relationships and facing multiple demands and 
claims. To solve problems in organisational structures, that on the one hand may be both hierar-
chical and open, decision makers may be stratified across all levels in the hierarchy. 
Burns & Stalker investigated industries and Cohen et al. investigated universities and public, 
political administrations primarily. This combination of Burns & Stalker’s organic system of 
management as a symbol of rational choices with the Garbage Can Model as a symbol of anar-
chistic choices suits the hybrid organisations of Danish water companies, which are structurally 
and organisationally mixed in the same way that both industrial and public administration is. 
This makes the Organic Stakeholder Model combine decision making from both spheres rational 
(organically adaptive to changes) as well as anarchistic.      
THE ORGANIC STAKEHOLDER MODEL (OSM) 
As we saw from the literature review of stakeholder theory, many models are limited in at static 
way defining what R. Edward Freeman asked in the very first place: ”Who and what really 
counts?” (Freeman, 1984, 2010). While stakeholder theory in Freemans version has a built-in 
ethical turn to face values and qualities as an outcome for the stakeholder relationship, I have 
investigated how ethics are considered in face-to-face meetings among decision makers and 
their stakeholders and how decisions are made primarily on ethical considerations combined 
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with the intended rationality of ’who and what really counts’. The staticness of stakeholder 
models, whether they are visually made in diagrams or orally explained textually, is in the first 
place linked to what we understand by a model. 
My understanding of a ’model’ is that this term encapsulates a certain view of a complex phe-
nomenon knowing that this is not the full explanation to everything contained in that complexi-
ty. We have seen how Mitchell et al. (1997) and Wartick & Wood (1998) offer a model of con-
sistency in the academic literature saying that stakeholders can be characterised by their 
relevance in terms of power, legitimacy and urgency. This model has been referred to frequent-
ly, but it has the same possibilities and limitations as other models or views regarding the same 
phenomena. A model has a tendency to leave everything else out of the picture. The model I 
present does this too, but in relation to the power, legitimacy and urgency-model it does not act 
as a restriction on that specific model nor on any other stakeholder models. It presents a view 
that can be combined with the other models presented in the literature review, because it poses 
questions relating to other matters of the same phenomena. The Organic Stakeholder Model 
wants to view the microprocesses of decision making, and how this creates a pattern similar to 
organic systems of management while dealing also with rationality and irrationality as anarchis-
tic desion-making processes. 
The model is purposefully kept very simple. This idea may conflict with the complexities, but it 
actually offers a viewpoint too. However, to embrace complexity in organisations, in projects or 
issues, and in decision making knowing that decision makers have cognitive limitations of com-
prehending large amounts of information, very few indicators are necessary to explain how this 
limited rationality (March, 1994) operates in practice. Therefore my model shows how ethical 
decision making is possible when linked to stakeholder theory by two dependent variables:  
• Time 
• Costs 
’Time’ is in the model understood in two ways: 
• Chronological time (calendar time) 
• Relational time (past, present and future) 
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’Costs’ are in this model also understood twofold: 
• Economic costs (in terms of finance) 
• Relational costs (in terms of social and environmental consequences of the 
changes made by decisions) 
Now, one may think that these two categories assume rational choice where both phenomena 
have to be as minimum as possible. Au contraire, the model shows how time and costs are neat-
ly connected to the values and qualities of ethics as well as incorporating the features of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency as well as many other features in the multi-complexities of human in-
teraction. In this respect time and costs can be both limited and expanded in the mixture of gar-
bage-can processes and organic systems for adaptation to environmental change and fluidity. 
The rational ideal of every complex issue was–for the decision maker–that time and cost limita-
tions should be eroded as dependent variables so that problems had all the time and unlimited 
economy to be solved within.  
This is the contradictory obligation in most situations in life. In organisations–any kind of as-
semblage of humans in a structured or loose coupled group with defined or loose coupled tasks 
and merits–almost every issue, problem, or project has a limited time and costs allocated for the 
task in hand. The decisions to be made inside these boundaries are often to be made on unclear 
preferences, fluid participation (Cohen et al., 1972), changing environments (Burns & Stalker 
1961), limited or irrational use of knowledge (March, 1994), limited allocated resources, and 
rational thinking. Decision makers as humans are most likely to perceive themselves and the 
ideal decisions they want to make in irrational circumstances characterised by different layers of 
power (and legitimacies) influencing the choices. Next the definitions contained in the Organic 
Stakeholder Model are shown with special emphasis on how time and costs as dependent varia-
bles express ethics in decision-making processes.  
Stakeholders have in this model an overall perpetuating role as the problem or risk holder and 
the decision influencers (Freeman, 1984, 2010). For this role I do not distinguish between pri-
mary or secondary stakeholders, nor do I distinguish between their levels of influence by catego-
rising them into schemata of power, legitimacy, and urgency. By ’problem’ or ’risk holder’ I see 
stakeholders as the various individuals that are affected by a problem or bear a risk connected 
to the organisation, which has an ’energy’ to them that has exceeded the equilibrium of concern 
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such that attention is now paid to these problems or risks in order to make certain actors act 
and change the situation, so that the problem can be solved and equilibrium retained.  
By ’decision influencers’ I see stakeholders not as egalitarian actors having similar influence, 
but as influencers, that manage to impact decisions in the process of decision making with more 
or less weight according to the problem and risks they hold. 
Problems are in this model defined as uncertainties, issues or impacts, that have reached an 
amount of energy attached to them that cannot be ignored at the time because of the threat 
against survival ultimately. If an organisation reaches a point where production costs exceed the 
revenue of the sale, the organisation has to make changes to adapt to the market situation in or-
der ultimately to survive or close down, as in Burns & Stalker’s (1961) investigation. If an or-
ganisation does not change its actions in a specific way, penalties will arise. Eventually the or-
ganisation will not survive after a certain amount of time.  
Some problems are not as essential for the survival or death of the organisation: most problems 
are small problems that take place as a normal issue in the organisation, and which could take 
place at any time. However, if we assume that no problems were solved at all in an organisation, 
a point of no return would be reached eventually, and the question of survival or death would be 
present. Problems are normally solved according to their importance whether the actions taken 
are part of an anarchistic model such as the Garbage Can Model or any other kinds of models. 
This is according to Cohen et al.’s and March’s specifications (Cohen et al., 1972; March, 1994) 
due to the ’energy’ it takes to solve problems. Some problems have little energy attached to 
them and are easy and quick to solve, while others have a heavy load of energy attached to them 
and take more time, resources and costs to be solved. Problems do not arise for no reason, by 
no-one or for nothing.  
The rational reason may not be present at the moment the problem appears, and that is why 
knowledge is important for actors in order to understand the problem and to solve it. Irrational 
problems can also arise as well as irrational choices, where the knowledge and rationality is very 
limited. However, in the case where means and ends are related to power, irrational choices by 
one decision maker can be a rational choice for another, for instance a superior. In this model 
problems are always attached to a receiver or a sender. Here I attach them to the stakeholders. 
Problems are sent from somewhere and someone, who either has a problem or will receive an-
other problem if the specific problem is not solved. The stakeholders, who are interested in deci-
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sion making, have a stake in the problem in one way or another (Freeman 1984, 2010). Either 
they are employees working for the company to earn money for a living, or they have other rea-
sons to have a stake in the actual problem or issue. If a potential stakeholder does not have a 
stake in the problem, he or she will not use their energy in either for decision making or claims, 
demands, or even for attention to the problem.  
A problem or an issue can also be attached to the stakeholders that do not have a voice them-
selves. For instance the natural environment, the climate, the animals, the poor, the disabled etc. 
There are many problems and issues that do not have a voice or are not heard by the voice they 
have. Therefore these stakeholders normally have a spokesperson or spokes-organisations to 
represent them. Some stakeholder models regard the environment or the climate etc. as stake-
holders themselves despite their lack of direct voice (Woodward, 2002). However, the evidence 
of ’undesired changes’ having a ’voice’ are in this model assumed to have a spokesperson in the 
shape of a human being or an organisation to represent it. Other models regard the environment 
and the climate as issues in themselves (Freeman, 2010), but this model does in this instance 
distinguish between the entity itself represented by a spokesperson and the problems (the issues) 
attached to it.    
Risks are defined in the model as the amount of uncertainties and unknown impacts one is will-
ing to accept when taking a decision and making a choice. This amount can be divided into ty-
pes with interconnections: 
1) Known or imagined risks 
2) Residual risk (intersection of 1) and 3)) 
3) Unknown risks 
The first type can be rationally estimated using calculations or measures of consequences of 
harm and probabilities. Still it does not ’do away’ with all kinds of risks (March, 1994). The 
rational way of dealing with risks is mapping all possible knowledge from all possible and imag-
ined sources and interactions into a schemata and estimating the level of the known risks and 
Known  Unknown Resi 
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FIGURE 3: RISK-TYPES
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actions that can reduce these risks. There is still an amount of unknowable risk also when actors 
rationally make choices in order to reduce these risks.  
These residual risks traverse the known and the unknown risks. The unknown risks are not able 
to be counted nor cognitively possible to estimate. Everything we know or can imagine is put in 
the first and manageable category. The unknown is cognitively unattainable, but these are still 
risks that we are aware can happen, but we do not know them before we experience them for the 
first time. In this part of the risk model together with the residual risks–the risk that we could not 
eliminate after estimating the known risks and taking actions to reduce its probability–we can 
also call ’risk taking’ (March, 1994). Whenever a decision is made and implemented and put 
into action, the residual risks and the unknown risks can occur as a consequence of the decisions 
we have made. Only after seeing the consequences of our decisions and actions allocated to the-
se, can we experience and make sense out of what has happened (Weick, 1995).  
Ethics is in this model is attached to the consequences of the outcome of the decisions made. It 
is also in this model attached to the unspecified and individual understanding of terms such as 
’behaviour’, ’quality’ and ’value’. Ethics in this sense is not defined a priori to the outcome, 
since the notions of ethics as well as behaviour, quality and value are all attached to the impacts 
of the outcome. When making ethical decisions different norms, values, and moral considera-
tions come into play. These definitions are not possible to make exhaustively a priori. Some 
ethical implications are stated regulatively in the legislation, others are connected to customs, 
perceived or written norms, religious or cultural behavioural moral considerations etc. It would 
take an entire thesis to explain what ’ethics’ means in specific contextual frameworks. There-
fore, the notion ’ethics’ in this model stays open to the specific contextual, cultural, and reli-
gious norms, values and morals present at a specific time and setting.  
Is ethics a rational thing? As long as ethics is part of an agreement stated as a written text, for 
instance that of legislation, religious books, normative scripts approved by an authority of any 
kind etc., I will consider it to be rational because enough people have voluntarily agreed that this 
is worth considering. This said, there are many discussions among scholars, professionals, and 
practitioners about what is the right ethical stance to adopt. Some behavioural norms are consid-
ered ethical in some parts of the world and considered unethical in other parts of the world, for 
instance in ethical matters in religion. This paper does not take any stance in these discourses, 
but regards ethics as a notion connected to an agreed rightful behaviour, qualities, and values 
solely understood in the present context of matter situated in a specific time and place. 
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Decisions are in this model defined as choices that are made to stabilise a certain amounts of 
uncertainty, and that is difficult or takes a certain amount of energy to reverse or is irreversable 
eventually. A decision can made to buy a new set of trains for the nation, following decisions on 
producing them, and the outcome of the actual product cannot be reversed, only destroyed, re-
used etc. The outcome of the materiality cannot enter the same conditions as if it were prior to 
the production of the new set of trains. If the nation refuses to receive the ordered trainsets be-
cause of an unsatisfactory outcome, the trains cannot disappear or be transformed back to 
steelbars, organic oil products, etc. It will always be something else. Resold, destroyed, reused, 
recycled, etc.  
Some decisions can be reversed if no outcome or impact has been executed at the time of the 
changed decision. These reversals can be made according to the energy necessary to reverse the 
decision. Sometimes it takes little energy such as different parties meeting at a specific place 
agreeing to reverse the decisions made with a small amount of energy attached to these deci-
sions. At other times the reversability takes more energy to ”undo” the decision, or the outcome 
may also be changed but in a way that the impact has no relevance or has an indifferent effect on 
the already made outcome. 
Outcome is defined by the impact of the change that the decision and actions attached have cre-
ated. An outcome is always attached to a change which is attached to actions made for institut-
ing the change based on a decision made by someone. Only after the outcome has become a re-
ality, can people understand what change has happened based on the actions linked to the 
decisions made and see what the impact is. As Weick has put it: ”How can I know what I think 
until I see what I say?” (Weick, 1979). We can only understand the consequences of our actions 
based on our deliberate decisions or our unconsciousness, which leads me to the last step in the 
model: sensemaking. 
Sensemaking is in this model derived directly from Karl E. Weick’s work (1995). In this respect 
it is the last definition in the model leading to the ongoing organic cycle of the stakeholder mod-
el. Actions and outcomes (consequences) are interpreted by the stakeholders and decision mak-
ers leading to new decisions, and maybe new problems as seen in the Garbage Can Model. Solu-
tions, that have various characteristics, can either turn our attention to new problems to solve or 
continue the process in the same direction as the one we were in before. Weick (1995) says that 
sensemaking can only be retrospective and here he means–as Søren Kirkegaard articulated in 
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1843–that life can only be interpreted retrospectively, but must be lived forwardly (Thielst, 
1994). We interpret the actions we (or others) have made in the past; not while we live them out.  
This leads me to the expression of the model and to discuss the correlation between the entities 
explained above and the correlation with the ’ethics’ and the dependent variables, time and 
costs. The Organic Stakeholder Model comprises the above terms: stakeholders, problems, risks, 
decisions, outcomes and sensemaking. The shared link between them is ethics consisting of the 
dependent variables time and costs. The latter finally express how ’ethics’ is connected to deci-
sion making when involving stakeholders in it. Throughout the definitions of the seven catego-
ries within the model, we see how the dependent variables are explained by extracts from the 
definitions: 
FIGURE 4: THE ORGANIC STAKEHOLDER MODEL 
ETHICS DEPENDING ON ’TIME’ 
The dependent variable ’time’ in the central notion of ethics is apparent in the way that prob-
lems enter the decision-making process by stakeholders either inside or outside the organisation 
at a specific time. The sender or the receiver of the problem or derived problems of decision 
making are characterised by stakeholders. From the definition of a problem attached to a stake-
holder we saw how time was linked to energy load. We also saw that problems arise when the 
energy load has reached a point and time, where something has to be done in order to avoid eth-
ical issues such as harm, survival, the avoidance of death, or the collapse of the organisations or 
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the lives of the stakeholders. The problems may enter the decision makers table long before a 
disaster is present, even so early that no sign of a potential problem is visible. 
However, if risks from the problem are perceived to be real, problems may be attempted to be 
solved long before they even manifest as real problems. In this we see time as relational. Either 
to prevent a disasterous future from being realised or to avoid consequences that might happen. 
In relational time people use their knowledge from their prior experiences either their own or 
through their awareness of other similar situations experienced and described by others. So in 
order to prevent certain problems from being realised in the future, the knowledge and experi-
ences from their past are used deliberately to solve problems imagined or calculated (estimated) 
before evidence for them appears. 
Time has two kinds of features in this model: chronological and relational. Chronological time is 
used for instance when a timetable is made for a specific problem to be solved and decisions and 
products have to be created in order to solve the problem. Relational time is, when decisions are 
made from our experiences or knowledge in order to prevent problems occurring, for instance 
when doing a risk calculation or estimation. Then, we imagine risks that might occur when eval-
uating different paths on which to go. We use sensemaking to interpret our experienced actions 
and their consequences, and we value them in terms of ethical qualities such as being good, bal-
anced, harmful, etc. Risk management is mainly perceived as evaluating risks taken if certain 
decisions are made prior to decision making. We want to estimate to what degree harm to others 
and to ourselves is probable and what courses we have to take to avoid this harm.  
We could imagine businesses doing these risk calculations in order to enhance utilitarian goals, 
but most of the time managers consider risks both outside and inside their organisations because 
they are aware of risks that affect stakeholders and that would probably harm the organisation as 
well. For example, harming customers that buy a specific good will lead to certain penalties to 
the organisation sooner or later. Of course some utilitarians or speculative managers can inflict 
harm upon others, but these kinds of motives are not considered in this model. The model as-
sumes that managers care about their stakeholders and have ethical aims in their decision mak-
ing. This model wants to show how this is dependent on time and costs both situational (chrono-
logical time and financial costs) and relational (past, present, and future time and social or 
environmental consequences). 
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Time or timing has a special value or quality related to ethical decision making and stakeholder 
relationships. A sound and ethically good relationship with stakeholders calls for a specific need 
for managers taking the right decisions according to problems and resolutions at specific points 
in time. If decisions are made too late after the specific consequences of a problem or decision, 
the results are that the energy attached to the specific problem does not end with the elimination 
of the problem. It is not neutralised, which means that new and additional energy will be at-
tached to the problem. The necessary energy to solve the problem ex post is then much higher or 
has a more heavy load than problems solved in time.  
For example, when France resisted stopping nuclear testing in 1995, a worldwide boycott of 
French products resulted in devastating counter-pressures to this decision and the trade of 
French goods in general. Afterwards, it took a long time before demands for French goods were 
near the same level as before. Some claim that it has never been the same after this political mis-
take, especially not in Denmark (Bentzen & Smith, 2001). In this specific case we see a clash of 
realtime political decisions with worldwide consequences, where global stakeholders relate to 
the past through their memory of the devastating pictures of the victims of the atomic bombing 
in Japan in 1945. They react based on their own decision making grounded in the judgement that 
the nation of France did this out of self-interest forgetting to imagine the consequences of a 
worldwide consumer and political boycott of French goods. Stakeholders make sense retrospec-
tively of actions made in the past, and they react to actions in the present through the meaning 
they attach to these actions while deciding in the present and for the future the expected conse-
quences of their present actions (Weick, 1995). 
ETHICS DEPENDING ON ’COSTS’ 
This example leads us to describe the dependent variable of ’costs’ within ethics. Costs are to be 
perceived twofold as financial and relational (social and environmental consequences) respec-
tively. As we saw in the former variable time, the two different notions of costs are often inter-
linked the same way. Financial costs ordered to solve a given problem may also have conse-
quences of relational costs. Problems are solved ideally in order to ’do away’ with them or 
neutralise them, but some problems cannot be solved without financial costs attached to them, 
while others can be solved by offering an apology or explaining ones behaviour to the one that 
has been harmed by a certain action (March, 1994). 
The problems regarded in the Organic Stakeholder Model are the ones that have attached both 
financial costs as well as relational costs to them. When a problem is posed in an organisation 
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and has to be solved as a kind of project, it often has a certain amount of energy attached to it, 
which means that in order to solve or neutralise the problem and minimise the relational costs, it 
often needs a financial cost budget to do the proper decision making.  
The examples investigated in this paper all have these preferences attached to them, but they are 
solved very differently: from pure rational or resolveable behaviours to oversight and flight ac-
tions such as seen in the Garbage Can Model (Cohen et al., 1972). Typically for these kinds of 
problems, multiple stakeholders have an interest in the decision-making process and the conse-
quences of the actions posed ex post decision making. The ethical decision making involves 
inclusion of various stakeholders or debates around what it takes to neutralise the problem in 
order to satisfy a certain number of stakeholders ultimately.  
The problem is not a standalone problem in these kinds of projects. Many juxtaposed problems 
arise when making decisions, and all problems have to be dealt with either directly or indirectly 
according to the risks they contain. Often a certain amount of financial cost has been agreed to 
be allocated to solve the problem as well as a certain amount of time available to solve the prob-
lem. However, as we will see from the examples, these boundaries might be fixed, but may dur-
ing the decision-making process be negotiated with multiple stakeholders. Sometimes the stake-
holders have what Mitchel et al. (1997), Wartick & Wood (1998), and Fassin (2009, 2010) 
address as certain and crucial amounts of power, legitimacy, and urgency to stretch the bounda-
ries of time and costs. Sometimes determinant stakeholders such as the authorities, regulators, 
and politicians pose demands that affect the problem either needing more finance and/or time in 
order to solve it satisfactorily for these stakeholders.  
At other times stakeholders have to obey these determinant stakeholders and live with decisions 
that create certain relational and perhaps financial costs regarding their interests. For example, 
when a new road is decided in the city council, it affects land and property owners, who are 
forced to move out of their houses. Often they receive financial compensation from the society 
in return for this harm done to them, if their properties lie in the geophysical area decided for a 
new road. The power of these political, legislative, or regulative stakeholders is stated by law. 
Whether property owners like the decisions or not, they have to obey these decisions, which 
they are then economically compensated for. In these cases the implicated stakeholders often 
argue about the balance between the relational costs and the received financial costs, because the 
values and qualities they have lost might represent an unbalance in the view of the victims of 
this specific political decision.  
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In other cases decisions are more flexible regarding various stakeholder demands of the various 
energies (power, legitimacies, and urgencies) and solutions are sought to balance these energies 
to satisfy as many stakeholder demands as possible. In the latter situation ethics may be more 
fluid and at the same time other ethical issues might be negotiated in the decision-making pro-
cess by the inclusion of various stakeholders and transparency in motives, means and ends in the 
decision-making process (Pedersen 2006). For example, legislation concerned with the interests 
of the public allows public service actors to decide and solve different problems the best way, as 
we saw in the example with the planning of a new road. Ethics are typically built into the legis-
lation of how affected stakeholders have to receive financial compensations for the costs, of a 
project which applies to them.  
However, the legislation does not indicate how and where the road should be placed and which 
public concerns the project should consider. In this respect the ethical decision making of the 
planners comes into play. Maybe rational reasons of where to place the road may make the 
planners consider the benefit of the many roadusers. At other times the ethics of the individual 
becomes a natural consideration for planners.  
For example, if the roadplanning removes the livelihood of small shopkeepers and no alternative 
place for these shops can be provided, the road planners might consider ethical issues for both 
the roadusers and the shopkeepers in a way so that the shops are preserved and the physical 
place of the road is considered for the adaptation of both the individual and the public interests.  
The problems for these complex projects is that decisions regarding allocated costs and time are 
often decided prior to the final design of the project, especially if the project is politically decid-
ed. Financial costs and time schedules may be fixed, however, vast examples of public construc-
tion processes shows that both budgets and time are typically exceeded in the end (Kreiner 
2009) because of unforeseen events, claims, demands etc. that were unknown at the time of de-
cision making, or worse: that decisions are made on a wrong basis. 
COHERENCE OF THE OSM MODEL  
The coherence of the Organic Stakeholder Model (OSM) and especially how ethics perpetuates 
it is visualised by a basic schemata, in which cases can be described in to create the specific and 
concrete coherence applicable to each individual case. 
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follow the same pattern. The coordinate system (Figure 5) shall be seen as a part of the ethical 
core of the OSM. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE OSM 
The six project cases executed in two different Danish water companies show how ethical deci-
sion making involves several stakeholders in the decision making as well as how the planners 
listened to the voices of weak stakeholders. They also show how the projects depend on the 
proper allocation or flexibility of time and costs, and how this eventually will become a business 
case for the water companies. Appendix 2: Table B, page 300, shows the different premises on 
which of the six cases are based.  
The six cases are all different, but at the same time they share the same qualities and values as 
part of their ethical decision making. All the cases were extremely complex, and very few de-
terminant decisions were extracted out of the hundreds of different decisions made during each 
process in each project. These decisions were chosen for their crucial ethical impact on the fea-
sibility and completion of the projects. The evolution and combination of the lines in the upper 
and lower quadrant show how stakeholder involvement in ethical decision making determines 
the outcome of the project ultimately. If stakeholders were not heard or involved, the problem 
would have been unsolved or the outcome would have generated new problems. We also see 
how fixed financial costs and chronological time were not possible for the completion of the 
project in many of the cases. Every time the upper quadrant line jumps up, a decision is made to 
extend both financial costs and chronological time in order to meet stakeholder demands and to 
complete the project in an ethical manner to satisfy the many before the few. 
Odense Port 
Decision (A) in Figure 6 was the problem of an open wastewater basin in a suburb called Tarup 
in the city of Odense. This problem had been present for many years but as unsolvable as a Gor-
dian Knot because of the lack of possibilities to dig in a densely urbanised area. Now techniques 
of tunnelling were possible, and decisions to close this open, un-environmental basin were 
made. Soon after decision (a) was made, the City Council decided (b) to develop the port of 
Odense from an industrial area into a recreational area with the possibility eventually of swim-
ming in the Channel of Odense.  
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possible to design the reservoir to reduce the risk of new flooding from 1 per 10 years to 1 per 
50 years.  
The stakeholders needed extended time to agree to such a decision, because it was crucial for 
them how much economic compensation they got from selling their houses to the water compa-
ny. Finally, the prices were negotiated satisfying seven out of the nine houseowners, who agreed 
to sell their houses and move out a year after the agreement was signed. They needed this time 
to find new homes or build new houses elsewhere (c). The final outcome (d) of the design of the 
new rainwater basin was made in cooperation with the remaining houseowners and the union of 
owners in the area to make the new water reservoir a natural ’pearl’ for social purposes as well 
as technical ones. 
The next case is very different from the three above, but the time/cost dependencies are shown 
to be just as viable as in the above. 
Ryttermarken 
The merger of a water and wastewater company in Svendborg with the municipal waste section 
necessitated a new building with room for more offices, a canteen and more meeting facilities 
(a) in Figure 9. What seemed to be a traditional construction of a new building turned out to be a 
struggle of conflicting stakeholder demands, that were solved by a democratic process. This 
process continued during the design until decision (b) was made, but the needs of the stakehold-
ers–primarily the employees–initiated several conflicts, that had to be solved during the design 
phase.  
After this process, that made the financial costs and chronological time expand to meet all the 
needs arising, the building was to be built in an energy project to reduce the consumption of 
fossil energy and substitute this with ’green’ energy from geothermal and solar thermal heating 
as well as from solar cells to produce electricity for the entire property housing the administra-
tion and operation facilities of the new water and waste company in Svendborg. Unfortunately 
the project had several end problems, that resulted in new conflicts, since failures in the con-
struction created an awful smell of sewer odor as well as cold and heat problems occurring after 
the commissioning of the new building. Luckily these problems were solved after a while, but 
these problems had an effect for a long time after the project had been finished and these feel-
ings overruled the ethical results of the energy neutral building in the first place in the employ-
ees’ minds.     
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What the Organic Stakeholder Model offers is an ethical mindset for decision makers in their 
considerations of the involvement of multiple stakeholders in their decision-making processes 
and how they can benefit from that process if allowed some flexibility in the dependent varia-
bles of time and costs. It also shows how some problems may be solved by these investments 
eventually. The model is no shortcut to ease decision-making processes, however, I hope my 
contribution with a more ethical decision-making process eventually can develop a business 
case both financially and socially for decision makers. 
CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
The above qualitative study of six cases from mega projects (and problems) to small projects in 
two Danish water companies shows us how ethical decision making depends on two crucial var-
iables: ’time’ (chronological and relational) and ’costs’ (financial and social). Whether decision-
making processes are more rational or garbage can-processes, these examples show that in order 
to avoid problems to be solved by ’oversight’ and ’flight’ (Cohen et al., 1972), which does not 
really solve anything, that the Garbage Can Model of decision making is very true albeit prob-
lematic.  
If these complex problems are to be solved, decision makers must invest in elasticity in terms of 
’time’ and ’costs’ to provide ethical decision making in order to solve seemingly insoluble prob-
lems. This is what Burns & Stalker showed was possible in ’organic’ systems, which are more 
effective than ’mechanic’ systems, and that is why the above is an Organic Stakeholder Model. 
The necessity to include stakeholders in both determinant level (Mitchel et al., 1997; Wartick & 
Wood, 1998) as well as non-determinant levels during the process and to value ethics by provid-
ing flexibility in time and costs may be the way to solve complex problems ultimately (Kreiner, 
2009). When time and costs are fixed in an inflexible way, the outcome will be framed by this 
fixing and the result depend on what is possible inside the rigidity of this framework. However, 
very few complex problems are fixed in time and costs.  
As we saw, sometimes it is possible through the inclusion of stakeholders in the design phase to 
reverse the financial costs as in the Sanderum case as well as in the last two cases of energy re-
duction. In these instances it is possible to see a business case financially as well as socially and 
environmentally. 
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how well water companies in four different nations 
and different political cultures are engaged in the CSR discourse. This question is relevant after 
more than 20 years of privatisation of the public administration’s bureaucracy with its adoption 
of management styles, behaviours, and thinking from the private business sphere. This paper 
critically examines how water companies take part in the CSR discourse, by which institutional 
mechanisms this managerial ‘thinking’ in terms of institutional ‘logics’ has come about, and 
which adopted ‘meanings’ lie behind it.  
The paper shows a qualitative ethnographic investigation and a discourse analysis of privatised 
water companies from four different nations in terms of political democratic traditions and mar-
ket economies: Denmark, the UK, the US, and South Africa. Seven companies are chosen in 
each country from the smallest to the largest in order to obtain maximum variety and express 
analytical generalisations across nations and company sizes. The findings of the cross-
geographical, political, and market economic study shows how institutional logics are transfer-
ring from ’implicit’ CSR towards ’explicit’ CSR through the mechanisms of coercive, norma-
tive, and mimetic isomorphism. Companies that are only engaged in coercive isomorphic ’im-
plicit’ CSR show a hesitant and resistent engagement, whereas companies engaging in 
normative and mimetic isomorphism translate their discourses in a more authentic way into ’ex-
plicit’ CSR.  
The findings question the credibility of this authenticity when most CSR reports from the water 
companies are made without third-partyaccreditation, without performance indicators, and only 
through narratives that are hard to scrutinise. The research has limitations regarding the dis-
course analysis, which in Denmark was possible to conduct from both oral texts such as inter-
views, observation studies and document analysis, whereas in the UK, the US, and South Africa 
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the qualitative material is based only on written texts from documents, CSR reports, annual re-
ports, and written communication between regulators and companies. The research implications 
suggest a further replication of the findings from a more in-depth analysis of the institutional 
logics in these companies in the UK, the US and South Africa by replication of the study from 
Denmark. The practical implications of this study suggest a transformation of political instru-
mentation from rule setting to incentive making to make public water service companies even 
more engaged in ’explicit’ CSR to obtain more authenticity and a higher level of legitimacy in 
the field compared to the strong tradition of ’explicit’ CSR seen in the private business sphere.  
The originality and value of this research is shown by the empirical findings of the theoretical 
suggestions by Matten & Moon (2008) in how ’implicit’ CSR is transferred to ’explicit’ CSR in 
the privatisation of public service companies in the water sector across nations, cultures, politi-
cal, and market economies. It shows through the discourse analysis of institutional logics how 
institutional isomorphism is prevalent in this sector and how New Public Management systems 
need to conform from instrumental rule making to incentive making to make public services 
adopt CSR in a more authentic way. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Discourse analysis, Isomorphism, Institutional 
logics, Water companies 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has for decades been characterised by its voluntary na-
ture through which private businesses should contribute to the welfare of society (Carroll, 1991; 
Schwartz & Caroll, 2003; Kramer & Porter, 2006; O’Toole & Vogel, 2011). CSR is expected to 
be a business duty in multinational companies by intergovernmental organisations such as the 
OECD (OECD, 2001, 2011; ILO, 2006) and the UN111 (UN, 2012b). It is thus diffused to their 
respective member nations, where this has become part of national legislation. Companies en-
gage in CSR for various reasons such as stakeholder pressure (Freeman, 1984; Freeman et al., 
2010), legitimisation (Carroll & Shabana, 2010), expected competitive advantages (Kramer & 
Porter, 2006), or social entrepreneurship (Hockerts & Wüstenhagen, 2010).  
CSR is understood very differently across nations, and a huge difference is seen between Anglo-
American countries and Central European / Scandinavian countries. This phenomenon is de-
scribed by Matten & Moon (2008) as 'implicit' (embedded in norms and regulations) and ’ex-
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plicit’ CSR (embedded in business policies). This distinction is relevant in understanding the 
differences in how CSR is perceived when comparing CSR in companies across nations, which 
will be discussed later in this paper. 
CSR has sprung out of the private business sphere since the 1950s (Bowen, 1954; Moura-Leite 
& Padgett, 2011). However, recently public service companies’ engagement in the CSR dis-
course has been seen in the literature (Lauesen, 2011). After 20 years of privatisation and regu-
lation following the global trends of New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991; Rhodes, 
1994; Keating, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004), public service companies need to be acknowl-
edged as having an impact on the overall CSR agenda.  
This paper compares the discourses from the water companies in Denmark with the privatised 
companies in the UK, the US and South Africa. These types of companies have only been ex-
plored by a few researchers in relation to CSR and mainly by researchers in the UK or the EU 
(e.g. Johnston & Smith, 2001; Barraqué, 2003; Larrinaga-Gonzélez & Pérez-Chamorro, 2008; 
Crowther, 2012) and by researchers of accounting (Crowther et al., 2001; Rogers, de Silva, & 
Bhatia, 2002; Adams & McNicholas, 2006; Crowther et al., 2006; Adams & Frost, 2008; Idowu 
& Towler, 2008). Concretely, Johnston & Smith (2001) found that the environmental perfor-
mance indicators used in the water industry are legislation-driven instead of measuring envi-
ronmental impacts to improve the environmental performance of their company.  
Barraqué analysed the water sector internationally and concluded that the New Public Manage-
ment marketisation policies increase water prices and use the rhetoric of “droughts” to frighten 
people with possible water ”wars”. Barraqué recommends that we look back in history to the 
days of municipal governance of the water services. At that time a low cost perspective and the 
“objective of having the municipality manage the water supply was to get the rich to pay for 
good clean water for the poor” (Barraqué, 2003, p. 210). Larrinaga-Gonzélez & Pérez-Chamoro 
analysed water companies in Spain and found that these public organisations’ sustainability re-
ports seemed to be coupled with real organisational strategies and operational activities. 
Crowther (2012, also referring to Crowther et al., 2001) found among British water companies 
that the major driver for them to reveal environmental reports was actual pressure and the miti-
gation of future pressure from their regulators, Ofwat. 
This shows that there might be different rationales and institutional approaches to NPM, which 
emphasises the need for further research to provide knowledge of which institutional logics 
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(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) are at play both in regard to corporate 
social responsibility among managers and in regard to NPM among regulators of this sector. 
Following this path, this paper explores how the seemingly implicit CSR becomes explicit and 
how this makes a difference (Matten & Moon, 2008) in enhancing CSR and stakeholder en-
gagement in the water sector. The following research question guides this paper:  
How well are water companies engaged with corporate social responsibility?  
The paper is structured in the following way. First, an empirically induced account of how CSR 
is perceived and conceptualised among practitioners in the water sector through their discourses 
is presented. Next, the research methodology of qualitative discourse analysis, and afterwards 
each nation’s institutional regime of NPM and the theory of institutional isomorphism (DiMag-
gio & Powell, 1983) are explained. This leads to the discourse analysis of the institutional logics 
based on Thornton et al.’s (2005) definitions, which are analytically investigated in the water 
sector in relation to CSR. The empirical findings of the discourse analysis of CSR in water com-
panies and among their regulating stakeholders from Denmark (DK), the UK, the US and South 
Africa (SA) are finally presented and the conclusions provides a prospect for future research.  
AN APPROACH TO CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
A consensual definition of CSR is hard to find in the academic literature. Many scholars refer to 
Carroll's pyramid (1991) differing between economic, legal, ethical and discrete bases of CSR 
(Matten & Moon, 2008; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). However, the CSR concept depicted as a 
pyramid with philanthropy at the top and economy at the bottom has lead to inappropriate hier-
archical misinterpretations of what is most important. Thus Schwartz & Carroll (2003) chose to 
revise it into a Three-domain Model of CSR as a Venn diagram with overlapping circles of 
economy, the legal, and ethical domains. 
Nevertheless, these principles find repercussions in the international society through intergov-
ernmental organisations such as the UN112 (UN, 2012b) and OECD (OECD 2001, 2011; ILO, 
2006). These institutions have adopted and institutionalised a broad CSR concept that includes 
terms of economy, the environment, sustainability, labour, and human rights, and concretises 
what has been researched for many years in academic CSR circles (MacLeod, 2007). In this 
respect Matten & Moon’s (2008) ‘implicit’ and ‘explicit’ CSR is important to bear in mind, 
since misunderstandings about these notions and what people (laymen as well as scholars) mean 
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when they say “CSR” is not obvious. There is no fully shared meaning of what constitutes CSR. 
Especially the notion ‘implicit’ CSR is much contested today and results in a harsh debate of 
what is ‘real’ CSR? Can it be said to be CSR if it is implicit and taken for granted (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1967)? When does implicit CSR become explicit? Matten & Moon (2008) explain 
these questions vaguely in their descriptions: 
 ”On the one hand, explicit CSR is part of a broader movement of the global 
spread of management concepts, ideologies and technologies which mostly re-
sult in some sort of ‘Americanisation’ of management practices.” (Matten & 
Moon 2008, pp. 12-13).  
“[…] there is ample evidence that CSR in the ‘explicit’ sense is gaining mo-
mentum and spreading all over Europe (and beyond).” (Matten & Moon, 2008, 
p. 1). 
This spread of ’Americanisation’ and explicit CSR is replicated in Europe and abroad by many 
studies.  
“[T]here is not ‘a’ European social model, but several: Anglo-Saxon, Central-
European, Scandinavian or Nordic, Mediterranean, Central and Eastern Euro-
pean etc.” (Argandona & Hoivik, 2009, p. 9).  
Similarly, CSR is replicated differently in other parts of the world, (for instance Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America) where explicit CSR is seen in connection to particular institutional contexts 
and distinct from others (Adams, Hill, & Roberts, 1998; Maignan & Ralston, 2002; Welford, 
2003; Habisch, Jonker, Wegner, & Schmidpeter, 2005; Midttun, Gautesen, & Gjølberg, 2006; 
Matten & Moon, 2008; Höllerer, 2012; Argandona & Hoivik, 2009; Lauesen, 2011). 
This paper investigates how explicit CSR is discursively emerging in the public service sector 
that has been privatised or quasi-privatised and has adopted a wide range of managerial practic-
es such as implementation of CSR as a discourse in their new business policies. Especially ex-
plicit CSR, that goes ‘beyond legislation’, has become popular (Matten & Moon, 2004). How-
ever, in the EU some elements of CSR are normatively encouraged and sometimes coercively 
authorised from the institutions that regulate these companies (Doh & Guay, 2006). In the latter 
one might speak of implicit CSR when legislation demands CSR. However, the way it is de-
manded is to be incorporated as explicit CSR in the relevant business policies. For instance, the 
Danish law requires large companies to provide CSR reports as recommended by the OECD 
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(OECD, 2011). In these they must describe how they individually work with explicit accounts of 
CSR113. This type of implicit CSR law provides a ’formative’ regulation. This means that the 
legislation does not explicitly state the ”what” and “how”: it requires a certain genre but not a 
certain content. This is seem similarly when states require businesses to publish annual reports 
(Höllerer, 2012). How the individual organisation enacts CSR is still explicit and discrete. 
This paper explores how public service companies engage in explicit CSR discurses. It analyses 
to which degree this engagement is part of isomorphic processes (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983): 
coercive (‘implicitly’ demanded in a ’formative’ but not a descriptive way as a genre), norma-
tive (‘explicit’ if the norm is occurring among voluntary initiatives of companies; ‘implicit’ if 
the norm is encouraged by the regulators as a genre) and mimetic (purely explicit as when cor-
porations imitate others’ voluntary CSR initiatives) processes.  
Practitioners of public water service companies in Denmark, in which CSR is not regulated114, 
perceive CSR from their local point of view and do not refer to any theoretical models. Some of 
the managers refer to the concept of Global Initiative Reporting. However, most express their 
gut feeling or self-expressed logic of what CSR is about. Therefore, a discursive and open ap-
proach of CSR is preferred in this paper to define what the sector sees as important descriptors 
of CSR across nations. Through discourse analysis institutional logics, in which CSR is inter-
preted, is analysed from comparable texts established or approved by managers of cross-national 
water companies (see also Crowther, 2012). References to patterns in which CSR is expressed 
by the various managers of water companies in different nations are compared in Appendix 2: 
Table B, page 300.
CSR is partly normatively promoted and partly regulated by law by each nation’s environmental 
ministry115 as implicit CSR, although most CSR is explicit and voluntary in the water sector. 
The managers of the water companies agree that CSR is relevant for environmental preserva-
tion, mitigation of climate change, human rights, and occupational safety in the sense that it of-
ten goes ‘beyond legislation’ (Matten & Moon, 2008). However, CSR is also used to secure a 
sustainable economic pricing system that is regulated, and to secure complianc with legal mat-
ters including the prevention of corruption. This induced account of CSR can be seen as a logic, 
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not to be confused with an institutional logic as described by Friedland & Alford (1991) and 
Thornton et al. (2005). It is a logic that flows in the institution of water services, which traverses 
several institutional logics such as the institutional logic of the market, democracy, bureaucracy, 
religion/science, family, profession, and corporation. However, this discourse analysis does not 
measure to which degree CSR is enacted in practice eventually; what is said is not always true, 
and what is true is not always enacted in practice (Brunsson, 1993). Institutional logics are parts 
of the ideas within an organisation, which establishes its own legitimacy (Friedland & Alford, 
1991) by mirroring what is institutionally accepted among others that share this discourse 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2005).  
In many cases these institutional logics in the discourses are hard to continuously neglect and 
decouple from practice, because when these logics–institutional or non-institutional–are first 
expressed, they will be scrutinised by the public (Meyer 2004) in order for them to be trustwor-
thy if they are enacted in practice eventually. This means that in time and with continuous 
stakeholder pressure, institutional logics will have repercussions on everyday practices of organ-
isations or will come to reflect the practices of CSR that these organisations are expected to per-
form (Meyer, 2004). This is especially seen when the accountability of an organisation is de-
manded through third-partyscrutiny (Crowther, 2012).  
The plausibility and reliability of the logics in the institutional field of public water service can 
therefore be analysed in the discourse analysis through 1) the juxtaposition of the opposing (e.g. 
the regulators’) discourse; by 2) by accreditation of performance measurements (by independent 
accountants or certification bodies) or; 3) by descriptions in texts by other independent parties. 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AS RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A discourse analysis is a study of the language of use. This can be interpreted in many ways 
such as through content analysis (taking the spoken word for good as an expression of ‘reality’), 
linguistic analysis (looking at the meaning of words used) (Gee, 2011), critical analysis (using 
Critical Theory (e.g. Habermas, 1971)), or through a broader social and politically informed 
construction approach to sociology (e.g. Berger & Luckmann, 1967) in order to critique and 
change society by making the interconnections of things, the dominance of ideologies, or the 
power in relationships visible (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).  
Critical discourse analysis takes its departure in hermeneutical interpretation traditions rather 
than deductive traditions depending on mere linguistic analyses without neglecting issues, con-
tents, and topics (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 28). The analysis of argumentation is typically ana-
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lysed into domains such as ‘kinds of..’ and ‘forms of..’, strategies and logics, compositional 
frames, insinuations, symbolism, and metaphors as well as the linguistic analysis of idioms, say-
ings, vocabularies, and styles within a certain school of knowledge (Ibid.). From these ideas the 
arguments presented in this paper are related to the institutional logics, which has been exam-
ined by analysing the arguments within interviews and discursive texts using Thornton & 
Ocasio’s (1999) redefinitions of Friedland & Alford’s (1991) initial account of institutional 
logics. The discourse analysis of institutional logics found within empirical arguments will cap-
ture the institutional framing and contrasting of different meanings of CSR in the water sector. 
By using the institutional approach to discourse analysis a critical stance is taken by looking for 
‘contrasting’ logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Spradley, 1979, 
1980). The interpretation of how these contrasting logics play up against other logics can thus 
determine the validity and reliability of the discourses of CSR taking place in the water compa-
nies.  
Discourse analysis is an emerging field in contemporary CSR research. E.g. Coupland (2005), 
Laine (2005), Tregidgaet al. (2007), Biloslavo & Trnavcevic (2009) bring interpretive and dis-
course analysis in to investigate CSR and sustainability reports, websites, and other such sources 
of written texts. This paper introduces an empirical and case-based investigation of the discours-
es of CSR of seven water companies and their regulators in each nation. In the case of Denmark 
the empirical material is based upon interviews and participant-observation studies. This materi-
al is then compared to the CSR discourses in corporate texts from water companies’ CSR reports 
and other public documents from websites from seven other water companies from the UK, the 
US, and South Africa respectively.  
All 28 companies are chosen to qualitatively show a maximum of variety (Flyvbjerg, 2006) of 
different company sizes related to their quantitative production of water. The three largest com-
panies and four medium size companies are chosen from all nations. Since the nations differ in 
size and have different sizes of water companies, it only makes sense, for instance, to compare 
them with those small and medium sized Danish water companies, which have a clear CSR pro-
file either explained in public reports, on their websites, or through interviews. The idea compar-
ing also medium sized and large companies within and across nations is to get as broad a CSR 
definition as possible but still to make this definition as comparable as possible. 
In Denmark I carried out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with top managers (directors), 
planners, CSR experts, economists, project managers (engineers) and four interviews with two 
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municipal authorities and one state authority. My methodology is inspired by the constructivist 
ethnographic tradition (e.g. Stake, 2000; Kvale, 2007; Justesen & Mik-Meyer, 2010; Fontana & 
Frey, 2005; Spradley, 1979; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Denzin, 1989). CSR reports, annual re-
ports, and other documents were found on almost all the Danish case companies’ websites116 as 
well as the authorities’117 and branch organisations’ websites118. From the UK, the US, and 
South Africa research material was found in documents and information from the webpages of  
the chosen water companies in each country119 and from documents from the webpages of their 
authorities120, regulators121, and diverse branch organisations respectively. See Appendix 3: Ta-
ble C, page 303. 
NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM
New public management (NPM) is a contextual frame for the institutional settings of the public 
water companies in Denmark as well as in the UK, the US, and in South Africa (Lauesen, 2011). 
NPM has grown worldwide since the 1980s in reaction to political and financial crises such as 
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(http://amwater.com/corporate-responsibility/corporate-responsibility reporting/index.html ), California Water Ser-
vice Group (http://www.calwatergroup.com/sustainability/index.shtml), Denver Water 
(http://www.denverwater.org/AboutUs/EnvironmentalStewardship/), Aqua America (http://ir.aquaamerica.com/), 
El Paso Water Utility (http://www.epwu.org/) and Owensboro Municipal Utilities (http://omu.org/). All re-retrieved 
20th September 2013. 
South Africa: Rand Water (http://www.randwater.co.za/Annual%20Reports/Forms/AllItems.aspx), Johannesburg 
Water (http://www.johannesburgwater.co.za), Umgeni Water (http://www.umgeni.co.za/governance/ar.asp), 
Lepelle Northern Water (http://www.lepellewater.co.za), Bloem Water (http://www.bloemwater.co.za/ar.html), 
Amatola Water (http://www.amatolawater.co.za/about-us/introduction ) and Pelladrift Water (no URL, data found 
on www.dwaf.gov.za ). All retrieved August 2012 and re-retrieved 20th September 2013. 
120
 Danish environmental ministry (www.mim.dk ), British environmental ministry (www.defra.gov.uk ), the US 
environmental protection agency (www.epa.gov ) and Department of Water Affairs in South Africa 
(www.dwaf.gov.za ). All retrieved August 2012 and re-retrieved 20th September 2013. 
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 Denmark: Competition Authority (www.kfst.dk/tilsyn ), the UK: OFWAT (www.ofwat.gov.uk), the US: 
NARUC (www.naruc.org) and South Africa: DWA (www.dwaf.gov.za ). All retrieved August 2012 and re-
retrieved 20th September 2013.
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the oil crisis in the 1970s and the financial crisis in 1980s (Kettl, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2004; Christensen & Lægreid, 2010). The traditional bureaucracy was seen as inefficient, slow, 
and in some nations very corrupt and incapable of lifting the nations out of its financial prob-
lems. Change of the public administration from being state and local public administrations was 
initiated through privatisation of various kinds of public offices into more business-like consor-
tia (Osborne, 1993; Hood, 1991).  
There were demands for budget steering, annual reporting, managerial structures and autono-
mies, and contracts with incentives and penalties regulated by state authorities that were ulti-
mately politically controlled (Kettl, 2002; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Christensen & Lægreid, 
2010). By adopting the wisdom of the private sector and the idea of the invisible hand of the 
market (Sullivan & Sheffrin, 2003) it was assumed by powerful liberal state leaders such as 
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher that the new stabilisation of public spending could turn 
the tables (Hood, 1991; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).  
The significant (post-) new public management features in the four nations is shown in Appen-
dix 4: Table D, page 304. 
The consequences of the requests from state governments and intergovernmental organisations 
such as the OECD for creating ’value for money’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Pedersen, 2010) 
seemed at first hand to be only for economic savings. CSR, on the other hand, addresses the in-
terests of the society (Garriga & Melé, 2004; Van Marrewijk, 2003; Carroll, 1991) in general in 
order to overcome the problems of inequality, human rights, labour conditions, environmental 
problems, climate change, and other such social issues. The political imperative of NPM seems 
to override these social incentives of CSR in its demands of ’doing more with less’ and the crea-
tion of ’value for money’ through economical savings and efficiency and effectiveness making 
and not through social improvements. However, this apparent dichotomy was to be found non-
valid ultimately, since both sides (NPM versus CSR) contained issues of concern for both eco-
nomic and environmental issues, however, from different perspectives. 
The empirical reality of NPM explained in the discourses of water companies is a translation of 
meaning from one type of logic (for instance the logic of economy) to another (for instance the 
logic of environment) through their institutional contexts (Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Czarniawska, 1998; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Weber & Glynn, 2006). The managers’ percep-
tion of what they think is right and wrong with their institutional framework (NPM) and their 
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interpretation and sensemaking of it (Weick, 1995) as public agents is used discursively as a 
motivator to change their institutional setup (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1994; 
Scott, 2001).  
This is not to say that the logic of economy is wrong and the logic of environment is right. The-
se agents can affect their legislative institutions by complaining over specific issues to the Ap-
peals Board, or to assemble themselves in branch organisations and through them be heard in a 
collective and amplified voice. This works better for them than if they tried to create a discourse 
among their peers themselves (Freeman & Medoff, 1976). Thus, the juxtaposition the discourses 
of public water service companies about their relationship with CSR and their institutional con-
text within the NPM framework suggests an analysis of how their institutional logics come 
about through the idea of coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism as a process to initiate 
change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 150-153) 
Institutional isomorphism 
Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell wrote their seminal work on institutional isomorphism 
investigating why organisations had become so similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147). 
They found that organisations did not position themselves as distinctive from other organisa-
tions in a competitive marketplace; rather they changed their organisations to become more sim-
ilar according to three isomorphic processes. These isomorphic processes were found to have 
impact on resource centralisation and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and 
structuration of professionalism summarised as the following (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, pp. 
154-156): 
• Coercive isomorphism: The greater extent to which organisations in a field transact with agen-
cies of the state, the greater the field as a whole becomes similar due to the state requiring adop-
tions of standards and legislation in the field. 
• Normative isomorphism: The greater dependence an organisation has on another organisation or 
assemblies of organisations (e.g. in trade unions) and on (their) shared resources (e.g. groundwa-
ter or human capital resources), it will adopt the structure, behaviour and business model of the 
other(s). 
• Mimetic isomorphism: The more uncertain the relationship between means and ends are, the 
greater extent organisations will model themselves on organisations they have found successful. 
These theoretical ideas will be adapted in the following analysis of NPM and CSR discourses 
and the conflicting/competing logics among water companies and their regulative stakeholders. 
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For an overview of theoretical definitions of institutional logics used (Thornton et al., 2005), see 
Appendix 6, Table F, page 308. In the upcoming analysis I will refer to this table by pointing to 
the inserted ’chess board’ numbers such as (A1), (B1) and to the entire logics as “row (A)”, 
“row (B)” etc. The last column shows the hybridisation of the competing, but coexisting logics, 
which is found in the relationship between the contextual frame of new public management and 
corporate social responsibility. 
Discourse analysis of conflicting/competing logics of CSR in the water sector 
DENMARK: INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDER PRESSURE 
In Denmark there were especially conflicting logics between the managers of the water compa-
nies and their regulating authorities in relation to CSR based upon the relatively new (2009) 
mandatory economic regulation according to the Water Sector Act:  
“It constrains our environmental and sustainability duties to manage and se-
cure a fresh and healthy water resource for future generations!” (Interview A, 
March 2011, my translation). 
The managers’ main institutional logic, in which ’CSR’ was found mentioned, was the  logic of 
profession and the logic of corporation situated within a normative isomorphism across water 
companies. In Appendix 5: Table E, page 306, we find the main arguments of the managers. 
These can be placed in row (B) and (C) and with only fragments of row (A) accepted and a few 
logics from row (D) in Appendix 6: Table F. The authority’s main institutional logics within 
NPM are the institutional logic of the market (row A) and the state (row D), which produces a 
coercive isomorphism upon the regulated water sector.  
At the time of investigation, many top managers were deeply engaged in policy making and a 
collective discourse through their branch organisations through bringing their complaints to 
courts and hoping for changes to be made in order to receive financial rewards (A17) for their 
environmental investments (C15)122. The price cap regulation in (A12) and (D12) conflicts with 
the autonomous decisions that company managers have (B12) and the reward system attached to 
them (A17). The ability for these managers to decide their own prices and thereby indirectly the 
income of the company is at stake here. All complaints were denied by the regulators123 due to 
arguments about the enhancement of welfare (D1) for the lowest possible cost for the citizens 
                                                
122
 Price Cap Notice § 33, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=140562 (in Danish), retrieved 
August 2012 
123
 http://www.kfst.dk/Menu/Soegeresultatsside?t=1AF3, re-retrieved 20th September 2013. 
157
(A12).  
In the managers’ arguments are also found replica of (D2) and (D3) about resource dependence 
on groundwater reservoirs and their commitment to distribution, which the managers of water 
companies claim being capable of handling autonomously on behalf of the wider society as a 
part of their normative isomorphism. An excerpt of the 25 qualitative interviews is assembled in 
Appendix 5: Table E, page 306, which expresses the overall pattern of the Danish research. 
Investments in environmental protection and sustainable handling of natural resources do not 
suit the institutional logic of the market, consisting of the exchange of commodities and eco-
nomic depreciation of investments of goods, whose value declines over time. The Price Cap 
Notice indirectly promotes investments and sanctions operational costs in a complex model cal-
culating a price cap, which is the maximum price of a regulated service (Lauesen, 2011). When, 
for instance, afforestation is not approved as an investment due to the institutional logic of the 
market and the institutional logic of the state (regulation), it becomes an operational cost, which 
is benchmarked and affects and diminishes the price cap, which eventually puts a pressure on 
the water companies’ survival. The companies can either choose to accept this and calculate it as 
an operational cost according to the market logic, or they can refuse to invest in afforestation if 
the regulation threatens their survival on the quasi-market.   
However, not all kinds of environmental investments are a problem in the Price Cap Notice; 
investments in technology and fixed assets are depreciable, and therefore they can be encapsu-
lated into the price cap as seen equivalently in the UK124 (Crowther et al., 2006; Lobina & Hall, 
2001; Danish Competition Authority, 2003). 
At a glance these competing institutional logics of profession/corporation versus market/state 
seem to be a driver for the discourse between the managers of water companies and their author-
ities. This, however, is not the entire picture when interpreting the two opposing institutional 
logics from the mechanism of the opposite market logic of the water companies. This includes 
row (A) except from (A9), (A10), (A12), (A14), (A15) and (A16). 
Most of the interviewed managers say that the conditions should be reversed from ‘making the 
managers manage’ (A12) to ‘letting the managers manage’ (B12) (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; 
Hood, 1991; Politt & Bouckaert, 2004). However, they forget or leave something out of their 
discourses:  
                                                
124
 The Water Industri Act 1991  
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“There exists no real market or free competition in natural monopolies such as 
the public water sector” (Interview A, October 2011, my translation).  
That is number (A1), (A3), (A5), (A8), (A10), (A14), (A15) and (A16). These mechanisms are 
replaced by the authority regulation within the equivalent areas in row (D). 
The coercive isomorphic pressure from the state and local authorities upon the water companies 
enacts a resistance from the water sector expressed in their competing institutional logics. The 
regulation made by the state and local government of the water companies creates a coercive 
isomorphism, where economic targets and objectives are benchmarked and calculated into a 
price cap by the authorities (Matten & Moon, 2008).  
The discourses have negative repercussions for this conflict of institutional logics. Whether CSR 
benefits the resource preservation or diminishes financial costs, in the long run it suits both 
competing logics. It is then translated in the discourse into the logic of profession as expressed 
in the key sentence: “We must preserve the natural resources and mitigate the climate change”
((C15) or (D2)). However, it is only executed if long-term market benefits are recognised ((A17) 
and (B17)) by the managers and the municipality owners of the water companies. 
In general the Danish water companies are so small that they are not obliged to produce CSR 
reports unless they are considered to be the largest companies in Denmark125. Their institutional 
history of being a part of the municipality administration for decades has generated a dichotomy 
in the new context: the normative isomorphic spirit of ‘social commitment’ that has continued 
into the ‘business spirit’ of the discourse has not left their ‘self-regulation’ spirit yet. Managers 
believe that they are trustworthy due to their persona and former history of being a part of the 
local municipal administration. Local authorities and former colleagues of the managers from 
the water companies express this concern today:  
“Managers in the water companies must learn to decode this irrational idea 
that existed before, where nobody complained about this double role of sel-
fregulation of their own operations at that time.” (Interview I, March 2012, my 
translation). 
Therefore, ironically, when the highly discursive promotion of CSR is interfered with a ‘busi-
ness-like’ economic thinking by their new regulators, the managers react promptly to this insti-
                                                
125 BEK nr 761 af 20/07/2009, https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=126096 (in Danish), retrieved 
August 2012  
159
tutional change by adopting features that suits them best (A7) and by defeating what currently 
constrains them (A12) (D12).  
“The same agency mechanisms are seen in other public service sectors in 
Denmark that are state regulated since the 1990s for instance the electricity, 
gas, oil and transport sector. To an even worse degree of conflict. This is pea-
nuts, however!” (Interview G, August 2011, my translation). 
THE UNITED KINGDOM: SUSTAINABILITY CONCERNS AFTER 20 YEARS OF 
ECONOMIC REGULATION? 
The situation of regulation of the UK water companies has been followed through the website of 
the British water service regulation authority, OFWAT. British water companies have existed 
since the late 1980s and have been economically regulated due to price cap mechanisms since 
then.  
In late 2010 OFWAT had news about ‘sustainability’ on their website, although no specific 
terms of regulation of sustainability were produced at that time. Today, and since the price re-
view in 2009, OFWAT has systemised the regulation of sustainability in the UK context. All 
UK water companies must produce and follow a clear business plan where they must state how 
they will incorporate various sustainability issues and report their progress to OFWAT every 
five year. This means that the water companies have their own environmental policy stated on 
their website and are evaluated towards this logic of CSR by the authorities. However, can this 
adoption of a CSR logic survive a critical discourse analysis and justify whether the companies 
are accountable for their conduct? 
The CSR objectives required by the British government and scrutinised by OFWAT as regula-
tors are126: 
• Production of a five-year Water Resource Management Plan 
• Plan for mitigating and reducing impacts to climate change 
o Consider low carbon and renewable energy in investments and planning 
• Reduce leakages from the system 
• Improve resiliency and mitigation of flood hazards 
• Manage their own land in a sustainable manner including secure biodiversity 
                                                
126
 OFWAT 2008, and www.ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/waterresources/legal , 
www.ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/waterresources/planning , 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/waterresources/leakage/, retrieved August 2012 and re-retrieved 20th Sep-
tember 2013. 
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• Engage with consumers and consider their viewpoints in improving a sustainable service 
The UK water companies are either obliged (coercive isomorphism) or encouraged to follow 
(normative isomorphism) this CSR logic promoted by OFWAT. Regulation of CSR is done on 
the basis of reporting how well the companies achieved what they said they would achieve in 
their CSR policies.  
However, not all UK water companies reveal CSR reports. Not all UK water companies provide 
the same facts and figures in their CSR reports. Some, such as Yorkshire Water, have a sustain-
ability statement report explaining in text how they work with CSR. However, these texts are 
without performance indicators. Others have a CSR case study report, where they show different 
examples of their presumed CSR work told as a narrative and illustrated with pictures supposed-
ly from the cases. All UK water companies display their individual programmes to promote bio-
diversity in their ownership of land properties, which is mandatory, as well as the companies 
themselves promoting special programmes to attract and support employment of staff. 
In line with the coercive regulation as well as the normative recommendations from OFWAT, 
the primary new CSR target of the UK water companies is to engage in the overarching climate 
change mitigation as a first and foremost voluntary CSR objective. However, this is rather en-
couraged normatively from regulator to company besides the normative and coercive environ-
mental targets already pursued through the environmental legislation. This shows a high degree 
of coercive and normative isomorphism translated through the regulator. Customer relationships 
are regulated through price caps, and this model is where the Danish model for regulation found 
its inspiration. These stories and pictures, however, do not justify whether the CSR discourse is 
enacted into practice when no third-partyscrutiny of performance indicators are validating it in 
the first place (see also Crowther, 2012; Crowther & Seifi, 2010; and Cheney et al., 2004). 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: FINALLY TAKING CLIMATE CHANGE 
SERIOUSLY 
America is a country with a population of more than 320 million127, which is much larger than 
Denmark’s with only 5 million inhabitants (Hockerts & Wüstenhagen, 2010). However, despite 
the structural differences of state governance and market economy, a highly liberal market 
economy and a coordinated market economy respectively (Campbell & Pedersen, 2007), both 
countries share a similar structure in regulating public water services (coercive isomorphism). 
                                                
127
 http://worldpopulationreview.com/united-states/, retrieved 20th September 2013. 
161
Both have two central governmental/federal regulating bodies; an environmental ministry and an 
economic regulator. In the US the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates the law 
implementing environmental impact by water companies such as water quality, wastewater out-
lets, water conservation, and natural protection in general128.  
The economic regulator, who sets the water rates, is the public utility commission at state level 
organised by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissions129. Some of the US 
water companies are fully privatised and represented in many states; other companies are still 
owned by the municipality. They all share a similar federal institutional setup and regulation 
across states; however, regulation differs very much and is not inherently as effective as it could 
have been (Beecher, 2009; CSS, 2011). In regard to public water services this setup makes them 
comparable to other and smaller countries, which also have a similar institutional setup such as 
in Denmark, the UK, and South Africa.  
The chosen variety of US water companies and their discursive approach to CSR, express a 
strong emphasis on community charity as part of their CSR logic. Environmental protection is a 
repercussion from the mitigation of the climate change engagement envisaged and normatively 
praised by the EPA. However, this is not regulated but normatively diffused in an isomorphic 
manner throughout the states with more or less success. We find this new normative logic of 
sustainability mainly reflected in the largest private companies in their CSR policies and re-
ports130: 
• Mitigate climate change and improve air quality by reducing GHG emissions and radiation
• Protect water by reducing contaminants and restore watershed and ecosystems (biodiversity)
• Promote sustainable communities, preserve and restore land, strengthen human health and envi-
ronmental protection. 
• Reduce chemicals in products and promote pollution prevention 
The CSR reports from the privately owned water companies in the US are not equally impres-
sive in unveiling many performance indicators. Again we see an imbalance in corporate stories 
and pictures while certificates of and participation in CSR indexing lists that may validate this 
CSR logic is only adopted by the few largest companies. The two municipality-owned water 
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 www.epa.gov/waters retrieved August 2012 
129
 www.naruc.org retrieved August 2012 
130
 EPA Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (EPA 2011), http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P1008YOS.PDF, 
retrieved August 2012 and re-retrieved 20th September 2013.
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utilities (El Paso Water Utility and Owensboro Municipal Utilities) have neither CSR policies 
nor reports on their webpages.  
SOUTH AFRICA: STILL LIVING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE APARTHEID REGIME 
The end of the apartheid era (1948-1994) has in South Africa had a close link to the history of 
new public management and CSR revolution in that country. In 1997 the Water Service Act was 
completed to catch up for the millions of South Africans who had no access to water and sanita-
tion (Deedat & Cottle, 2002). A year when the privatisation of the water companies followed in 
order to fulfil the capital need, and a regulating body was promoted to ensure the intentions of 
the act, which “recogni[ses] the rights of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation”
(WSA, 1997, p. 1).  
This regulating body was created as the Department of Water Affairs of the Republic of South 
Africa to serve both as environmental and economic regulator. At first these intentions had a 
hard beginning with sky rocketing water prices (McDonald & Pape, 2002; Hall et al., 2010). 
After a period of implementing legislation to prevent harsh private profiting and to donate free 
water pricing to the poorest areas, the cost-recovery principle with regulation on pricing is today 
implemented as a coercive isomorphism. However, it seems to be in constant need of improve-
ments (DWA, 2012). 
The water companies in South Africa are met with many coercive CSR obligations and norma-
tive CSR incentives from their regulators. However, most of the companies studied have quite a 
different approach to CSR compared to the three other nations. Where climate change and envi-
ronmental protection have a high stake in the CSR discourses in Denmark, the UK, and the US, 
human rights, human diversity, HIV/AIDS programmes, and utilisation of local labour and sup-
pliers are much more highly valued in the South African discourse.  
Only a few of the investigated companies revealed environmental performance indicators. This 
does not mean that mitigating climate change and drought management is not important in 
South Africa: it means that the companies are meeting a CSR logic of human capital and mitiga-
tion of poverty disseminated by the regulator, who has not implemented sustainable and green 
programmes in its regulation as much as the other nations yet.
CONCLUSION
To answer the research question; “How well are water companies engaged in corporate social 
responsibility?”; a clear pattern in the regulated public water service sector is shown in Appen-
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dix 7: Figure A, page 311. The findings of the cross-geographical, political, market economics 
study of a maximum variety of water companies showed how institutional logics are transferring 
from implicit CSR to explicit CSR through coercive, normative, and mimetic isomorphism. 
Companies that are only engaged in coercive isomorphic implicit CSR show a hesitant and re-
sistant discursive engagement.  
When social responsibilities are regulated in a formative way, the logic of CSR shows a relative-
ly high compliance interpreted as coercive isomorphism, which the local (national), regional 
(union level such as the EU and USA) and international (such as the OECD) levels promote. 
However, the regulation does not determine to which degree CSR issues should be met and how 
they are met and carried out. The regulation replicates a type of for instance OECD expectations 
of multinational enterprises, which means that what is regulated is that the companies should 
make plans, follow them, and be evaluated according to them by the regulators. 
Whereas when companies engage in normative and mimetic isomorphism, explicit CSR con-
firms their legitimacy using third party-evaluated performance indicators. The normative iso-
morphism is then seen when a non-regulated part of CSR is disseminated as an expectation from 
the regulator to the sector. In this way the normative isomorphism can be said to include both 
implicit and explicit CSR. 
This suggests that policymakers should consider the use of incentives rather than strict rules in 
promoting CSR to make public water service companies engage in normative and mimetic iso-
morphism. This would result in explicit CSR, which would contain more authenticity (or hones-
ty) and a higher legitimacy in the field compared to the strong tradition of explicit CSR seen in 
the private business sphere, where third-partyscrutiny is part of the validation. 
In Denmark, where social responsibilities are not regulated, the case studies show a tendency of 
mimetic isomorphism where few companies (approximately 10 %) try to imitate the large com-
panies, who as first movers are the diffussors of the CSR logic. They engage actively in declara-
tions of performance indicators verified by accredited institutions. However, we do not see a 
clear and general normative isomorphism since water companies in general have neither CSR 
policies, reporting systems, nor certificates that guarantee their trustworthiness.  
In the UK OFWAT has initiated the implementation of sustainability performance in its regula-
tion and defined certain kinds of social responsibilities as a coercive isomorphism. These parts 
are mandatory, but are to be developed individually on all case companies’ webpages as norma-
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tive isomorphism. However the quality and reliability vary strongly from strong and compas-
sionate CSR reports revealing both quantitative metrics and qualitative storytelling to weak re-
ports that only show CSR examples of storytelling not combined with quantitative measure-
ments nor with independent evaluation.  
In the US many privately owned water companies are regulated also according to obligations to 
publish CSR policies as well as to report them131 (CSS, 2011). The two largest companies are 
listed on sustainability indices that have accredited information of their CSR policies and re-
ports. The municipality owned water companies are not regionally but self-regulated, and one 
can hardly find any CSR or any other kinds of social responsibility information on their 
webpages. This gives a similarly mixed picture of private versus publicly owned water compa-
nies in the US, where cross-country multinational industries are regulated but not regional com-
panies (CSS, 2011).  
In South Africa the regulation of CSR is very developed in the largest companies in matters of 
human relations and less developed in environmental and climate matters. In contrast to Danish 
and US water companies, the South African water companies have a much more transparent 
CSR policy regarding human rights, diversity, health programmes, and education programmes 
promoted normatively by the regulators. On the other hand, they lack information on the envi-
ronment and climate-related information. We see the same promotion of human rights and di-
versity in the UK water companies as a normative CSR issue, but alongside environmental and 
climate related performances. 
The conclusion of this comparative international case study of water companies in Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa reveals a mixed result of CSR perfor-
mance in the companies studied. We see a relatively high level of CSR acknowledgements at the 
discourse level, which have a strong environmental focus in Denmark, the UK, and the US, 
whereas in South Africa the focus is central around human/labour rights. These things point to a 
high degree of normative/mimetic isomorphism including in the discourse. 
The regulation of water companies in the various NPM systems is replicated by the companies’ 
websites. However, CSR without the coercive or normative encouragement from the regulator 
seems dependent on the degree of mimetic isomorphism, which is slow to translate into norma-
tive isomorphism. Capturing all isomorphisms is evident when regulators impose social respon-
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 www.naruc.org, retrieved August 2012 
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sibilities templates as ’formats’ upon the water companies, which is seen in most of the exam-
ples found cross-nationally.  
However, these formats do not dictate the degree to which CSR should be carried out; only that 
it should be part of the companies’ business policies and displayed on their websites and in the 
plans they submit to their regulators for future evaluation. The latter indicates that the apparent 
dichotomy or competition between the logic of economy and the logic of environment may 
come to coexist when regulators impose mandatory formatting but voluntary content. This ex-
plains why the competition is not about water companies disliking their economic obligations; 
they dislike the absence of a proper format in which to work with both the logic of economy as 
coexisting with their logic of environment. 
The findings show that there is much more to achieve if stakeholders put pressure on the public 
service companies and do not let them live a life without scrutiny. The public water sector will 
lag behind the private sector if it does not follow the trends initiated by the private sector; the 
public sector has lived a life out of the CSR limelight with the implication that CSR was what 
the public sector was doing. This paper asked: How well are water companies engaged in cor-
porate social responsibility (after its privatisation)? The answer given is that they may think 
they do well, but fairly few show us how well they are doing in a credible way.     
PROSPECTS 
Public services need to be investigated much more in relation to CSR. Regulation seems to be 
highly embedded as coercive isomorphism in this sector especially for guaranteeing economic 
sustainability, whereas environmental sustainability is more or less left to mimetic and slowly 
emerging normative isomorphism in all the compared nations’ water companies.  
We know from the few case companies, that submit comprehensive accredited CSR reports with 
performance measures, that between 80 % - 100 % of all emission comes from fossil energy 
(Table 1, CSS 2011) with only one case (Denver) as low as 65 %. This is an area where water 
companies including sewerage and wastewater treatment can improve their CSR prospects in the 
future. The public sector has a long history of scrutinisation of its economic and qualitative per-
formance. However, not many studies have focused on this institutional field as contributing to 
CSR. 
The research has limitations in terms of the discourse analysis, which in Denmark was possible 
to conduct from both oral texts such as interviews, observation studies and document analysis, 
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whereas in the UK, US and South Africa it is based only on written texts from documents, CSR 
reports, annual reports, and written communications between regulators and companies. The 
research implications suggest further replication of the findings from a more in-depth analysis of 
the institutional logics in these companies in the UK, US and South Africa compared with the 
study from Denmark. 
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PAPER #4 
Stakeholder Dissonance: Corporate Social Responsibility Versus 
Regulation. A Study of a Trust Recovery Process. 
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(Presented at the 3rd Organisational Governance Conference at Copenhagen Business School, 
8-9 August, 2013. Accepted for publication but in a shortened version in the forthcoming, peer-
reviewed book anthology called “Organisational Governance and the Global Crises: Financial, 
Environmental, Sustainability and Corporate Social Responsibility Crises in the Aftermath of 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 2007”, edited by David Crowther & Linne Lauesen. To be pub-
lished by the Cambridge Scholars Publishing. This paper is the full pre-print132 version of this 
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) as an umbrella concept can be defined as “the broad ar-
ray of strategies and operating practices that a company develops in its efforts to deal with and 
create relationships with its numerous stakeholders and the natural environment” (Waddock 
2004, p. 10). CSR has suffered from a lack of trust between businesses and their stakeholders 
especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis and its extensive examples of severe economic 
greed in the banking and investment sectors while lacking institutional regulation (Bannerje, 
2008; Souto, 2009; Karnani 2011(a)+(b); D’Aselmi, 2010; Emeseh et al., 2010; Schreck, 2010; 
Gianarakis & Theotokas, 2011; Hanson, 2011; Mackey, 2011; O’Toole & Vogel, 2011; Emeseh 
et al., 2010; Herzig & Moon, 2011; Lauesen, forthcoming).  
‘Trust’ is in this paper defined through Rousseau et al.’s (1998, p. 395) terms as “a psychologi-
cal state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behaviour of another”. The derived terms such as ‘trust breakdown’, ‘trust build-
ing’, and ‘trust recovery’ are thus understood in relation to this definition of ‘trust’. ‘Trust 
breakdown’ is understood as a psychological state that is the reverse of the above trust defini-
tion. It may evolve over time, but it can also happen momentarily due to a critical event. The 
core premise of a trust breakdown in the understanding of this paper is that trust has existed be-
fore, but is now lost between agents. ‘Trust recovery’ is thus related to trust breakdown and un-
                                                
132
 (see definitition at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/authors/writing/author_rights.htm) 
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derstood as an ongoing process, where the intentions are to repair the trust that was lost. How-
ever, this process needs an instrument or some microprocesses to be built up, and these instru-
ments or microsteps are understood as ‘trust building’ processes. These can happen either prior 
to any trust being established or in order to recover a broken trust relationship between agents. 
When trust is fully recovered, we can again talk about trust in its prior sense.  
As a consequence of the contemporary lack of trust in organisations and institutions many com-
panies and states suffer from a lack of incentives to meet the expectations of the broader society 
and its inhabitants (Lauesen, forthcoming). This phenomenon is here called ‘stakeholder disso-
nance’ and is defined as the stakeholders’ disagreement and dissatisfaction with (parts of) the 
outcome and behaviour of organisations whether it is businesses, governments, or other kinds 
organisations, which they depend upon. “The term ‘dissonance’ implies a level of disconnect 
that is not always conscious or intended. It is more a lack of alignment where [some]....do not 
mesh well [with others] despite mutual needs and interests” (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010, 
p. 127). This paper sets out to investigate stakeholder dissonance and the process of trust recov-
ery as a struggle between a business sector’s voluntary corporate social responsibility and the 
authorities’ tightening of municipal and state regulation upon this sector.  
The business sector investigated in this paper is the Danish water service sector, which is chosen 
as an empirical example of a sector, which since 2003 has suffered from an institutional trust 
breakdown. It has been quasi-privatised and become market-driven through a public reform in 
2007. The trust recovery process is further ahead than in that for instance in the banking sector, 
and this can thus be used as an inspiration for other sectors in the aftermath of the general trust 
breakdown following the global financial crisis in 2008.  
The following research question is central in this paper:  
How does the process of trust recovery play out for organisations who experience a trust break-
down in the area of corporate social responsibility, and which mechanisms are involved in the 
trust building process?
Since trust recovery in the Danish water sector has not yet been fully settled but is still ongoing 
seven years after the privatisation, the possibility to follow the trust recovery process in the 
midst of the struggle between the water companies’ corporate social responsibility and the mu-
nicipal and state authorities’ regulation has been insightful as a study of stakeholder dissonance 
and how difficult it is to enact voluntary CSR when regulation severely interferes. 
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This paper draws on Bogenschneider & Corbett’s (2010) Community Dissonance Theory, which 
explains the mechanisms of barriers between the communications of researchers, policy makers, 
and policy practitioners, all seen as different communities. These communities each have their 
own vocabulary of motives (Mills, 1940), need for knowledge, textual and information tradition, 
and pace of communicating knowledge to their own stakeholders. In this paper these ideas are 
used in the setting of the Danish water companies’ engagement with their authorities in enacting 
CSR versus regulation. 
From this new way of seeing stakeholders as different communities with the above traits this 
study can highlight emerging developments of CSR versus regulation in other sectors as well, 
for instance the financial sector (Herzig & Moon, 2011), for policy makers, regulators, and pro-
fessionals. The contribution of this paper to the CSR and stakeholder literature is based upon the 
findings in the paper of how trust recovery in the Danish water sector is connecting macrolevel 
dynamics between regulation and CSR, which needs to be rooted in the microlevels of organisa-
tions down to the individual level.  
I discuss why government regulation is not sufficient to ensure trust either in this sector or in for 
instance the banking sector due to mechanisms of cheating and gaming behaviour (Hood, 1991; 
Crowther, 2013). I argue that trust needs to be anchored in the organisations’ engagements with 
each other in spite of their different and competing logics down to the individual level. In this 
case I juxtapose the regulators and regulated companies. I show how trust can be developed 
through the companies’ voluntary engagement in CSR and how this engagement is vulnerable to 
the regulators’ ignorance of this process.  
Finally, I explain through the Community Dissonance Theory (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 
2010) combined with crucial points from the theory of Vocabularies Of Motives (Mills, 1940) 
and the Institutional Logics’ Perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) how 
this engagement as a part of trust recovery involves knowledge sharing and willingness to learn 
from each other’s professional and institutional cultures and languages in order to align the dif-
ferent vocabularies of motives and logics into coexistence.   
TRUST IN STAKEHOLDER RELATIONS 
In Freeman’s well-known stakeholder concept, which is defined as “any group or individual 
who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporations’ purpose” (Freeman, 1984, 
p. vi) Freeman did not directly mention ‘trust’ as a vital part of the corporation’s stakeholder 
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relationship. However, later with Wicks & Gilbert (1994) he talked about trust as one of the 
main ideas in stakeholder relationships:  
“Communication provides the mechanism for persons to interact with and learn 
from one another, to build trust, to find points of agreement and disagreement, 
to discover how a relationship can enrich each party involved, and to sculpt a 
form of interaction that fits them.” (Wicks et al., 1994, p. 487).  
Trust between organisations and their stakeholders is not only vital to the stakeholders: seen 
from Freeman’s strategic lens, it is also important for the corporation or organisation as a part of 
their strategising purposes for “reinforcement of attitudes which promote worker involvement, 
increase trust, and bring out added commitment and productivity” (Ibid., p. 491; see also Free-
man, 2005, 2010; Freeman et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 2007). Wicks wrote with his colleagues 
that “trust seems to be a good markets and firms can't get enough of” (Wicks et al., 1999, p. 99) 
and referred to how trust can facilitate cooperation, lower transaction costs, promote efficient 
market exchanges, and improve the firms adaptability to complexity and change. Therefore they 
continue Freeman’s strategic lens in seeing trust as something tradable for businesses as part of 
their intentional strategic motives.  
Since the idea of using trust expressed through CSR policies, corporate reports, and business 
incentives for stakeholder engagement (e.g. Lawrence, 2002) was adopted not only by responsi-
ble companies. It was also adopted by businesses that did not only ‘do good’ for society, but 
claimed to be trustworthy when they at the same time exploited nature, externalised their work-
forces, polluted the environment, and were part of the explanation of why trust in the concept of 
CSR and stakeholder engagement began to fade (Greenwood, 2007; Buzar et al., 2010; Krka et 
al., 2012).  
Economic crises affecting billions of people are thus the worst catastrophes for concepts of good 
intentions such as CSR and stakeholder engagement since they are easy to blame instead of the 
behaviour of those who exploit them. It is thus in the interests of both researchers and practitio-
ners to reinvestigate the core of the CSR and stakeholder engagement in order to make these 
concepts regain the reliability and validity for which they were intended. This paper argues that 
the concept of ‘trust’ is crucial to bring these two phenomena back on track and to find ways to 
recover trust between businesses, their authorities, and other stakeholders since this have in 
many places been lost during the financial crisis if not before.  
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COMMUNITY DISSONANCE THEORY
Bogenschneider & Corbett (2010) studied the relationship between university researchers, poli-
ticians, and public officials from the mid 1990s till 2010, which has resulted in a theory of why 
professional communities have difficulties in understanding each other. They define Community 
Dissonance Theory as portraying “knowledge producers and knowledge consumers as function-
ing within a discrete number of disparate communities that find it difficult to communicate with 
each other” (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010, p. 15).  
They base their theory upon the interaction from evidence-based research and policy-making 
procedures and outcomes. Each professional community; that of the research community 
(knowledge producers); the political community (policy makers, knowledge consumers); the 
mediators’ (translating the communication between communities, knowledge consumer and 
producer) professional community; and the public officials (enactors of the policies, knowledge 
consumers); are all distinct and incompatible cultures within the boundaries of each profession:  
“Sometimes researchers communicate well with policy makers, other times they 
appear to represent very different species.” (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010, 
p. 16).  
Seeing knowledge producers and knowledge consumers as domains that can encapsulate both 
professional and institutional cultures, the authors provide a platform in which trust recovery 
can be studied among multiple stakeholders, organisations, and institutions. Each community 
group is formed around a core technology and a core professional performance task that form 
the respective institution’s purpose, culture, and structure. Each community is “shaped by pro-
fessional and institutional cultures in ways that differentially affect how their inhabitants think, 
act, and behave” (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010, p. 77). 
The theory discusses the different culturally based traits of each community (profession) such as 
communication style, working style, temporal salience, information needs, and writing styles in 
order to show the culture clash between communities that are incapable of meeting each other’s 
needs. For instance, the need of policy makers to have grounded research as a foundation of 
their concrete policies often meet barriers between the knowledge producers and consumers. It 
may take years to create sufficient research documentation prior to a decision-making process, 
which is not equivalent with most policy making processes, which often is here and now. Also, 
the way and the language, in which the researchers communicate their knowledge production to 
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their respective academic fields, does not match the brevity, conciseness, and the language that 
the knowledge consuming policy makers necessarily understand. The same clash is seen be-
tween the policy makers as knowledge producers of law texts and the public officials that have 
difficulties in translating this into concrete practices (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010).   
This culture clash may result in a trust breakdown between the agents belonging to different 
communities. However, these patterns may also facilitate the recovery of trust, which requires 
mutual work in comprehending the cultural differences of these communities in order to col-
laborate and perform their interrelated working tasks (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010, p. 122-
125). Some of the most important instruments suggested by Bogenschneider & Corbett are to 
harmonise the different cultures within the communities and enhance trust through improving 
the alignment of their different communication styles, working styles, temporal differences, in-
formation needs, and writing styles. The temporal salience and communication style explained 
above is where the clashes between researchers and politicians are most extreme, the authors 
claim.  
The process of trust building can be facilitated through knowledge sharing (Bachmann & Ink-
pen, 2011; Lee et al., 2010) whether it is found on interpersonal, organisational, or institutional 
levels (Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010). This argument is central in Bogenschneider & Cor-
bett’s Community Dissonance Theory, which lifts the argument that knowledge sharing is im-
portant for trust building from a microlevel to a macrolevel. This paper suggests that these 
knowledge and communication bases can be extended towards the cultures of any communities. 
An example between the operators and their regulators in the Danish water sector will be shown.  
However, the ideas underlying Bogenschneider & Corbett’s Community Dissonance Theory 
neglect one important issue in relation to the trust recovery between the business and its stake-
holders: they do not treat the underlying motives behind the different communities’ cultures, 
knowledge bases, and inherent logics. Thus, I will argue that the Community Dissonance The-
ory combined with Mills (1940) Vocabularies of Motives and the Institutional Logics’ Perspec-
tive  (Friedman & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) may further enlighten us as to how trust 
recovery can be processed to disentangle stakeholder dissonance and the struggle between cor-
porate social responsibility and regulation.   
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VOCABULARIES OF MOTIVES  
Mills framed the sociolinguistic term ‘vocabularies of motives’ and argued that “motives may be 
considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable functions in delimited societal situa-
tions” (Mills, 1940, p. 904). Mills studied how motives were recognisable through language, 
which linked behaviour and motive through the terms (vocabularies), with which the social actor 
interprets his own conduct. The motives have their own reasons, i.e. they are interpretations 
stemming from a certain ‘logic’ that is rooted in the language universe and culture of the agents. 
However, Mills was interested in why certain motives were verbalised rather than others. Mo-
tives stand in Mills’ concept as anticipated situational consequences of questioned conduct and 
the cognitive awareness of these. However Mills’ motives do not necessarily require long judi-
cious arguments; citing Kenneth Burke:  
“Our introspective words for motives are rough, shorthand descriptions for 
certain typical patterns of discrepant and conflicting stimuli.” (Burke, 1936, p. 
45; cited in Mills, 1940, p. 905) 
However, Mills recognises that different situations have different vocabularies of motives ap-
propriate to their respective behaviours (Mills, 1940, p. 906). On the other hand Mills argues 
that motives are not taken out of the blue: “[they] are accepted justifications for present, future, 
or past programs or acts” (Mills, 1940, p. 907) and the individual’s control of such acts ex-
plains them. In this sense we see how motives with their shorthand reasoning become taken for 
granted vocabularies that are accepted in different parts of society related to certain communities 
and their logics (Berger & Luckmann, 1967).  
The interesting part of Mills’ theory for this study is when the motives in one field differ from 
the motives of another. Mills termed this as ‘mixed motives’ or ‘motivational conflicts’ when 
competing or discrepant situational patterns and their respective vocabularies of motive exist. A 
conflict of motives occurs when “motives belonging to disparate systems of action, which have 
differing vocabularies of motives appropriate to them manifest vocabulary patterns that have 
overlapped in a marginal individual and are not easily compartmentalised in clearcut situa-
tions” (Mills, 1940, p. 912).   
Power is unavoidable in Mills’ understanding of institutional practices and their vocabularies of 
motive: they exercise control over delimited ranges of possible situations (p. 913). For Mills and 
his successors it becomes crucial to decontextualise this type of power relationship and its insti-
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tutionalised linguistic framing of normative actions situated within clusters of vocabularies of 
motives. 
In the same vein contemporary researchers try to establish an understanding of how trust be-
tween different stakeholders is related to different vocabularies of motives. Dirks et al. (2001) 
proposed that to understand the determinants of cooperation in situations, where interdependent 
individuals have mixed motives, a social exchange account of trust will moderate the relation-
ship between cooperative motives and cooperative behaviour (Dirks et al., 2001, p. 458):  
“Under high levels of trust, the individual will be more likely to attend to coop-
erative motives, while under low levels of trust the individual will be more 
likely to attend to competitive motives.”  
This paper will investigate to which degree Dirks et al.’s propositions can be found salient for 
the trust recovery process between the dissonant stakeholders in question in the Danish water 
sector as well.  
Kramer et al. (2010) explain the salience of motives in relation to trust recovery and enhance-
ment of trust in organisations, which entails the creation of conditions that are conducive to the 
development and maintenance of positive expectations about others’ trust related intentions 
[motives] and capabilities [competences] (Kramer et al., 2010, p. 248; see also Kramer, 1999; 
Möllering, 2005). These findings can be extended to the cooperation between organisations and 
their stakeholders to see if it is possible to create appropriate conditions for aligning competing 
motives, logics, and capabilities between these agents.  
To understand and recognise how different communities interact, conflict, and recover trust; 
which institutional language universes and cultures they participate in; and which logics and 
motives are prevalent in their respective communities; can contribute to an understanding of 
how trust recovery can be established. Stakeholder complexity involving a multitude of organi-
sations and agents needs a recognition of which mechanisms are at stake and which efforts are 
needed to recover, build, and nurture trust between them.  
LOGICS 
This paper has chosen to use the term ‘logics’ in the framework as presented by institutional 
theory. Although the term ‘logics’ takes part in an ongoing discussion both in institutional the-
ory (e.g. Binder, 2007) as well as in cultural theory (e.g. Rao & Giorgi, 2006), this paper recog-
nises that logics of organisations exist in multiples (Binder 2007; Gertsen, Søderberg, & Zølner, 
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2012), but at the same time (a) certain logic(s) may dominate a stakeholder relationship whether 
they compete or coexist (Sackmann & Phillips, 2004; Gertsen, Søderberg, & Zølner, 2012; Mar-
tin & Frost, 2012).  
To extract these dominating logics this paper finds relevance in using Friedland & Alford’s 
(1987, in Scott, 2008; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, 2012) proposition of ‘institutional logics’. 
Friedland & Alford explained, for instance, the institutional logic of capitalism as an accumula-
tion and the commodification of human activity; the logic of the state as rationalisation and legal 
regulation of human activity; and the logic of science as mundane truth (Friedland & Alford, 
1991, p. 248; Scott, 1987, p. 500). They found that there was no necessary harmony between 
these logics and belief systems: they can be multiple, conflicting, or contradicting.  
“Institutional logics are socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce 
and reproduce their material subsistence, organise time and space, and provide 
meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804).  
Besides the idea that logics exists in multiples and compete with each other, they may also coex-
ist as bricolages (Campbell, 1997; Dacin et al., 2002), or hybridisations (Pedersen & Dobbin, 
2006), or overlap in consensus or with one logic dominating the other (Ruef & Scott, 1998; 
Thornton, 2002; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Schneiberg & 
Clemens, 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; Reay & Hinnings, 2009).  
A typical logic that is shared among contemporary governments, authorities, and businesses is 
the market logic, which is linked to Friedland & Alford’s logic of capitalism (Friedland & Al-
ford, 1991). Other logics may belong to the category of the institutional logic of science related 
to the profession in question. A vast body of research has shown how the institutional logic of 
capitalism and science respectively conflict especially where public governance having adopted 
an overarching institutional logic of the market meets organisations that may decouple from 
their regulation (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 2001).  
However, few studies have shown how two seemingly competing institutional logics success-
fully merge, create new hybridisations or coexist (Mazza, Sahlin-Andersson, & Pedersen, 2005; 
Reay & Hinnings, 2009; Thornton et al., 2012). This study is interested in finding the process 
mechanisms of how competing or contradicting logics may find a balance in a trust building 
process, which may facilitate trust recovery, and how the logics within each universe of mean-
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ing travel from competing logics into coexisting logics (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998; Friedland 
& Alford, 1991).  
To understand how these different logics shape meaning, interact, and compete with other kinds 
of logics, Berger & Luckmann (1967, p. 65) suggested looking for how different agents (or or-
ganisations or institutions) legitimate themselves. They suggest that this legitimation can happen 
through pretheoretical affirmation (‘this is how things are done’); rudimentary theoretical affir-
mation where explanatory schemes related to actions are explained through narratives, myths, 
and proverbs; explicit theoretical and sectorial affirmation belonging to the technical language 
universes of the distinctive communities in which a profession is grounded; and symbolic uni-
verses of theoretical affirmation that “integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass 
the institutional order in a symbolic totality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 95).  
The first level is founded upon self-evident knowledge; the second upon transmitted schemes of 
texts or orally told stories; the third upon administered procedures sanctioned by different le-
gitimators such as strong and leading agents of the field or directly through the law by regula-
tors; and the fourth upon cognitively meaningful integration in the institution as a whole.  
The symbolic universes of meaning in different provinces each constitutes an institutional order 
and becomes part of what the province takes for granted and how it incorporates the logics 
within it. Since different symbolic universes exist, there are naturally competing or less mean-
ingful symbols in one universe seen from the perspective of the other. If opposing symbolic uni-
verses should meet, deviant conceptions must be integrated through translation from one uni-
verse of meaning to the other (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 85). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this paper to investigate the trust recovery process from a pervasive 
stakeholder dissonance and conflict between CSR and regulation is a qualitative case study 
analysis of seven Danish water companies and their local and state authorities. The cases are 
chosen on the basis of contextual (legislative and structural) similarity but with a maximum va-
riety in company size in order to be able to analytically extend the findings towards a broader 
field (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
I have conducted interviews and observation studies from different sized organisations from 
small, medium, to large and multinational companies and through a snowball sampling located 
their most salient stakeholders during the period 2011-2013. This was combined with a docu-
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ment study from 2000 till 2013, and through my comparison of these it was possible to gain in-
side knowledge of how trust was breached and recently emerged as a trust recovery process con-
sisting of various trust building mechanisms. 
The seven companies were chosen from different Danish municipalities and include four small 
and medium sized enterprises and three large companies producing from two to fifty million 
cubicmetres of water. The case studies of these companies have been carried out as qualitative 
inquiries involving: 
• In-depth interviews with managers and stakeholders of seven Danish water companies 
• Participant-observations in the daily life of a medium respectively a large company 
• Field studies of three projects carried out in different companies, and a 
• Documentary study of the companies’ CSR reports and annual reports, publications from 
the authorities related to the Water Sector Act, related letters from the companies and 
their branch organisations, and articles from two professional magazines in which the 
companies publish their work. 
More than fifty taped interviews and five taped meetings with different managers, employees, 
and external stakeholders of the seven companies were conducted. Field notes from the partici-
pant-observation studies were taped as an audio diary immediately after my visits to the water 
companies. All material was transcribed. The taped interviews and meetings for this study are 
listed in Appendix 1: Table A, page 289. The extract used especially in this paper is shown in 
Appendix 8: Table G, page 312. 
Many qualitative methodology scholars have addressed the constructionist approach to qualita-
tive inquiry (Kvale, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Gubrium & Holstein, 2001; Charmaz, 
2006). This perspective has also found its way into the so-called New Ethnography (Denzin, 
1989; Goodall, 2000; Bochner & Ellis, 2006), where the role of the researcher is recognised as 
being a part of the mutual and reflexive interpretation of the reality in question (Spradley, 1979, 
1980; Becker, 1998; Denzin, 1989; Goddall, 2000; Charmaz, 2006; Ellis & Bochner, 2006; 
Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).  
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Interviews, observations, and documents from the case studies were analysed using the eth-
nosemantic method described by James P. Spradley (1979, p. 91-216) including four types of 
analysis:  
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1) Domain analysis, where symbols and meanings expressing cultural or tacit knowledge are 
grouped into categories called ‘domains’.  
2) Taxonomic analysis investigates the internal structure of the ‘domains’ to be able to identify 
‘contrast-sets’ or ‘subsets’ and their semantic relationship. Taxonomy analysis looks for the 
breadth and depth of each ‘domain’ from an inside-out perspective.  
3) Componential analysis involves a search for the attributes or components of meaning that 
signal differences or contrasts among symbols in a ‘domain’. This enables a holistic and non-
static, but dynamic expression of what is the meaning of the ‘domains’ in all its facets. 
4) Theme analysis involves the search for interrelationship among the ‘domains’ to be inter-
preted into larger cultural themes that control behaviour or stimulate activity which is tacitly 
approved in a given society (Spradley, 1979, p. 185). 
First, a pilot study (Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001) among top and middle managers of four water 
companies was carried out to find the relationships through which their daily lives were con-
nected to corporate social responsibility (CSR) and how this was enacted. Using the pilot study 
as a springboard for a full qualitative inquiry, the rest of the study followed in an induc-
tive/abductive way, where new issues were inductively found alongside an abductive discussion 
of the initial issues from the pilot study in relation to CSR. 
The field observations involved meetings both at the organisational and the interorganisational 
levels, and even though not all the content of the meetings was related to CSR and trust, special 
sequences of key meetings are used in this study as background material. My choice of docu-
ment study was related to the subject of CSR and its opportunities and barriers.  
All relevant taped interviews and meetings were transcribed into textual form, which alongside 
document texts were interpreted and decontextualised into paraphrased statements according to 
their discursive weight and salience in the empirical material. In condensed form this material 
was used in the domain analysis (Spradley, 1979, 1980; Van Maanen, 1988; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990; Charmaz, 2006).  
In the analysis I have deliberately chosen to work with a limited number of codes extracted from 
the material as the final and condensed raw material in order to obtain an in-depth understanding 
of a few overarching concepts rather than a broad and complex account of the variety of mean-
ings attached to the everyday conduct of the informants (Spradley, 1979). The codes (X) were 
analysed using Spradley’s semantic relationship of domain types (see Appendix 12: Figure B, 
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page 320) in order to retrieve a cover term for the domain (Y), which afterwards was used for 
further taxonomy and componential analysis.  
Only the semantic relationships that were found inductively relevant were used. See Table 1. 
Code  
(X) 
Key sentence (example) Semantic relationship  
(X is a …. of Y) 
Domain  
(Y) 
Economic efficiency 
and effectiveness 
“We are punished for our 
environmental investments” 
“Our board can only decide 
upon service targets now” 
is a result of 
is a reason for 
is a kind of 
is a way to 
Distrust 
Paradox 
Trust recovery 
Behaviourise 
TABLE 1: CODE, KEY SENTENCE WITHIN THE CODE, SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP, DOMAIN. 
For instance; the code (X), ‘Economic efficiency and effectiveness’, contains two key sentences 
derived from the interviews, where one is framed as: “We are punished for our environmental 
investments” (Interview B, March 2011, my translation). This sentence frames a statement, 
where a manager from a water company blames the authorities for punishing them for having 
invested in environmental improvements such as planting forest to protect groundwater from 
contamination from agriculture. He complains that the regulator will not let his company receive 
an economic benefit from doing this through a deduction of the price cap. The manager takes 
this as a result (semantic relationship) of ‘distrust’ between the authorities and the water com-
pany. This ‘distrust’ becomes a domain (Y) in the analysis. The same key sentence is a reason 
for (semantic relationship) the domain called ‘paradox’ since in the eyes of the manager, doing 
good for society should be rewarded.  
After recognising a range of domains, these were analysed for their taxonomy (internal semantic 
relationship; the content of the domain) and their contrasts, which was part of the componential 
analysis. In this way key phrases from interviews, meetings, field notes, and document studies 
were analysed interpretively and condensed into fewer and richer domains. These led to the final 
findings of themes related to institutionalised trust consisting of trust breakdown and trust re-
covery through the process of trust building. See the excerpt in Table 2 and the full analysis in 
Appendix 9: Table H, page 313. 
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Domain  
(Y) 
Taxonomy  
(internal relationship) 
Component  
(contrast-set) 
Theme 
Distrust
Paradox
Trust recovery
Behaviourise
Disempowerment 
Economic exclusiveness 
Regulation/benchmarking 
Sound strategy/low cost 
Autonomisation 
Environmental neglect 
Punishment, “sick system” 
Constraints affects quality 
Trust breakdown 
Trust recovery 
TABLE 2: DOMAIN, TAXONOMY, COMPONENT, THEME 
To continue the example from the domain ‘distrust’, within this general feeling of distrust be-
tween water companies and their authorities expressed by managers of the water companies is a 
deep disapointment as to how the new Water Sector Act has ‘disempowered’ them (internal re-
lationship, taxonomy), since it is now the state, which decides which decisions are good and 
bad, and the water companies are rewarded or punished through their individual economic price 
caps, which do not favour environmental investments prior to others. As a ‘contrast’ to this 
managerial feeling of ‘disempowerment’ a wish for ‘autonomisation’ (component analysis); i.e. 
having the right to decide how to invest rightfully themselves; underlies this statement and is 
widely expressed in interviews with managers of the water companies. Eventually these step-by-
step analyses of the code (X) ‘Economic efficiency and effectiveness’ leading to the domain (Y) 
‘distrust’ result in a theme of ‘trust breakdown’ between the water companies and their authori-
ties. In this way other codes are analysed into domains, and through taxonomies and contrast-
sets different themes are derived, sometimes in combination with one another. 
FINDINGS
The interviews, in which I asked my respondents how the water companies’ engaged with their 
stakeholders in relation to their corporate social responsibilities, revealed a main theme of ‘trust’ 
and how CSR for the managers of the water companies had become a vital part of the trust re-
covery process and which trust building mechanisms they saw involved in it. All managers felt 
an overarching breach of trust between them and their regulators: 
Manager: “It's not as if the public has trust in what we say. So everything we 
do in relation to the Supply Secretariat, we have to have an auditor stamp on 
everything.” (Interview B, March 2011, my translation). 
They also talked about how this trust breakdown influenced their work with CSR: 
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Manager: “We bought 315 hectares of land where we will raise forest [which 
can protect groundwater from leaching of various substances, pesticides, etc.] 
to protect a wellfield. The Competition Authority refused to approve the affore-
station because it had a secondary purpose; public leisure and recreation, so 
we got no deduction in our price cap for it since we are not allowed to spend 
utility money on that part of it.” (Interview B, March 2011, my translation). 
The initial addressing of ‘trust’ was replicated throughout the next interview sessions after the 
pilot study, where it had been initiated. Trust was referred to in interpersonal relationships (be-
tween colleagues), professional relationships (between work professionals), client relationships 
(between managers and citizens as well as managers and contractors), and organisational rela-
tionships (between organisations as a whole and between organisations and regulating organisa-
tions).  
Codes in relation to corporate social responsibility and trust were concerned the natural envi-
ronment, climate change, citizen concerns, traffic and mobility, and work environment, which 
all encapsulated a logic of ‘environment’ (and the protection of it), and codes of economy, bu-
reaucracy, regulation and price caps, which all resembled a logic of ‘economy’ and savings. See 
the entire analysis scheme in Appendix 9: Table H, page 313. 
Below is explained what lies within these two main codes, which constitues the issue inherent in 
the dichotomous logics of respectively ‘economy’ and ‘environment’. 
REGULATOR’S LOGIC: ‘ECONOMY’  
The institutional, legislative, and structural premises for the Danish water companies are stated 
in the Water Sector Act, which emerged with a public reform in Denmark in 2007. This act is a 
late adopter of the logics within the global (Post-) New Public Management trajectory, which 
has been disseminated within the OECD member states since the 1990s (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1993; Keating, 2001; OECD, 2005; Greve, 2009; Pedersen, 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; 
Lauesen, 2011). Locally in the Danish water sector it includes water companies with a produc-
tion above 200,000 cubicmetres of water in addition to the authoritative roles of the local and 
state governments.  
The logics within the change of contextual premises and regulation of the water companies is 
found in the history leading up to the formation and implementation of the new Water Sector 
Act. Before the reform the regulation of the water companies was mainly executed from the 
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municipal environmental authorities and the local city politicians at the City Board. A critique of 
the former practices of regulation and operation of the water companies was stated in a report 
from the Competition and Consumer Authority from 2003. This report concluded that “the wa-
ter market in Denmark has not had the same scrutiny as have other supply areas such as heat 
and electricity supply”, and since the competition in the electricity sector, according to this au-
thority, had resulted in a significantly more efficient power production, the analysis in the 2003 
report “shows that the same is possible in the water sector” (Spenner & Wacker, 2003, p. 101):  
State Authority: “This report lead to a ‘service check’ in the Danish water sec-
tor, and after a short period of 2-3 years an official governmental committee 
wrote a (non-published) report around 2006, which confirmed the recommen-
dation.” (Personal communication with the Competition Authority, August 
2011, my translation).  
After political action the Water Sector Act became a part of the larger Structural Reform enacted 
in January 2007 (Lauesen, 2011). The Ministry of the Environment, which had authored the text 
within the Act, had a political incentive to cherish both the then liberal government and the Min-
istry of Finance and to adopt the government’s strong political incentive for a ‘tax stop’ and re-
duction of expenditure in the public sector in general (personal communication with a former 
employee of the Ministry of the Environment, October 2011). The concretisation of this logic of 
economy includes the ideas of ‘efficiency and effectiveness’, that was adopted through interna-
tional pressure and was pervasive in the thoughts of the Ministry of Finance. They put pressure 
upon the Ministry of the Environment mediated by the reports written by the Competition Au-
thorities from 2003-2006. 
This neoliberal logic of economy replicates the ideas within the New Public Management litera-
ture since the late 1980s as well as white papers from the OECD (Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gae-
bler, 1993; Keating, 2001; OECD, 2005; Greve, 2009; Pedersen, 2010; Christensen & Lægreid, 
2011). The initial report from the Consumer Authorities states the expected amount of savings 
that was assumed possible by the new privatisation and regulation of the water companies as an 
effective amount of 1.3 billion Danish Kroner per year. This was part of the political incentive 
to mobilise the enactment of the institutional change and the implementation of the logic of 
economy (Spenner & Wacker, 2003, p. 101). 
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With the new Water Sector Act municipalities had to separate operation from authority and cre-
ate quasi-privatised, limited liability companies with separate boards and no financial cluster 
between the rate funded companies and the tax financed areas of the municipalities (Lauesen, 
2011). The Competition Authority was politically and legally appointed as the state’s financial 
regulator arising from its own recommendation. It regulates the income and expenditures of the 
new water companies. The regulator ensures that the water companies within this framework 
continue to operate within the cost-recovery principle; that they become quasi-privatised and 
separated from the direct activities and economic interests of the municipalities; and that they 
follow the Danish Limited Liability Act as a non-listed, privately held corporation, whose shares 
are owned solely by the municipalities.  
Each year they enact price cap regulations to approximately 325 water companies in order to 
effect the economic saving potential promised at an appropriate pace. According to the Compe-
tition Authorities the logic of economy has been negotiated in order to meet pressures from the 
water sector, and the economic potential has been refined as an invisible optimal potential, 
which is never spoken of anywhere afterwards (personal communication with the Competition 
Authority, August 2011). Nevertheless, the process of aligning the logic of economy with the 
logic held by the water sector is ongoing as a consequence of strong stakeholder influence acting 
in unison with the branch organisation of the water sector, DANVA (see Lauesen, 2011). 
OPERATOR’S LOGIC: ‘ENVIRONMENT’ 
The water companies, on the other hand, have quite a different logic, which is linked to their 
core services and scientific profession of delivering water and purifying wastewater. Before the 
reform the operator’s institutional logic of professionalism expressed as ‘providers of water for 
protecting health, the environment, and sustainability’ was taken for granted. This logic is insti-
tutionalised in water companies in many OECD nations (e.g. Johnston & Smith, 2001; Rogers, 
de Silva, & Bhatia, 2002; Barraqué, 2003; Adams & McNicholas, 2006; Adams & Frost, 2008; 
Idowu & Towler, 2008; Larrinaga-Gonzélez & Pérez-Chamorro, 2008; Lauesen, 2012).  
The logic of environment as part of the water companies’ institutional logic of professionalism 
is held first and foremost in non-financial terms. To ensure these logics the water companies 
invest in projects:  
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• to mitigate climate change such as enlarging their storage and purifying capacities to 
avoid sewerage overflow and substituting their use of fossil energy for green technolo-
gies in order to lower their emissions;  
• to protect their groundwater reservoirs with for instance afforestation, which will have 
future recreational functions for the public, and land purchase in order to decrease the 
use of pesticides, which are all part of services that go beyond their legislative require-
ments (Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming).  
The financial cost-recovery principle, which is part of this logic of environment is grounded in 
the idea that natural goods should be equally provided for the public ideally for free. However, 
since there are financial costs involved in providing healthy, environmental friendly, and sus-
tainable water, the price of water must only reflect the direct costs of the service with no profits 
(Barraqué, 2003). 
Before the reform it was not necessary to frame these operational activities of providing water 
and purifying wastewater into any globally recognised concepts such as corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR). The taken-for-granted assumptions of the appropriateness of the logic of envi-
ronment were directly integral to the municipal services (Larrinaga-Gonzélez & Pérez-
Chamorro, 2008; Lauesen, 2012). The Water Sector Act does not reflect this logic of environ-
ment according to the operators and their branch organisations (Lauesen, 2011). Thus a trust 
breakdown was articulated among the Danish water companies’ directors and explicitly stated in 
the branch organisation DANVA’s magazine addressing the distrust in the new system of se-
verely felt regulation constraints (see Bækgaard, 2011). 
All interviewees in this research including that of the regulators echo the discourse of a trust 
breakdown. Thus, instruments meant to enhance the level of trust in the water companies to 
cover for its implicit loss of legitimacy because of the dismissal of the logic of environment, was 
emerging in business policies and programmes within the widely recognised field of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). In 2012 approximately ten percent (33 out of 325) of the Danish 
water companies now have web publications of their adopted CSR policies. These policies are 
related to issues stated within the UN Global Compact and various EU directives promoting 
green accounting and certification (such as ISO standards and EMAS) in order to show trans-
parency in issues of environmental protection, human rights protection, and stakeholder en-
gagement (Lauesen, forthcoming). 
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This tendency to publish statements within the framework of CSR on company websites does 
not per se indicate whether or not the actual company enacts the logic of environment. However, 
the academic literature of how water companies enact the above logic and how it is historically 
and institutionally framed in legislation, norms, and values can be found in a range of papers 
(see Johnston & Smith, 2001; Rogers, de Silva, & Bhatia, 2002; Barraqué, 2003; Adams & 
McNicholas, 2006; Adams & Frost, 2008; Idowu & Towler, 2008; Larrinaga-Gonzélez & Pérez-
Chamorro, 2008; Lauesen, 2011). The findings within this research confirm that this logic is 
also prevalent in companies that do not officially publicise their engagement with CSR pro-
grammes, and that the logic is part of a larger institutionalisation that is rooted within their entire 
identity and legitimacy. 
CODING OF THE LOGICS 
The codes were translated into different domains, in which the conflict between the logic of ‘en-
vironment’ and ‘economy’ respectively highlighted the theme of trust between water sector or-
ganisations, local authorities, and state authorities. The more care a water company would take 
in reducing their impacts upon domains within the logic of environment such as concerns for 
nature, citizen, traffic and mobility, and climate change, the more it affected the domains within 
the logic of economy in the raising of costs and price for water deliverance, and vice versa. 
However, reductions of emissions of greenhouse gases were in many cases similar to economic 
cost reductions, which created a business case for this concern in many water companies, which 
seemed to help sustain the coexistence between the two logics.  
Following Berger & Luckman’s idea of looking for legitimacy (see also Tolbert & Zucker, 
1983; Westphal et al., 1997) this was most clearly found within the state authority, from where 
the new bureaucracy was diffused as a regulatory pressure upon the water sector:  
State Authority: “The water sector had not been exposed to competition’ as had 
other public service fields in Denmark. This was a necessary thing to do.” (In-
terview H, August 2011, my translation).  
It was seen as an opposing case at both the municipality level and the organisational level of the 
water companies, where accounts of legitimacy loss were explicitly stated among all case or-
ganisations generally. 
The internal semantic relationship of the domains comes across in two vital functions of public 
water service operations: 1) production and deliverance of water and transport and purification 
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of wastewater and 2) the maintenance of the infrastructure such as the pipe networks and the 
water works and treatment plants. These operations have mainly a service purpose, but in order 
to maintain the network system, some disturbances of the social order while doing construction 
work in urban or rural areas occurs. Citizens, traffic, shop and landowners, the environment and 
the climate etc. are disturbed temporarily by noise, reduction of space, as well as by emissions, 
outlets, and waste from the general workings. However, these operations did not seem to disturb 
the balance of trust between the stakeholders and the operators due to the level of explicitness in 
communication between the water companies, their contractors, and the citizens affected (Laue-
sen, 2012). 
The external semantic relationship between the domains explains the water companies’ struc-
tural and hierarchical position in the institutional setting in relationship to other organisations, 
which control or are controlled by each other. The state authority administers the Water Sector 
Act, in which the water companies as well as the municipalities are involved. The municipality 
has two roles in the external semantic relationship with the water companies: one as the owner, 
and the other as local environmental authority. The municipality grants permission to and con-
trols the water companies.  
This means that they provide access for the water companies to disturb private or public prop-
erty in the interest of the common weal, for instance when a water company needs to maintain 
or install a new pipe system on either private or public land. The citizens have in their capacity 
as landowners certain legal rights to receive financial compensation from the water companies 
due to the loss the landowners have from the pipe work the water companies are permitted to 
install on this third-partyproperty. The constructors, who are hired to install or maintain a pipe-
line, work as a subcontractor for the water companies, and due to the contract between them 
suppliers are subject to the water companies’ regulations (Lauesen, 2011).  
The componential analysis of the domains looks for contrast-sets within the CSR domains in 
relation to the theme of ‘trust’ (Spradley, 1979, p. 173). The contrast-sets are found in the inter-
views as ‘conflicts’ or the prevention of the same. See Appendix 10: Table I, page 317. 
The conflict between regulation and CSR reveals three overall categories, which are later dis-
cussed as ‘themes’: trust breakdown, trust building, and trust recovery. These themes are seman-
tically combined as part of the taxonomy of the domains. When the domain ‘distrust’ appeared it 
had many sources. However, they were all related to the institutional trust breakdown. One of 
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them is explicitly stated as being part of a typical phrase expressed by many interviewees: “They 
do not understand us”, which is coded as ‘competence incongruence’. The state and local au-
thorities freely admitted that their knowledge  competencies in the field they regulated was se-
verely lacking. However, this was also a problem with the water companies for the (project) 
managers, who did not understand the concerns, motives, and duties of the authorities.  
THEMES 
The main themes found in this research in relation to ‘trust’ and CSR were ‘trust breakdown’, 
and ‘trust recovery’ with an underlying process of ‘trust building’. 
Trust breakdown 
The state authorities declared a trust breakdown with the 2003 report and provided the answer to 
this breakdown as an institutional change with the Water Sector Act involving the general neo-
classical logic of creating economical efficiency and effectiveness in public service. The idea of 
separating a water service, that is rate funded, both economically, legally, and physically from 
the municipalities, that are tax funded, in order to mitigate the invisible or potential misuse of 
the water sector economy to co-finance other municipality expenses, for instance social services, 
was instantly applauded by the water companies. Hereafter the water companies had opportuni-
ties to reestablish their infrastructural systems, that in some municipalities had been severely 
neglected: 
State Authority: “The two largest concerns there have been were economic ef-
ficiency and the separation of authority and operations! Simply to separate the 
money boxes from each other! When you speak to officials who have worked in 
the municipalities you can hear between the lines that the tariff income from 
the municipal water service has been used to finance everything other than the 
pure operation of water delivery and infrastructure! You won’t find it written 
down, and I would not like to say it, but you can say that it has been a mutual 
understanding between officials. Today, the municipalities do not put much ef-
fort in hiding it either!” (Interview H, August 2011, my translation).   
It was not illegal for the municipalities to get loans from the water funds at favourable rates; 
they had no other ‘bank’ to go to. Taking up private loans had not been an option for municipali-
ties before the reform; they could arrange an ‘internal loan’ with interests at the same level as 
‘normal’ banks (Haugaard, 2004).  
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Trust recovery 
To recover the breakdown of trust between professionals, who possessed different and at times 
incompatible logics such as the logic of environment and the logic of economy, we must under-
stand the underlying barriers that have had to be overcome. These barriers were found to be 
epistemological knowledge and language (or logic) barriers; the ability to be able to cognitively 
understand, perceive, and respond to other stakeholders’ institutional and professional nature, 
institutional and professional field of knowledge, and their cultural professional language, logics 
and concerns (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2005; Bogenschneider & Corbett, 
2010). 
The barriers between the economists and the lawyers from the state regulating office, the techni-
cal engineers in the water companies, and the typical biology/geology educated and trained staff 
in the local authorities were found to be based upon their different epistemological backgrounds 
(Kuhn, 1970). Often they did not understand the language, the vocabulary, the logics, motives, 
means, and ends of the other party. In their mindsets and cultural universes, they had competing 
logics with the other party (Mills, 1940; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Dirks et al., 2001; Thornton 
et al., 2005; Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010).  
In other words, the engineers might understand the scientific logic and public service motives of 
the biologists and geologists when they talked about environmental concerns for watersheds, 
biodiversity, and natural habitats; however they did not understand why the local authorities 
could not disentangle their technical logic of environment and expertise well enough when they 
discussed natural preservation and vice versa.  
The technical logic of environment in the water companies has adopted the analogy of the CSR 
concept, regarding which all the managers in the research found appropriate comfort and could 
easily relate and translate their technical language to be framed in this broad and to them fash-
ionable phenomenon (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1998). Some referred to institutionalised CSR sys-
tems such as the UN Global Compact or Global Reporting Initiative, while others did not. The 
motive for the water companies was found to gain as much independence as possible from vari-
ous regulators and authorities, and in this sense the translation of ‘the company’ into ‘CSR’ 
seemed very convenient. 
The engineers stood in stark contrast to the logics presented to them by their state regulators. 
The engineers neither understood nor shared the same dominating logic of economy nor did they 
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understand the motives of the economists and lawyers about economic equity and savings in the 
public service sector. The managers perceived themselves as continuously performing ‘best 
practices’ both qualitatively and economically within the municipal authorial supervision, which 
on the other hand strengthened the state authorities’ ideas of the water sector as a utility maxi-
mising sector that must be regulated and controlled (Friedland & Alford, 1991). The motives of 
the state to meet pressures of legitimacy in adopting New Public Management strategies where 
they were missing such as in the case of the water companies blend with the national political 
(liberal) motives for reducing taxes, which similarly subsumed the rate funded water sector. 
The local authorities, however, were found to have a closer scientific epistemological relation-
ship with the technical engineers. Many were educated in overlapping natural science fields. 
Interviews with the local authorities have shown that this task was easier because they were both 
geospatially and epistemologically more closely positioned. Importantly, they also shared the 
motive of willingness to engage with each other and to enhance their cognitive understanding of 
their interdisciplinary fields due to their shared ownership and their connection to the local poli-
ticians of the municipality City Board.  
Trust building 
To recover trust between these agents microprocess of trust building were found, whose success 
rate was shown to depend upon the willingness (motive) of organisations and the individuals in 
these organisations to engage in knowledge sharing, negotiations, collaboration, and the neces-
sary control for the level of compliance with institutionally accepted logics. The adoption of the 
New Public Management system in the Danish water sector is one answer to trust recovery 
based upon control and compliancy (Rousseau et al., 1998). However, trust was not found capa-
ble of being established alone from the institutional regulation as control systems because of the 
risk of creating a system of cheating, gaming, and other attempts at ‘survival’ by those who 
were entrapped in the system (Hood, 1991; Crowther, 2013; see also Bachmann & Inkpen, 
2011). It needed to engage individuals interorganisationally in the trust building process to re-
cover the trust breakdown fully.  
The necessary engagement involved the alignment of competing logics and motives through a 
mutual willingness to share knowledge with the other party and to learn each other’s profes-
sional and institutional cultures, languages, and vocabularies (Mills, 1940; Bogenschneider & 
Corbett, 2010). Dirks et al.’s (2001) findings of trust is therefore found relevant to this research, 
where trust can be a moderator in the relationship between cooperative motives and cooperative 
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behaviour between agents and organisations that engage in the alignment of the vocabularies of 
motives in which a coexistence of institutional logics can become possible.  
Local Authority: “We [the local authorities and the local water company] have 
been working together on developing a workable basis among us. In the begin-
ning there was VERY little acceptance from the officials, but the leadership of 
the company said ‘of course we should do that’. But now, next week again, a 
few of us are going to a meeting together, and they are really nice to say, ‘Call 
straight down! Call Judy and suggest that she’s gotta go with us!’ Because they 
know that I need knowledge about their work! Together! So that we hear the 
same thing and our roles are tightened up a bit from that lawyer consultant 
there: ‘You do that and you do what’. Well, we think, yeah, yeah! And every 
time that happens, then it becomes easier and easier! But we have - together, 
we actually have started all over again! We do not have any reference points 
together. It is COMPLETELY from scratch!” (Interview A, March 2012, my 
translation). 
The operators reflected a crucial need to balance regulation with their voluntary CSR invest-
ments and operations in order to establish and institutionalise a coexistence of the competing 
logics, motives, and concerns from all relevant institutional fields in order to facilitate the per-
sonal commitment by those who practice the law. This balance can be obtained if the regulators 
and policy makers adopt voluntary CSR incentives that stands outside the ‘regulatory space’ 
(Hancher & Moran, 2000), which enables a ‘voluntary space’ that is not punished within the 
regulations, which operators today feel is the case (Lauesen, forthcoming). See Appendix 11: 
Table J, page 319 for a summary of the findings and their linkages. 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS
Based upon my findings I suggest a theoretical extension of Bogenschneider & Corbett’s (2010) 
Community Dissonance Theory to embrace multiple stakeholders each having their own com-
plex and unique culture and communication modus based on their institutional, professional, or 
individual comprehensive language universes. This includes the knowledge-sharing and educa-
tive diffusion of each language universe’s vocabulary including its important nouns, verbs, ter-
minologies, semantics, taxonomies, and axioms. I also suggest incorporating the vocabularies of 
motives, which is closely linked to the language universes and cultures of the different profes-
sional and institutional communities. The more these languages and their derived logics and 
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motives can coexist, the more trust can recovered as seen in the relationship between the water 
companies and the local authorities. 
However, the trust between the legal/economic state authority and the managers of the water 
companies have not fully recovered trust to the same level and still need a balancing of logics 
and motives into further trust building attempts if risks of ‘gaming’ and ‘cheating’ are to be 
avoided. It necessitates a mutual desire and motivation by both parties within organisations and 
institutions to invest time and willingness to be able to overcome the problem of distrust among 
them. The remaining questions are: Is it desirable for the regulators that the operators trust them 
or is the trust issue more relevant between citizens and regulators than between regulators and 
operators? Is it not enough to have created a ‘regulatory space’, and why is it necessary to have 
a ‘voluntary space’ for CSR? 
Regulation can provide immediate trust between the state and its citizens (Edelman Trust Ba-
rometer, 2012, p. 3). However, the advantage of having a ‘voluntary space’ for corporate social 
responsibility in the operator’s field, that is promoted and reflected in the regulation respecting 
this ‘space’, is an emerging field in for instance the British water sector. This paper can 
enlighten the political decision-makers in deciding and implementing CSR as a desired and vol-
untary asset and eventually rewarding CSR investments by changing the regulations in order to 
reflect this concern regarding the economic regulation if it is found politically appropriate. By 
creating these ‘spaces’ with well defined boundaries it may facilitate the logic of economy and 
environment respectively from being dichotomous into coexistence in respectively a ‘regulatory 
space’ and ‘voluntary CSR space’ without being forced into an uneasy hybridisation of logics 
and motives. 
Future research can follow the recommendations in this paper and benefit from comparing lin-
guistics (nouns, verbs, semantics etc.) or logics from professional language universes and inves-
tigate the meaning of these and their adoption into other professional language universes. These 
findings are found to be general enough to be applied to other sectors, for instance the banking 
sector, especially by combining the Community Dissonance Theory with the Vocabularies of 
Motives and the Institutional Logics’ Perspective. In other words, aligning logics and motives in 
well defined ‘spaces’ that may coexist across institutions or organisations has been found to be 
crucial for trust recovery in this research, which has shown that the link of trust between busi-
ness and society may be through a new balance between CSR and regulation.  
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PAPER #5 
CSR in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
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(This paper is an almost identical post-print version of the printed version: “CSR in the after-
math of the financial crisis”, Social Responsibility Journal (2013), 9 (4), pp. 641- 663. 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the paper is to examine the literature of CSR before and in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 2008. The aim of the research question is to map out the consequences on 
CSR because of the crisis, to derive new principles for future CSR models consistent with the 
consequences of the financial crisis, and to suggest new research as well as policy making pos-
sibilities to highlight the importance and necessary survival of CSR as an instrument for sustain-
able and financial progress.  
The paper uses a literature review of CSR prior to and after the financial crisis in 2008 with an 
emphasis on academic papers published in peer-reviewed journals. The findings of the paper 
reveal that post-crisis CSR models do not articulate anything that has not been mentioned be-
fore. However, they do strengthen former values of CSR, but still lack an overall formula of 
how the financial sector can adopt CSR in the core of their businesses and transparently display 
their products and the risks adhering to them.  
The paper proposes a new Four ‘E’ Principle that may guide new CSR models to accomplish 
this deficit. The Four ‘E’ Principle is based upon the core of Schwartz & Carroll’s Three-
domain CSR Model, which the Principle extends and revises: Economy, L/Egal, Environment, 
and Ethics. This Principle disentangles the dialectic relationship between economic and social 
responsibility; takes financial products into consideration; refines the definitions of good stake-
holder engagement without the illusions of corporate ‘Potemkinity’133; and considers the benefit 
of replacing the semiotic meaning of the ‘C’ in CSR from ‘corporate’ to ‘capitalisms’’ social 
responsibility in order to extend the concept towards a broader range of market agents.  
The paper calls for a discussion on ways in which governments and businesses can enhance so-
cial responsibility though balancing the requirements of more engagement by businesses as well 
                                                
133
 ’Potemkinity’ is defined in the paper based on the myth of ’Potemkin Villages’ and is used to criticize corporate 
social performance and the lack of transparency in corporate reporting displaying corporate illusions.
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as public sector companies in CSR. The paper suggest some instrumental mechanisms of how 
governments can involve not only multinational companies but also smaller companies and 
other kinds of organisations acting on the market to make them engage more in CSR.  
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, CSR concepts, financial crisis, financial sector, gov-
ernment role.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2008 
The Lehmann Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Freddy Mac, Fanny Mae, Golden Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, and CitiGroup among other financial institutions have been accused of initiat-
ing the financial crisis in 2008 and the current pandemic global recession due to the negative 
effects of their subprime mortgage lending (Hellwig, 2008; White, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2008, 2009; Herzig & Moon, forthcoming). Subprime mortgage lending consists of high risk 
investments in mortgages to borrowers unable to meet their financial obligations. It involves 
risks reduction of losses by covering up risky loans with less risky loans in the so-called deriva-
tives market. Products such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS), Mortgage Backed Securities 
(MBS), Asset Backed Securities (ABS) and Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO) were and 
are still sold on the global investment markets (see Hellwig, (2008); and Schwarcz, (2008) for 
further explanation of these financial instruments).  
The rapidly rising house prices were thought to be a guarantee of security for poor borrowers 
being able to pay their subprime loans back when they sold their houses in the future. A general 
belief that the housing prices could not stall–at least not before the lenders had secured their 
risks and sold it off in the international market–was to become a blind faith in the so-called 
“house bubble” (Schwarcz, 2008; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). Financial bubbles have been seen 
in other sectors in the past. For instance, an art bubble was recognised in accordance with the 
housing bubble, an IT bubble at beginning of the 2000s, in the 1990s the Asian market relived a 
financial crisis, the oil crisis of the 1970s and the meltdown in the 1980s. Actually we could 
continue beyond to the Great Depression in the 1930s and trace circles of manic booms and de-
pressive periods throughout more centuries (Galbraith, 1994; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008; Kindle-
berger & Aliber, 2011).  
Such ‘bubbles’ have not caused all financial crises. Some has been initiated by recessions due to 
earlier warfare such as the Great Depression in 1930s, and others due to the shortage of natural 
resources such as oil (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). How could these developments be allowed to 
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happen when it is historically known that prices cannot rise inevitably? History memory seems 
to be the most short-lived in the financial sector of all fields (Galbraith, 1994) collectively 
backed with a renewed faith in “this time it is different” (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The historic 
development of the current 2008 financial crisis can be traced back to the beginning of the early 
1990s (White, 2008), where the US investment bank JP Morgan invented a way to reduce loan 
risks in the business sector using a technique known from other areas such as farming: to spread 
risks over a market of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). In the case of Enron, JP Morgan had high 
risk loans that would have drained them and prevented them from doing other business. With 
the new CDS the risk of losing credit was reduced due to the spread on the market of multiple 
investors, which meant that JP Morgan could continue their business with other companies.  
What seemed to be an innovation in security and stabilising funding to secure financial institu-
tions by sharing both high risk and low risk loans soon spread to other financial institutions as 
‘the great idea of the century’. Derivatives entered the financial markets so fast that they became 
the mainstay for taking even higher risks in subprime mortgages. The rapid diffusion effect con-
cerned the American federal regulators, who in the late 1990s suggested regulation of the de-
rivatives that did not fall under normal financial products because of their fear of a coming fi-
nancial meltdown. However, a massive lobby against regulating the derivative market lead by 
the largest bank, CitiCorp, and leading politicians such as Alan Greenspan, made deregulation 
possible, which meant that banks could now engage in investments or merge with investment 
companies and get involved in the market of mortgages and derivatives. The market now ex-
ploded into consumer-related risks: subprime mortgages. One of the arguments in this lobbyism 
stems from Clinton’s political promises when he took office. 
Bill Clinton promised in 1995 that every American was entitled to own a house (White House, 
1995). No Americans should be forced to live in miserable conditions without shelter, and the 
American society was rich enough to reduce the income gap by offering poor families a house. 
The financial sector responded by putting pressure on the president to abrogate the Glass-
Steagall Act and allow banks to engage in investments, merge with investing companies, and 
make riskier loans not only for businesses but also for mortgages for everyday people and fami-
lies in order to fulfil this policy. This resulted in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, that lib-
eralised the financial market and made high risk loans known as the subprime mortgages be-
come possible (White, 2008). Practically insolvent loan takers could now finance a house 
through mortgages, which they would not have been granted before. These loans were called 
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‘NINJA’ loans, which meant loans to ordinary loantakers with No Interest, No Jobs, and [no] 
Assets (Partnoy, 2009). 
The liberalisation of the EU financial market took place just a couple of years later (Vives, 
2001). Many large banks and investment companies such as the German IKB Bank, Credit 
Suisse, and many others invested aggressively in subprime mortgage derivatives, which soon 
spread to even the smallest banks all over the world. We all know the results of the financial 
crisis with bank collapses and tremendous impoverishment for small borrowers all over the 
world. This irresponsibility has lead to the current global recession in all types of sectorial busi-
ness sectors as well as the public sector affecting a huge range of citizens living at the edge of 
society (Partnoy, 2009).  
This paper examines what happened to the concept and practice of corporate social responsibil-
ity (CSR) since this movement apparently had not enough clout to prevent another financial cri-
sis. Although the OECD Guidelines and the UN Global Compact and other ‘soft law’ officially, 
politically, and institutionally made CSR equal good business conduct, these instruments did not 
seem to be able to avoid the irresponsible behaviour of at least the financial sector. Now the fi-
nancial crisis has overwhelmed and overshadowed all other types of crises, such as ecological 
crises, environmental crises, and human rights crises, which were among the reasons for the 
CSR blossoming. Therefore, the paper highlights the state of the art of CSR in relation to the 
financial crisis through a literature review of the discursive changes of the CSR debates before 
and after the 2008 event. The question of how CSR is developing in the financial sector will be 
addressed exclusively although CSR in this paper generally is seen as an umbrella framing all 
business sectors. 
CSR UP TO 2008 
The history of CSR can be dated back to the World War II (Moura-Leite & Padget, 2011) and in 
some nations even further back to the 19th century (Bannerje, 2008). However CSR accelerated 
in the 1990s and 2000s as a response to growth in wealth and business profit (Carroll & Sha-
bana, 2010) at a rate hitherto not seen (See Appendix 13: Figure C, page 321). 
Traditionally CSR debates have fluctuated between two poles in the literature: 1) the norma-
tive/dogmatic, business case, profitability school (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2000; Porter & 
Kramer, 2002, 2006) and 2) the stakeholder school (Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1991; Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995; Schwartz & Carroll, 2003; Matten & Moon, 2008; Freeman et al., 2010). Garriga 
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& Melé (2004) provided an extended overview over these types of schools and suggested four 
different types of CSR traditions as shown in Figure 1:  
FIGURE 1: CSR ’SCHOOLS’ 
The idea of the ‘business case’ for CSR gained prominence especially for scholars such as Por-
ter & Kramer (2006) who referred to the profitability and competitive advantages of strategic 
CSR for the financial bottom line. They suggested a licence to operate approach to CSR in all 
kinds of businesses (Porter & Kramer, 2006, p. 4) claiming that it should be deeply connected 
with the overall economic performance interests of the company. Their CSR concept of ‘shared 
value’ highlight that  
“a healthy society needs successful companies. No social program can rival the 
business sector when it comes to creating the jobs, wealth, and innovation that 
improve standards of living and social conditions over time” (Porter & Kramer 
2006, p. 5).  
Furthermore, they argued that if governments weaken the ability of businesses to operate pro-
ductively, they may constrain the businesses so much that competiveness fade, wages stagnate 
and jobs eventually disappear. Porter & Kramer saw this wealth creation as equally important as 
the sustainability and social responsibility that companies should also apply. Their rationale was 
that when wealth decreases, tax income, philanthropy and voluntary ‘do gooding’ evaporate. 
However, Porter & Kramer’s argument that CSR provides a competitive advantage and that stra-
Instrumental
•Emphasising strategic management for 
economic wealth creation for the company
• (e.g Friedman 1970, Jensen 2002, Porter and Kramer 2002, 2006, 
Hart and Christensen 2002, Prahalad and Hammond 2002, Prahalad 
2002)
Political
•Emphasising power-asymmetry between the 
corporation and society and derived social 
responsibilities for companies
• (e.g. Davis 1960, 1967, Donaldson and Dunfee 1994, Andrioff and 
McIntoch 2001, Wood and Lodgdon 2002, Matten and Crane 2005, 
2007)
Integrative
•Emphasising the integration of social 
demands into the business
• (e.g. Sehti 1975, Preston and Post 1975, Vogel 1986, 2005, Wartick 
and Mahon 1994, Mitchell et al. 1997, Agle and Mitchell 1999, 
Rowley 1997, Carroll 1979, 1991, Wartick and Cockran 1985, 
Wood 1991, Swanson 1995, Schwartz and Carroll 2003, Matten and 
Moon 2004, 2008)
Ethical
•Emphasising moral values as ethical 
obligations above any other considerations
• (e.g. Freeman 1984, 1994, Brundtland Report 1987, Evan and 
Freeman 1988, Donaldson and Preston 1995, UN Global Compact 
1999, Philips 2003, Melé 2002, Philips et al. 2003) (Garriga and 
Melé 2004, pp. 52-53 + 63-64)
CSR 'schools'
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tegic CSR is the answer to improve CSR results in general has not proved sustainable, of which 
the financial crisis is an outstanding example.  
Carroll (1991) supported the idea of the business case for adopting CSR, however, in an impor-
tantly changed version:  
“Only when firms are able to pursue CSR activities with the support of their 
stakeholders can there be a market for virtue and a business case for CSR” 
(Caroll & Shabana 2010, p.102).  
Carroll distinguished the profit principle from Friedman. It was originally set in terms of ‘ac-
ceptable profits’ and not the version of ‘maximising profits’ for shareholders (Carroll, 1991, p. 
41). Carroll’s (1991) influential Pyramid of CSR, later with Schwartz (2003)  refined and re-
vised into the Three-Domain Model of CSR (Matten & Crane, 2005; Visser, 2006), acknowl-
edged that the formed had lead business to think that if they only added philanthropic donations, 
they would exercise the full concept of CSR (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003, p. 505). The new 
Three-domain Model has merged the ‘philanthropy’ part into the ‘ethical’ part de-emphasising it 
as the greatest imperative as the top in the former Pyramid of CSR would suggest.  
Even before the crisis, the Three-Domain Model seemed a more integrated and less layered con-
cept expressed no longer in a pyramid shape with hierarchical divisions but in a co-dimensional 
Venn diagram (see Schwartz & Carroll, 2003, p. 509, Figure 2). However, although this revision 
had already been presented in 2003, it did not seem to have the same influence upon business 
managers as the old hierarchical Pyramid of CSR had. Their efforts to try to draw the readers’ 
attention to the middle core of the Three-Domain Model, the simultaneously eco-
nomic/legal/ethical part134 (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003, pp. 518-520), seemed to have good inten-
tions, but no effects: at least not in the financial sector. 
The majority of CSR concepts emphasised the ‘multiple stakeholder approach’, which discur-
sively dominated the purely economic and rational choice perspectives of CSR (e.g. Friedman, 
1970; Jensen, 2002). Stakeholder theory is a field of its own and seen from Freeman’s (1984) 
perspective somewhat in competition with the concept of CSR, which Freeman accuses of hav-
ing becoming “an ‘add-on’ to a given profit making corporate strategy” (Freeman et al., 2010, 
p. 238) and suffers from the ‘separation thesis’:  
                                                
134
 any activity simultaneously stimulated by economic, legal and ethical interests, for instance obeying ethical 
concerns and laws in the production and the trading of goods 
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“The discourse of ethics can be separated so that sentences like ‘x is a business 
decision’ have no moral content, and ‘x is a moral decision’ have no business 
content” (Freeman, 1994, p. 412).  
Freeman was inspired by Sen’s (1987) and Putnam’s (2002) ideas of the ‘collapse of the 
fact/value dichotomy’ suggesting that economy is inherently entangled with matters of ethics 
and “the false dichotomization of the two has impoverished discipline-based analysis in both 
economics and ethics” (Freeman, 2010, p. 68). Sandberg (2008a) listed nine different ways to 
interpret Freeman’s response to this ‘separation thesis’ and showed how this thesis lacks clarifi-
cation, which might explain why the debate around it has had a hard time coming to grips with it 
(Sandberg, 2008b). In spite of this debate Freeman acknowledges the CSR literature taking the 
idea behind his stakeholder theory seriously and that this theory is well suited to inform and de-
velop concepts of CSR in order “to guide managers towards how to acknowledge and deal with 
the complex reality they face” (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 224). 
CSR IN BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Research has shown that the business case for CSR was hard to see as profitable in the 2000s 
(Gupte, 2005; Schreck, 2010). However, there were indirectly many gains from CSR that might 
impact on profit eventually (Vogel, 2005). Vogel argued that if Walmart, Nike, and British Pe-
troleum did not address CSR, whether profitable or not, it might impact their overall sales, be-
cause customers and legislators cared about how multinationals conducted their businesses and 
impacted workers, children, nature, and the climate (Vogel, 2005, pp. 164-166). 
Another significant and widely cited CSR concept questioned the typically American ideology 
of CSR as being entirely voluntary for private corporations. Matten & Moon (2008) suggested 
that CSR could also be secured by the intervention of the state, union agreements, implicit cul-
tural and institutional norms, and other non-explicit behaviours. Their ‘Implicit/Explicit’ ap-
proach to CSR recognised that not all CSR was entirely–as the above theories implied–
voluntary: especially in the EU where some parts of CSR were highly integrated into institu-
tional norms, values, and (regulated) legislation. 
This perspective has led to a variety of productive European research mainly following the start 
of the financial crisis (e.g. Hiss, 2009; Höllerer, 2012; Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming). A range of 
scholars from Europe showed how implicit CSR consisting of values, norms, and rules codified 
and mandatory as within legislative requirements for corporations have become more explicit 
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especially after the OECD encouragement of (quasi-) privatisation of the public administration 
into voluntary corporate policies, programmes, and strategies (e.g. Argandoña & Hoivik, 2009; 
Hiss, 2009; Meyer & Höllerer, 2010; Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Lauesen, 2011, forthcom-
ing; Höllerer 2012).  
Finally, the introduction of the UN Global Compact and OECD revision of the Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises made CSR become officially and politically accepted and institution-
alised into the concept of business excellence. 
CSR IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The historical period from the release of governmental regulation according to the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (1999) and onwards provides a hint of how this sector approached CSR. CSR 
was in the financial sector perceived as “a program of actions taken to reduce externalized costs 
or to avoid distributional conflicts” in response to market failures (Heal, 2004, p. 1). Responsi-
ble banking/investing was to avoid distributional conflicts that caused harm to the clients of the 
bank or investment company. It contained issues like insider trading, where privileged personnel 
or organisations exploited their access to information for their own benefit instead of their cli-
ents’ or the public’s (cf. Heal, 2004, p. 26), or avoiding the allocation of under-valued shares to 
people that could bring them additional business, fake bids, rigged auctions, or volume-
contingent commissions (Heal, 2004, p. 26). These were assembled in the ‘Equator Principles ’ 
initiated in 2002.  
The purpose of the Equator Principles was and still is to prevent banks and investment compa-
nies from engaging in socially irresponsible companies, that would take loans for more than $50 
million and indirectly involve these banks in accusations of major pollution, human rights viola-
tion, and other antisocial use of their funds (Heal, 2004, p. 28). However, The Equation Princi-
ples have been criticised by various NGOs for not preventing their members from investing in 
antisocial projects, which maked their trustworthiness spurious for the time being (Herzig & 
Moon, 2011, p. 11).  
The positive side of responsible banking both contemporarily and prior to the financial crisis 
was the diffusion of microcredits to poor people and entrepreneurs as a part of the social entre-
preneurship movement for instance in India and Africa (Mayoux, 2001; Sapovadia, 2006; for an 
overview see Hockerts et al., 2006). Banks and investment companies were not averse to reveal-
ing social reports, but they were not reporting their activities in a way that would make readers 
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alarmed over their conduct due to their ‘normalisation’ of their practice and their small impact 
on environmental and social issues. They did not reveal suspicious relationships with controver-
sial clients (Herzig & Moon, 2011; Stray & Ballentine, 2000, cited from the former). 
Research from CSR reports from five banking groups (Lloyds/TSB, the Royal Bank of Scotland, 
HSBC, Barclays, and the Co-operative Bank) revealed that the growing importance of CSR con-
siderations was in the banking sectors’ CSR reporting used to marginalise the information. Only 
some organisations were at the time “beginning to articulate a stance with regard to CSR, as 
increasingly more attention is being paid to social and environmental issues” (Coupland, 2006, 
p. 865).  
These findings were similar to findings from banks from e.g. Singapore (Tsang, 1998); Malaysia 
(Abdul & Ibrahim, 2002); the UK (Decker, 2004); Bangladesh (Kahn, Halabi, & Sami, 2009); 
Australia (Pomering & Dolnicar, 2009); and a study of banks from Nigeria, which identified 
severe problems with “selfinduced vices, regulatory laxity, inauspicious macro economic envi-
ronment, and endemic corruption in the economy as the major constraints to the discharge of 
CSR in the Nigerian banking system” (Achua, 2008, p. 57). Decker (2004) mentioned that “in 
the UK retail banking sector, the impact of CSR is increasingly manifest in the efforts to create 
a competitive advantage out of CSR strategies, the growing prominence of mutual financial in-
stitutions in government policy and collaborative efforts between a range of financial institu-
tions” (Decker, 2004, p. 712). 
However, not all literature from the banking sector shows the same neglect of CSR. Viganò & 
Nicolai (2006) found among European banks that although this banking sector had “been quite 
slow in considering the consequences of the issue of sustainability, despite of the fact of their 
exposure to risk having an intermediary role in the economy” (Viganò & Nicolai, 2006, p. 5) 
they began as much as did their American colleagues (Jeucken, 2001) around the Millennium to 
address the issue of sustainability in environmental and social issues. Jeucken (2001) supports 
Viganò & Nicolai’s (2006) findings that research interests focused initially on the ‘direct risks’ 
for banks being indirectly involved in the financing of polluting activities by lending money to 
irresponsible companies. The ‘indirect risks’, such as the client’s solvency/continuity or collat-
eral, were only taken up recently and investigated in the sector (Viganò & Nicolai, 2006, p. 5).   
Hellwig (2008) analysed the systemic risks in the financial sector leading to the 2008 subprime 
mortgage crisis, and found that the moral hazard and greed among banks’ and investment com-
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panies’ managers led other managers investing in mortgage security instruments, which too 
were unreliable. However, due to their complexity, these managers found them secure, espe-
cially those compound packages (MBSs, CDOs, etc.) of risky subprime loans mixed with high 
security loans given top ratings by bank assurance companies or rating companies (Hellwig, 
2008). Since these instruments were ‘packages’ that were standardised by accreditation compa-
nies, many managers did not understand their full potential and inherent risk although they knew 
that these ‘packages’ consisted of both high risk and low risk mortgages. The belief that in the 
upscaling of prices on houses and other assets, the market accepted that the risk was covered, 
which spread to other investors themselves, and no-one believed that there would ever be a 
meltdown on the market, that seemed only to go up. Therefore, the market of financial goods 
was not regarded as a risk that could explode, which was why it was never put into words to the 
public before the meltdown was actual. Hellwig expresses this through three aspects:  
“First, moral hazard in origination was not eliminated, but was actually en-
hanced by several developments. Second, many of the mortgage-backed securi-
ties did not end up in the portfolios of insurance companies or pension funds, 
but in the portfolios of highly leveraged institutions that engaged in substantial 
maturity transformation and were in constant need of refinancing. Third, the 
markets for refinancing these highly leveraged institutions broke down in the 
crisis” (Hellwig, 2008, p. 14).  
Mortgage companies were rivalling each other in spotting a sky-rocketing market in which to 
sell high-risk compounds. They put political pressure upon the accrediting companies to rate 
these high-risk compounds Triple-A as the highest mortgage security, which made poor quality 
goods appear attractive for investment companies not knowing what they had bought due to the 
complexities of CDOs and MBSs. Since the track of a single high-risk mortgage loan would be 
covered up hundreds of times before reaching the investor in question after multiple trading on 
the market, no-one could ever validate the real value of the goods ultimately (Hellwig, 2008; 
Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2008, cited from the former). Therefore, in August 2007 a chain re-
action started involving a global net of banks and investment companies, which only a few ana-
lysts had foreseen would come when the ‘bubble’ did burst (Hellwig, 2008, p. 38; Reinhart & 
Rogoff, 2008). 
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CSR BEYOND 2008 
The academic debate of CSR in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis has been fruitfully 
addressed in recent years in the academic literature (e.g. Bannerje, 2008; Karnani 2011(a)+(b); 
D’Anselmi, 2010; Schreck, 2010; Gianarakis & Theotokas, 2011; Hanson, 2011; Mackey, 2011; 
and Moon, forthcoming). This debate is very important to be continued since the aftermath of 
the financial crisis has not yet seemed to reveal any major changes to mitigate future effects 
from this type of financial crisis (Souto, 2009). In the midst of the aftereffects of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, corporate social responsibility seems to have been subsumed in the public debate as a 
tool for reining in the greed, the irresponsibility, and the fallibility of the invisible hand of the 
market (Smith, 1776/2003; Emeseh et al., 2010). 
New post-crisis movements such as the ‘Conscious Capitalism’ (O’Toole and Vogel, 2011; 
Hanson, 2011; Mackey, 2011), ‘CSR 2.0’ (Visser, 2010(a)), the ‘USDIME’ framework 
(D’Anselmi, 2010), and rearticulations of the sustainability approach (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 
2009, 2010) view CSR and business conduct from enlightened ethical, stakeholder based, and 
sustainable business practices.  
Conscious Capitalism (CC) is the business sector response to CSR evolving after the crisis as a 
way to speak up for business practices, that were now seen in a poor light according to the repu-
tation, that the banking sector had diffused on all other business sectors. The CC- movement 
celebrates Freeman’s stakeholder theory and recognises the need for businesses to make profits 
but in a way claiming that making money is not the most important in making business. Their 
claim, however, has not been convincing to many journals other than the California Manage-
ment Review, which acts as a megaphone for this movement (see California Management Re-
view (CMR) 2011, 53 (2)+(3)).  
CC claims its support for higher purposes: to make meaning and motivation to inspire, engage, 
and energise their stakeholders; to integrate ethics, social responsibility, and sustainability prac-
tices into core business strategies; to engage employees in decision making and the sharing of 
ownership and profits; and to create value based leaders without salaries of 300-500 times that 
of their employees (O’Toole & Vogel, 2011, p. 61; Hansson, 2011; Sisodia, 2011; Rauch, 2011; 
Mackey, 2011). Scholars such as Vogel (editor of CMR) & O’Toole praise the initiative but are 
aware of the lack of evidence. They show how business members of the movement have several 
shortcomings trying to live up to their claims and the unrealistic expectations of corporate per-
formance that the movement claims to serve (O’Toole & Vogel, 2011).  
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The ‘CSR 2.0’ is another conceptual idea developed by the scholar Wayne Visser (2010(a)+(b)) 
‘CSR 1.0’ was about companies establishing relationships with different communities, engaging 
in philanthropic contributions and image branding. CSR 2.0 is about the global common, inno-
vative partnerships and stakeholder involvement. CSR 1.0 was about ‘one size fits all’ meaning 
standardisation, accountability through external certifications and listing companies at sustain-
ability ranking lists, whereas CSR 2.0 is about decentralising power to shared local panels of 
stakeholders, realtime reporting, and social entrepreneurship (Visser, 2010(a), pp. 144-145). 
Visser presents five concepts that make CSR 2.0 a success: a focus on creativity, scalability, 
responsiveness, glocality, and circularity as the mainframe of the new concept.  
Creativity is important to escape the mere tickbox approach to CSR resulting from standardisa-
tion and accreditation; scalability is important to escape the charming case stories to show how a 
real change is implemented on larger scales away from small, nice, once-upon-a-time stories; 
responsiveness is important to engage in cross-sector partnerships and stakeholder-driven ap-
proaches; glocality, which is a term derived by the elision of ‘global’ and ‘local’, emphasises the 
‘think global, act local’ philosophy, where international norms should be implemented locally; 
and circularity means thinking in terms of cradle-to-cradle in production, designing products 
that are inherently good for all levels of process (Visser, 2010(a), pp. 146-147).  
“We don’t need to go to extremes to prove the uneconomic nature of responsi-
bility...The fact of the matter is that, beyond basic legal compliance, the mar-
kets are designed to serve the financial and economic interests of the powerful, 
not the idealistic dreams of CSR advocates or the angry demands of civil soci-
ety activists” (Visser, 2010(a), pp. 129).  
Visser offers three options for taking CSR forward based on the major deficits CSR, which as an 
ideal offers, without being able to persuade businesses to implement it:  
1) Recognise that role of CSR in the business world is a tactic for reputation management.  
2) Pretend that CSR is working and more of the same is enough.  
3) Reconceptualise CSR as a radical or revolutionary concept to challenge the economic model 
and offer genuine solutions to global challenges (Visser, 2010(a), pp. 129-130).  
Visser expresses the paradox of linking CSR to business practice: although most managers know 
how to behave responsibly and in words and belief may adhere to its moral and ethical values, 
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the non-business case for CSR and its ‘costs’ leads business managers to think of their financial 
responsibilities and personal income prior to their social responsibilities.  
The ‘USDIME’ framework is a concept developed by Paolo D’Anselmi (2010) in response to 
the irresponsibility of business conduct in practice. This concept focuses on “stewarding the 
unknown stakeholder, allowing information disclosure, developing a culture of implementation, 
and exercising micro ethics” (D’Anselmi, 2010, p. 49). The ‘unknown stakeholder’ is “he, who 
does not share a voice, who doesn’t know he has a stake in the activities of the organisation 
being analysed” (D’Anselmi, 2010, p. 52), and who needs to be told of his stakes through a fair 
and comparative disclosure from companies set up against each other. D’Anselmi argues that it 
is not enough to spread glamorous stories of how good a certain company thinks it is. The com-
pany needs to show it with reliable data such as benchmarking, that can make a comparison be-
tween the conduct of a specific company with competing companies of the same kind, so the 
‘unknown stakeholder’ can identify his actual stake or risk from being involved or affected by 
the company.  
The companies disclosing their activities should engage in a culture of implementation instead 
of pure politics and announcements, which can be measured by reliable data instead of spurious 
announcements in disclosures. Finally, by living the ‘micro-ethics’ D’Anselmi means avoiding 
disinformation and not revealing the faults of others, but highlighting ethical values and results 
from e.g. whistleblowing, external claims upon the company, and how they stand in relation to 
the ethics of e.g. stem cells, abortion, and other crucial ethical stances (D’Anselmi, 2010, pp. 
49-50).  
D’Anselmi recognises that it is not enough that businesses like the notion of CSR and use it in 
branding but not in any other practice. He does not believe that they might enact CSR and 
stakeholder engagement just by saying so. If businesses are aiming to be trustworthy, 
D’Anselmi suggests that they engage in sector benchmarking and show their performance 
against their competitors. In other sectors, such as many privatised public sectors, this part is 
done mandatorily by state regulators (e.g. Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming; Crowther et al., 2001), 
and D’Anselmi might be right in his observation. Some questions arise, however. Who should 
oversee the credibility of these benchmarking data? The state, NGOs, or other independent 
third-partycompanies? The latter are likely to be ‘corrupted’ or ‘pressured’ by the mortgage-
banking sector, so maybe we have to leave this task to the state too? 
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Finally, the rearticulation of the sustainability view of CSR (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 2009, 
2010) suggests a retrospective look at the Gaia Hypothesis (Lovelock, 1979) and Brundtland 
Report (1989) suggestions for sustainable behaviour and encourages the inclusion of ‘financial 
sustainability’ as a fourth dimension to the inclusion of sustainability within CSR. The Gaia 
Hypothesis is ”a model in which the whole of the ecosphere, and all living matter therein, is co-
dependent upon its various facets and formed a complete system... interdependent and equally 
necessary for maintaining the Earth as a planet capable of sustaining life” (Aras & Crowther, 
2008, p. 17).  
From this departure Aras & Crowther have developed four core issues of sustainability of equal 
importance: (1) ’societal influence’, defined as a measure of the impact that society makes upon 
the corporation in terms of the social contract and stakeholder influence; (2) ’environmental 
impact’, defined as the effect of the actions of the corporation upon its geophysical environment; 
(3) ’organisational culture’, defined as the relationship between the corporation and its internal 
stakeholders, particularly employees; and (4) ’finance’, understood in terms of an adequate re-
turn for the level of risk undertaken (Aras & Crowther, 2008, cited from Lauesen, 2012(b)). This 
revival of the Magnum Opus wisdom of sustainability thoughts hybridised with contemporary 
economic models of the corporation serves to remind us that what was once ‘good religion’ has 
almost been forgotten and needs refurbishment and rebalancing with regard to tarnished CSR 
concepts exploited for corporate reputation rather than practice. 
Where CSR before the crisis was concerned with large multinational companies engaged in 
sweatshop and supply chain activities involving violating human rights including child labour 
(Buchholz & Carroll, 2009; Crane et al., 2008), the gaze has since turned towards the scapegoats 
of the financial world such as banks, investing companies such as the Lehman Brothers, Gold-
man Sachs, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, nefarious accountants such as Arthur Anderson (the 
Enron scandal) and other mortgage lenders, accrediting institutes, and many more (Bannerje, 
2008; Souto, 2009; Karnani 2011(a)+(b); D’Anselmi, 2010; Emeseh et al., 2010; Schreck, 2010; 
Gianarakis & Theotokas, 2011; Hanson, 2011; Mackey, 2011; O’Toole & Vogel, 2011; Herzig 
& Moon, 2011). In this vein Emeseh et al. (2010) argue that multinational companies have been 
surfing the skies for too long and need to be regulated and controlled more severely to prevent 
greed, more bank failures, and social collapse for citizen taxpayers and former house owners, 
who have been impoverished.  
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The above new CSR concepts include, but (still) de-emphasise profit alone as a primary goal; 
they extend the multiple stakeholder orientation (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 2009, 2010; 
D’Anselmi, 2010; Visser, 2010(a)+(b)); and continues to argue that business ethics, social re-
sponsibilities, and sustainability practices can merge into core business strategies (O’Toole & 
Vogel, 2011; Hanson, 2011; Mackey, 2011). These new ideas are not without critique. They 
have been accused of naivety by those, who seek for a more ‘realistic’ version (O’Toole & Vo-
gel, 2011) of business practices and by those, who sound the irresponsibility of businesses in 
general (Buzar et al., 2010; Krka et al., 2012). Wayne Visser proclaims “the impotence of CSR 
in the face of more systemic problems has been nowhere more evident than in the global finan-
cial crisis” (Visser, 2010(b), p. 8). 
These approaches, however, are not new. They have, as this review shows, been prominent in 
the CSR literature even before the financial crisis, although they are more emphasised in the 
industrial sector than in the financial sector.  
CSR IN BUSINESS PRACTICES 
In practice, businesses have reduced their overall financial activities in order to regain financial 
stability, which affects their CSR engagement (Jakob, 2012; Kemper & Martin, 2010; Karaibra-
himoglu, 2010; Mia, 2011).  
“The financial crisis of 2008 had a clear impact on CSR initiatives in many 
companies because of the exceptional pressure that they had to face in order to 
survive and with massive layoffs and expenditure cuts on community involve-
ment programs being the most obvious outcomes of the crisis.” (Jakob, 2012, p. 
259).  
However, not all CSR initiatives seemed doomed in her investigation; some CSR issues gained 
more strength after the crisis, for instance organisational governance such as codes of business 
conducts and anti-corruption policies as well as environmental policies and compensation poli-
cies (Jakob, 2012, p. 259, 272). Brammer et al. (2012) suggest that “even as individual and cor-
porate ‘greed’, ‘misconduct’ and ‘failure’ have been argued to be at the root of the current 
financial crisis, the debate in the media, in politics and wider society has time and again focused 
on the ‘system’ which invited—or at least tolerated—the practices responsible for the crisis”
(Brammer et al., 2012, p. 22; cf. Campbell, 2011). 
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However, the decline of CSR activities has been shown as a direct effect of the financial crisis 
(e.g. Karaibrahimoglu, 2010, p. 382). The crisis has harmed economies worldwide and created a 
global recession (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 2009). Governmental spending has been tightened, and 
some countries, especially in Southern Europe, are now facing a tremendous challenge to miti-
gate bankruptcy and eventual exclusion from EURO collaboration (Marsh, 2011). In Greece, for 
instance, government cutbacks, as a consequence of the requirements for the extensive loans that 
the state has received by the European Union, have resulted in hospital mergers, reduced patient 
services, and massive layoffs or paycuts for staff (Kalafati, 2012).  
In times of crises economic spending in the private sector is reduced; unfortunately, however, it 
severely affects businesses’ engagement and investment in CSR. Scholars now talk about the 
consequences of corporate irresponsibility and link it to the financial crisis and the current re-
cession (Visser, 2008; D’Anselmi, 2012; Herzig & Moon, 2011). Apparently some companies 
had prior to the crisis forgot the two top layers of Caroll’s Pyramid (1991) of CSR: the ‘philan-
thropic’ and the ‘ethical’ parts of CSR. However, the literature also reveals that corporate irre-
sponsibility is not necessarily the general pattern of corporate behaviour even when facing the 
recession: besides the already known irresponsibility of the banking and financial institutions, 
businesses as well as governments are adopting new strategies both for a more sustainable econ-
omy as well as strategic CSR to sustain growth (Gianarakis & Theotokas, 2011; Herzig & 
Moon, 2011). 
”The financial crisis has prompted companies to move away from the socially 
responsible behavior as it costs a lot to satisfy a stakeholder’ expectations.” 
(Gianarakis & Theotokas 2011, p. 6). 
However, history shows us that the strategy to stall investments in CSR in times of financial 
crises and following recessions might be both fortunate and disadvantageous. When businesses 
as well as governments face financial crises, their first and foremost job is to create financial 
stability and thereafter growth (Taylor, 2009). However, the instrument used for this purpose in 
both governments and businesses has still reinforced the downward spiral of the recession in 
multiple layoffs, and cuts in expenditures, which have amplified the downturn in consumerism 
in general.  
How do we stimulate financial growth with layoffs, customers’ lack of payment capacity for 
goods, and decreased public and private investments? Governments and businesses are striving 
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to create more jobs. Governments of rich nations especially are redirecting multiple funds to 
rescue their markets and businesses to enhance consumerism, tax income, and eventually create 
growth and financial stability for businesses and governments (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). This 
is the ideal that most politicians are discussing and striving for, however, in many cases not able 
to put into practice (Herkenhoff & Ohanian, 2009; Altman, 2012).  
Other businesses, however, seem actually to have strengthened strategic CSR during the current 
recession in order to stabilise its financial turnover and recover from the fiscal failures and mar-
ket collapse of 2008.  
“Instrumental CSR, in which firms would make financial gains simply by doing 
good, may have sustained the greatest image of all CSR theories. This is in part 
because there are very few rewards for any firms in this climate, and the pro-
portion of profits attributable to benevolent deeds is yet smaller” (Kemper & 
Martin 2010, p. 236).  
Porter & Kramer’s ideas of a competitive advantage as well as philanthropy may not be useful 
in a recession, Kemper and Martin claim. However, this does not prevent that business leaders 
from hoping for a comeback of strategic CSR. Using strategic CSR may now enhance trust and 
reliability and indirectly bring about the financial stability that businesses crave (Thomé, 2009; 
Gianarakis & Theotokas, 2011).  
CSR IN FINANCIAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 
The financial sector was in relation to sustainability and environmental impacts traditionally 
seen as a non-polluting and therefore non-impacting sector (Herzig & Moon, 2011). However, 
even though some banks began to make public their ‘indirect risks’ (Viganò & Nicolai, 2006), 
the financial crisis has shown that the financial sector did not pursue its business activities in 
ethically right ways in any case, which made scholars, practitioners, and governments turn their 
critical lenses towards the overall financial scandals and global impact on employment and im-
poverishment. Some claim that this is now seen as even worse than various ecological catastro-
phes due to the massive scale of its global impact (Kallis et al., 2009).  
While the system of complexity was spun out in the worldwide net of the financial market of 
trade, it was easy to blame everyone else and especially those who went bankrupt, which is a 
typical reaction after a financial meltdown (Galbraith, 1994). Governments worldwide reacted to 
the crisis in very different ways according to their economic capabilities. Nations and federa-
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tions lost their confidence in this sector and reinforced regulations alongside provisions of bank 
packages to stabilise the financial sector and the economy of their countries.  
Today many former bank and investment executives are placed in high positions as consultants 
and regulators of their ‘own’ sector, which may contribute to the still widely held distrust of the 
entire sector even after some governments have tried to save the loans of the people from the 
consequences of high risk loans, that have sent millions of people onto the streets living a miser-
able life in the aftermath of the financial crisis. (See Hellwig (2008) for a comprehensive over-
view of the subprime mortgage crisis). Corporate social responsibility has not been an instru-
ment that governments promoted as a solution for the stabilisation of the financial sector; 
regulation and federal guaranteed economic support with strict demands towards nations on the 
verge of financial collapse are today’s continuing breaking news especially in the EU (e.g. the 
current situation in Greece, Cyprus, and other Mediterranean EU countries). 
Discussions on governmental interference and regulation were perceived as ‘bad rhetoric’ before 
the crisis. However, now scholars have begun to praise this as an instrument to solve the previ-
ous irresponsibility of the financial business sector (e.g. Crawford and Williams, 2010; Karnani, 
2011(a)+(b)): “When the pursuit of private profits by firms leads to a reduction in public wel-
fare, the ultimate solution, of course, is government regulation”, says Karnani (2011(b), p. 79) 
and dismisses voluntary or self-regulating CSR for businesses and suggests a government regu-
lated CSR that is binding, coercive, and enforced. Others plead for at least a redefinition of 
which social responsibilities businesses now are to take up (O’Toole & Vogel, 2011; Hanson, 
2011; Karnani, 2011(b)). 
CORPORATE SOCIAL “POTEMKINITY”? 
In the academic literature the metaphor ‘Potemkin Villages’ are often used in settings where 
agents create different ‘versions’ of the ‘truth’ more or less in accordance with what had really 
happened in the scene of events (e.g. Brudney, 1982). To comment upon the development gap 
between the ideological premises of CSR and their practical implementation and lack of this in 
the business sector, it is appropriate to briefly describe the meaning of ‘Potemkin Villages’ and 
the suggested paraphrase: ‘corporate social potemkinity’. 
The label ‘Potemkin Villages’ stems from a myth about the Russian minister Grigory Potemkin, 
who ordered peasants to spruce up the riverfront of the Dnieper River in advance of the arrival 
of the Empress' Catherine II’s visit to Crimea in 1787 (Montefiore, 2005). These fake back-
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grounds were meant to impress the Empress about her mighty realm and its beauty, but the flip-
side of this constructed backdrop was a realm in decay. The suggested paraphrasing of this myth 
into the word or metaphor of ‘Potemkinity’ can also be used for the corporate deficits in corpo-
rate social performance and their consequent ‘disguising’ of it, which the academic literature has 
amplified after the financial crisis.  
The fake backdrops of corporate promises of being both financially and socially responsible 
have been scrutinised by several researchers after the detonation of the explosive crisis. Preuss 
(2010) found that several estimated US based multinational companies such as IBM, Exxon 
Mobil and Goldman Sachs claimed altruistic societal intentions to various media while hiding 
their profits in Offshore Finance Centers (OFC) or ‘Tax Havens’ such as the Cayman or Ber-
muda Islands for tax avoidance, estimated at US$ 11.5 trillion (Hampton and Christensen, 2007; 
cited in Preuss, 2010, p. 366). Spitzeck & Hansen (2010) found ‘evidence’ from companies’ 
rhetorical claims in their reports of their strong stakeholder engagement as a corporate practice 
exemplified in customer integration in product innovation, the companies’ stakeholder dialogues 
in operation management, and the companies’ reports disclosing key performance indexes.  
However, the drawbacks of their investigation based on the ‘truth’ of corporate report ‘propa-
ganda’, may lead to these stakeholders being part of a so-called ‘hearing’, which in close obser-
vation studies rarely ends up as evidence of decisional influence (Lauesen, forthcoming). The 
answer to this potential disguise of the stakeholder engagement of corporate practices can per-
haps be explained by Minoja et al. (2010) who suggest that the more stakeholders engage with 
the managerial core of the company, the less stimuli to innovation and change is seen due to the 
lack of criticism inherited in it. The fact that managers of corporations choose to display their 
positive stakeholder relationships and not their conflicts in corporate reports testifies that stake-
holder engagement may be wisely selected by managers in order to produce ‘nice stories’ to the 
public and stabilise managerial power over the company (Lauesen, forthcoming).  
Research in corporate social performance (CSP) replicates this falsity, for instance when com-
panies claim to use the UN Global Compact Principles and never use them in actual practice 
(Arevalo & Aravind, 2010), where performance becomes an act of ‘potemkinity’. Arevalo & 
Aravind (2010) provide an explanation resulting from their survey analysis of 271 different or-
ganisations ranging from 63 companies, 40 NGOs, 112 SMEs, 2 city organisations, 20 business 
associations, 31 academics, 1 CSR organisation and 2 foundations. The more companies actu-
ally enacted CSR in their policies, programmes, performances, and goals, the more negatively 
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they were affected by the economic crisis (Arevalo & Aravind, 2010, p. 415). Does this suggest 
that in times of economic crisis, companies should keep clear of engaging in any aspect of CSR 
in order to secure their economic survival? This is not the conclusion Arevalo & Aravind pro-
vide, since their second finding suggests that companies that were proactively engaging in CSR 
were found to be less affected by the economic crisis.  
This finding made the authors conclude that continuing to enact CSR principles into CSP pro-
vides a better basis for coping with financial crises (Arevalo & Aravind, 2010, p. 417). How-
ever, this rather illogical correlation does not explain which other spurious variables can be de-
rived from their quantitative analysis, which clearly suggests that corporations with a 
presumably good CSP are hit harder than corporations that are developing CSP and not conduct-
ing CSP at the time in question. It replicates Vissers’ (2010(a)) suggestions that one cannot as-
sume a financial business case out of good CSP on a short-term basis; we need to know how 
companies in a longitudinal and historically based study survive economic fluctuations (multiple 
economic crises); do they manage better if they had invested in good CSP than those, who had 
not, sticking to purely corporate financial performance? With such a study we could make well-
based claims if CSP in fact did have a positive effect on long-term financial stabilisation or if 
‘good performance’ is a disguise of ‘potemkinity’ in order to hide the real effects of corporate 
behaviour.  
HAS CSR CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS? 
The research question of this paper was: “What has happened to CSR in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in comparison to before?” The literature review within this paper shows that the 
discourses of CSR in theory in pre- and post-crisis theoretical models have changed relatively 
little.  
The emphasis, which represented theoretical ideas of CSR before the financial crisis, was on 
multiple stakeholder relationships, transparency (and honesty) in disclosure, ethical values (hu-
man rights, environmental protection, and sustainability), and strategising businesses in order to 
be competitive while being socially responsible (meaning that profitmaking is acceptable as 
long as the above is preserved). The CSR concepts that have emerged after the financial crisis 
have showed a direction where: 
• The stakeholder approach has grown and moved from an outside-in (responsive) to a more 
inside-out (proactive) view suggesting an engagement with multiple stakeholders (includ-
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ing the ‘unknown stakeholders (D’Anselmi, 2012)) looking at what the impact of the 
company is and how negative impact can be changed in an operational way instead of 
philanthropically serving the stakeholders and continuing business practices, which has 
left CSR where it is (Visser, 2010(a); O’Toole & Vogel, 2011; D’Anselmi, 2012). 
• Philanthropy has been de-emphasised as it was misused for ‘stakeholder-oriented’ by cor-
porations as a cover up for real damages; however it is still considered a part of ‘doing 
good’ especially in terms of financing growing markets for social entrepreneurs (Mayoux, 
2001; Sapovadia, 2006; Hockerts et al., 2006; Aras & Crowther, 2010; Visser, 2010(a)). It 
has taken over more or less business’ sole focus on charity and sponsorship. 
• Sustainability has grown into framing not only environmental issues, but also social and 
especially financial issues (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 2009, 2010; Visser, 2010(a)), since all 
new CSR models do not blindly consider profit only as ‘bad’; in a conscious and sustain-
able way, profitmaking still is the livelihood for businesses, albeit the focus has shifted 
towards a more holistic emphasise of the business in society. 
The answer to the research question is that the idea of CSR has not changed; it has been 
strengthened, but not renewed, which is seen in D’Anselmi’s introduction of the concern for the 
‘unknown stakeholder’ as a clearer articulation of what former CSR models already had empha-
sised (e.g. Carroll, 1991; Wood & Jones, 1995; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Garriga & Melé, 
2004; Freeman & Velamuri, 2008). The de-emphasis of philanthropy has already happened be-
fore the crisis (Schwarz & Carroll, 2003), however, it has not prevented businesses from con-
tinuing to juxtapose philanthropic sponsoring with CSR. The sustainability-turn was also promi-
nent before the crisis (Lovelock, 1979; Brundtland, 1989) and has included not only 
environmental concerns but also financial concerns (Aras & Crowther, 2008, 2009, 2010). 
This is surprising due to the reverse findings of the discourses of CSR in practice, which have 
changed dramatically due to the consequences of the financial crisis. Wordings such as ‘irre-
sponsibility’, ‘greed’, ‘habitual lying’, and demands for ‘governmental interference’ have initi-
ated a new tone of intolerance both towards the financial sector as an institution as well as to-
wards the business sector in general in the post-crisis debate. This anger is not surprising: it is a 
normal reaction to a financial crisis:  
“This, invariably, will be a time of anger and recrimination and also of pro-
foundly unsubtle introspection. The anger will fix upon the individuals who 
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were previously most admired for their financial imagination and acuity... and 
their incarceration will be viewed with righteous satisfaction. There will also 
be scrutiny of the previously much-praised financial instruments and practices 
– paper money; implausible securities issues; insider trading; market rigging; 
... program and index trading – that have facilitated and financed the specula-
tion. There will be talk of regulation and reform. What will not be discussed is 
the speculation itself or the aberrant optimism that lay behind it” (Galbraith, 
1994, location 281 - 288, Kindle edition). 
Taking Galbraith’s recommendations seriously we need to consider some crucial dimensions in 
order to meet objectives of transparency especially of the ‘products’ of the financial sector in 
order to mitigate future speculative periods and the same fallacies that men have acted upon 
throughout centuries with financial crises (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
THE FOUR ‘E’ PRINCIPLE
The financial sector both engineered and created the result of a global recession due to an un-
healthy financial market system directly linked to the financial sector with a subsidiary critique 
of governments’ lack of proper regulation. History has revealed that some in the business sector 
already were aware of these risks (e.g. JP Morgan), but failed to articulate them for motives we 
can only speculate on. Was it to preserve their own businesses? The emerging question is 
whether the ideas behind CSR can provide any help in healing a sick (financial) system, or 
whether governmental regulation should take full responsibility for regulating this sector? Is it 
possible to make CSR encompass financial products that are so complicated, that each time they 
are traded (maybe daily), they become more elusive of more questionable quality and with op-
portunities for even more greed and manipulation? 
The future of CSR and where it is positioned between governmental regulation and voluntarism 
needs a further discussion on the means and ends of the global economy. CSR needs an articula-
tion, which only few have dared to address (e.g. Karnani, 2011(a)+(b)). 
Finally, the disentanglement of the dialectics, that previously existed in these debates (e.g. dis-
cussions of the ‘separation thesis’ in Freeman and Velamuri, 2008; Freeman 2010(a)+(b); and 
‘fact/value dichotomy’ in Putnam, 2002), needs to be reevaluated.  
To prepare for these debates new CSR concepts and models need first of all to recognise that the 
financial sector does not exist in a vacuum (Freeman, 2010(b)). The financial sector is an ‘indus-
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try’ with tentacles reaching far into other industries. The financial sector has complicated prod-
ucts, whose social effects can be hard to understand for people other than financiers. This should 
not exclude this sector from being included in the field of CSR. In this respect, the field of CSR 
needs to embrace the need for stakeholders to have comprehensible information of the social 
impacts of the financial products they buy. This means that new CSR models need to expand 
their concepts into a vocabulary that can embrace the products and consequences of the financial 
sector. As physical products can be labelled with a declaration describing what they consist of in 
details, so might financial products be able to be, so that independent rating companies can have 
a fair and non-pressured chance to evaluate these products in order to secure trust in these com-
pound products.  
Furthermore, CSR has for long been about ‘everything but finance’: an ‘add on’ to the financial 
business core (Freeman, 2010). This dialectical relationship has to end if we should be able to 
cope with future financial fluctuations successful attempts at stabilisation (Putnam, 2002; Free-
man & Velamuri, 2008; Freeman, 2010(a)+(b)). In order to make financial ‘products’ and their 
consequences transparent to the public in order to overcome the barriers that the crisis has left 
the world in: its effects on social poverty; its negative or stalling effects on the ecological crises 
and various sustainability issues, new CSR models should: 
• Disentangle the dialectic relationship between economic and social responsibility: 
o Cancel the ‘promise’ of an economic, profitable business case out of short-term in-
vestments in CSR and substitute it with an incentive of ‘consciousness’ for long-term 
sustainability.  
o Rethink the semiotic meaning of the semantics of CSR: consider what would happen if 
the ‘C’ represented ‘capitalism’ to obtain a more holistic perspective of the totality of 
the market agents providing semiotic meaning for smaller companies (Freeman, 
2010(a)), NGOs, quasi-privatised public service companies, public administrations, and 
even governments? 
• Align financial products with that of physical products: 
o Allow financial products to be scrutinised to investigate which derived, financial im-
pacts upon society these products have in a comprehensible vocabulary that stake-
holders understand. 
• Refine stakeholder engagement to avoid performance measures such as ‘Potemkinity’: 
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o Reject ‘Potemkinity’ in the performance measures of corporate reports and urge man-
agers to allow critical voices (Deetz, 1992) as a part of their corporate transparency in 
order to facilitate positive change for the company and its stakeholders.  
Based on Schwartz & Carroll’s (2003) middle core of their Venn Diagram in their ‘Three-
Domain CSR Model’, I suggest some principles for future creation of new CSR models. This is 
called the Four ‘E’ Principle incorporating the above in Appendix 14: Figure D, page 322. 
The proposed Four ‘E’ Principle of future CSR models should encapsulate: 
• Economy: includes the impacts of surplus, debt, production, products and overall risks:  
o Display who benefits from the surplus and by how much; who is sacrificed for the debt 
and how severely; what are the impacts of processes in manufacturing, dissemination, 
exchange, and possession of the products upon various stakeholders; and which overall 
risks are there of all the above processes and explain the actions the organisations 
might take to mitigate these. 
• L/Egal: includes the consequences of regulation, (non-)compliance, (anti-)corruption, and 
(non-)equality: 
o Display which types of regulation the organisation is subject to. 
o Explain both compliance and non-compliance of regulatory objectives and which ac-
tions will be taken to mitigate corruption and evaluate risks of incidents of corruption. 
o Explain the degree of diversity and critically measure the risk of damage to certain 
stakeholder groups.  
• Environment: include the impact upon: stakeholders, living nature, environment, and cul-
tural heritage: 
o Display which stakeholders, living species and natural habitats, human and natural en-
vironments including endangered subgroups and geospatial areas of land, water, and air 
as well as which cultural heritages are impacted by the conduct of the organisation and 
explain what is being done to mitigate it. 
o Explain why certain stakeholders have a voice and impact upon managerial decision 
making and not others, and explain which critical stakeholder opinions are included or 
excluded by the management’s decisions. 
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• Ethics: include the concerns for people, planet and profit: 
o Explain which policies the organisation has to protect the people within and outside the 
organisation, protect the planet from its impact; share its profit; and how it will execute 
this. 
What does the Four ‘E’ Principle offer that for instance the UN Global Compact or the Global 
Reporting Initiative do not offer? The Four ‘E’ Principle urges managers not just to display, but 
also to reflect on their organisation’s total impact upon stakeholders and to include critical 
voices as well as managerial responses. It offers a perspective upon financial ‘products’ and 
phenomena such as economic surplus and debt and urges managers to reflect upon the societal 
consequences of these. Finally, it implicitly argues that critique and self-critique is not a vice; 
rather it is a virtue will result in legitimacy and trustworthiness in managers who dare to avoid 
corporate ‘potemkinity’.  
Social responsibility is about creating actions that enhance trust in capitalism and its multiple 
effects upon multiple stakeholders and their environments (Lauesen, forthcoming). Trust can 
neither be established by regulation alone nor by giving market agents full discretion. CSR has 
been used and misused by businesses to gain legitimacy. Thus, new concepts are needed to de-
lineate a way of giving all kinds of organisations acting in the capitalist market an ideational 
comeback regarding social responsibility, both in industry, the financial, governmental, non-
governmental, and the public sector. To admit that CSR is more about the entirety of capital-
isms’ social responsibility may encourage such new concepts to emerge. 
The outcome of this paper is to suggest that new research in CSR should facilitate a revision of 
‘old’ CSR concepts in order to adapt to the Four ‘E’ Principle suggested in order to revive the 
ideas behind CSR as a field as an alternative to or in conjunction with governmental regulation.
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(Presented as “Corporate Texts as Cultural Meaning Transmitters” at the 8th Organisational 
Studies Summer Workshop, Mykonos, Greece, May 22-26 2013. This pre-print is a slightly 
changed version of the paper, which is in ongoing review in the Accounting, Auditing and Ac-
countability Journal, Emerald.) 
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to investigate what CSR reporting does to an organisation in terms 
of how such texts create micro changes in the everyday life of the organisation regarding its re-
sponsibilities towards society. 
The methodology consisting of multiple discursive methods is used for analysing organisational 
behaviour and micro changes herein and used for analysing the meaning that can be derived 
from corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports of 28 water companies from Denmark, the 
UK, the US, and South Africa respectively. A maximum of variety is sought across companies 
and nations in terms of sizes and market-economic settings (Flyvbjerg, 2006), whereas the insti-
tutional setting of water companies is sought to be similar. The organisational culture is per-
ceived as being hybridised of multiple cultures that coexist or are blended (Gertsen, Søderberg, 
& Zølner, 2012). Critical discourse analysis consisting of vocabularies of motives within texts 
(Mills, 1940; Spradley, 1979, 1980), critical visual analysis of images (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 
2006; Kress, 2010), and reflexive, contrasting analysis (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009) from a 
close observation study and interviews within a water company in Spring 2013, is carried out.  
The findings show that critics may be right in their claim that (some) corporations exploit their 
corporate texts and inherent authorship in voicing a political manifesto of corporate branding as 
‘window-dressing’ and ‘greenwashing’. However, these texts impact the text-producing organi-
sation itself through the cultural meaning that it communicates. Thus these texts and their crea-
tion become important both for the organisation and its inhabitants in terms of their understand-
ing of (their) organisational culture, how it changes, which political messages and meanings it 
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carries, how the motives and intentions frame and impact the multiplicity of culture(s) within the 
organisation, and how this framing can be culturally productive or counter-productive. 
The research is conducted through an ethnographic in-depth method limited to 28 cross-
geographical/national CSR reports chosen from different sized nations in terms of population, 
different market-economic settings, but similar institutional settings of managing water compa-
nies. This means that the research shows analytically, but non-statistically, generalisability due 
to the maximum variety of companies, which makes similarities and differences between com-
panies salient, which can be tested statistically in future research. 
The paper includes practical implications for practitioners in their reporting of corporate social 
responsibility in enhancing their reflexive understanding the agency inherent problems underly-
ing the production of corporate texts and their publication and exposure to critique. The paper 
also includes analytical implications for ethnographic researchers in the presentation of a multi-
method practice providing analytical generalisability without adopting a positivistic, scientific, 
quantitative method but rather a qualitative field of inquiry. 
The originality and value of the paper is that it offers a unique way of strengthening the triangu-
lation between an ethnographic close observation and interview study in one organisation with a 
document study of similar organisations’ corporate social responsibility reports across geogra-
phy, nationality, and cultural boundaries. In this way the research is both an in-depth study and a 
study of breadth. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility reporting; cultural meaning transmission; everyday 
organisational life; political motives, intentions, and implications.        
INTRODUCTION 
The trustworthiness of CSR reporting has suffered from poor credibility in the academic CSR 
literature, which makes scholars claim that it is hard to sustain the value of these reports in gen-
eral (e.g. Schaltegger et al., 1996). CSR reports have been criticised for ‘window-dressing’, i.e. 
expressing their actions as being sustainable while they are not; expressing that they do good for 
society in one regard and in other regards they violate societal interests; and ‘greenwashing’, i.e. 
praising their products and conducts as more environmental friendly than they really are. Such 
kind of textual impression management is typically also emphasised through the presentation of 
shining pictures from the organisation’s archive in their CSR reports in order to brand the or-
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ganisation (e.g. Cooper & Scherer, 1984; Laughlin & Puxty, 1986; Crowther 2002, 2003; Pa-
lazzo & Richter, 2005; Morsing, 2006; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007; Holme, 2010).  
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports are not traditionally seen as carriers of meaning 
that may change an organisation or organisational culture: they are seen as a part of a strategic 
management serving the expectations of society while doing financial business (e.g. Prahalad, 
2004, 2010; Porter & Kramer, 2002, 2006). They are also seen in relation to risk management 
(e.g. Husted, 2005; Bebbington et al., 2008) and stakeholder management to control the impact 
that different stakeholders have upon the company. In CSR reports organisations can communi-
cate admissions, and concessions or show how they donated grants to various societal purposes 
(e.g. Freeman, 1984; Carroll, 1991; Crane & Matten, 2007; Crane et al., 2008; Buchholz & Car-
roll, 2009; Aras & Crowther, 2010).  
However, few scholars have researched other meanings that CSR reporting may have for or-
ganisations beyond impression management (e.g. Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007), legitimacy 
theory (e.g. Deegan, 2002), or risk reputation management (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2008) such as 
organisational change (e.g. Gray et al., 1987, 1988) and organisational culture (Adams, 2000; 
Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007). Recent studies have emphasised visual analysis of corpo-
rate texts (e.g. Putnam et al., 2004; Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004; Rose, 2011; Bell & 
Davison, 2012; Margolis & Pauwels, 2011; see also special issue of the Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Journal, 2009, Vol. 22 No. 6) such as CSR reports (e.g. Höllerer et al., 
2013). However, research lacks studies of which meanings these texts including its images have 
for the organisation itself, how this meaning is forming the organisations and may change their 
behaviour in regard to certain criticised issues, and how they have implemented such (micro) 
change(s) into the general core of their organisational culture. 
This paper wants to contribute to this gap of knowledge by examining a sector that has had a 
relative short history of CSR reporting in order to be able to identify which kinds of micro 
changes this relatively new business conduct may have done to the organisation. For this pur-
pose an organisation in the Danish water sector–a medium-sized water company with a CSR 
reporting history of five years–has been chosen as a basis for an ethnographic close observation 
study. In order to evaluate whether this organisation’s way of doing CSR reporting can be said 
to reflect other similar companies’ CSR reporting behaviour, this observation study is combined 
with a document study of 28 water companies’ CSR reports from Denmark, the UK, the US, and 
South Africa. The research question that this paper wants to answer through the above study is:  
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How do corporate social responsibility reports create meaning for the everyday life in an or-
ganisation?  
This study shows how corporate social reports in the water sector are meaning-carriers through 
their texts and images, which in a politicised way implicate the everyday life of the organisation 
studied. It also shows how different stakeholder views are suppressed in the CSR reports studied 
neglecting voices of for instance employees, customers, suppliers, external organisations and 
other stakeholders, and how this has deeper implications for the everyday life of the organisa-
tion. The study does not take a realist or objectivist approach towards trying to evaluate the 
‘truth’ of the researched organisation and the CSR reports: it shows how the CSR reports 
through their politicization affect the organisation’s behaviour on the premise that its CSR re-
ports express how the organisations’ management wants the organisation and its employees to 
work and to be perceived by its stakeholders (see also Martin, 1992, 2002). Through the publi-
cation of these reports on various public media such as websites, sustainability indexes, and 
other public lists, the CSR reports expose a biased organisational culture for public scrutiny, 
which may create resistance from employees, create new discourses, and affect the actions and 
behaviours that organisations engage in for enhancing their legitimacy, trustworthiness, credibil-
ity, and accountability.  
Through this study, the paper contributes to the literature of social and environmental account-
ing research and its impact on organisational change (e.g. Gray et al., 1987, 1988; Adams, 2002; 
Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007) as well as the literature on CSR and accounting (e.g. 
Crowther, 2012; Höllerer et al., 2013). Next, a very short review of the literature of CSR report-
ing is presented in order to underpin the research question and the academic contribution. 
THE LITERATURE OF CSR REPORTING
Corporate social reports typically celebrate the activities and values of the corporation and ne-
glect or under-emphasise bad behaviour or poor outcomes unless they are explicitly measured in 
regulated targets, which they have not managed to improve (D’Anselmi, 2011; Crowther, 2012; 
Lauesen, forthcoming). In this way organisations sustain a myth of continuation of improve-
ments and try to persuade the reader that they are capable of fulfilling this claim (Crowther, 
2012). This is in the academic literature of impression management known as the bias of narra-
tive reports (see a review of this literature in Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). Corporations of-
ten enhance their positive social impacts on areas very peripheral to their core activities such as 
charity giving to Third World countries to keep up the myth of companies working for the good 
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of society. Showing bad performance is perceived as damaging the organisation’s reputation and 
thus it is not displayed in these reports. This makes them more or less unreliable in the eyes of 
the audience and exposes the reports to the severe critique (e.g. D’Anselmi, 2011; Buzar et al., 
2010; Krka et al., 2012). This is much debated among scholars, who perceive CSR reporting 
from either the viewpoint of legitimacy theory (e.g. Patten, 1992; Brown & Deegan, 1998; 
Deegan et al., 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; Milne & Patten, 2002; and for a review of this literature 
Deegan, 2002; all cited from Bebbington et al., 2008) or reputation risk management (e.g. 
Friedman & Miles, 2001; Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005; all cited from the review in 
Bebbington et al., 2008; see also O’Dwyer, 2003).  
Some of the critique claims that CSR reports in opposition to financial reports often take a more 
narrative turn although many reports simulate the economic language and explain the perform-
ance of the organisation in indexed quantitative units and metrics (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 
2007; Crowther, 2012). The growing exploitation of graphics, photos, and narratives, which may 
now have reached a point of tabloidization, is assumed to make a traditional boring report more 
interesting for stakeholders to read. Organisations particularly that describe their conduct in pure 
narratives and pictures have attracted much criticism for their incredibility and non-transparency 
(e.g. Bebbington et al., 2008; Rolland & Bazzoni, 2009; Crowther, 2012; Lauesen, forthcom-
ing). This critique is relevant and important, since the pictures and the narratives that supposedly 
should be in concert with the organisation’s quantitative performance measurements clearly lead 
a life not only in concert but also independently of other information pertinent to the organisa-
tion. Thus, they risk making reports into icons and fairy tales and may draw attention on some-
thing other than what should have been intended. 
Some scholars have perceived social and environmental accounting research as a vehicle for 
encouraging organisational change (e.g. Gray et al., 1987, 1988), which has received critique 
from scholars (e.g. Tinker et al., 1991; cited in Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007) emphasis-
ing a conflict-based perspective perceiving accounting as a vehicle for “perpetuation of exploi-
tative social relations” (Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007, p. 334). Adams (2002) found that 
the reporting process, the attitudes of participants creating it, and the organisational culture in 
general play an important part in the accountability and trustworthiness that can be allocated to 
such disclosures (Adams & Larrinaga-Gonzales, 2007, p. 334). 
This paper contributes to this literature as well as the literature of CSR through its investigation 
of how CSR reporting impacts the organisational culture(s) and vice versa, which creates a flux 
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between these two phenomena as a kind of symbiotic relationship for better or worse. In this 
respect this paper wants to investigate if it is possible to argue for a specific CSR reporting cul-
ture that may not only exist in the water sector, but may be possible to detect in other business 
sectors as well. Finally, the paper wants to show how such a reporting culture creates meaning 
for an organisation’s multiple cultures eventually.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
The author of this paper acknowledges the existence of multiple cultures in one organisation 
(e.g. Sackmann & Phillips, 2004; Gertsen, Søderberg, & Zølner, 2012; Martin & Frost, 2012). 
These multiple cultures are seen as situated and contextually negotiated (Mills, 1940; Brannen, 
2009; Brannen & Salk, 2000) and thereby simultaneously integrated, differentiated, and frag-
mented (Martin, 1992, 2002).  
That an organisational culture is integrated means that it shares values and has consensus in mu-
tually consistent, typical managerial, interpretations hereof. This type of organisational culture 
excludes ambiguity and differences in views (Martin 2002, p. 94). Thus, the integration perspec-
tive offers a unison voice representing a monocultural, managerial view of the organisational 
culture (e.g. Selznick, 1957; Pettigrew, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; Barley, 1983; Mintzberg, 1983; Mar-
tin & Siehl, 1990; Ebers, 1995; Schein, 1985, 1990, 1996, 2009; Martin, 1992, 2002). 
The differentiation perspective focuses on the opposite of the integration perspective: the incon-
sistent interpretations of manifestations expressed by subcultures, in which consistency and con-
sensus exist separate from other subcultures (e.g. Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Christensen & 
Kreiner, 1984; Martin et al., 1985; Sunesson, 1985; Rousseau, 1989; Martin & Siehl, 1990; Van 
Maanen, 1991; Deetz, 1992; Alvesson, 1993; Brunsson, 1995; Svenningson & Alvesson, 2008; 
Martin, 2002, p. 94). In these subcultures a kind of integration perspective exists in miniature, 
which means that the subcultures may each share certain parts of interpretations of manifesta-
tions, but may disagree to others. Martin & Siehl (1990) typified subcultures as ’dominant’,  
‘enhancing’, ‘orthogonal’ and ‘countercultural’. The enhancing subculture over-emphasise the 
values of the dominant (managerial) culture, whereas the orthogonal subculture accepts the 
dominant values and interprets them into values that fit the subculture’s own separate values, 
while the counter-cultural subculture challenges the core values of the dominant culture and 
supports alternative values (Martin & Siehl, 1990, p. 73). Thus the differentiation perspective 
offers polyphonic, dialectical voices, which work both in harmony and contrast. 
225
Finally, the fragmentation perspective neither sees organisational culture as clearly consistent 
nor inconsistent, but emphasises ambiguity and multiplicity rather than clarity and harmony. It 
sees consensus as transient and issue specific (Martin, 2002, p. 94). Ambiguity is more than ig-
norance or confusion; it encapsulates the complications, tensions between opposites, paradoxes, 
and contradictions (e.g. Weick, 1979; March & Olson, 1976, 2004; Hedberg, 1981; Feldman, 
1989; Brunsson, 1985, 1989; Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1991, 1993, 1995; Alvesson, 1993; 
Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 2012; Martin, 2002, p. 104). The fragmenta-
tion perspective thus emphasises organisations as multicultural, where each individual within 
the organisation may participate and contribute in a web of different and subjectively perceived 
cultures explicated in different alliances of situational appropriateness (March & Olsen, 2004). 
This constitutes an invisible organisational coherence and eventually prevents the collapse of an 
organisational anarchy. Thus the fragmentation perspective displays a cacophony of discordant 
voices, which often are unrelated, disharmonious, and chaotic. 
In multiple cultures of organisations some parts of the organisational culture may be shared and 
stable, although they may be redefined over time and hybridised in a way that offers continuity 
and as well as change (D’Iribane, 2009; Gertsen, Søderberg, & Zølner, 2012, p. 5-6). This multi-
perspective approach of analysing organisational behaviour and culture is emerging in the field 
of CSR and Sustainability research (e.g. Stoughton & Ludema, 2012; Stokes, 2012), and this 
paper wants to contribute to the accounting literature by suggesting this theoretical perspective 
as well.  
CRITICAL THEORY AND ITS CONNECTION TO VOCABULARIES OF MOTIVES, 
GRAMMAR OF IMAGES, AND ARCHETYPES 
Critical theory underpins a political (e.g. Deetz, 1992), intentional, and motivational (e.g. Mills, 
1940) perspective on communication (see also Habermas, 1967; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Hine, 2000) such as oral speeches or interviews, texts, and images and stresses a reflexive cri-
tique of society and organisations and its respective cultures (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).  
“All information today....has to be considered as sponsored information.” 
(Deetz, 1992, p. 32).  
This kind of ‘sponsored’–i.e. carrying a hidden ideology that is authorised by someone–meaning 
of texts has a nexus of persuasion of the readers (Van Dijk, 2006). In other words, a text carries 
a political intention and motivation given by the author, which may be more or less hidden or 
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framed rhetorically to persuade the reader to adopt the meaning that the author wants to transfer 
through the text:  
“Intention ... is awareness of anticipated consequence; motives are names for 
consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to them.” (Mills, 
1940, p. 905).  
Intentions and motives may carry a political message or an ideology that may be encoded in 
texts as well as in images (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 2), and this may be framed either 
through what Mills (1940) termed as being different ‘vocabularies of motives’ or what Halliday 
(1985, p. 101) called ‘grammar’, which Kress & Van Leeuwen has termed the ‘grammar of vis-
ual design’ (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 2):  
‘[G]rammar [is a] set of rules one has to obey if one is to speak or write in 
“correct” , socially acceptable ways’.  
Visual symbols can through their exploitation of ‘archetypal’ icons disguise their ideological 
core and pursue an allegedly objective representation (Kress & Van Leeuwen, 2006; Kress, 
2010; Mitchell, 1994, Höllerer et al., 2013). These archetypal icons can potentially invoke and 
bridge different rationalities simultaneously and pick up a variety of recipients at divergent loca-
tions familiar to them (Höllerer et al., 2013, p. 147, 163). These widely accepted manipulations 
of ‘stilleben’ pictures merge symbols with inherent messages consisting of different kinds of 
archetypes, which are put together in new constellations in order to tell a story or supply an ex-
isting textual story in corporate reporting. 
To decode such vocabularies of motives and grammar of visual design (or images) in texts re-
quires reflexive interpretation according to contemporary scholars of critical theory (e.g. Alves-
son & Sköldberg, 2009; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). A way to decode images in texts may 
thus be approached by analysing typical patterns within the texts, whereas patterns in images 
may be detected through looking for ‘archetypes’. The concept of ‘archetypes’ can be under-
stood in a Jungian sense as typifications of certain objects or symbols (Jung, 1959; Neumann 
1972).  
“‘Archetype’...tells us that...we are dealing with archaic – or I would say – 
primordial types, that is, with universal images that have existed since the re-
motest times.” (Jung 1959/1990, translated by R. F. C. Hull, pp. 4-5).  
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The idea behind this combination of theories of organisational culture and critical theory with 
the concepts of vocabulary of motives, grammar of images, and archetypes is to create a frame-
work of looking for recognisable patterns in interviews, texts, and images in order to critically 
examine how a CSR reporting culture within an organisation is connected to the multiple cul-
tures of the organisation. In the next section I explain how I have implemented these theories 
and concepts in the methodology of the paper.  
METHODOLOGY
This paper analyses how water companies discursively display and talk about their enactment of 
CSR in their organisational everyday life and how they disclose this in their CSR reports. This 
part of the study took place from January till April 2013 as an ethnographic participant-
observation study in a Danish medium-sized water company, where a group of 12 organisational 
members were creating its annual CSR report. In addition CSR reports and websites about CSR 
from 28 water companies divided into 7 companies from each nation of Denmark, the UK, the 
US and South Africa is studied. These companies were chosen to represent a maximum of vari-
ety (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 230) so that small, medium, and large companies (including multination-
als) were present in the study. To find similarities and dissimilarities among a maximum variety 
of water companies enhances the probability that other companies within the same range will 
follow the same institutional pattern to be viable.  
The choice of water companies in Denmark were made of the following basis: The Danish water 
company, in which I conducted the participant-observation study, granted me full access to the 
organisation, to interviews, as well as to the documents I needed for the research. The other 
Danish water companies were chosen because they too either gave me access to interviews, ob-
servations, or internal (not published) document collection. The choice of comparative water 
companies were chosen from nations that shared a similar institutional setup to the Danish com-
panies, but had different market-economic contexts apart from the Danish context. For instance, 
the market-economic context in Danish water companies is that the market is simulated, but in 
practices monopolised characterised by being non-profit driven through the cost-recovery prin-
ciple (Lauesen, 2011).  
The Danish water sector has been formed from an inspiration of the UK water sector context135; 
whose market-economic context is for-profit driven with private shareholders. The market-
                                                
135
 (personal communication with the director of the Competition Authority in Denmark, August 2011) 
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economic context of the UK water companies has been inspired from the US context136, and the 
choice of this nation gave the opportunity to compare the other water companies with much lar-
ger water companies such as multinationals like Suez Environment. Finally, the choice of water 
companies from South Africa was based on having a nation with a much different socio-
economic history compared to the rest of the water companies might strengthen the outcome. 
The end of the Apartheid regime in early 1990s has impacted the way that South Africa has cho-
sen to perceive its water market: South Africa has decided to provide water for the poorest areas 
in the nation free of charge, whereas other areas are regulated through the cost-recovery princi-
ple, and again a few water companies are allowed to make profit out of their water sales (see 
more on the http://www.dwaf.gov.za webpage).  
To achieve as nuanced an analysis as possible I compared the discursive findings of these 
documents with the findings from the participant-observation study combined with interviews of 
the group of 12 employees making a CSR report in the Danish water company from January 
2013 till April 2013.  
ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY OF THE PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION STUDY 
I used critical discourse analysis suggested as a quadri-hermeneutic reflexive approach by 
Alvesson & Sköldberg (1994, 2009) trying to discover the ideological (or political) effects in 
producing and reproducing messages (Kress & Hodge, 1979; Kress, 1985) for multiple stake-
holders in corporate texts. According to Alvesson and Sköldberg quadri-hermeneutic reflection 
means that the researcher is making 1) interpretations of 2) interpreting subjects combined with 
a critical counter interpretation of both the accounts of the 3) interpreted subjects and the 4) in-
terpreting researcher herself as a way of creating multiple interpretations in an open-critical, 
dialectical way (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994, p 271; see also Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; 
Hine, 2000; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 6; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). The quadri-
hermeneutics can then be used to make the interconnectedness of ‘things’ visible (Fairclough, 
1995, p. 747; cited from Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 7) including the tacit, silenced, motivational, 
and intentional ‘things’ (Mills, 1940) of the texts written by both the researched and the re-
searcher.  
The observation study is displayed as a vignette of how the group of 12 employees were con-
structing the company’s CSR report. To protect the company and the employees and critically 
examine my own role in this setting, I have changed salient identifiers such as names, events, 
                                                
136
 (personal communication with professor David Crowther, De Montfort University, UK, August 2013)
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and other sensitive issues. The interview quotes as well as the observation study vignette serve 
the purpose of following the construction and meaning creation from this group creating the 
annual corporate social responsibility report and to show how the enactment of producing this 
kind of corporate text impacts the organisational culture(s) and how negotiation, editing, and re-
editing are the core premise behind this construction (Czarniawska, 1997). 
TEXTUAL COMMUNICATION 
The texts of the CSR reports are examined by an open-critical, reflexive interpretation of the 
authoritative statements within the reports. The instrument used for this purpose is Spradley’s 
(1979, 1980) ethno-semantic method as a backdrop for the reflexive method of the quadri-
hermeneutic interpretation of authorship (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994). Spradley’s ethno-
semantic method provides options for utilizing the dialectical opportunities of open versus criti-
cal thoughts as well as analysing both on the micro and macro level (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) 
through the dialectic relationship of the taxonomy and componential analysis. When working 
openmindedly with the text and its opposition in the contrast sets Spradley’s methodology offers 
an opportunity for quadri-hermeneutic interpretations and critique of its authorships.  
The CSR reports were read openly looking for statements that could enact a ‘code’ recognised in 
other reports as well. Key statements were then collected from those companies making state-
ments in a specific code, which was then assembled with other codes in a spreadsheet. In order 
to reduce the amount of codes and multiplicity of statements, the next step was to look for a key 
text that could frame the many ways of expressing ‘economic efficiency and effectiveness’, for 
instance (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994). In one of the reports is found a text:  
“The Water Sector Act made significant inroads in everyday life in the Water 
Centre South in 2011. Both the price cap regulation and the standardised in-
vestment framework, which together–with the Act current wording–puts our op-
erating expenses under pressure and challenges our sustainable investment.” 
(VCS Denmark, 2011, p. 5, my translation).  
Other reports are similar:  
“Under the industry's regulatory regime, the revenues raised from our custom-
ers do not fully meet the cash needs of the business to deliver ongoing invest-
ment.” (Welsh Water, 2006/7, p. 17).  
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This type of quote finds resonance in several reports, albeit expressed differently. In Appendix 
15: Table K, page 323, is shown how the analytical steps from creating a code to finding a do-
main is carried out. The above statements have enacted the code ‘economic efficiency and effec-
tiveness’ and an overall edited key text representing the different wordings of the code: ‘Regula-
tion jeopardises our operation expenses and sustainable investments’. Next, the semantic 
relationship (Appendix 16: Table L, page 324) was used to derive a ‘domain’ (in Table K) as a 
category of meaning in which more codes could be assembled, in for instance: ‘X (code) is a 
kind of Y (domain)’.  
Neither statements nor domains are apolitical or objectives without contradictions (Deetz, 1992; 
Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994). I have deliberately chosen to look for motives in my ethno-
graphic analysis (Mills, 1940) – both explicit (text-induced) and implicit (silenced, alternative) 
motives – in order to capture the intentions of the integration perspective of the texts. These mo-
tives enable reflective interpretation at a deeper level and offer through their explicit-
ness/implicitness an opportunity to contrast the printed reality of the texts, which may provide 
an understanding of why these texts are capable of affecting everyday life in organisations. 
Thus, I looked at the taxonomies (Appendix 17: Table M, page 325), i.e. the internal relation-
ship that the domains explicitly revealed. Some domains had more than one internal relation-
ship. Thus, the same kinds of domains may be listed several times during the entire analytical 
spreadsheet, which is made to list all kinds of possible interpretations. 
I used Spradley’s componential analysis to look for contrast sets looking both for eventual di-
chotomies in or ambiguities of motives, silenced motives, or keywords that might assemble 
which type of ideology might lie behind inherent in the domains. I used this type of analysis to 
frame a critical interpretation looking for possible political incentives (Deetz, 1992; Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 1994; Van Dijk, 2006). In the example in Appendix 17: Table M I interpreted the 
domain of ‘hybridization of motives’ in two kinds of motives: ‘utility maximization’ motive 
expressing that the managers want to do a much possible with the available economy at hand, 
and the silenced and implicit idea that ‘sustainability is costly’, which can be interpreted from 
all three key texts within the code.  
Finally, a theme was derived to bring about an interpretation of the incentives behind the mo-
tives expressed as a whole. I found that the initial code ‘economic efficiency and effectiveness’ 
expressed two themes: one based on purely economic motives of ‘enrichment’ and the other 
based on hybridizations of motives of both ‘economy’ and ‘sustainability’, which is interpreted 
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as ‘legitimacy’. Throughout the analysis the multiple codes was assembled into fewer themes, 
which yielded the basis for my overall analysis of the texts and findings of the meaning systems 
of the CSR reports. 
VISUAL COMMUNICATION 
What I have noticed and been particularly interested in is why the apparently neglect of stake-
holder voices in the texts instead were reflected as in the images, whose function then can be 
interpreted as bridging these textual deficiencies and thus also bridge the (potential) motive(s) 
behind this seemingly repeated framing and taken-for-granted way of composing CSR reports. 
Therefore, I have used the Jungian concept of ‘archetypes’ (Jung, 1959; Neumann 1972) to se-
lect certain objects or symbols that I find pervasive throughout the CSR reports. The archetypes 
are used as carriers of meaning in symbolic form in the CSR reports, and they are therefore at a 
first glance of a certain and limited amount. I collected 1345 corporate photographs from CSR 
reports and corporate websites about CSR. 
The first and often displayed (in Appendix 18: Table N, page 326) kind of archetype in the pho-
tographs is ‘human beings’ typified in gender, race and age: Men, women, children, and young-
sters. These appear as either employees representing the company, its customers, or various 
stakeholders from the community including young pupils and students, whom the company is in 
contact with and specifically showing their social commitment towards either according to fi-
nancial donations or learning dissemination (Crowther & Gomez, 2002; Crowther, 2012; Laue-
sen, forthcoming). These archetypes are in this paper systematically numbered and counted hav-
ing been recognised from their interactive activities. Employees are recognised from working 
with core activities of the water company such as with pipe construction, talking in a telephone, 
sitting in front of a computer, standing beside an activity or asset of the water company, their 
formal dress, or their appearance near signs and symbols such as a logo of the company. Cus-
tomers are recognised from their interaction in homes, their interaction with a company em-
ployee, their informal dress code, or their appearance in family, school, or other assembly set-
tings, where their dress codes distinguish them from that of the employees. These customers are 
further divided into three subcategories according to ‘age’ and ‘function’; child (including 
youth), adults (grown ups), families (at least two consisting of a child and an adult in close and 
family-like setting) and students/pupils (recognised in school/educative settings). This choice is 
made due to their inductive and repetitive appearance of which many pictures occurred with 
these constellations. 
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Natural phenomena and geographical locations are called ‘environment’, which include pictures 
of the nature (including all kinds of landscapes), water (all kinds of appearances of water in their 
natural occurrence), and climate (including all kinds of subterranean phenomena such as the sky, 
clouds, the sun/sunshine or other kinds of whether or aerial phenomena)137. 
Technical phenomena are called ‘constructions’, which include all kinds of structures with vari-
ous kinds of technology linked to the operations and the assets of the water company. Only a 
few special archetypal constructions are highlighted in subcategories such as water taps, wind 
turbines/solar cell panels, and fountains/constructed waterfalls. 
Behavioural occurrences related to CSR are called ‘behaviour’, which include ‘drinking water’, 
‘corporate giving’ (philanthropy), ‘human diversity’ as a special value in both hired employed 
staff and in customer relationships, and ‘leisure/education’ as a special subcategory of the ‘cor-
porate giving’ back to the society. 
Finally economic phenomena called ‘economy’ shown in payment for water services are 
counted in its typical appearance of money, bill, computer payment, signs with textual messages 
of ‘saving water/money’ or ‘save energy’ and finally pictures of a piggy bank. 
Next, the findings of this study are presented, however, in reversed order: first comes the inter-
pretation of the cross-geographical comparison of the 28 CSR reports, and next the presentation 
of the close observation study of the Danish water company. This is done because the latter 
complements and completes the analysis of the first, and furthermore the latter provides the 
overall answers the research question of this paper. 
FINDINGS
TEXT ANALYSIS 
The findings of the cross-geographical discourse analysis of texts in the water companies’ CSR 
reports are displayed in Appendix 19: Table O, page 328. These findings show how the CSR 
culture generally is described in a unison, managerial, monocultural, and ‘one-size-fits-all’ per-
spective. This is what Martin (1992, 2002) calls the integration perspective. The tone is held 
overtly positive; celebrates the organisation’s performance as ‘efficient and effective’; and of-
fers several promises supplemented either with key performance indexes or narratives of a con-
tinuously improving culture (Van Leeuwen, 2005; Crowther, 2012).  
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 Spivak (1973) framed another word called ’archetypal places’, but here she was talking about places of func-
tionality such as eating places, places to sleep, hunt, mate, etc. In this paper I talk about places with multiple func-
tions, which means that these places are not chosen for their functionality alone, but also for their aesthetic value. 
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The themes consisting of motives identified in the texts of the CSR reports and websites of the 
28 water companies was (in prioritised order: stronger to weaker theme): 
• Legitimacy: CSR and sustainability are used as arguments for legitimating the compa-
nies as being their core business mission, which have been given to them by society. 
That is what they ‘do’ and what they ‘are’, they claim, when they deliver water and pu-
rify wastewater before letting it back to nature.  
• Economy: investments in CSR and sustainability are claimed so costly that the eco-
nomic regulation and the restrictions within are argued to be a hindrance for the com-
panies to be as sustainable as they wish. Here, the companies are talking about envi-
ronmental protection including mitigating the climate change and posing this as a 
paradox towards the sustainability of pricing and the economic basis for their business. 
• Minimizing economic utility maximization: the regulator’s aim is to balance and 
hence minimise the water companies’ economic utility maximization whether it is for 
profit making (regarding the for-profit companies) or budget maximization (regarding 
the non-profit, cost-recovery companies) 
• Sovereignty: all companies complain about their loss of sovereignty due to the regula-
tion they are subsumed. They claim that their mission is so strong that they would be 
better themselves to decide what is good for society, the environment, and their cus-
tomers. 
• Enrichment: the for-profit companies directly complain that the regulation makes 
them earn less money and profit for their owners. The non-profit companies complain 
about their restricted budgets, which, if they could have set their own price on water, 
they would have had a much larger budget to operate with. 
‘Efficiency’ is often used as a keyword in both the economic and the CSR/sustainability dis-
courses within the reports. The presented stable, unified, and controlled CSR culture in the or-
ganisations is highlighted through the issues that these reports include as well as leave out of the 
text. Some reports include other stakeholder voices mainly in concert with the managerial, 
dominant account of culture. Other reports – especially in Denmark and the UK – hybridise a 
motive of ‘economy’ into that of ‘sustainability’ either by claiming for instance that the state’s 
price cap regulation or hinders sustainable investments or supports the claim that ‘efficiency’ is 
possible both in improving the ‘economy’ and the ‘sustainability’ in ‘doing more with less’. Few 
reports–especially from South Africa and the US–include critical stakeholder voices such as 
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independent statements of the authorities and whistleblower issues from anonymous stake-
holders (typically employees).   
The emphasis is on the management’s ‘sustainability’ motive, which in the CSR reports is per-
ceived as positive and legitimate. In contrast to a juxtaposition of, for instance, corporate finan-
cial performance reports, where the economic motive of ‘enrichment’ is highlighted as positive 
and legitimate, this motive is in most CSR reports de-emphasised. ‘Economy’ is in these CSR 
reports directly linked to investments in CSR and sustainability. This ambidexterity of motives 
may explain why confidence and trust in CSR reports receive such critical responses from the 
audience of readers. 
VISUAL ANALYSIS138  
The visual analysis of photographic images within the same CSR reports and websites is dis-
played in Appendix 20: Table P, page 335. This analysis shows an overall managerial attempt to 
compensate for the lack of stakeholder voices due to the representational deficits of the manage-
rial account. Of the 1345 photographs 772 were found to belong to the archetypal group called 
‘human beings’, 1207 to the group called ‘environment’, 806 to the group called ‘constructions’, 
281 to the group called ‘behaviour’, and ‘economy’139. The authors have through these images 
tried to create a visual polyphony of a multiplicity of stakeholders to show that the managers 
actually care for them, emphasising: 
• Happiness: children, families, customers, employees, and managers with smiling faces.  
• Protection: undistorted nature depicted in manipulated high-modality colours. 
• Expertise (technical): control of service, maintenance and deliverance of water. 
• Diversity: various races, gender and ages of employees and customers.  
                                                
138 Notification: Copyright protected material 
When referring to corporate published material on the internet there are two concerns that this paper necessarily has 
to address; textual references and references to images, which are differently protected by copyrights. I follow the 
legal right of referring to texts from the internet, which typically must be referred to in institutionalized ways by 
linking to the publication in question in the style recommended by the publishing houses or by the media in which 
this text is published. A further complication, however, exist when displaying pictures that are in the ownership of 
third party and regulated with various different laws. In the US replication of pictures from the Internet can be done 
when no harm is done towards the picture; however ‘harm’ is defined very loosely and can be judged differently by 
different courthouses (Ginsburg, 2000). In the EU, however, the copyrights of photographs and images are stricter 
and more ambiguously regulated, and as a consequence researchers must obtain written permission each time an 
image made by another party is published (Engle, 2002; Hugenholz and Senftleben, 2011). Following, severe fi-
nancial costs for the author may occur if he or she wants to show these pictures. Hence, in this paper no photograph 
is therefore depicted, but collected privately in case of others wanting to privately investigate them for free, and in 
this paper Internet links to the relevant pictures of the relevant company report is made so that the reader can search 
for an example of one of the typical pictures referred to. 
139
 the photos are typified into more than one group of archetypes. 
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• Sustainability: children symbolised as the vulnerable future (i.e. the next generation) 
• Charity: corporate giving to poor, disabled, elderly, female people and children from 
former colonised Third World countries relieves the inherited bad consciousness.  
• Responsibility: management displayed in ‘stilleben’ pictures; formal (often male) dress 
codes symbolizing paternal responsibility as providers of products and financial liveli-
hood.  
The stark difference between the unison, managerial voice in the texts and the compensation for 
stakeholder repression through various, polyphonic, positive photographic images is found 
throughout all reports. What the photos de-emphasises are:  
• Sadness: for instance of the negative effect of the climate changes created by the indus-
trialised world.  
• Exploitation: for instance of natural resources.  
• Homogeneity: dominance of a white (and in South Africa a black), male constituency.  
• Incompetence: the challenge of not being competent enough, lack of education.  
• Insecurity: lack of knowledge about future impacts.  
• Threats: from natural catastrophes initiated by human (industrial) impact.  
• Power: managerial power and power asymmetry between the management and its 
stakeholders  
• Enrichment: through hidden profit or budget maximization motives.  
The positive, archetypal photos are used to supplement and compensate the texts to persuade the 
readers of the CSR reports of their sincere motives of stakeholder inclusion. When the images 
are analysed as a whole deconstructed from the texts, the grammar of the images (Kress & Van 
Leeuwen, 2006) tells an implicit cultural story based on spiritual values inherent from a western, 
modernised, and enlightened culture of Biblical ethics including love, care, forgiveness, charity, 
protection and work to obtain ‘divinity’ displayed as a natural Paradise on Earth as part of the 
sustainability motive of the organisation (see also Höllerer et al., 2013, for similar findings from 
Austrian CSR reports). 
This visual analysis of the photographic images, however, does not succeed in delivering a mul-
ticultural perspective of the CSR culture of organisations in spite of the divinity of the symbol-
ism their transfer. The detachment of text and images through the messages transferred of re-
spectively ‘efficiency’ and ‘divinity’ of the images constitutes an incommensurability between 
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the textual promise of ‘doing more with less’ and the picturesque promise of creating a ‘divine 
world’ both covering and under-emphasising the economic motives crucial to the financial sur-
vival of the organisation. The sustainability motive, which is highlighted both in the format of 
the CSR reports and the intentions of it, becomes hard to dissect due to the above incom-
mensurability, which makes the overall persuasion of the audience ambiguous (own publication, 
forthcoming).  
Next, I examine which meanings these types of organisations put into and take out of the mak-
ing of CSR reports, which is studied through the observation study of the group of twelve people 
constructing a CSR report in a Danish water company from January till the end of April 2013. 
VIGNETTE 
The group consisted of a middle manager, ten non-managerial members; one or two members 
from each of the different departments within the company, and me, the researcher. Each mem-
ber of the group was given the role of coordinating data collection within their ‘own’ department 
with me as an overall coordinator of the group. The people in the CSR group were not used to 
working together although everybody knew each other as colleagues, which was interesting for 
me as an observer to see how things developed for the final creation of the CSR report. 
To me, we were an uneasy bunch of people all with good intentions, but many of us had never 
worked closely together before, which made this group work very experimental in some senses. 
It was not without problems that we had to figure out the best way of muddling through different 
issues during the short timespan we had before the deadline of the report. One person told us 
that in his department they had faced problems of stress due to a local manager’s sick leave, and 
that he thus could not guarantee his participation in the coordination meetings, which were 
scheduled each second week. I said that we could email or phone each other if there was any 
information that he needed or if I as overall coordinator needed specific things from him. An-
other person had a hard time understanding which kinds of data were really needed and why he 
was needed to provide these data. Others again occasionally had personal problems of their own 
to contend with, which meant that they could not participate in meetings, but somehow we man-
aged to get along dividing the tasks among us in a fair way trying to avoid creating problems for 
ourselves and others as well as reaching the deadline in time.  
As a coordinator I sometimes felt bad about not knowing if we were ultimately going to accom-
plish this task due to the unease within the group and the effect of other issues impinging on the 
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group from the outside. On the other hand, people were very concerned about each other and 
took over if one faced temporary problems. After the physical job of collecting data such as 
measurements of consumption of electricity, fuel, personnel data, and other typical data for the 
CSR report, the intense period of interpreting what these data were telling us about our company 
began. At this stage the top manager, who had overall responsibility for the report to the board 
and the owners of the company, participated strongly. In the last month after finishing data col-
lecting, writing up the report, and looking for organisational stories and explanations for certain 
data or events, the top manager and some of his crew of managers wanted to be engaged in the 
overall interpretation of the data.  
The stories within the CSR report were thus edited and re-edited several times in order to ‘repre-
sent’ both what the data were telling us, but also to consider the intent of the report for the or-
ganisation seen through the lens of the management team and the top manager responsible for it. 
No issues were covered up, but some data were interpreted rather differently from our initial 
group and management team, which meant that some negotiation was going on to come up with 
the ‘right’ (political) interpretation to be expressed in the text of the CSR report. It should also 
reflect what was written last year and which kinds of ‘promises’ had been made in the chronolo-
gy of the CSR reports. Examples of these kinds of negotiations, editing and re-editing were: 
“I do not like that you suggest using the word X in the report, because the 
board members might interpret this as an authoritative statement; as if some-
one is watching over us and coming to punish us if we do not comply. Use the 
word Y instead so that it reflects our intentionality – not something that we 
promise, but something we strive for.” (Quoted from an informal meeting with 
a manager after the first draft of the CSR report, my translation). 
“It is a problem that our emission of X is so high! Can we display it in another 
way, because we cannot do more to reduce it because it depends on so many 
variables that are out of our control? Maybe you could show X as a relative 
variance instead and Y as an absolute variance here compared to the last four 
years, so we give ourselves an opportunity to reflect upon how we want to solve 
this problem in the future?” (Quoted from a second informal meeting with the 
same manager as above, my translation). 
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“We have no explanations of why this measurement is worse in our department 
than last year. We don’t know. Just put it nicely in the report and write that we 
will follow the development in the future.” (Quoted from a short conversation 
with a project manager in the search for explanatory stories for the data, my 
translation). 
When asking different managers and employees which meaning the CSR report had for them, 
different and fragmented answers arose: 
“You know; if it hadn’t been for these reports we would never had known which 
impact we really have upon society and the climate change, for instance. Since 
you wrote our first report I took it to the board arguing that we needed permis-
sion to do something about reduction of our climate impact. And you know – 
today we have convinced them that we need to invest in our own windmill to 
begin producing our own green energy. I could not have argued this before, 
because we did not have the data supporting this amendment. Now it is in pro-
gress and we are conducting an environmental investigation in order to find the 
best place for this windmill. We are also looking for other investors, but right 
now it is just us. But others may join in later. We are definitely going to try to 
get this windmill, because we cannot reduce our energy consumption more just 
by fine-tuning our apparatuses. The figures show this, as we’ve discussed re-
cently. It is impossible. I am really pleased that we have come so far, and I am 
proud of our reaching this goal in order to become CO2 neutral in a few years. 
That is what sustainability is about, isn’t it?” (Quoted from a top manager just 
before publication of the CSR report, my translation).      
“I never thought anybody minded reading our CSR report! Who would be in-
terested, I thought? But now after having been part of creating this year’s re-
port it makes much more sense to me. And it makes me much better equipped to 
understand the impacts of what we are trying to accomplish in our everyday 
life. You know, before, the guys went on fine-tuning here and there and nobody 
else understood if it worked or not. Now we can see what works and what does 
not. At least sometimes we are able to explain why we now do things. Before, it 
was more by intuition. For instance, in our department we try to minimise our 
energy consumption by aligning the pressure in different areas of the town. At 
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the same time we have this obligation to provide a certain minimum pressure of 
water in the tubs. In some places it was way above the objective, and in other 
places too low. But now we see that our tuning has produced results, and we 
have a feeling that we can accomplish a lot more by paying more attention to-
wards this, thanks to the numbers, interpretations of the data, and stories sur-
rounding the data in the CSR report. So…..now I don’t care if anybody else is 
reading it; I am, and I really think it makes me more proud of my work knowing 
that what I do makes a good impact.” (Quoted from a conversation with a tech-
nical designer during our interpretation of data in the CSR report, my transla-
tion). 
“In our department we are fed up with all this ‘efficiency’ talk, because it 
makes us sick and worn down that we have to run faster and faster. We cannot 
cope with it anymore. See – my colleague went off sick with spinal problems 
last month. We just want relief and be able to get on with our ‘normal’ job, 
now. But we have also learned a thing or two, because we had to share our col-
league’s difficult job while she was on sick leave, and we did this job in an-
other way from the way she had done it, and it actually worked out quite well 
and took off the pressure from impacting on our bodies by using a truck we had 
in a smarter way. Now the problem is that when she returns she might want to 
change things back to where they were, and now we do not agree with that 
anymore. I hope she will listen to us – also in order not to fall back into sick-
ness again, because we actually are doing things more ‘efficiently’ now in this 
new way although we have more work of her work to do while she is away. 
Hopefully she can see the benefit for herself, for her health and our health in 
continuing doing it in the new way and reducing the workload for all of us 
when she is back, if she can accept that we have made this change for her.” 
(Quoted from a conversation with an operation technician in the midst of data 
collection, my translation). 
INTERPRETATION 
These extracts show how the CSR reporting had multiple effects upon the everyday work of the 
employees: some were good, some initiated changes, while others were less good, and again 
others making room for thinking in new ways. In this way the CSR reports has ‘done something’ 
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to the organisation, which have learned from it and some do not mind much if nobody else than 
those directly involved in it cares, because they do. For others it is important as a kind of ‘face’ 
towards society: the local politicians, the citizens or other, potential readers. But mainly the re-
port serves in multiple ways as text for negotiation both internally of the organisation and exter-
nally towards the stakeholders, and vice versa.  
From the observation study and the interviews we learned that small micro changes in actions 
occured each time the CSR report was written in terms of changing the way that the organisation 
and the individuals cowrited it, perceived it, and perceived themselves as a kind of collective, 
negotiated identity, and in technical terms of agency of ‘what works and what doesn’t’. This 
does not mean that everybody in the organisation has a unison, shared understanding of what 
their collective identity is, but the way the text of the CSR report reflects a negotiated nexus–an 
‘edited’ and ‘re-edited’ culture–and paves the way towards what makes sense to many and does 
minimum harm to others within the organisation and becomes one idea of the ‘glue’ (Weick, 
1976) that makes the organisation stick together in the face of several other competing objec-
tives and logics and serves as a kind of textualisation (Ricoeur, 1973) of who ‘we’ want to be. 
A kind of ‘directionality’ in this form of ‘textualisation’ of the organisational culture into a pub-
lished artefact exposing it to stakeholders, over whom the organisation does not have control, is 
part of what they risk getting typified into a characterization of either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Boje, 
2008). The powerfulness of the ‘textualisation’ is that it is hard to erase what has once been 
written especially if it has been published. When a corporate report has been published in textual 
form, it is exposing the authors trying to ‘represent’ the organisation from behind in ways that 
can be interpreted and judged in many different ways by the reading audience (Crowther, 2012). 
This, the management has been very aware of. Exposure to critique is the vulnerability through 
publishing organisational texts, which easy becomes artefacts directly linked to an external per-
ception of ‘this is the culture of this organisation’ never minding who is the author, how many 
authors are behind the report, and who has ultimately sponsored the text (Deetz, 1992).  
In this sense ‘culture’ becomes ‘political’ both in the process of both writing up the texts and 
utilizing it afterwards. The texts are negotiated; an ‘edited’ reality, and ‘re-edited’ into a static, 
non-dynamic document with the dangers this brings (Czarniawska, 1997). At the same time, the 
text is not a standalone document; it is a part of intertextuality referring to previous released 
texts and documents, press releases, and other related kinds of communication (Orr, 2003). The 
CSR report becomes a ‘dynamic’, ongoing document in an ongoing history of storytelling about 
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the organisation’s collective identity. In many senses it may be decoupled from other parts of 
everyday life of organisations, which may be diverse and fragmented (Martin, 1992, 2002; 
Weick, 1995).  
However, by allowing publication of the CSR report and its life being partly in a vacuum and 
partly in a dynamic space of micro changes and intertextual relation with other documents, this 
report–in spite of its rigidity, decoupled nature, and non-diversified expression of the multiplic-
ity of organisational culture going on in organisational everyday life–expresses a political inten-
tionality and motivation of ‘showing face’ to the environment. If the report is made too inade-
quate, it creates an impression of ‘window-dressing’ and ‘greenwashing’, which may 
immediately rebound on the organisation as negative stakeholder feedback. But if it is made 
rigorously, it may serve as a ‘means’ for continuity of a negotiated culture and policy making in 
constant flux.  
It is important for organisations to improve their descriptions of their intentionality, political 
means and ends, multiple motives, and how they respond to such in an interaction with stake-
holders, since the power of CSR reports are not only one-way. Artefacts such as these ask for 
(better, improved) interactions between the organisation and its stakeholders rather than to 
‘prove’ a perfect world in harmony. The more CSR reports display ‘artificial', overtly positive 
pictures, omit stakeholder voices, and lack or over-emphasise ‘promises’ to the society in which 
it operates, the more critique it will expose the organisation in question to, which hopefully will 
respond towards this stakeholder pressure eventually. On the other hand, the more aware the 
authors of the CSR reports become and learn about these effects that their textualised culture has 
on societal expectations, the more the organisation can choose to interact in a dialogue respond-
ing to demands, display critical voices, and develop its organisational culture in interaction with 
its (responsive) stakeholders and ultimately become more trustworthy. 
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FIGURE 1: DYNAMIC OF TEXTUALISATION-ENACTMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
Figure 1 illustrates how the seemingly static ‘textualisation’ of the organisation’s CSR reporting 
interacts dynamically with the ongoing multiplicity of organisational culture in its everyday life. 
Once the organisational culture has been ‘textualised’ into a description in a CSR report and 
perhaps has received diverse responses from internal and external stakeholders, it may change 
the way the organisation enacts its multiplicity of cultures as a micro change. Then in the next 
text this change may be described and ‘textualised’ in a slightly new way through trying to re-
flect on what has happened, who has responded to the former text or past events, and which 
promises has been made or been neglected. This again may impact the enacted organisational 
multiplicity of cultures in a slightly changed way. Along with this the organisation learns how 
other stakeholders have an impact upon it, which expectations they have, and continues reflex-
ively to think about how the organisation can, should, and might respond upon its impacts, 
which constitutes what I call a ‘feedback flux’. This ‘feedback flux’ continues as a process of 
the evolution of the organisation in slower or faster pace depending on the events taking place. 
CONCLUSION
The above analysis and comparison of CSR reports and observed everyday life working with the 
construction of this demonstrates several ambiguities based on the incommensurability espe-
cially between the integrationist perspective within the reports’ texts and the behaviour of the 
multiple organisational cultures. The CSR reports are written as if there exists an archetypal 
culture within the organisation, and since the coherence of both the textual and visual images 
supports the integrationist perspective and neglects other (conflicting) cultural perspectives, this 
message is expected to ‘do’ something140 to the organisation. In the observation study, what the 
CSR reporting culture ‘does’ to the organisation and its inhabitants (Binder, 2007; Hallett, 2010; 
                                                
140
 to ‘do’ nothing is also a behavior  
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Hallett & Ventresca, 2006) is to frame how they are supposed to work, which values they are to 
value, and what purposes they are to follow in the future, which may be described in the CSR 
report. In this way the CSR report (or the sponsored authorship behind it (Deetz, 1992)) tacitly 
‘assumes’ that the organisation will act, interact, and perform as stated in the textualised repre-
sentation of the CSR culture of the organisation in the reports.  
Being political (Deetz, 1992) and partly decoupled from the multiplicity of cultures in the or-
ganisation this study suggests that the CSR reports persist as an institutional representation of 
‘a’ typified ‘reporting culture’, which is accepted by sectorial peers, governmental regulators, 
intergovernmental bodies, and organisational fields in general (Berger & Luckman, 1967). 
Hence, derived from the dialectic relationship seen in the close observation study, it is suggested 
that CSR reports represent an institutionalised ‘culture’ of its own, partly decoupled from the 
multiplicity of cultures that exist in living organisations. Instead the CSR reports make one per-
ceive the organisation as one entity and make stakeholders (including employees) assume that 
this is the way they are expected to behave, which again is a way of harmonizing multiple or-
ganisational cultures into one streamlined culture. This is not without implications, as the obser-
vation study shows, because the people in the organisation may react very differently to this 
harmonization of the organisational cultures.  
The meaning that the CSR reporting culture have created for everyday life of organisations can 
be interpreted as constructed on behalf of elitist members of an organisational community cele-
brating the dominant aspects of their culture. This view offers identity and legitimacy for the 
members of the dominant, enhancing, and partly the orthogonal subcultures within the organisa-
tion (Martin & Siehl 1990). For counter cultures and critical stakeholders it may serve as a 
means too: By taking the literal text serious, these stakeholders can – if they possess enough 
power – either hold the organisation responsible of the text and the inherent promises it offers or 
use the text as a springboard for further negotiation suiting their own purposes.  
Recognizing, that CSR reports is not only the stakeholders’ window to an integrated, monocul-
tural, and negotiated study of organisational everyday life, but are also means for stakeholders to 
hold managers accountable for their conduct, or as a means to enact a countercultural debate or 
critique of the so-called ‘organisational culture’, these texts necessarily becomes multicultural 
due to its publication and exposure for internal and external critique, future demands, and expec-
tations. In this sense changing the view from ‘content’ to ‘enactment’ offers an opening for 
bridging interpretations of integration, differentiation, and fragmentation perspectives. In other 
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words, multiple cultural meanings, motives, and expectations may be enacted in the organisation 
through the corporate texts and the stakeholders’ diverse reactions to them. In this way the 
meaning of corporate reports for organisational everyday life may not necessarily be negative 
for subcultures that do not agree with the reports, the immediate stories within it, and the conse-
quences from them. Elaborated from Mill’s terminology (1940) I suggest that this could be 
called the ‘enactment of motives’ behind the reports. 
The ‘enactment of motives’ is what these corporate texts ‘do’ to the organisation; how they 
come to influence the enactment of organisational everyday life. The enactment of the motives 
that were explicitly found within the 28 CSR reports’ texts and images showed how a hybridiza-
tion of the multiplicity of cultures within the organisation in practice was attempted, but partly 
failed. Seen from a constructivist perspective this political document enacts a series of practices 
in the organisation as well as it enables a range of reactions and counter reactions from stake-
holders as seen in the example of the vignette. As a consequence the document becomes nego-
tiable in terms of which practices the organisation should follow or change. In spite of eventual 
critique of the format and content of the CSR reports, this ‘enactment of motives’ and its par-
ticipation in ongoing controversies make it bridge multiple cultures in organisations.   
To ask this institutionalised CSR reporting culture to gain more credibility and authenticity by 
recognizing that the organisation consist of a multiple cultures thereby allowing more pluralism 
or polyphonic stakeholder voices in the texts of CSR reports is a way of saying that CSR reports 
represent a ‘truth’ that can be perceived as ‘false’ by critics. To balance managerial motives 
with other stakeholder’s motives may enhance the trustworthiness and credibility of the CSR 
reports by the reading audience. Similarly, the archetypal, photographic images supporting the 
above critically evaluated texts, could be more diverse, showing problems as well as the good 
intentions of the companies, and display a more balanced integration of the different motives, 
especially those that are de-emphasised in images of CSR reports. 
This paper sees the CSR reports as cultural artefacts, which in their having a political and nego-
tiable function can enable organisational change or micro changes, and in this sense these re-
ports bridge multiple cultures in organisations by their enactment of motives both those within 
the CSR reports and of diverse stakeholders reacting upon the report. 
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PAPER #7
Mitigating the Climate change in Exercising Sustainable Project 
Management in Engineering: Case studies from Scandinavia. 
    	      
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(Prepared for review in the journal Leadership and Management in Engineering, American So-
ciety of Civil Engineers (ASCE). This journal does not use abstracts) 
After having worked 10 years as a project manager in the Danish water sector I was given sup-
port to study PhD in corporate social responsibility in the water sector in cooperation with the 
Scandinavian Society of Trenchless Technology (SSTT), Vand & Affald from Svendborg, and 
the Copenhagen Business School. This paper reveals a study of CO2 emissions from two differ-
ent pipeline installation practices: traditional trenching (excavation) and trenchless technologies 
(No Dig). Seven comparative case studies were established in Scandinavia in collaboration with 
SSTT: two projects in both Norway and Sweden, and three projects in Denmark. The research 
questions guiding this study were:  
1) What is the climate impact from excavation and No Dig methods respectively in pipeline in-
stallation projects? 
2) What can we learn about sustainable project management from these case studies? 
The findings reveal prospects for sustainable project management in the field of engineering, 
and the outcome has lead to a proposed model for sustainable project management available for 
businesses interested in working with leadership and sustainability. First, a short review is made 
about what sustainability and corporate social responsibility are in theory and practice, and af-
terwards the methodology of the study is presented followed by the findings and propositions. 
SUSTAINABILITY / CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) are often used inter-
changeably in the vast literature as well as in business practice141. I will delineate the main is-
sues and instruments and finally focus on the international and intergovernmental recommenda-
tions from the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) and the Organisations for Economic 
                                                
141
 For a contemporary overview see Lauesen (forthcoming). 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Companies and their 
practical implications. 
The academic literature of sustainability and CSR has roots back to the 1950s (e.g. Lovelock et 
al., 1974; Moira-Leite & Padgett, 2011). A provoking article in the New York Times written by 
Milton Friedman (1970) and named “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits” initiated an acrimonious debate as to what was meant by CSR.  
However, almost a decade later, Archie B. Carroll was among the first to provide a CSR model 
with a more generally accepted definition: “The social responsibility of business encompasses 
the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society has of organisations at a 
given point in time” (Carroll, 1979, p. 500). This definition of CSR has survived in the academic 
literature more or less until today and also corresponds with the intergovernmental definitions 
we see in the UNGC and OECD Guidelines.  
During the 1980s the influence of R. Edward Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory coloured new 
developments of CSR concepts (Moura-Leite & Padgett, 2011). Freeman’s definition of stake-
holders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the or-
ganisation’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) recognised the growing importance for business 
ethics codes as a part of CSR and stakeholder management in general.  
From the 1990s the strategic management approach to CSR alongside the stakeholder approach 
gained strength and resilience from its recognition by the UN, the OECD, the World Bank and 
the Internal labour Organisation (ILO) (Moura-Leite and Padgett, 2011). In accord with this 
approach, Donna J. Wood revisited the Corporate Social Performance (CSP) model established 
by Carroll (1979). She showed that business’ social responsiveness to institutionalised CSR 
consisted of environmental assessment, stakeholder management, and issues management, 
whereas CSP constituted the social impacts, programmes, and policies made by business (Wood, 
1991, p. 691). The idea of ‘sustainability’ was inherited within the framework of these new 
categories although it as an academic field led its life in parallel to the CSR movement.  
Alongside new findings and ideas within the sustainability literature developed, they were im-
mediately adopted in the above framing of CSR as a ‘cause’, which CSR models had to aim to 
protect (e.g. Frederick 1998). For instance, the Gaia Hypothesis offered by James Lovelock and 
Lynn Margulis (1974) claimed that the biosphere of the planet Earth formed a complex interact-
ing system as a whole organism, where the biosphere has a regulatory effect (homeostasis) on 
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the Earth’s environment in a limited capacity (Lovelock, 2006). This hypothesis says that nature 
will and can adapt to certain changes in order to sustain itself. However, this has been contested 
by the rainforest reduction, depletion of natural resources and biodiversity, and the addition of 
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere, which Lovelock argues is the planet’s natural reaction to 
human impact. The Brundtland Report (1989) recognised that these delimiting tendencies were 
getting out of control and defined sustainable development as “development that meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (Brundtland Report, 1989, p. 43).   
Moving from a vague definition of CSR to an incorporation of business ethics, stakeholder the-
ory, strategic management and performance, and sustainability, the Millennium with its IT boom 
exploded with academic titles about CSR and sustainability (Lauesen, forthcoming). From this 
initiation the United Nation Global Compact (Annan, 1999) and OECD Guidelines (Gordon, 
2001) began together with the ILO142 to frame their intergovernmental understandings of what 
CSR and sustainability were meant to comprise both politically and for business practice.  
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises have a history dating back to 1976. How-
ever it was not until 2001, where the UN defined how they perceived CSR in their Global Com-
pact, that the OECD adopted these principles into the Guidelines. The UN Global Compact de-
fines CSR as specific principles covering human rights, labour, environment, sustainable 
behaviour, and anti-corruption. The debates in intergovernmental policy making as well in the 
academic literature concerning business practices to do with CSR and sustainability were very 
concerned about the rising problems they saw. Sweatshop activities including the use of child 
labour in the supply chain factories of multinational companies; women’s rights violations; and 
the major environmental disasters such as the oil spills and exploitations in Third World coun-
tries during the 1990s came on the agenda.  
These scandals initiated a harsh critique of specific multinational companies. Many of them, 
however, responded and changed their conduct and adopted CSR and sustainability principles, 
which they tried to implement in the periphery states in which they operated as a kind of reputa-
tion recovery operation to stop customers fleeing. The debate is still going on in the first decade 
of the Millennium as to whether multinationals have succeeded in enacting CSR and sustainable 
practices in a proper manner. Critics say that CSR and sustainability are being misused by com-
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panies only for reputation management–‘greenwashing’ and ‘window-dressing’–and have not 
gained the prominence and excellence suggested by their ethical intentions. On the other hand, 
we see many good examples of even small companies actually doing good things for society, 
who manage to combine social, environmental, and financial sustainability (e.g. Haigh & Hoff-
man, 2012) in a time where the financial crisis is still affecting the lives of people and business 
all around the world.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of a water company and its building contrac-
tors’ efforts in creating sustainable project management. I reveal both the difficulties and the 
successes and come to the conclusion that both things constitute a model for how engineers can 
succeed in sustainable project management by considering the aspects based upon concrete find-
ings from our study. 
METHODOLOGY
A range of members of SSTT including developers, entrepreneurs, and constructors volunteered 
to participate in case studies with the aim of learning how to become part of a sustainable future. 
A spirit of “if we can show how to conduct our business socially, responsibly, and sustainably, 
there is no end of advantage for our triple-bottom lines” (i.e. economic, social, and environmen-
tal outcome). The cases in the project were already established and in their beginning phase, 
which diminished the costs of establishing new and unplanned projects in the field.  
To eliminate the risks of failure of the investigation, data consisted of few, but crucial indica-
tors, which I found manageable for the data collectors, who were also the project managers of 
the case study projects. These indicators included:
• Pipe material, dimension and length 
• Production method (description) 
• Installation method (description) 
• Fuel consumption (all kinds) 
• Material consumption (all kinds) 
• Transportation (kilometres) 
• Total man-hours used 
Two small projects from Norway soon provided these data, and a project from Sweden followed 
afterwards. These data were the results from trenchless technologies and comparisons with tradi-
tional excavation from earlier projects. In Denmark two new projects were established. The first 
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had three parallel pipeline installations done by two trenchless technologies and one by tradi-
tional excavation respectively. The second compared two different trenchless technologies. In 
the latter it was not possible to gather data from traditional excavation, because a local contrac-
tor, who did not participate in our investigation, wasin charge of this.  
The project managers had instructed their constructors how to fill in the schemas and rigorously 
note every drop of fuel and material spent and waste produced. The constructors should differ-
entiate whether they were working on the trenching part or on which one of the trenchless parts 
in order not to mix the data up.  
After having received all the data my calculation of the CO2 impact from the data began. In Eu-
rope the polymer sector had sponsored a report comparing different polymer materials for pipes 
and revealing data from scientific tests carried out by academic researchers. However, the con-
crete sector refused to provide any specific data and referred to local consultancy reports. I de-
cided, however, to use independent research-based data of concrete materials in order to be able 
to calculate the CO2 impact from our Scandinavian study. 
In the seven case studies the following premises guided the comparability and reliability of the 
data: 
• The pipeline installations comprised respectively traditional trenching (excavation) and 
trenchless technologies (No Dig) as comparable methods in areas of geological condi-
tions of soil materials (not rock). The geographical context was urban areas, and the 
timeframe of the projects was from 2011 - 2013. 
• The case studies were chosen to represent as broad a range as possible according to the 
range of pipe sizes (from ø90 mm to ø1600 mm) and represented both composite and 
concrete pipe materials. It was not possible to follow a project using ductile pipes or pro-
jects established in rock materials. However, these types of pipe materials and installa-
tions are also relatively rare in Scandinavia due to the cost of rock bursting and installa-
tion of ductile pipes. Our cases thus represent typical No Dig versus excavation projects 
in Scandinavia. 
• The data collection consisted of volumes of fuel, materials used, waste produced, man-
hours and economy spent, and in one of the cases a citizen survey in the respective areas 
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of the project were carried out. The raw data were as free of estimates and as possible 
and collected in as standardised formats and schemas as possible provided by the re-
searcher of the project. The project managers in charge of the projects collected the data 
from their work, and the researcher conducted qualitative interviews with the citizens. 
• Data from the production of pipe materials, installation of pipelines, and transport of ma-
terials after collection were theoretically calculated into CO2 emissions for comparison 
between No Dig and excavation techniques. In order to compare different pipe sizes all 
results were calculated into kilogramme (kg) CO2 per inner volume cubicmetres (m3). 
Thereby it was possible to compare how much emission it took to produce 1 m3 of inner 
pipe volume independent of pipe size and material. This calculation used conversion fac-
tors found in the literature, which is referred to in the endnotes of the paper143.  
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 Conversion factors used to calculate the CO2 emission from energy and material production: 
• Fuel (kg CO2/liter):  
o Diesel:  2.8535  
o Petrol:  2.2423  
o Oil:  2.5443  
o Source: Defra/DECC 2012 (direct emission factors) 
• Electricity (kg CO2/kWh): 
o  0.416 
o Source: SEF Svendborg 2012 – conservatively used factor in all cases since a local CO2-factor 
were not possible to get. This factor may be lower abroad since in Denmark a high level of energy 
from wind turbines are included, and in Norway and Sweden hydro works providing energy from 
water turbines are also common as low emission electricity generators. 
• Water/wastewater (kg CO2/liter): 
o   0.0005308 
o Source: Vand & Affald, Svendborg 2012 – a conservatively used factor is used in all cases since a 
local CO2-factor was not possible to get. 
• Sand/gravel (kg CO2/tonnes): 
o   3.98 
o Source: UK Quarry Products Association (QPA 2008), referred in ‘Sustainable Aggregates – CO2
emission factor study 2010’, ARRB Group, Australia, retrieved June 6th 2013 at 
http://www.sustainableaggregates.com.au/docs/SASA_C02_Emission_Factor_Study.pdf  
• Crushed stones/concrete (kg CO2/tonnes): 
o   4.02 
o Source: Same as above. 
• Asphalt (kg CO2/tonnes): 
o   179 
o Source: Report from the Danish consultancy company COWI to the Danish Railway Authorities 
BaneDanmark 2011: “CO2 opgørelse for opgradering, elektrificering og drift af jernbane mellem 
Ringsted og Holeby”, retrieved June 6th 2013 at: 
http://www.bane.dk/db/filarkiv/9132/H1_TB_CO2%20opg%F8relse.pdf (in Danish only). 
• Concrete, in-situ, (kg CO2/tonnes): 
o   147 
o Source: National Ready Mixed Concrete Association, USA: “NRMCA Publication Number 
2PCO2: Concrete CO2 Fact Sheet. February 2012”, retrieved June 6th 2013 at: 
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• As the results are calculated as descriptive statistics they do not explain statistical vari-
ance between arbitrary samples, but variance between different samples grouped in a No 
Dig cluster and an excavation cluster. If it is possible to see a specific difference in CO2
emission from the cluster of trenched methods (excavation) compared to the cluster 
trenchless methods (No Dig) all else being equal, then it is possible to talk about a ten-
dency (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Although the cases are unique and their variety represents the 
range of differences expected in the field based upon maximum variety, it makes us ca-
pable of analytically generalising our findings (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
• Interviews, taped meetings, email correspondence with stakeholders, and field notes 
were conducted and respondents’ names were made anonymous by the researcher in the 
interests of the trustworthiness and reliability of the quality of this kind of empirical ma-
terial. Stakeholders interviewed were neighbours and owners living in the area of the 
pipe installations, while interviews, taped meetings, email correspondence, and field 
notes in relation to this part of the PhD were conducted with top managers, middle man-
agers, project managers, constructors, consultants, suppliers, and branch organisations. 
Papers, where these qualitative data are presented in more detail, are shown in the refer-
ence list (see own publications). 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.nrmca.org/sustainability/CONCRETE%20CO2%20FACT%20SHEET%20FEB%202
012.pdf  
• Steel (kg CO2/tonnes): 
o   1.78 
o Source: Report from the Danish consultancy company COWI to the Danish Railway Authorities 
BaneDanmark 2011, see link above. 
• Polymer pipes (kg CO2/kg material): 
o Different estimated CO2 emission factors are extrapolated from: TEPPFA - The European Plastic 
Pipes and Fittings Association’s LCA-analysis: Production and installation of diverse polymer 
pipes. Factors used only for production and installation. See http://teppfa.eu/sustainability-a-
environment/-epd.html  
• CIPP-hoses (kg CO2/kg material): 
o The CO2 emission factors are rare to find measured or calculated by Scandinavian CIPP manufac-
turers. Data from one large company were provided, which were used conservatively in all cases 
and extrapolated from because of the wall thickness of similar products. The different factors 
provided are part of this company’s ownership and cannot be publicised in this paper due to con-
fidentiality and possible misuse of this information by competitors. 
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Excavation provides a median emission that is twice as high as No Dig ranging from the largest 
difference of 4.71 in comparing pure excavation (Fig. 3, no. 15, pooled ø160-900 mm) with pure 
No Dig (CIPP) (Fig. 3, no. 12, pooled ø150-500 mm)144 to 0.30 in mixed No Dig-excavation 
methods (Fig. 3, no. 17, pooled ø160-1200 mm)145. The largest emissions were seen in the small 
dimensions, where No Dig (HDD) in ø90/110 mm (Fig. 3, no. 1) showed 5,950 kg CO2/m3 ver-
sus excavation of ø90 mm (Fig. 3, no. 3) 18,933 kg CO2/m3 with a difference of factor 3.18.   
From the qualitative material consisting of interviews, documents, and observation studies we 
learned that managing projects in a sustainable and socially responsible way takes a certain en-
ergy to implement: 
Project manager: “The hardest thing for me was to persuade the contractors 
that they should do this extra data collection and that it would benefit their 
companies as well as ours. They did what I asked them to because they are paid 
to, but I guess they thought it was rather ridiculous and only extra work for 
them”. (Interview D, June 2012, my translation). 
This quote is an example of why it had been necessary to engage all the workers including those 
in the supply chain such as the constructors, in collecting data and behaving in a certain way, 
which the developers found appropriate. However, when asking a contractor, they often do not 
see the problem, because they too had an interest in participating in becoming a sustainable 
company themselves: 
Constructor: “We would like more developers to ask us to perform their pro-
jects in more sustainable ways. They pay us to work either to be cheap and 
crude or to be the showcase for sustainable behaviour. It is very simple. We 
would not win any tenders if we claimed that we would only work in this or that 
way. It HAS to come from the developers to set the sustainability agenda!” (In-
terview J, January 2012, my translation). 
Citizen: “Did someone tell the workers to be so nice to us residents all the time 
they were working in our area? I wondered why they were so extraordinary re-
spectful and helpful with everything so that they did not bother us at all even 
though they worked with these enormous machines etc. They moved around as 
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 These samples are from the same case study where data is pooled over a year from an urban area of approx. 
250,000 inhabitants. 
145
 The No Dig and excavation part of the pooled sample was separable in clusters.
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soon as they saw a car approaching making way for it and came to us with all 
kinds of valuable information. Someone must have told them to!” (Interview no. 
8, January 2012, my translation). 
Constructor: “We always try to be helpful and kind towards the citizens and 
residents in the neighbourhood of our different road works. If we are not, they 
complain and ruin our work, and it destroys our reputation and our entire 
working climate. So no matter what the developers say, we ALWAYS, I would 
claim, act politely and helpfully towards citizens! Or else, we are out of the 
market!” (Interview J, January 2012, my translation). 
These quotes reflect that the responsibility of being sustainable has to come from the developers, 
or those who control the moneybox. However, it also reveals that constructors do not always 
want just to make money the cheapest way, but to be able to brand themselves as being a sus-
tainable and socially responsible company through their behaviour. 
From the findings referred to both the difficulties and opportunities for management practice to 
enact corporate social responsibility and sustainability in pipe rehabilitation projects we learned 
that to manage such objectives takes a certain amount of leadership, encouragement, motivation, 
and hard work to fulfil the vision and mission of becoming a fully sustainable and socially re-
sponsible company in totality, as displayed below in Figure 6. The case studies showed what 
could be called the ‘reverse Armstrong quote’ (Armstrong, July 21, 1969, NASA, Houston): 
what is one small step for the sustainability of mankind, takes one giant leap for a company. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We are all aware of the grand discussions of how to become sustainable and socially responsible 
companies. However, few have invited us inside to observe the work it takes to practise this vi-
sion of being socially responsible and sustainable corporations. From this study we have learned 
that for managers in the water sector working with pipe rehabilitation, it takes much leadership
as well as much work before it is possible to claim to be sustainable or to be practising corporate 
social responsibility in all aspects of business conduct. The findings suggesting a rule of thumb 
based on the the difference in CO2 emission between excavation and No Dig revealed that 
trenchless technologies are half as low in CO2 emission as traditional trenching methods. These 
findings are based upon cooperation with the SSTT members in these projects, and from this I 
suggest a model of how to conduct sustainable project management as seen in Figure 6.  
FIGURE 6: SUSTAINABLE PROJECT 
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1999; about utility ethics and Bentham & Mill, see Hall, 1949). In this model it makes no differ-
ence which ethical standpoint is taken towards having faith. The fundamental issue is that hav-
ing faith in ethical matters and applying this to the conduct of the business ‘doing good’ for all 
stakeholders and their environments and serving justice in a fair and equal manner is what it 
takes to be able to engage in CSR and sustainability, because the reverse–bad conduct and injus-
tice–is a vice which is much easier and much cheaper. In this sense faith becomes linked to sus-
tainability as an end. 
Bravery is a personal trait as a means that is necessary to implement the faith in the business 
ethics mentioned before. However, bravery does not come automatically in the business world; 
it is in need of economic support in order to have something to exchange in purchasing a good; 
it is in need of management as a kind of human capital of diverse skills in planning, administrat-
ing, controlling, and problem solving in order to establish the change needed; and it often needs 
innovation in order to reduce the costs and be efficient and effective to achieve the task in hand 
in a world of limited resources (e.g. Mintzberg, 1982, 1987, 2003). 
Care is another personal trait necessary in connection with the ethical faith and the bravery 
needed to execute it. In this sense care is the direction to which the faith and bravery is ad-
dressed; towards sustainability as a higher purpose and end in the care for people, planet and 
profit (Lovelock & Margulis, 1974; Brundtland, 1989; Aras & Crowther, 2009). The balance of 
these three objectives within the very idea of sustainability is part of the new revival of the sus-
tainability approach, where economic goals are not separated from environmental and human 
goals (see Freeman & Velamuri, 2008 about the fallacy of the ‘separation thesis’ between these 
phenomena). 
Leadership is a final means toward the end, which through motivation, inclusion, justice and 
trust (see Hofstede, 1980; Phillai et al., 1999; Krafft et al., 2004) offers a possibility for an entire 
organisation to share the bravery to the behind a task or project. The ‘lonely, brave rider’ seldom 
accomplishes complicated goals alone, and this is where leadership has its great opportunity to 
act as an appropriate means. In this sense it is necessary to understand why management is not 
sufficient and thereby to understand the difference between ‘management’ and ‘leadership’ 
(Kotter, 1990). Management is instrumental and administrative involving planning, organising, 
controlling, and problem solving in order to create consistency and order (Kotter, 1990, p. 4). 
Leadership, on the other hand, produces movement, change and establishes direction, alignment 
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of people, and is motivating and inspiring (Kotter, 1990, pp. 4-5). The one cannot live without 
the other.  
The inside-out axis shows how this model in order to succeed must be implemented at the very 
core of the organisation and sustained in the last instance by everyone in the entire organisation-
al environment around a project. In other words; anyone who has an impact upon the project 
must live up to the model and its visions in order for the project to be socially responsible and 
sustainable and fulfil its ultimate ideal.  
The top-down axis shows how this model in order to succeed must be supported from the top of 
the organisation to the bottom, meaning that if the vision is not taken up in the entire organisa-
tion, even one weak link can make the vision crumble.  
The eventual success of the projects examined in this paper was only due to the faith, commit-
ment, care and leadership managed as an inside-out manner by the organisations, which had 
these ideas anchored from the top management to the field workers. The rate of the success may 
be discussed from various perspectives. Knowing the costs and benefits revealed in this paper, I 
do not claim that the projects were managed to be fully sustainable and socially responsible in 
every small instance of its multiple processes. I only recommend a way to proceed with such an 
idea and some tools usable for sustainable project management.   
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The role of materials and material practices in institutional logics 
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(Pre-print146 in review in the journal Organisation Studies.) 
ABSTRACT
This paper is a result of a three-year study of institutional logics in the water sector and it’s 
grounding in material practices. It is based upon a cross-geographical case study of 28 water 
companies from Denmark, the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa from 2011 
- 2013. It contains reference to a qualitative analysis of 50 interviews and meetings with manag-
ers and regulators of Danish water companies and an archival study from 2000 - 2013 of water 
companies from the above nations.  
The paper identifies how a logic based on corporate social responsibility in the water companies 
both competes and coexists with a logic based on new public management ideas from their regu-
lators. It also shows how the institutional logics inherent in these logics are grounded in the ma-
terials and material practices in these companies and their regulators.  
Materials are found to be symbolic carriers of ideas and physical manifestations of value in in-
stitutional logics. Material practices within institutional logics are found to be the creation 
and/or manifestation of ideas and values into materials and objects and the reciprocal exchange 
or symbolic exhibition of them in social interaction. 
Keywords: Case study, corporate social responsibility, institutional analysis, institutional lo-
gics, public administration and organisations 
INTRODUCTION
The well-known concept of institutional logics coined by Friedland & Alford (1991) in Bringing 
society back in: Symbols, practices and institutional contradictions in the so-called ‘orange 
book’ edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio was initially called ‘The Logic of Insti-
tutions’ and based upon the following idea:  
“Each of the most important institutional orders of contemporary Western so-
cieties has a central logic – a set of material practices and symbolic construc-
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 also known as ”version 1” according to SAGE, see http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav under ”Authors Re-using Their Own 
Work” at the bottom of the page. 
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tions- which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to or-
ganisations and individuals to elaborate.” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). 
Friedland & Alford defined institutions as ”supraorganisational patterns of human activity by 
which individuals and organisations produce and reproduce their material subsistence and or-
ganize time and space” (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 243) for which they proposed five major 
categories of institutional logics (IL)147 respectively: that of capitalism, the state, democracy, the 
family, and religion/science. Organising, they proposed, is mediated by these central logics, for 
instance to accumulate the commodification of human activity by the IL of capitalism; to ration-
alise and regulate human activity by the IL of the state; to participation in popular control over 
human activity by the IL of democracy; to motivate human activity into community and loyalty 
towards its members by the IL of family; and to symbolically construct the reality of human 
activity by the IL of religion/science.  
These suggestions remained uncommented upon for almost a decade until Thornton & Ocasio 
(2008) took up the thread (Lounsbury & Boxenbaum, 2013) and defined ‘institutional logics’ as:  
“The social constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material 
practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and 
organisations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, 
and reproduce their lives and experiences.” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 2).  
Thornton et al. (2012) wanted to make this idea into an institutional metatheoretical framework 
that could be used for the institutional analysis of the interrelationships between institutions, 
organisations, and individuals in a social system. The theoretical premises were the duality be-
tween agency and structure, historical contingency, material, and symbolic institutions prone to 
multilevel analysis (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 6). They addressed the claim initiated by DiMaggio 
(1988, p. 4) of the deficits of neoinstitutional theory in which he called for interest, agency, and 
institutional entrepreneurship all to be considered, since neoinstitutional theory so far had not 
focused on human interest and agency. Since DiMaggio’s critique, scholars within neoinstitu-
tional theory have initiated the emergence of new developments of agency-based (post-) neoin-
stitutional theories such as Institutional Entrepreneurship, Institutional Work, and Institutional 
Logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 1999, 2005, 2008, 2012; Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006; Battilana et al., 2009). 
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 from here on I will occasionally when appropriate distinguish between institutional logics by writing the abbre-
viation (IL) and other logic by spelling them out such as ”the logic of...” 
263
Thornton et al. (2012, p. 6) framed the Institutional Logics’ Perspective as a response and reac-
tion to institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), where agency is constrained by 
the institutional macrostructures in which the organisations were placed. This made other schol-
ars claim that agents were seen as ’institutional dopes’ (Campbell, 2007). In the Institutional 
Logics’ Perspective human and organisational interests, values and assumptions alongside the 
Carnegie School theories of attention were primary (Thornton, 2004) alongside its recognition 
of the former structural macro-view and the idea of institutional entrepreneurs. Thornton et al. 
(2012) wanted this perspective to frame a broad field of institutional and organisational theory 
in order to merge different macro- and microviews to show ”how action depends on how indi-
viduals and organisations are situated within and influenced by the spheres of different institu-
tional orders” (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 10).  
The Institutional Logics’ Perspective is thus trying to explain different institutional and organ-
isational phenomena within one new distinct perspective. Through Thornton et al.’s interpreta-
tion of Friedland & Alford’s (1991) initial ideas they try to balance on a knife edge embracing 
everything and being distinctive as well. Rejecting the idea from institutional isomorphism 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1983) that cognitive psychology such as habits, scripts, and schemas can 
explain human and organisational behaviour and agency as incompetent, Thornton et al. (2012, 
p. 41-42) invited theories of power and strategy, the struggle between different organisational 
cultures, theories of decision making, interests, attention, negotiation, exchange, and vocabular-
ies of motives (Mills, 1940) also to be part of the multiple explanations for institutional com-
plexities (e.g. Simon, 1947; March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963; Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; March & Olsen 1984, 1996; Weick, 1976, 1995; Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001; Thornton et al., 2012, p. 93). It is not surprising that this multifaceted per-
spective of institutional logics has received certain criticisms for its ambitiousness in collecting 
a new metaframe of different institutional, psychological, and organisational theories into one 
perspective that might seem ambiguous to some scholars. 
Thornton et al.’s theory of Institutional Logics’ Perspective has been criticised for determining 
agency a priori, which for instance Binder (2007) claims is not the case, because multiple logics 
are combined in complexities serving the needs and motives of the inhabitants of the institutions 
in question. Another critique comes from Friedland (2013), who claims that Thornton et al.’s 
(2012) perspective has been stuffed with too much ‘substance’. Substances cannot be reduced to 
arbitrary properties nor to materiality but are kinds of states with which one has instrumental or 
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ownership relations, and which are “enacted through material practices organized around ob-
jects, through things and bodies, and the words by which they are named and constituted”
(Friedland, 2013, p. 34). This means that humans can do something with objects and things 
through the state of ownership and easily transfigure substances into things and objects, which 
are easier to conceive than abstract notions (Friedland, 2013, pp. 34-35). 
Friedland saw the modern state and its figures of power, divinity, and love dovetailing symboli-
cally in practice (Alford & Friedland, 1985, p. 432; cited in Friedland, 2013, p. 26). Therefore 
he and Alford attributed institutional logics to power, vocabularies of motives and beliefs, and 
the processes by which these interests were conditioned by those logics as an institutional speci-
ficity (Friedland & Alford, 1985).  
Friedland was occupied with how institutional logics could be reframed as cross-institutional 
virtues, which were replicated towards other like domains, as for example non-religious states, 
bureaucracies, market states etc. to understand how the domain of religion had deceived the do-
main of nationalism and policy making in state bureaucracies and democracies (Friedland, 2013, 
p. 27). Bringing Society Back In (Friedland & Alford, 1991) was aimed at the “reduction of the 
social to the individual and organisational decisions” and to pair them with a non-totalising 
understanding of the social in tensions of independent and contradictory, heterogenic institu-
tional fields (Friedland, 2013, p. 27).  
Friedland wanted to show that “all institutions had metaphysical foundation beyond sense and 
reason”; that a trans-institutional understanding of instrumental rationality was misconceived; 
and that the formations of both subjects and objects are co-implicated. Institutions can thus be 
seen through the transcendent illumination of a kind of (quasi-) religion, which has its own 
‘gods’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘illuminations’, ‘enchantments’ and ‘values’ that the subjects adhering 
to them ‘love’. Institutional logics are thus the means for understanding the agents in certain 
social orders and how they have come to love its rationalities and worship (or celebrate) the in-
herent ‘gods’ behind these orders whether it is the market, bureaucracy, democracy, religion or 
other such domains. Their values such as ‘salvation’ to religion, ‘aesthetics’ to the arts, ‘power’ 
to politics, ‘property’ to capitalism, and ‘knowledge’ to science is a logical, teleological consis-
tency exercising ‘power over man’. The cultural content is a “substantive value with a ‘determi-
nant content’ which derives its authority from the will of those who value it, known through the 
particular discourse and practices through which it and its constituting conflict with other val-
ues is effected” (Friedland, 2013, p. 28).  
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What anchors the value into the institutional logic is then explained by the aforementioned ‘sub-
stances’ (Friedland, 2013, p. 34). Institutional logics thus presume institutional meaningfulness 
as well as individual or organisational interests and power as interdependent, but constitutional 
features unlike Thornton et al.’s (2012) perception that it posits “different interpretations of how 
to use power” (Friedland, 2013, p. 35). In this way Friedland emphasises that power is rela-
tional, which is constituted in the institutional logic rather than being a matter of behaviour or 
cognition.  
Thus, institutional logics are not blindly steering human agency but binding values, material 
practices, and observable objects through the substances inherited by them, since institutional 
logics are “practical forms of value rationality” (Friedland, 2013, p. 36). The ‘substances’ 
bridge and classify actionable objects, and they bind normative morality and ethics “as a tran-
scendental value, which specifies what ought to be desired” throughout each social order ena-
bling and forming agents, who either can voluntarily accept or reject it. The substances bridge 
this voluntary agency with contingent structure through their institutional logics (Friedland, 
2013, p. 38).   
Friedland implicitly argues for not making institutional logics into a kind of model as if these 
logics work as institutions themselves and in the old macroperspective sense control human 
agency or divide it into different institutional spheres or ‘pillars’. Rather they should be seen as 
value binding substances in which human agency can voluntarily can jump back and forth as it 
suits them. Friedland’s ideational critique of the Institutional Logics’ Perspective thus leaves an 
open question of how to link material practices into these value binding substances. This role of 
the material practices has been under-researched and is thus an emergent field within the Institu-
tional Logics’ Perspective (Jones et al., 2013, p. 51), which this paper seeks to address.  
As one of the few, Jones et al. (2013) found that the material dimension of institutional logics 
has mainly been interpreted as practices and structures, but rarely as physical objects of study 
and which roles agents attach to materials and how they form their material practices around 
them. Scholars should not “shy away from trying to specify how material underpin practices”
(Jones et al., 2013, p. 65) and how they instantiate the ideas or symbolic forms of the objects, 
how they change, and impact role relations and changes of practices and in that way how mate-
rial may connect ideation and practices (Jones et al., 2013, p. 66). This paper follows Jones et 
al.’s request and consults cultural theories in order to find ways of defining materials and mate-
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rial practices in order afterwards to test this according to the substances as seen through the In-
stitutional Logics’ Perspective. 
THE ROLE OF MATERIALS AND MATERIAL PRACTICES IN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
The literature of cultural theory offers some suggestions as to how materials such as physical 
objects and material practices such as the use of these materials have been framed in earlier 
studies. Tylor (1871) was among the first to delineate a culture through defining its subject mat-
ter through the progressive analysis of the material of observation (Kroeber and Kluckholm, 
1952; Stocking, 1966, p. 868). Later, the Polish-English anthropologist Malinowski (1922) in 
his study of the Kula Ring in Papua, New Guinea and its exchange of gifts, the role of materials 
was explicitly described as reflecting cultural values (Ziegler, 1990; Jones et al., 2013, p. 68). 
Through explaining how economic and social exchange were linked together in establishing the 
social order in tribal societies primery for commercial trade, Malinowski initiated the viability 
of materiality and value in cultural studies (Ziegler, 1990, p. 142). 
At the same time, the German economist and sociologist Weber (1922/1978)148 developed his 
theory of bureaucracy and described the notion of ‘red tape’ (regulation) in bureaucracy through 
his theorisation of ‘value’ as ‘orderly rationality’ and as an ideal way to organise a working cul-
ture. Weber framed bureaucracy by the metaphor ‘the iron cage’ meaning rigid boundaries such 
as hierarchies, management by rules, organisation by functionality, and impersonal treatment of 
every individual in an equal way. What we could call materials and material practices, Weber 
called ‘artefacts’, which should be understood in terms of the meaning which their production 
has for human action either as a means or an end (Weber, 1921/1922; in Roth & Wittich, 1978, 
p. 7). This resonates with Malinowski’s observations of gift giving as a social exchange (or 
trade) in rural tribal areas ultimately upholding human basic needs of life in material as well as 
extra-material consumerism and welfare. 
The early Chicago School pragmatists (e.g. Park, Thomas, Burgess, and their students) studied 
urban ethnography in exotic, odd milieus among the deviant, the criminal, the homeless, the 
gangs, and the opium addicts, but also in powerful bureaucracies such as medical professionals, 
school teachers, policemen, and business men among others (Van Maanen, 1988). These schol-
ars were looking for facts and meanings of human activity, which they found related to the so-
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 although Weber has not been regarded as a scholar of cultural studies 
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cial structures of regulation or community succession,149 and concrete physical environmental 
factors such as buildings, vegetation, availability and accessibility of food, and other materials 
for exchange such as money acquired either through work or crime (Clements, 1916; Thomas & 
Znaniecki, 1918; Park, 1915; Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925).  
Later, scholars of social psychology and ethnography found in the 1970s-80s that materiality in 
the form of texts150, art, music, and games had the intrinsic purpose of transmitting ideational 
values to an audience or group members of a community (e.g. Blumer, 1969; Becker & Geer, 
1970; Goffman, 1974; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Spradley, 1979, 1980; Clifford, 
1988; Van Maanen, 1988; Fine, 1995). The value of materials according to symbolic interac-
tionism is seen on the basis of the meanings that things have for human actions in relation to 
them (Blumer, 1969, p. 2). Human beings interpret these things and modify these meanings 
through the process of social interaction (Blumer, 1969, p. 2, 4). This is similar to Schein’s con-
cept of ‘organisational culture’ in which materials and material practices can been understood as 
carriers of meaning, a way of transmission of ideas and values between people through cultural 
artefacts (Schein, 1985; 1990, p. 111; 2012). Based upon this short review of cultural theories 
and how materials and material practices are perceived here, I propose a definition of these and 
how they can be perceived as manifested in institutional logics: 
Materials and objects are symbolic carriers of ideas and physical manifesta-
tions of value in institutional logics.  
PROPOSITION 1: THE ROLE OF MATERIALS AND OBJECTS IN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Materials and objects are in Proposition 1 perceived physically and tangibly and as symbolic 
carriers of ideas refer to the intangible meanings people impose on them. The physical manifes-
tation of value inherited in materials and objects refers to their functional use such as water, that 
can physically be used for drinking, sailing or swimming in, or trees that represent the physical 
properties of producing oxygen and can be used to make furniture or fire. Materials and objects 
may have various and different symbolic and physical meanings. However, they often symbolise 
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 e.g. institutions like the family, school and church, policing, business, and political institutions, as well as groups 
of gang members controlling the flow of money and stimulant drugs in a certain concrete and bounded area from 
other competing groups 
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 oral or written histories, tales, urban legends and rumours 
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direct meanings regarding human as well as organisational life generally, because they create 
the physical conditions for this. 
Material practices in institutional logics consist of the creation and/or mani-
festation of ideas and values into materials and objects and the reciprocal 
exchange or symbolic exhibition of them in social interaction. 
PROPOSITION 2: THE ROLE OF MATERIAL PRACTICES IN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Material practices, on the other hand, refer in Proposition 2 to the human agency and interaction 
of which material and objects are used as means and ends (Weber, 1921/1922; in Roth & Wit-
tich, 1978; Blumer, 1969) whether they are physically produced and exchanged or symbolically 
exposed to an audience as artefacts (Malinowski, 1922; Schein, 1990). Material practices only 
refer to one overarching process of production and two different outcomes; exchange or exhibi-
tion. They are thereby strictly related to organisations and institutions and their purpose in soci-
ety is to produce ideas and value in symbolic and physical form.  
Because it may be argued that, for instance, the production of knowledge or services are not 
physical nor material objects, I recognise that intangible products such as these may be hard to 
understand in terms of materials and objects. However, often in the production of knowledge 
and services, materials and objects are used to facilitate these ends (e.g. Woolgar & Latour, 
1986; Bogenschneider & Corbett, 2010) such as computers, paper, machines, human voices, or 
hands, and in this indirect understanding the production of non-tangible ends, materials and ob-
jects do enter the processes and end up in the institutional logics as well.  
The manifestation of values and meaning into materials and material practices can be studied by 
integrating an analysis of cultural artefacts, interviews, and observation studies in organisations, 
as Schein argued. However, for material practices to be considered as part of a logic, it is neces-
sary that these patterns of material practices are to a certain degree dominant in the form of 
shared values and beliefs, which are symbolised through the material practices as manifestations 
in order to make meaning out of everyday life. In this way the logics are collective and shared at 
least with someone else and they are not just going on inside these collective people’s heads to 
be termed a ’logic’; they also have to be enacted into cultural manifestations that carry a sym-
bolic measure that this is what these people understand when they talk about it. It is always im-
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portant to remember that a logic is not the same as a ‘true story’ or evidence that this is ‘really 
what is going on’ in an institution.  
To evaluate the role of materials and material practices in institutional logics it is important to 
recall Friedland & Alford’s (1991, p. 248) wording that institutional logics are “a set of material 
practices and symbolic constructions, which constitute the [institutional orders’] organizing 
principles and which is available to organisations and individuals to elaborate”. Unlike Thorn-
ton et al.’s (2012, p. 2) reflexion that these principles are used specifically to “organize time and 
space and reproduce [individuals’ and organisations’] lives and experiences”, Friedland & Al-
ford never put these restrictions upon their definitions of institutional logics, but left them open 
to individuals and organisations from which to elaborate new logics. 
In the next section I will provide the methodology for the analysis of my empirical material to 
test the initial validity of my propositions using case studies from the water sector.   
METHODOLOGY
This paper’s empirical material is derived from a cross-geographical qualitative study (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) of 28 water companies located in Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa. Seven companies were chosen in each 
nation with the aim of reaching as broad a sample as possible that was practically feasible. Thus, 
companies from small, medium, and large, and also multinationals are investigated in each na-
tion in order to reach analytical generalisation through maximum variety (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The 
nations, in which the water companies are located, are chosen according to a similar principle of 
maximum variety in terms of their different national contexts, but are unified in terms of adher-
ence to corporate social responsibility investments companies all subsumed under the intergov-
ernmental concept of New Public Management (Mathiasen, 1996).  
However, due to the spread of geographic context, the way the empirical material has been pro-
vided differs. In Denmark I had access to participant observations (Spradley, 1980) in three of 
the seven companies, and conducted 50 taped and transcribed interviews in all seven companies 
(Spradley, 1979). Whereas in the UK, the US, and South Africa, where I did not have access nor 
funding or time to do an ethnographic investigation, I chose to collect archival documents from 
2000 - 2013 that were richly displayed on company and regulators’ websites (Olsen, 2003). 
Since all the empirical material is impossible to display in this paper, I have continuously 
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throughout the findings referred to my former in-depth papers published in academic journals 
should readers want a deeper insight in the concrete cases referred to. 
The water companies’ logic of CSR and their regulators’ logic of NPM is displayed in a con-
structed hybrid table of suggested institutional logics by respectively Friedland & Alford (1991) 
and Thornton et al. (2012). However, this hybrid constellation may only be credited to myself 
and is not derived from either of the authors mentioned. However, the content of this table is 
directly derived from both authors’ referred works and should be evaluated in that context. 
FINDINGS
The logic of corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays a crucial role especially in the Danish 
water sector as a competing logic from the logic of New Public Management (NPM) of ’effi-
ciency and effectiveness’, ’doing more with less’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) and overall politi-
cal incentives to minimise the expenses of companies using public funds.  
Appendix 21: Table Q, page 338, resembles Friedland & Alford’s (1991) and Thornton et al.’s 
(2012) institutional logics151. Some fields are filled in with suggestions for Thornton et al.’s IL 
of respectively profession and corporation based on the empirical findings in this paper152. 
The logic of CSR is displayed as black-framed fields in Appendix 21: Table Q bridging almost 
all the ILs, whereas the logic of NPM goes through the vertical ILs of the market and the state 
respectively.   
We see a pattern of how these two logics both compete (Lauesen, 2011) and coexist at the same 
time. The competition between the state regulators’ logic of NPM versus the water companies’ 
logic of CSR is displayed in the black dotted circles compared with the black chess-fields (CSR) 
under the categories of respectively ’rituals’, ’values’, ’basis of affiliation’, ’basis of obligation’, 
’basis of loyalty/legitimacy’, and ’identity’ (Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming (a) + (b)). 
The logic of CSR is perceived to coexist with the logic of NPM where they overlap. Typically 
these overlaps emerge where both the regulator and the water companies shares the IL of capi-
talism (the market) or where they share the IL of the state (bureaucracy). 
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 as interpreted by Thornton et al. 2012 
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 These fields were not necessarily left blank intentionally by Thornton et al.; they made an attempt to interpret 
Friedland & Alford’s (1991) paper, categorizing the text into different strata, and following from this changed these 
categories and formed their own. Thus – in order to make the merged institutional logics more holistic, I have cho-
sen to fill in these ‘grey fields’ with reference to my own findings in order to provide an analytical basis for how 
and how the logic of CSR traverses the institutional logics. 
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RITUALS 
Thornton et al. (2012) do not mention ‘rituals’ as part of their proposed IL of respectively the 
profession and the corporation. However, in order to juxtapose their ideas with those of Fried-
land & Alford’s (1991), I have made some suggestions of rituals in these IL based upon my 
findings from water companies. The ritual within the IL of corporation it is suggested is similar 
to the IL of capitalism in which the corporation works, namely the ‘signing of a contract’ be-
tween the employer and the employee. In the Danish water sector (Lauesen, 2011) the ‘contrac-
tual signing’ between the municipality as owner of the water company and the management of 
the company typically takes place as a celebration at the annual general meeting, where the rules 
of operation are renegotiated once a year. This ‘general meeting’ is thus suggested to be a ritual 
of the IL of profession, because it is where the shareholders and other representatives of the wa-
ter companies are mandated to vote about the companies’ business plans and suggest changes to 
them. It is at this type of meeting that the board members of a water company are 
(re)appointed153.  
The ‘ritual’ of the state regulator’s IL of state is ’issuance of budgets and plans’, and in Den-
mark, it is the issuing of the Danish water sector’s budgets and plans as a part of their regulating 
role. This IL competes with the water companies’ IL of capitalism, profession, and corporation, 
i.e. their feelings of a right to autonomy. The logic of CSR is manifested according to the IL of 
profession through the ‘general meeting’, and although the provision decided at this annual rit-
ual is done autonomously, the dominance of the regulator’s logic of NPM is apparent since the 
regulation determines what is and what is not legally possible (Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming (a)). 
The material practices underlying this ritual besides the physical ‘signing a contract’ are also the 
material outcome in the form of spending money: 
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 In Denmark every fourth year a municipality election for the city council takes place, and new politicians may 
come to represent the citizens of the municipality on the board of the water company. The citizens of the municipal-
ity are typically the consumers and customers of water companies’ services and are represented by the politicians 
they have elected themselves coming to the board, the customers somehow implicitly being the owners of the com-
pany.
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Manager: “I think that we have spent more than 1 million Danish Kroner in 
wages and besides that we have spent around 0.5 million on mandatory consul-
tancy [auditor expenses]. So I think that the billion that the Competition Au-
thority claims that the water companies have to save annually is already spent 
on bureaucracy. If I was just told to save 20 percent on consumer prices or ex-
penditure I could have used the same amount of time [and money] to solve this 
problem during this very same year.” (Interview A, March 2011, my transla-
tion). 
VALUES 
The value of the IL of corporation it is suggested is almost similar to the IL of capitalism, but 
instead of ‘commodification of human activity’ it is suggested that how ‘to organise human ac-
tivity into productivity’ takes its place in order to fulfil the IL of capitalism. The value of the 
profession is thus suggested to be the ‘pooling of professional knowledge’, which is necessary 
for both the IL of profession and corporation consisting of professional employees (Lauesen, 
2012, forthcoming (b)). Danish water companies negotiate through their logic of CSR with mul-
tiple stakeholders with very different logics in order to live up to their constitutional obligations 
of serving the public in the broadest sense based on their owner’s IL of democracy (community) 
and its value of ‘community pressure for popular control over human activity’ (Lauesen, 2012). 
These values are similarly found in the institutional logic of religion of how to morally conduct 
its activities in respect of other stakeholders (e.g. Meyer et al., 2013; Lauesen, forthcoming (c)).  
The value of the state regulator’s IL of the state is ’rationalisation and regulation of human ac-
tivity’. Neither of the aforementioned institutional logics conflict with the logic of CSR nor with 
the logic of NPM, because these two institutions are located in different institutional spheres. 
From my interviews I understood the water companies’ need for creating symbols to construct 
their logic of CSR and how that conflicted with the regulator’s need to rationalise and regulate 
in terms of his logic of NPM. These two objectives do not match mainly because the logic of 
NPM is based on the myth of ‘doing more with less’154. However, this objective does not neces-
sarily conflict with the logic of CSR. In some cases it is possible to do things better both for so-
ciety at large and for the company in question by doing things more smartly and investing in for 
instance energy reducing technologies or green energy products and perhaps saving money in 
the long run: 
                                                
154
 creation of more value with less money 
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A former officer in the Ministry of the Environment: “We were always very 
careful about writing that you can save a billion per year [by making the water 
sector more efficient], but that is not the same as saying that water prices will 
decline! It will only get cheaper than it would have been otherwise! We get 
more out of the same money! Or out of the money allocated.” (Interview B, Oc-
tober 2011, my translation).    
The difference and conflict occurs because the mainly held belief among managers of water 
companies is that to enact CSR they must invest more money here and now in order to achieve 
better quality and potential savings in the long run. The material practices bound to these values 
are exemplified in the quotes below as reductions in emissions due to the investments in tech-
nologies to mitigate climate change: 
Project manager: “The low-hanging fruits are already picked. The first 25 per-
cent of reduction of CO2 emission was easy to do by buying smart technologies. 
Now, the next 5 percent we need to do this year is not that easy. I don’t think 
we will make it this year.” (Interview D, November 2012, my translation). 
BASICS OF AFFILIATION 
The basis of affiliation of respectively Thornton et al.’s IL of profession and corporation is sug-
gested to be the ‘membership’ of each institution155 (Lauesen, 2011). The basis of affiliation for 
the logic of CSR crosses the boundaries of four different institutional logics. First, the IL of 
capitalism since CSR is voluntary and market driven156, which furthermore suggests the IL of 
the state. Citizens have a right to be heard, which is part of the IL of democracy, and they are 
often symbolised as a ‘nuclear family’ - an ideal consumer particularly displayed in pictures in 
corporate reports and webpages (Lauesen, forthcoming (a) + (c)). 
The basis of affiliation of the state regulator’s IL of the state is similar to ’legal and bureaucratic 
hierarchies’. The IL of capitalism, which is shared among the water companies and their regula-
tor, is here divided in two competing logics, since the water companies’ interest is that the ’mar-
ket is free and unbounded’ whereas the regulator’s logic according to the actual situation is that 
the market can only be simulated. When a natural monopoly operates in a market without real 
competition, it is not free and unbounded.  
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 for instance of ‘profession unions’ and of ‘corporations’ through the employment and contract signing between 
employer and employee 
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 although in the UK some legal, mandatory, environmental sustainability plans are conducted by the water com-
panies and evaluated by the state regulator (ref paper #3) 
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The logic of CSR cut across the water companies’ IL of capitalism seeing the market as free and 
unbounded and the IL of the state seen as ’legal and bureaucratic hierarchies’ in all other in-
stances than the IL of capitalism. The water companies in Denmark claim that this is taken care 
of through the cost-recovery principle, since they cannot make profits, through the IL of democ-
racy where they exercise  ’citizen participation’, and through the IL of the ‘family’ in the com-
pany working as a service provider for a ’community of individuals’. The logic of CSR largely 
frames the agreement between the regulator and the water companies’ logics apart from the 
regulation of the market. See the examples below in interview quotes about the material prac-
tices of earning money: 
Manager: “Originally, the idea was that the regulators should not interfere in 
the environmental and service objectives, which in turn were decided at the ap-
propriate places, and it could be in a municipality or the Board [of the water 
company] or the State [e.g. the Ministry of Environment]. Thus the regulators 
should not bother but take this on board. The idea was not that we should cut 
down on our environmental and service investments. [The manager is reading 
from the text of the Water Sector Act, which he has right in front of him]: ’The 
law will help to ensure a healthy water supply with a sound environmental 
quality, which takes account of the security of supply and nature andis oper-
ated in an efficient manner that is transparent to the consumer’. As it works 
now the administration of the law goes against every single word in this text!” 
(Interview B, October 2011, my translation). 
Regulator: “Water is indeed a natural monopoly, and the politicians have  [in 
Denmark] refused to fully privatise it and make it profitable. Our groundwater 
must be a shared good and not given over to profit making. But the cost recov-
ery principle alone is not enough as a control.” (Interview G, August 2011, my 
translation). 
Former officer in the Ministry of the Environment: “It was the Competition Au-
thority [the regulator] itself, which launched the Competition Report in 2003. 
As I recall, it was not company segregation, which was the ’mantra’; the focus 
was on efficiency and effectiveness so if every company was as good as the 
best, what could we then save on financially? For example, the Technology 
Fund, to which water companies can apply for money for CSR related invest-
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ments; the Ministry of Finance would NEVER accept that we said that now we 
offer 20 million to this fund, but the consequence is that the water prices should 
rise some insignificant amount - but in principle – such a rise would contradict 
the former government’s policy about tax and duty freezes. The only way you 
could get this fund through would be by taking the money from efficiency im-
provements!” (Interview B, October 2011, my translation). 
BASICS OF OBLIGATION 
The basis of obligation of the IL of democracy is suggested as resembling the logic of the state: 
to ‘convert issues to political consensus’. This is very relevant for the Danish water companies, 
which are hybrids of private and public organisations determined by the political consensus of 
the City Hall (Lauesen, 2011; forthcoming (a), (b), and (c)). Political consensus about various 
CSR issues is, not only in Denmark, but also in the UK, the US, and in South Africa respec-
tively, driving water companies to invest in certain CSR related issues, which are demanded and 
politically derived, especially concerning the pending issue of mitigating climate change.  
Whether these political demands come from municipal climate plans as seen in Denmark, the 
regulator’s economic incentives for UK water companies to get deductions in the price cap by 
investing in green energy157, or the non-economic regulator of the environment as is the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency in the US, whose Sustainability Plan158 has been adopted by sev-
eral water companies for mere image management, the political demands are at least discur-
sively found in CSR reporting and translated into real investments, which is explicitly found in 
Denmark (Lauesen, forthcoming (c)).  
However, some CSR investments may also be unsuccessful especially for water companies in 
Denmark due to obstacles because of state regulation and the price cap calculations, i.e. the 
maximum price allowable for water. Some Danish water companies point out how their material 
practices in investments in afforestation were not credited deductions in their price cap. How-
ever, they have all chosen to continue this investment, because they were not close to the upper 
price limit. On the other hand, they fear that future investments in CSR-related issues will be 
obscured by economic regulation that will not match societal and environmental investments 
(Lauesen, forthcoming (a)).  
                                                
157
 see www.ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/    
158
 see http://www.epa.gov/sustainability/  
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The basis of obligation for the water companies’ IL of profession is suggested to be to ‘convert 
knowledge into field practice’. For the IL of corporation it is suggested to be to convert ‘labour 
into products and services’. Case studies of material practices such as pipeline installations have 
shown how much leadership it takes for project managers to engage multiple workers and other 
stakeholders in completing projects designed to improve the reduction of CO2 (Lauesen, forth-
coming (d)).  
To ‘convert knowledge into field practice’ requires a special focus on how the company through 
its actions can become more sustainable by enlisting all members of the organisation for this 
purpose. This work, alongside the former discussion of the regulation of the price caps, is an 
example of how the logic of CSR is linked not only to field practices but to four different insti-
tutional logics: the IL of capitalism converting human activity (service) into a material, mone-
tary price; the IL of religion in terms of considering moral issues in material terms such as creat-
ing clean water delivery and non-polluted environments; and the IL of profession as professional 
expertise, which is needed to convert these principles into the IL of corporation to form labour 
practices, products, and services from it. 
The basis of obligation for the state regulator’s IL of the state is to ’convert diverse individual 
issues into consensus’. The conflict between this IL the water companies’ is similar to a typical 
conflict of equality versus individual concerns, which is best illustrated through an example: 
Regulator: “Some 320 water companies have to be treated individually. The 
political expectation was that our evaluations of them would be highly uniform 
and rigorous decisions would be taken, based on an assessment of a principle. 
They had an expectation that it would be very much the same and it has to be 
proven that this is not here! Environmentally these companies are VERY differ-
ent! And that is probably one of the biggest challenges we have seen in relation 
to environmental and service objectives, which is a unique factor in the price 
cap to be calculated! Municipalities have the right to decide their very own ob-
jectives through their water and wastewater plans. There are as many goals as 
there are municipalities. We cannot handle so many environmental and service 
objectives. We can ONLY handle the uniform objectives! And it is the politi-
cians who must add rules for us to accept environmental and service objectives. 
Before that happens, we cannot regulate them. Virtually none have been ap-
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proved because we did not know what to approve, so the water companies are 
obviously very unhappy with this.” (Interview G, August 2011, my translation). 
BASIS OF LOYALTY/LEGITIMACY 
The basis of loyalty/legitimacy differs from nation to nation (Lauesen, forthcoming (a) and (c)) 
as to whether the water company is owned by private stockholders (the IL of capitalism through 
loyalty to a ‘share price’) or by the local community (the IL of democracy (community) through 
loyalty to ‘unity of will/belief in trust and reciprocity’). In both instances CSR is legitimated 
further by the IL of profession, i.e. loyalty to the personal expertise of the employees, and by the 
IL of corporation, i.e. loyalty to the market position of the company. Despite these material eco-
nomic incentives, water companies159 compete for legitimacy and positive reputations among 
their stakeholders. In Denmark this is especially clear according to how managers refer to their 
own company’s CSR accomplishments and how they either criticise or praise what other com-
panies have achieved:  
Manager: “We use this GRI [Global Initiative Reporting] thing, and something 
else in our certification system [ISO 14001, 50001, 22000 and OHSAS 18001], 
and now we have developed a project of a new integrated, holistic management 
system trying to look ALL the way around sustainability in all corners of our 
company. We begin with 240 indicators that give a description of the entire 
company! It's awesome! If you look around at my colleagues and see what they 
do with CSR, then you will say: Jesus, that is a LONG path for them to travel! 
Many haven’t even started of thinking about sustainability yet! In fact, I think it 
is only X company, and a few others who have even started thinking about it 
[reporting upon their impact upon society and sustainability], and if you see 
X’s report; You will think Jesus, is that really all? But what Y is doing is a pio-
neering job! They have moved into what we call ’dimension 3’ [including the 
supply chain in their reporting]. We are not that ambitious yet. We think it is 
more than enough to report upon our own impact inside our own ’fence’.” (In-
terview B, October 2011, my translation). 
The basis of loyalty/legitimacy for the state regulator’s IL of the state is democratic participa-
tion. The core difference between the logic of NPM and the logic of CSR is here reversed com-
pared to the former basis of obligation. The state bureaucracy (the regulators) forms its loyalty 
                                                
159
 from Denmark, the UK, the US and South Africa 
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and legitimacy based on political decisions160, which are translated into law and regulation. The 
water companies (especially in Denmark) do the same, but not towards the same politicians 
elected, since they are owned by the local municipality and loyal to the local politicians of the 
city, which again have different views as to which obligations each water company should meet. 
In this sense the communities, which both parties are loyal to, are different161 (Lauesen, forth-
coming (b)).  
AUTHORITY 
The authority to run a water company is granted by its owners and authorities according to four 
different institutional logics: capitalism, the state, democracy, and the corporation. It is the 
‘shareholders’ and ‘bureaucracies’ in the state or local government authorities, who will secure 
the ‘community values and ideology’ respectively of society at large and the ‘board of directors’ 
of the company, who have certain and vital independent rights to manage the water company in 
question. The authority within water companies according to the logic of CSR follows the three 
trajectories: the economic, legal, and ethical concerns (see Schwartz & Carroll, 2003). However, 
in Denmark due to the cost-recovery principle it is not allowed for water companies to spend 
consumers’ money on the external funding of projects irrelevant to the core area of the business: 
to deliver drinking water and transport and purify wastewater.  
The economy for all water companies (and their boards) despite material economic purposes–
whether they are based on profit making or non-profit making–is relevant for efficiency making 
(Lauesen, forthcoming (a) and (c)). However, in the cost-recovery companies, the focus is not to 
create as much surplus as possible, but to get as much for the money in hand or raise the price 
cap as much as possible in order to have as much economic freedom as possible. In the NPM 
literature it is also called ‘budget maximisation’ (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011). For the regula-
tors the reverse–lowering the price cap for the sake of the costs of the citizens in society–is the 
purpose. This is where the logic of CSR and the logic of NPM collide. Business ethics requires 
all parties to secure the ‘community values and ideology’ of society at large: the purpose thus is 
different. The water companies’ logic of CSR is to legitimise themselves as ‘doing good’ for 
society in terms of using different material practices for environmental protection and the miti-
gation of climate change, whereas for the regulators the logic of NPM is based on the ethics of 
                                                
160
 which are ideally grounded in democratic participation by citizen voters in parliament elections and with subse-
quent political consensus 
161
 the regulators are loyal to the broader society (that of the state) and the water companies are loyal to the local 
society (that of the municipality)
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societal concerns for the citizens’ expenditure. A good example is a small story to show how 
these ideas are referred to through material practices (Lauesen, 2012): 
A local negotiation took place between the managers of a project and both mu-
nicipal and state environmental authorities in order to resolve the problem of 
installing a pipeline of 3 metre in diameter under a protected wood, that was 
estimated to be more than 300 years old. The constructer hired by the water 
company wanted to install the pipeline by cutting down parts of the forest and 
replanting it afterwards, because this was the cheapest solution.  
First, the managers of the water company tried to convince its environmental 
authorities that this was the only possible solution to solve the environmental 
problem of handling continuous sewage overflow in a suburb of the city. This 
problem had been salient for more than 40 years, and the problem had been in-
tensified because of increased stormy weather due to the climate change in the 
area.  
The authorities were not pleased with this solution, but obeyed the political 
statement by the City Council that this solution was the only possible. Then an 
NGO complained about the authorities granting the permission to cut parts of 
the forest down. To avoid further proceedings before the Tribunal, the prolon-
gation of the project, and the increased downtime costs for the developer (the 
water company) to the constructor due to their contract, the water company 
chose to redesign the project into a tunnelling project, which made the entire 
project costs rise from 166 million DKK to approximately 185 million DKK. 
This new and more expensive, but forest protecting solution went into the City 
Board and was accepted in order to please more stakeholders and especially 
the concerned authorities and the NGOs. (Archival document collection from 
2003-2008 from Company B). 
IDENTITY 
The identity of water companies is closely connected to the logic of CSR, which is attached to 
the IL of democracy through ‘emotional connections and satisfactions’ by doing good for soci-
ety and the IL of profession through the ‘quality of craft and personal (or company) reputation’ 
linked to the legitimacy of ethics and morality converted into material practices. The Danish 
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water companies are being refashioned in a departure from the old municipality identity with the 
IL of the state (bureaucracy) and moving with quasi-privatisation towards the IL of capitalism 
(market) and the IL of corporation (Lauesen, 2011). These former public officials had not for-
gotten their former IL of the state (bureaucracy), but now it had moved more into the IL of the 
profession, where the social responsibility towards the citizens, they still served, was more or 
less decided and evaluated by peers in the water companies. The local authorities of a Danish 
water company explains this shift (Lauesen, forthcoming (b)): 
Municipal authority officer: “Many are confused about our new roles. Before 
citizens and professionals could just call certain people in the supply section, 
but they are not allowed to contact them anymore; they should contact us in the 
local authority. I too have had to find my own role in the authority anew from 
nowhere. ALL knowledge has been transferred to the new water company. And 
that is hard for me to cope with. We had to figure out everything from scratch! 
But it has also been difficult for the water company's people to find their new 
role. Because you were used to answer all kinds of questions from the citizens, 
and now they have to realise that the authoritative role is not theirs anymore! 
They need to let it go! After the first 2 years it is now becoming much, much 
better. But we have also had our quarrels and I have had to say to my former 
colleagues: ‘You cannot comment on your projects to the citizens! You have to 
refer to me and only me!’ And then they excuse themselves and say: ‘But I just 
wanna .... and I can ...’ etc. Yes. And it's not because they cannot help the citi-
zens out there, but they typically forget some things now that they are not au-
thorities anymore! They forget that there is something more that should have 
been said! So there I had to ....... yes, to be a little on edge sometimes. But I 
think that this barrier is over now. We have all found our new roles by collabo-
rating really closely. And that is really good.” (Interview I, March 2012, my 
translation).  
The identity of the water companies’ through their logic of CSR is also related to the IL of relig-
ion through the execution of ‘compassion and charity’, which is part of the Christian, Protestant 
idea of ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ (see Lauesen, forthcoming (c)). The identity of the 
state regulator’s IL of the state is ’social and economic class’, i. e. the Weberian idea that every-
body in society should be treated equally regardless of social and economic class (Weber, 
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1922/1978). The identity of the water companies versus their regulators and authorities have 
split their roles, since in the water companies’ IL of corporation the ’equality’ is directed to-
wards the members of the organisation and their personal expertise, quality of craft, and per-
sonal and company reputation.  
However, the logic of CSR is also located in the IL of democracy, which goes beyond the com-
pany itself and into the realm of society at large to bond with stakeholders in emotional connec-
tion and (mutual) satisfaction. This, however, should not conflict with the identity of the regula-
tor ultimately. It only does so because of the differences in foci of the logic of NPM versus the 
logic of CSR. Since the regulators identify themselves through material practices related to 
’economic equality’ and the water companies through material practices of ’environmental 
equality’, these two logics conflict due to the differences in material practices.  
Regulator: “We are 20 people to handle over 320 water companies. In the UK - 
OFWAT – they are 200 people to regulate approximately 6 water companies - 
large private companies that are allowed to make profit on water! So OFFWAT 
has much more resources but also a much tougher regulation if you ask me. 
There, we can talk about a real market! Whether we are there in 5 years, which 
I do not think will happen, but I can certainly see the benefits of a fully priva-
tised water sector. These water companies can do something that our compa-
nies cannot do today. For instance in the municipality of X – in a report from 
the Danish Industry – this municipality has saved a lot of money by allowing 
private companies to run parts of the water services. I would hope for more of 
this in Denmark. But as I said, we require max 5 percent in efficiency making 
at this time. And the things that come from economies of scale should not pun-
ish other smaller companies. That is built into the system! But I think we will 
see much more of mergers and collaborations between companies, and this is 
indeed a good way of efficiency making. However, to translate environmental 
efforts into economic terms is VERY difficult! It is also why it is such a BIG 
problem that requires something to be done about the Water Sector Law! For 
example, if a water company collaborates with 4 others to share a catchment 
area – this efficiency making should be shared among them as well as environ-
mental parameters and deductions. This will not be as easy as it is today! Not 
at all. It is not easily transferable to the economy and into the individual price 
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caps! The system is certainly not perfect yet!” (Interview G, August 2011, my 
translation). 
NORMS 
The norms upheld by water companies in their logic of CSR are those of the IL of capitalism as 
market driven ‘self-interest’ either for profit making or budget maximisation. This is especially 
true in cases of companies driven by the cost-recovery principle (e.g. in Denmark and partly in 
South Africa), but this logic is also seen among the privatised water companies combined with 
the IL of the state through ‘citizenship (of the company) in the nation’. We find an example of 
how the norms of the water companies’ logic of CSR are based in the IL of capitalism driven by 
‘self-interests’ (Lauesen, forthcoming (a)). Managers of Danish water companies have been 
deeply engaged in policymaking through a collective discourse provided by their branch organi-
sations, whose material practices were to bring their complaints to court hoping for changes to 
be made in order for the water companies to receive financial rewards in the form of monetary 
price cap deductions for their environmental investments:  
“[The Price Cap] constrains our environmental and sustainability duties to 
manage and secure a fresh and healthy water resource for future generations!” 
(Interview B March 2011, my translation).  
All complaints were denied by the regulators due to their IL of ‘citizenship in the nation’ and 
political incentives of ‘equality’ and ‘enhancement of welfare’ at the lowest possible cost for the 
citizens. In the same IL, the norms of ‘citizenship of the nation’ held by the Danish water com-
panies prioritise ‘citizenship’ into their material practices of protecting the environment, because 
climate change has made a huge impact on their business. This is costly to mitigate, and these 
costs are to be collected from the customers eventually. This is a similar issue in other nations, 
that have a more privatised water sector, for instance in the UK (Lauesen, forthcoming (c)):  
“Under the industry's regulatory regime, the revenues raised from our custom-
ers do not fully meet the cash needs of the business to deliver ongoing invest-
ment” (Welsh Water, CSR report 2006/7, p. 17). 
The norm of the state regulator’s IL of the state is ’citizenship in nation’. This IL competes with 
the water companies’ IL of capitalism. However, the logic of CSR in the water companies 
crosses over into their IL of capitalism through the norm of ’selfinterest’ by creating a business 
case out of CSR, and at the same time the IL of the state and its norm ’citizenship in the nation’ 
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is used by them to do good for society at large. Where the logic of CSR competes with the logic 
of NPM is in the regulator’s responses to the water companies’ IL of capitalism in their power-
ful regulation of the ’interest of the bureaucracy’. Due to the monopoly status of the water com-
panies especially in Denmark, the regulators fear that their economic incentives for political 
promises will not be successful unless the bureaucracy, which obviously contradicts the volun-
tariness of the idea of CSR and contradicts the creation of a business case out of CSR ultimately, 
controls it.  
The business case for CSR would in this highly regulated water sector depend upon how good a 
chance the water companies have to spend their savings on efficiency making regarding other 
material investments. In the meantime (see the end of the study) this issue has been renegotiated 
in Denmark, and water companies are now being allowed to reinvest their saved operational 
expenditure from climate related investment projects in further CSR investments in new climate 
related projects (VandNyt, June 12, 2013162). This opportunity has not been possible to discuss 
in this study because of the lack of evidence of the outcome of it, which we haven’t seen yet, but 
it is a promise that could bring the competing logics of CSR and NPM into coexistence. 
ATTENTION 
The attention is directed towards the IL of capitalism in the ‘status in the market’ for market 
driven water companies in direct competition with other water companies. For water companies, 
that are cost-recovery driven, the attention is directed towards the IL of corporation as a ‘status 
in the industrial sector hierarchy’ with which they are indirectly in competition through national 
benchmarking and price caps. Both for-profit and cost-recovery companies have at the same 
time directed their attention towards the IL of the state in terms of the ‘status of interest groups’ 
or stakeholders, that can impact or are impacted generally by the companies taking the role 
given to them by the state to distribute a natural material good for everybody in society. The 
water companies’ attentions are directed to their statuses in the market and the industrial sector 
respectively (Lauesen, forthcoming (a)). One manager of a small Danish water company says:  
Manager: “It's utopian to think that we as a single company without having our 
entire recharge area within the municipality borders can do anything worth-
while alone. There's no point in protecting groundwater recharge in a third of 
                                                
162
 see http://www.kfst.dk/nyt-nyhedsbrev/vandnyt/vandnyt-medfinansiering-af-klimatilpasningsprojekter-i-2014-
indsendelse-af-opl-den-ekstraordinaere-ansoegningsrunde-for-prisloftet-for-2013-medfinansiering-af-
klimatilpasningsproj-tidsfrist-for-ansoegning-om-huslejeomk-som-saerligt-forhold/ (in Danish). Retrieved June 
28th 2013. 
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the area, if it is contaminated with pesticides in the other two thirds. We'll have 
to seek new alliances. Then, we could compete and benchmark within municipal 
boundaries when the water reached the distribution network.” (Interview C, 
April 2011, my translation).  
Project managers of Danish water companies negotiate with multiple stakeholders, prioritising 
those, who possess most legitimacy, urgency, and power at a given point in time and space 
(Mitchell et al., 1997; Wartick & Wood, 1998; Lauesen, 2011, forthcoming (a) + (c)). Typically 
these salient stakeholders are authorities and landowners of different kinds related to a construc-
tion project, but the point is that any kind of stakeholder can become the most salient according 
to the severity of the issues they have as claims on the water companies (Lauesen, 2012; Cohen 
et al., 1972). Similarly we found that Danish managers compete for legitimacy and loyalty with 
their industrial peers in terms of enacting CSR. The attention of the regulators is similarly the 
‘status of interest groups’, and in this respect they often coexist with attention for the water 
companies’.  
STRATEGY 
The strategy of water companies regardless of type is directed to the IL of capitalism: to in-
crease efficiency and (eventually) profit (or budget). At the same time it is also directed towards 
the IL of the state to ‘increase the community good’ to all citizens in society, regarding which 
the material distribution of water is a crucial part. In order to manage these obligations, their IL 
of profession through ‘personal (or company) reputation’ is at play also to avoid (further) regu-
lation from the state as to how the water companies manage this task provided by the state. This 
combination of the logic of NPM connected to or underlying the logic of CSR is manifested in 
various texts of water companies, and especially in their CSR reports, (Lauesen, forthcoming (a) 
+ (c)).  
The keyword ‘efficiency’ is used in both the economic and sustainability discourses within the 
water companies’ CSR reports from Denmark, the UK, the US and South Africa (Lauesen, 
forthcoming (a) + (c)). Some reports, however–especially in Denmark and the UK–hybridise a 
motive of economy into a motive of sustainability either by claiming, for instance, that the 
state’s price cap regulation hinders sustainable investments or supporting the claim that effi-
ciency is possible both in improving the economy and the sustainability of the company by ‘do-
ing more with less’.  
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The emphasis in CSR reporting is concentrated on the management’s sustainability motive, 
which in this report format is perceived as positive and legitimate. In contrast to a juxtaposition 
of for instance corporate financial performance reports of the same water companies, the eco-
nomic motive is highlighted as positive and legitimate. However, the economy motive is de-
emphasised in most CSR reports. In spite of this apparent divide between the logic of NPM and 
the logic of CSR both logics are present in the everyday life of the water companies. Although 
economy is de-emphasised in CSR reporting, it does not mean that this is not at play when these 
companies enact their logic of CSR in their material practices. Economy is intertwined in mana-
gerial decision making regarding which CSR-related decisions to take. The strategy of the regu-
lator’s is to ‘increase the community good’ to all citizens in society, through the material distri-
bution of water at a reasonable price, and in this respect the logic of NPM coexists with the logic 
of CSR so long as it is negotiated taken into consideration the water companies’ other obliga-
tions such as their environmental obligations. 
INFORMAL CONTROL 
The informal control mechanisms are in the water sector generally provided by the IL of capital-
ism through ‘industry analysts’ that are typically assembled in branch organisations, creating 
and having a ‘voice’ for the entire sector in question, for instance against (further) regulation of 
the freedom of the companies to act in the market. Locally, for all in the water sector, the IL of 
the state is also at play as ‘backroom politics’, which is vital for the single organisation as well 
as for the entire sector in terms of municipal or state regulation, which water companies try to 
influence. The Danish branch organisations of the water companies negotiate with the state 
regulator in order to dampen the economic pressure upon their members (Lauesen, 2011). The 
IL of democracy is played out through the ‘visibility of actions’ done as material symbolisation 
of social responsibility, which is also important for the customers and other stakeholders in the 
water companies as a kind of legitimising informal control. Special professional ‘heroes’ within 
the IL of ‘professions’ are ‘celebrated in the community’ if a company takes a certain step to 
invest in CSR-related investments such as materials such as wind turbines, solar cells, an elec-
tric car park, or other such ‘green-tech’ commodities. This kind of invisible competition serves 
too as a kind of legitimising informal control of who is ‘good’ and who is ‘less good’. An exam-
ple of how this informal control is executed is seen in the following quote: 
Manager: “We've bought those Toyota Prius – an entire carpark of them. If you 
look with cradle to cradle lenses at the production of these cars it becomes very 
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much more stressful for the Earth than if you had bought a small diesel car. 
Because they have so many "exciting" metals and rubbish components, which 
are shipped from “Tierra del Fuego” or “Alaska” and all sorts of far away 
places - all the way to Japan, where they are assembling the cars, and out 
comes a product that is relatively energy efficient in daily operations, but the 
story before was slightly more complex. That’s what we were told by our col-
leagues in the sector when we bought our car park!” (Interview B, October 
2011, my translation). 
The informal control of the regulator is also ‘backroom politics’, however, in the respect that the 
regulators authorising the water companies, engage in backroom politics that may compete with 
the interests of the water companies and their striving for autonomy. 
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 
The economic system is symbolised by the ILs of capitalism, the state, and corporation framed 
in terms of concepts such as ‘the market’, ‘welfare’, and ‘managerial capitalism’ as coexisting 
ILs on the symbolic level, but competing on the concrete level of the hard regulation of prices 
based on the idea that ‘water should ideally be free’. No water company would ever say that 
they work to increase the price of water for consumers. On the other hand every water company 
confirms that CSR investments are expensive here and now, and although they do invest in them 
for the sake of the long-term effects of mitigating climate change and deadly viruses such as 
HIV, they still complain about the costs of these investments especially in relation to the regula-
tors’ economic constraints. If the ideal that ‘water should be free’ were the overarching logic for 
all water companies, they would not have much problem with their regulators, which is what 
they aim to secure through price cap mechanisms.  
At the same time there are multiple other concerns related to the logic of CSR in the water com-
panies, and most of them are related to their intensified and long-term investments. Danish wa-
ter companies have among the highest price levels of water, but the lowest leakage percentage. 
This means that the pipeline network is good in terms of how little it leaks (Lauesen, forthcom-
ing (a)). The Danish water companies have for several decades invested multiple sums in updat-
ing their pipeline network in order to secure the cleanest water for consumers in relation to 
health and environmental issues (Lauesen, forthcoming (c)). This means that the regulator’s 
logic of NPM that ‘water should be free’ and the material economic practices related to this 
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ideal are not in harmony but compete with material practices around the logic of CSR, which 
states that water should be as uncontaminated and healthy as possible. 
ROOT METAPHORS 
Several root metaphors are combined in the logic of CSR involving the ILs of capitalism, the 
state, democracy, profession, and corporation, such as ‘transactions on the market’, ‘redistribu-
tion mechanisms’ of a natural good to the public (common boundary), ‘networks of profession-
als’ influencing each other, the ‘corporation as a hierarchy’ structured more or less ‘organically’ 
in order to meet the demands of the market, or ‘regulation’ in order to survive as organisation 
and market agent based on the premise that they distribute a relatively clean and ‘green’ product 
compared to other industries (Lauesen, 2012). A clear tendency in these root metaphors is the 
balancing of the aforementioned ideal of the logic of NPM as free and plentiful water distribu-
tion with the ideal of the logic of CSR in creating healthy water and purification of 
(waste)water.  
CONCLUSION
In the above juxtaposition of the institutional logics underlying respectively the water compa-
nies’ logic of CSR and their regulator’s logic of NPM163 I have through the above examples 
tried to show how these ideas and their inherent competition and coexistence are grounded in 
materials and material practices and the consequences these practices have on society. The 
above studies show how materials and objects are carriers of symbols of ideas and in themselves 
are physical manifestations of values intrinsic to different institutional logics. It also shows how 
material practices consist of the creation and/or manifestation of ideas and values into materials 
and objects and their reciprocal exchange or symbolic exhibition in social interaction is 
grounded in different institutional logics whether they compete or coexist with other stake-
holders’ logics. The study of the role of materials and material practices within institutional lo-
gics, however, needs many more in-depth studies from different institutions to evaluate the va-
lidity of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Historical and longitudinal studies are recommended 
to test these propositions in sectors other than the water sector to see if the generalisation of 
these propositions is possible. However, this in-depth study of the water sector reveals concrete 
suggestions for underpinning how materials and material practices are inherent and grounded in 
institutional logics and how they may compete and coexist with the institutional logics of their 
regulator. 
                                                
163
 derived from New Public Management literature (e.g. Christensen & Lægreid, 2011) 
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APPENDIX 2: TABLE B 
CSR terms Denmark164 United Kingdom165 United States166 South Africa167
Sustainability in 
freshwater delivery 
Preservation of the  
groundwater aqui-
fers for making 
them sustainable for 
future generations. 
Create a sustainable 
cycle that allows us 
to meet our needs 
for water and sewer-
age today while 
enabling future 
generations to meet 
their own needs.  
Finding solutions to 
maintain adequate 
levels of water sup-
plies for commu-
nities 
Mitigate drought 
and strive for a 
secure, safe, and 
sufficient water 
supply for all peo-
ple. 
Sustainable waste 
water handling 
Use the best and 
least energy con-
suming technology 
to transport and treat 
wastewater. 
Increase pumping 
efficiency to mini-
mise the carbon 
footprint. Reuse 
treated wastewater 
for irrigation etc. 
Reduce spills and 
pollution from 
wastewater to pre-
serve water bodies 
and human health. 
Sustainable drain-
age/sewerage 
Use a combination 
of storm water ba-
sins and natural 
drainage of rainwa-
ter 
Use natural drainage 
from rainwater sepa-
rated from sewer-
age. 
Engage in policy 
making for removal 
of the “price cap” 
that hinders private 
investment in muni-
cipal infrastructure. 
Expand drainage as 
well as the water 
distribution system 
to cover more areas 
and supply more 
people in South 
Africa. 
Sustainable sludge 
handling 
Biogas production 
and ecological use 
of sludge as fertiliz-
er on farmlands 
Safe, reliable, effi-
cient and affordable 
sludge service inclu-
ding recycling and 
Reuse sludge for 
fertilising farmlands. 
Not explicitly stated. 
                                                
164
 Source: Interviews conducted by the author with managers of water companies in Denmark March 2011 – Feb-
ruary 2012. CSR and annual reports (in Danish) from Københavns Energi 
(http://www.ke.dk/portal/page/portal/Miljoe_klima/Det_goer_vi/Miljoet_p%C3%A5_dagsordnen/Miljoeberetning?
page=823 ), Aarhus Vand 
(http://aarhusvand.dk/Global/Om%20os/%C3%85rsrapport/AarhusVand_%C3%85rsrapport2011-web.pdf ), VCS 
Denmark (http://www.vandcenter.dk/Viden/Publikationer.aspx, Ansvarlighedsrapport 2011), Roskilde Forsyning 
(http://roskilde-forsyning.dk/media/169542/rosforscsr_ver03_web.pdf ) and Vand and Affald, Svendborg 
(http://vandogaffald.dk/om-os/planer-og-gr%C3%B8nne-regnskaber, Grønt regnskab 2011 (3 reports)). All re-
trieved August 2012. 
165
 OFWAT (http://ofwat.gov.uk/sustainability/ ) and from CSR  and annual reports from Thames Water 
(http://www.thameswater.co.uk/about-us/9568.htm ), Severn Trent Water 
(http://www.stwater.co.uk/upload/pdf/ST_CR_summary_2010.pdf ), 
http://www.dwrcymru.com/_library/leaflets_publications_english/our_sustainable_future/our_sustainable_future.pd
f ) and Wessex Water (http://www.wessexwater.co.uk/sustainability/sustainability/default.aspx ), retrieved August 
2012.  
166
 EPA (2012) FY Strategic Plan (http://water.epa.gov/aboutow/goals_objectives/goals.cfm ) and CSR  and annual 
reports from United Water (http://www.unitedwater.com/eBooks/DI_Report_2011/DI_report_2011.html ), Ameri-
can Water (http://amwater.com/corporate-responsibility/corporate-responsibility reporting/index.html ), and Aqua 
America (http://ir.aquaamerica.com/ , Sustainability Report). All retrieved August 2012. 
167
 DWA (2012) Blue Drop Report, DWA (2011) Green Drop Report, 
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/RSP.aspx, retrieved August 2012. Also derived from Annual reports from 
Rand Water (http://www.randwater.co.za/Annual%20Reports/Forms/AllItems.aspx, Annual Report 2011), Umgeni 
Water (http://www.umgeni.co.za/governance/ar.asp, Annual Report 2010/11), Johannesburg Water 
(http://www.johannesburgwater.co.za/ , Final Approved Annual Report (City Jan 2012)), Bloem Water 
(http://www.bloemwater.co.za/annual_reports.html, 2010/2011 Annual Report) and Amatola Water 
(http://www.amatolawater.co.za/about-us/introduction, Annual Report 2011). All retrieved August 2012 
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CSR terms Denmark164 United Kingdom165 United States166 South Africa167
disposal service 
Climate change Reduce emissions 
from greenhouse 
gases, produce green 
energy, and adapt to 
climate change. 
Mitigate the effect 
of climate change 
and adapt to climate 
change. Enhance 
low-carbon solu-
tions in investments. 
Adapt to climate 
change and mini-
mise gas emissions. 
Invest in low-energy 
technologies to miti-
gate climate change, 
and make plans for 
drought manage-
ment. 
Human Rights and 
Occupational 
health 
Health security in 
the working envi-
ronment; become an 
attractive work-
place; and provide 
education and em-
ployee benefits. 
Create a good work-
life balance, reward 
employees, provide 
education, provide 
flexibility, and pro-
mote diversity in 
employment. 
Our people thrive 
because they under-
stand the importance 
of their work, and 
the impact they have 
on the everyday life 
for millions of peo-
ple. 
Human rights and 
occupational health 
are vital to enhance 
job creation and 
education for the 
local, black popu-
lation. Enhance fe-
male employment. 
Consumer protec-
tion 
Provide the best and 
most secure product 
for the consumers at 
a fair price. Reduce 
leakages to below 
10 percent. 
Deliver safe, relia-
ble, high-quality 
water and sewerage 
services at a fair 
price. Reduce leak-
ages to below 35 
percent.  
Work with commu-
nities to meet water 
needs. Ensure high 
standards of water 
quality at a fair 
price. Reduce leak-
ages. 
Collaborate with 
local customers, 
stakeholders, and 
communities in the 
decision-making 
processes, and meet 
basic human needs,  
promote equitable 
access to water, and 
facilitate social and 
economic develop-
ment. 
CSR in the supply 
chain 
Support green and 
sustainable purcha-
sing. 
(Not specified) (Not specified) Promote local stake-
holders by the 
Broad-Based Black 
Economy. 
Enhancing Nature 
capacity 
Afforestation, wet-
land creation, and 
agricultural agree-
ments for ecological 
farming. 
Enhance natural 
environment and 
biodiversity in af-
forestation, wetlands 
etc. 
Invest and engage in 
biodiversity and 
stewardship pro-
jects. 
Support local com-
munities in nature 
conservation and 
water management. 
Impact upon land 
areas 
Reduce impact upon 
land and urban areas 
as much as possible. 
Reduce disturbance 
of traffic. 
Support wildlife and 
biodiversity preser-
vation; use biodiver-
sity risk mapping 
tools in businesses’ 
decision making. 
Invest and engage in 
biodiversity and 
stewardship pro-
jects. 
Support local com-
munities in nature 
conservation and 
water management. 
Charity Support local com-
munities in nature 
conservation and 
education. One large 
company supports 
water management 
in third world coun-
tries. 
Support local com-
munity and inter-
national funds for 
better water man-
agement, conserva-
tion of nature and 
biodiver-sity and 
education. 
Support local com-
munity in nature 
conservation and 
water management. 
Support local com-
munity in nature 
conservation and 
water management. 
302
CSR terms Denmark164 United Kingdom165 United States166 South Africa167
Economy Non-profit monopo-
lies with a state 
regulated price cap 
system.  
For-profit monopo-
lies with a state 
regulated price cap 
system.  
For-profit mixed 
monopoly and free 
market as well as 
tariff regulation 
varying across 
states168.  
Prevent corruption, 
preserve regulation 
of the cost-recovery 
principle, and re-
duce costs. Free 
basic water pro-
gramme 
TABLE B: CSR DEFINITIONS ACROSS COMPARED NATIONS 
                                                
168
 (Beecher 2009) 
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APPENDIX 4: TABLE D 
New Public 
Management
Denmark169 The UK170 The US171 South Africa172
Year of NPM 
reform
2009 1991 (1989) 1987 1997 
Rationale Realise a saving 
potential esti-
mated in 2003173
at 185 mio. US $ 
per year by cre-
ating a simu-
lated competi-
tive quasi-mar-
ket. Segregate 
income from 
municipality tax 
and spending. 
Privatised during 
the 1980s in the 
Thatcher govern-
ment in line with 
other public utili-
ties and infrastruc-
tural assets to save 
money. The regu-
lation came in late 
80s after the first 
failure of privati-
sation174. 
Privatised du-
ring the 1980s in 
the Reagan pres-
idency in line 
with other public 
utilities in order 
to save money. 
Regulation is 
strengthened but 
still fragment-
ed175
Privatised after 
the apartheid 
regime and re-
gulated by the 
government be-
cause of price 
setting and envi-
ronmental tar-
gets as well as 
human relations 
targets. 
Privatisation Quasi-privatised, 
natural monopo-
ly. No free 
choice of deliv-
erer. 
Privatised, no of-
ficial monopoly, 
but free choice of 
deliverer (de facto 
through pricing – 
the network has 
typically still one 
owner) 
Privatised, no 
official mono-
poly, but free 
choice of deli-
verer (de facto 
through pricing 
– see under “The 
UK”) 
Privatised in 
practice but not 
a free choice 
because of the 
division of com-
panies into mar-
ket regions. 
Managerialism Municipality 
owned, limited 
companies. 
Privately owned 
limited compa-
nies. 
A combination 
of privately 
owned limited 
companies and 
municipal and 
state ownership.
Privately owned 
limited compa-
nies. 
Budgets and 
accounting 
Yes. Demanded 
from the owners 
and the state 
authority 
Yes. Demanded 
from the stock-
holders and the 
state authority 
Yes. Demanded 
from the stock-
holders or the 
public owners
Yes. Demanded 
from the stock-
holders and the 
state authority 
Benchmarking / 
Key Perfor-
Only regulated 
and bench-
Regulated and 
benchmarked on 
Fragmented reg-
ulation and 
Regulated 
through the cost-
                                                
169
 See details in Lauesen 2011. 
170
 Source: www.ofwat.gov.uk Retrieved August 2012. 
171
 Source: Center of Sustainable Systems. University of Michigan. 2011.  
Second source: Osborne 1993. 
172
 See McDonald and Pape 2002 
173
 Competition Authority 2003 
174
 See details in Lauesen 2011. 
175
 (Beecher 2009) 
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mance Indexes marked on pric-
ing. KPI on per-
formance is done 
privately in the 
branch organisa-
tion DANVA 
pricing primarily. 
CSR is bench-
marked qualita-
tively as a demand 
from the state au-
thority OFWAT 
benchmarking. 
States decide 
who and how the 
regulation is to 
be carried out. 
EPA guidelines.
recovery princi-
ple. KPI and 
regulation are 
executed by the 
state authority 
DWA. 
Price caps Yes Yes Partly Yes 
CSR / Sustaina-
bility 
No state regu-
lation. Only CSR 
reporting is de-
manded from the 
largest compa-
nies. Voluntary 
CSR is promoted 
in the water sec-
tor itself through  
branch organisa-
tion(s) 
State regulation of 
CSR and sustain-
ability promoted 
by OFWAT. All 
companies have a 
CSR/sustainability 
policy and certain 
reported plans to 
OFWAT. CSR 
reports are only 
required from the 
largest companies.
Stockholders and 
CSR-indexed 
private compa-
nies provide 
CSR/ sustaina-
bility policies 
and reports. 
Stockholders 
and CSR-
indexed private 
companies pro-
vide CSR/ sus-
tainability poli-
cies and reports.  
TABLE D: NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT HISTORY AND STYLE 
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APPENDIX 5: TABLE E 
Interview date Quote from managers of Danish water companies 
March 2011 “The Competition Board refused to approve our investments in afforestation around 
our well fields. They say that urban forestry provides recreation for citizens and is not 
an economic investment in groundwater protection alone.” 
March 2011 “We cannot put targets like environmental protection and climate mitigation in our 
reporting for the benchmarking, because the environmental parameters are not based 
or transferred into economic targets, which is the format we have had to fill in accord-
ing to the benchmarking.” 
March 2011 “We cannot decide ourselves to spend more money in environmental friendly sludge 
treatment such as biogas production. According to the Water Sector Act the municipal 
authority has to make these kinds of decisions for us.” 
March 2011 “It will also make some utilities speculate in doing no maintenance of their existing 
assets, and simply to wait till they wear down and demand new installation works. This 
will lift the Price cap and is justifiable pursuant the Depreciation Rules.”
March 2011 “In the UK the water utilities have been very reluctant in preserving their ground wa-
ter or in investing in environmental protection for the very same reasons. You cannot 
depreciate these investments. What happened? They chose exclusive technology in-
vestments! It can be depreciated suiting the price cap system.” 
March 2011 “It makes sense for us to separate water utilities from the municipal administration 
and create local companies to simulate a market. It makes no sense to impose a new 
bureaucracy of regulations over these companies when the desire of reduce bureau-
cracy through privatisation is replaced with even more bureaucracy that binds compa-
nies’ hands and feets with only one purpose: To save money!”
April 2011 ”We have spent a lot of money on afforestation, which we did not get any credit for - it 
does not bother me as much as it bothers the others. Right now the economists expect 
economic numbers. Environmental and service targets are not defined yet in the legis-
lation, and there are plenty of things that belong to this - it'll come, I’m sure.”  
April 2011 “It's utopian to think that we as a single company without having our entire recharge 
area within the municipality borders can do anything worthwhile alone. There's no 
point in protecting groundwater recharge in a third of the area, if it is contaminated 
with pesticides in the other two thirds. We'll have to seek new collaborations. Then, we 
could compete and benchmark within municipal boundaries when the water reached 
the distribution network.“
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Interview date Quote from managers of Danish water companies 
April 2011 “None of the water companies had any environmental targets imposed in the Price 
Cap.”
Reponses from the Competition Authority 
Competition Authority 
2003, Ch. 4.5 
“When the privatisation in the UK resulted in higher prices for the consumers, it was 
largely a backlog of investments in the acquired plants and increased demands from 
the EU”
August 2011 ”The service and environmental objectives in the Water Sector Act are causing all our 
problems! The Municipalities have a right to impose any service and environmental 
objective they like in their water and wastewater plans – say 300 different objectives – 
and in the Water Sector Act, the definitions of service and environmental objectives are 
actually not defined! We as the regulator can’t handle that! We can only handle uni-
form goals! So it's has to be clarified by the Ministry of Environment in the future.”
TABLE E: EXCERPT FROM INTERVIEWS WITH DANISH WATER COMPANIES AND AUTHORITIES 
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APPENDIX 6: TABLE F 
TABLE F: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS. SOURCE: THORNTON ET AL., 2005. COLUMN (E) IS MY FINDINGS OF HYBRIDISED 
LOGICS. 
Key characteristics (A) Market (B) Corporation (C) Profession (D) State (E) Quasimar-
ket 
1) Economic system Investor capi-
talism 
Managerial capi-
talism 
Personal capita-
lism 
Welfare 
capitalism 
Investor (A1) 
and welfare 
capitalism (D1) 
2) Theories Agency Managerial Neoinstitutional Resource 
dependence 
Agency (A2), 
Managerial 
(B2), 
Neoinstitutional 
(C2), Resource 
Dependence 
(D2) 
3) Symbolic analogy Market as 
transaction 
Hierarchy as 
corporation 
Profession as 
relational net-
work 
State as 
redistribution 
mechanism 
Market as tran-
saction (A3) 
4) Sources of identity Faceless Bureaucratic 
roles; quantity of 
production 
Personal reputa-
tion and quality 
of innovation 
Social class 
and political 
ideology 
Organisational 
reputation and 
quality of inno-
vation (C4) 
5) Sources of legiti-
macy  
Share price Market position 
of firm 
Personal exper-
tise 
Democratic 
participation 
Organisational 
expertise (C5) 
and market 
position of firm 
(B5) 
6) Sources of autho-
rity  
Shareholder 
activism 
Board of Direc-
tors; management 
Professional 
association 
Bureaucratic 
domination 
and political 
parties 
Share price 
(A5), Board of 
directors (B6), 
Bureaucratic 
regulation (D6) 
7) Basis of norms Self-interest Employment in 
firm 
Membership in 
guild 
Citizenship 
in nation 
Self-interest 
(A7), citizen-
ship in distribu-
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Key characteristics (A) Market (B) Corporation (C) Profession (D) State (E) Quasimar-
ket 
tion area (D7) 
8) Basis of attention Status position 
in market 
Status position in 
industry 
Status position 
in network 
Status posi-
tion of inter-
est group 
Status position 
in market (A8) 
and industry 
(B8) 
9) Basis of strategy Increase effi-
ciency of 
transactions 
Increase size and 
diversification of 
firm 
Increase person-
al reputation 
and quality of 
craft 
Increase 
community 
good 
Increase effi-
ciency of trans-
action (A9) and 
public good 
(D9) 
10) Learning mecha-
nisms 
Competition 
prices 
Competition, 
training and rou-
tines; subunit of 
firm 
Cooperation 
apprenticing 
relational net-
work 
Popular 
opinion 
leadership 
Competition 
prices (A10), 
training and 
routines (B10) 
11) Informal control 
mechanisms 
Industry ana-
lysts 
Organisation 
culture 
Celebrity pro-
fessional 
Backroom 
politics 
Industry ana-
lysts (A11), 
celebrity pro-
fessional (C11) 
and backroom 
politics (D11) 
12) Formal control 
mechanisms 
Enforcement 
of regulation 
Board and mana-
gement authority 
Internal and 
external peer 
review 
Enforcement 
of legislation 
Enforcement of 
regulation 
(A12) and legis-
lation (D12) and 
Board (B12) 
13) Ownership forms Public Public Private Public Public 
(A13)(B13)(D1
3) 
14) Organisational 
form 
Market place M-form organisa-
tion 
Network organi-
sation 
Legal bu-
reaucracy 
Market place 
(A14), M-form 
corporations 
(B14) and legal 
bureaucracy 
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Key characteristics (A) Market (B) Corporation (C) Profession (D) State (E) Quasimar-
ket 
(D14) 
15) Logic of exchan-
ge 
Immediate 
best bargain 
Personal career 
advancement 
Indebtedness 
and reciprocity 
Political 
power 
Immediate best 
(REGULATED
) bargain (A15) 
16) Logic of invest-
ment 
Capital com-
mitted to capi-
tal markets 
Capital commited 
to the corporation 
Capital 
commited to 
nexus of rela-
tionships 
Capital 
committed to 
public policy 
Capital commit-
ted to capital 
markets (A15), 
corporations 
(B15) and pub-
lic policy (D15) 
17) Reward system* Financial 
income 
Competitive ad-
vantages (status) 
Career promoti-
on/ advantages 
(status) 
Financial 
income 
through 
taxes. 
Financial in-
come (A17) and 
competi-tive 
advantages 
(B17) 
*Row (17) is added to Thornton et al.’s model as an explanatory part, which is incorporated indirectly in the origi-
nal model, for instance in row (8), but not explicitly shown as decontextualised. 
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APPENDIX 7: FIGURE A 
FIGURE A: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
Corporate Social Responsibility
Economy, environment, human and labour 
rights 
(DK, UK, US and SA)
Environment
(UK, US, SA): 
Biodiversity and 
climate changes
Environment
(US, DK): 
Sustainability
Human
(UK, SA): Diversity, in-
clusion, (SA): 
HIV/AIDS, black 
economy
Community 
(UK, US): Charity
Coercive 
isomorphism 
('Implicit')
Normative 
isomorphism 
('Implicit'/ 'Explicit')
Mimetic 
isomorphism 
('Explicit')
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APPENDIX 8: TABLE G 
Company syno-
nym 
Managers Production 
(m3 water)
Authorities 
Company A 1 Top manager 
2 Middle manager 
3 Project managers 
11,000,000 1 state authority*176
Company B 1 Top manager 
2 Middle managers 
5 Project managers 
2,100,000 1 state authority* 
2 local authorities 
Company C 2 Top managers 2,400,000 1 state authority* 
1 local authority 
Company D 1 Top manager 
2 Middle managers 
3 Project managers 
15,000,000 1 state authority* 
Company E 2 Project managers 10,000,000 1 state authority* 
Company F 1 Middle manager 
1 Project manager 
51,000,000 1 state authority* 
Company G 2 Communication 
managers 
3,000,000 1 state authority* 
TABLE G: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS AMONG MANAGERS AND STAKEHOLDERS  
IN THE DANISH WATER SECTOR. 
* The state authority is the same for all companies.

                                                
176
 Some of the stakeholders are repeats and marked with * to indicate that it is the same in all cases. For instance 
the state authority was generally the same for all Danish water companies. The two different constructors are also 
repeats, having most of the companies as customers.
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APPENDIX 10: TABLE I 
Interviewees Vignette Conflict with 
Water company, 
top managers 
(4/4) 
The state authorities and legislation force us to prefer economy to envi-
ronmental and other social concerns. They do not trust us. They have 
totally removed trust in us as managers and in our municipalities for 
being able to set goal for us and control us. 
State authority 
Water company, 
top managers 
(4/4) 
We have had some initial problems with the city council politicians in 
the beginning. They did not understand that they should not make city 
politics in our board. They have to work for us when they are there. They 
understand their role better now. They can make politics in the City Hall 
afterwards. 
Local city politicians 
Water company, 
middle manager 
(3/4) 
The state does not understand how important our services are to be con-
ducted in the most social responsible way to ensure that we can deliver 
fresh water for future generations to come. They can’t just cut the prices 
and then think that the quality will be the same.  
State authority 
Water company, 
middle manager 
(1/4) 
It is very difficult to incorporate social responsibility in our tenders. The 
law prohibits competition in environmental targets, for instance. 
State authority 
Water company, 
project manager 
(8/12) 
The local authorities do not understand how we work with technical 
solutions in the interests of the environment, the citizens and the working 
environment for our operational colleagues. They do not trust us.  
Local authority 
Local authority 
(3/3) 
The managers of the water companies do not consider environmental 
concerns enough. They do not understand how they impact on nature 
with their technical solutions. They do not fully understand our concerns 
and obligations to preserve nature and the environment.  
Water company 
Local authority 
(3/3) 
We do not have enough knowledge capacity in our office to be able to 
understand how the technicians work and which technical solutions are 
the best for the environment. Since the Reform all technical expertise 
went to the water companies. It takes a lot of time to build up the compe-
tencies necessary to do a proper job regulating the water companies. 
Local authority 
Local authority 
(3/3) 
We do not have the technical competencies to understand and respond 
properly to the solutions the technicians within the water company sug-
gest. When we were separated from our former colleagues, the best 
skilled persons went to work for the public water company. We have 
none or very few left that know about it. We have to learn it all over.  
Water company and 
local authority 
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Interviewees Vignette Conflict with 
State authority 
(1/1) 
The water sector was not regulated before. They lived their own life and 
could set the price of water delivery etc. as they liked. If the local politi-
cians wanted a low price for the citizens, they postponed investments in 
the infrastructure, which suffers from proper maintenance in many small 
towns.  
Municipalities before, 
now the water com-
panies 
State authority 
(1/1) 
The municipalities took advantage of the income from water sales and 
used it for other means, which were not appropriate. Now we regulate 
the water companies to be economically responsible to the citizens. It is 
hard to incorporate environmental objectives because it is impossible to 
set a price on the value of nature etc.  
Municipalities before, 
now the water com-
panies 
TABLE I: COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS OF 'CONFLICTS'. THE NUMBERS IN PARENTHESIS REFER TO HOW MANY 
CONFIRMED THE VIGNETTES OUT OF THE TOTAL RESPONDENTS. 
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APPENDIX 11: TABLE J 
Trust Operator Regulator
Trust breakdown Distrusts the regulator Distrusts the operator 
Institutional logic ’Environment’ ’Economy’ 
Instrument CSR Regulation 
Dichotomy Voluntary Control 
Motive Independence Compliance 
Trust building Align motives Align motives 
Engagement Collaboration Distance 
Mean Direct knowledge sharing in 
face-to-face interactions 
Objective knowledge 
sharing by mediators 
End Voluntary space Regulatory space 
Trust recovery
(institutionalised)
CSR promoted and rewarded 
by regulation 
Regulation coexists 
with voluntary CSR 
TABEL J: FROM TRUST BREAKDOWN TO TRUST RECOVERY 
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APPENDIX 12: FIGURE B 
FIGURE B: JAMES P. SPRADLEY’S TYPIFICATIONS OF DOMAIN TYPES. ANALYTICAL STEPS FROM CODE TO DOMAIN. 
(SPRADLEY 1979)  
Kinds of (strict inclusion) 
Parts of (inclusion) 
Results of (cause-effect) 
Reasons for (rationale) 
Places for (location for action)  
Places in (spatial)  
Uses for (function)  
Ways to (means-end)  
Step in (sequence)  
Stages in (sequence) 
Attribute of (attribution) 
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APPENDIX 14: FIG
FIGURE D: A PROPOSED FOUR 'E'
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APPENDIX 15: TABLE K 
TABLE K: CODE, KEY TEXT, SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIP, AND DOMAIN. FROM SPRADLEY (1979, 1980) 
Code (X)  Key text  
(examples of extracted and shortened 
sentences)
Semantic 
relationship 
(x is a ... of y) 
Domain (Y)  
Economy, efficien-
cy and effectiveness 
Regulation jeopardises our operation’s ex-
penses and sustainable investments. 
Result of Economic motive 
Capital for investments is necessary for us to 
become a truly sustainable company. 
Way to Hybridisation of moti-
ves 
Economic growth yields sustainability, af-
fordability, and coping with regulation. 
Kind of Hybridisation of moti-
ves 
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APPENDIX 16: TABLE L 
Kinds of (strict inclusion) 
Parts of (inclusion) 
Results of (cause-effect) 
Reasons for (rationale) 
Places for (location for action)  
Places in (spatial)  
Uses for (function)  
Ways to (means-end)  
Step in (sequence)  
Stages in (sequence) 
Attribute of (attribution) 
Times of (temporal) 
TABLE L: SEMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS (SPRADLEY 1979, PP. 110-111) 
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APPENDIX 17: TABLE M 
Domain (Y)  Taxonomy  
(Internal relationship) 
Component 
(Contrast-sets) 
THEME (moti-
ve)
Economic motive Regulation is a threat to us Utility maximisation ENRICHMENT 
Hybridisation of mo-
tives 
Profit to ensure investment 
capital 
Utility maximisation LEGITIMACY 
Hybridisation of mo-
tives 
“Bigger is better” to ensure 
capital 
Sustainability is costly LEGITIMACY 
TABLE M: DOMAIN, TAXONOMY, COMPONENT, THEME  
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 p
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fic
ie
n
cy
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
; a
n
d 
sim
u
lta
n
eo
u
sly
 
st
ric
te
r 
de
m
an
ds
 
fo
r 
lo
w
er
 
pr
ic
es
 d
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at
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ra
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ra
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at
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 b
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ra
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l d
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at
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w
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w
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 k
ee
p 
pr
ic
es
 
lo
w
.
 
Ph
ila
nt
hr
o
py
 
Su
pp
or
t f
o
r 
v
u
ln
er
ab
le
 c
u
st
o
m
er
s 
is 
v
ita
l 
an
d 
w
e 
w
er
e 
de
lig
ht
ed
 t
o
 
se
e 
o
u
r 
R
e-
so
lv
e 
an
d 
Co
m
m
u
n
ity
 
Tr
u
st
 
sc
he
m
es
 
ci
te
d 
as
 
be
st 
pr
ac
tic
e 
in
 
th
e 
W
at
er
 W
hi
te
 
Pa
pe
r.
 
K
in
d 
o
f 
M
ot
iv
e 
o
f 
ap
pr
op
ria
-
te
n
es
s 
Ph
ila
nt
hr
o
pi
c 
su
p-
po
rt 
o
f 
v
u
ln
er
-a
bl
e 
co
m
m
u
n
iti
es
 
D
K
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
al
lo
w
ed
. 
So
ci
et
al
 e
xp
ec
ta
-
tio
n
s 
LE
G
IT
IM
A
CY
 
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
D
iv
id
en
ds
 
to
 s
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s 
ar
e 
th
e 
re
tu
rn
 
th
at
 t
he
y 
re
ce
iv
e 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s.
 
K
in
d 
o
f 
U
til
ity
 
m
ax
im
isa
tio
n
 
Sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
 
di
v
i-
de
nd
s 
ar
e 
m
ad
e 
cr
u
ci
al
 f
o
r 
co
m
pa
-
n
y 
su
rv
iv
al
 
D
K
 
an
d 
so
m
e 
SA
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
ar
e 
co
st
 
re
co
v
er
y 
ba
se
d 
EN
R
IC
H
M
EN
T 
Bl
a
m
e-
ga
m
e 
Th
e 
En
v
iro
n
m
en
t 
A
ge
n
cy
 
ho
pe
s 
to
 e
n
-
co
u
ra
ge
 
be
ha
v
io
u
ra
l 
ch
an
ge
 
fo
r 
lo
n
g-
te
rm
,
 
su
st
ai
n
ab
le
 
be
ne
fit
.
 
Th
e 
pr
o
-
gr
am
m
e 
o
f 
o
pe
n 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
w
ith
 
th
e 
fa
rm
in
g 
co
m
m
u
n
ity
 
o
n
 
th
e 
pr
o
bl
em
 
o
f 
di
ffu
se
 p
ol
lu
tio
n
s.
 
K
in
d 
o
f 
D
e-
em
ph
as
is 
o
f 
o
w
n
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 
A
 
ty
pi
ca
l 
bl
am
in
g 
o
f 
th
e 
ag
ric
u
ltu
ra
l 
se
ct
or
 fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ob
-
le
m
 
o
f 
di
ffu
se
 
po
l-
lu
tio
n
.
 
Th
e 
bl
am
e 
ga
m
e 
re
m
o
v
es
 
th
e 
at
te
nt
io
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s’
 
o
w
n
 
re
sp
o
n
sib
ili
tie
s 
R
EL
EG
IT
IM
IS
A
TI
O
N
 
M
ot
iv
a
tio
n
 
O
ur
 
ke
y 
ai
m
 
is 
to
 b
al
an
ce
 
th
e 
de
sir
es
 
an
d 
as
pi
ra
tio
n
s 
o
f o
u
r 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
an
d 
ou
r 
em
pl
oy
ee
s 
w
ith
 
th
e 
n
ee
ds
 
o
f 
th
e 
en
v
i-
ro
n
m
en
t a
n
d 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s.
 
A
ttr
ib
u
te
 in
 
V
oc
ab
ul
ar
ie
s 
o
f 
m
o
-
tiv
es
 
K
ey
 
ai
m
 
to
 
ba
la
nc
e 
de
sir
es
 
an
d 
as
pi
ra
-
tio
n
s 
o
f 
st
ak
eh
o
ld
-
er
s.
 
Co
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
th
ro
u
gh
 b
ei
n
g 
a 
fro
n
t 
ru
n
n
er
 
in
 
th
e 
su
st
ai
n
ab
ili
ty
 
di
sc
o
u
rs
e.
 
LE
G
IT
IM
A
CY
 
Tr
a
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
cy
 
is 
v
er
y 
am
bi
gu
o
u
sl
y 
re
-
po
rte
d.
 S
o
m
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
sh
o
w
 
a 
ra
n
ge
 
o
f 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
,
 
w
he
re
as
 
o
th
er
s 
re
sid
e 
on
 
st
o
ry
te
lli
n
g 
to
 
o
bt
ai
n
 
it.
 
A
ttr
ib
u
te
 in
 
M
ot
iv
e 
o
f 
tr
u
st
 
ex
-
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
So
m
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
u
se
 
m
an
y 
ke
y 
pe
r-
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
de
x
es
 
O
th
er
s 
u
se
 m
ai
n
-
ly
 
n
ar
ra
ti-
v
es
 
an
d 
sto
ry
te
lli
n
g 
LE
G
IT
IM
A
CY
 
TA
BL
E 
O
: E
TH
N
O
G
R
A
PH
IC
 A
NA
LY
SI
S 
O
F 
TE
X
TS
 
FR
O
M
 
C
O
M
PA
N
Y
 R
EP
O
R
TS
.
 
33
5
A
PP
EN
D
IX
 
20
: T
A
BL
E 
P 
Em
ph
as
ise
d 
ar
ch
et
yp
al
 m
o
tiv
es
 
 
D
e-
em
ph
as
ise
d 
ar
ch
et
yp
a
l m
o
tiv
es
 
“
H
a
pp
yn
es
s”
 
–
 
(H
ap
py
 
cu
st
o
m
er
s 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
s).
 P
eo
pl
e 
w
ith
 
sm
ili
n
g 
fa
ce
s.
 
A
 fe
w
 
pi
ct
u
re
s 
sh
o
w
 
ho
w
 
w
at
er
 c
o
m
pa
n
ie
s 
sp
on
so
r 
po
or
 n
at
io
n
s 
ei
th
er
 f
in
an
ci
al
ly
 
o
r 
w
ith
 
w
at
er
 s
er
v
ic
es
.
 
Th
ey
 
al
so
 
sh
o
w
 
o
th
er
 k
in
ds
 
o
f m
o
o
ds
,
 
fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
 m
o
o
ds
 
o
f s
ad
ne
ss
 
o
r 
in
di
ffe
re
n
ce
. 
Sm
ile
s 
ar
e 
u
se
d 
to
 
sig
n
ify
 
an
 
id
ea
 th
at
 
th
es
e 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
do
 is
 
pu
re
ly
 
go
o
d 
an
d 
cr
ea
te
s h
ap
pi
ne
ss
 
as
 
an
 
id
ea
lis
at
io
n.
 
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3):
 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
w
at
er
pl
c.
co
m
/p
ag
es
/h
om
e/
w
at
er
-m
et
er
s/
“
Sa
dn
es
s”
 –
 
(C
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
). 
Pic
tu
re
s 
o
f n
at
u
ra
l c
ha
n
ge
s 
o
r 
di
sa
st
er
s 
in
 
o
rd
er
 to
 
sh
o
w
 
se
v
er
e,
 
lo
n
gi
tu
di
n
al
 
im
pa
ct
s 
fro
m
 
fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
 
gr
ee
n
ho
u
se
 
ga
s 
em
iss
io
n
s 
an
d 
its
 c
o
n
se
-
qu
en
ce
s 
o
n
 
fu
tu
re
 li
fe
 
o
n
 
Ea
rth
,
 
ar
e 
ra
re
ly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d.
  
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(re
tr
ie
v
ed
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3):
 
ht
tp
://
va
n
dc
en
te
r.
dk
/V
id
en
/P
ro
jek
te
r/E
jer
sm
in
de
v
ej.
asp
x
“
Ex
pl
oi
ta
tio
n
”
 
–
 
(E
n
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l e
x
pl
o
ita
tio
n
). 
Pi
ct
ur
es
 o
f 
ho
w
 
w
at
er
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
ex
-
pl
o
it 
n
at
u
re
 in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f e
x
tr
ac
tio
n
 
fro
m
 
n
o
n
-p
ur
ifi
ed
 w
at
er
 d
isc
ha
rg
es
 
fro
m
 
st
o
rm
w
at
er
 
to
 
v
ar
io
u
s 
w
at
er
 
bo
di
es
 
su
ch
 a
s 
aq
ui
fe
rs
 o
r 
su
rfa
ce
 
w
at
er
, 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
ra
re
ly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d.
 
A
lso
 
pi
ct
u
re
s 
ex
pr
es
sin
g 
o
n
e 
o
f 
th
e 
m
ajo
r 
co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n
s 
to
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l 
im
pa
ct
 
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f e
x
pl
o
ita
tio
n
 o
f f
o
ss
il 
en
er
gy
 
an
d 
ho
w
 
th
is 
af
fe
ct
s 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 
du
e 
to
 
em
is-
sio
n
 
o
f g
re
en
ho
u
se
 g
as
se
s,
 
w
hi
ch
 
ar
e 
ra
re
ly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d.
 E
xa
m
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(re
tr
ie
v
ed
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3):
 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
ra
n
dw
at
er
.
co
.z
a/
A
bo
ut
U
s/P
ag
es
/B
ac
kg
ro
u
n
d.
as
px
“
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n”
 
–
 
(E
nv
iro
n
m
en
ta
l p
er
fe
ct
n
es
s).
 S
ig
ni
fy
in
g 
‘
pr
o
te
ct
io
n
’
 
o
f t
he
 v
u
ln
er
ab
le
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t 
in
cl
u
di
n
g 
n
at
u
re
,
 
al
l k
in
ds
 o
f s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s,
 
an
d 
th
e 
su
rr
o
u
n
di
n
g 
co
m
m
u
-
n
iti
es
. 
Th
es
e 
pi
ct
ur
es
 a
re
 ty
pi
ca
lly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
in
 
br
ig
ht
 
an
d 
n
ic
e 
co
lo
u
rs
 s
ho
w
in
g 
gl
o
ri-
o
u
s 
su
n
sh
in
e 
(se
ld
om
 
ba
d 
w
he
th
er
), 
blu
e 
sk
ie
s 
w
ith
 
w
hi
te
 
cl
o
u
ds
,
 
gr
ee
n
 
n
at
u
re
, 
bl
u
e 
w
at
er
 
bo
di
es
,
 
an
d 
co
lo
u
rfu
l 
flo
w
er
s.
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 
13
): 
ht
tp
://
va
n
dc
en
te
r.
dk
/O
m
_
o
s/A
n
sv
ar
lig
he
d/
El
m
el
un
d.
as
px
“
D
iv
er
sit
y”
 –
 
(S
ki
n
 c
o
lo
u
r).
 ‘D
iv
er
sit
y’
 
am
o
n
g 
em
pl
o
ye
es
 o
r 
bi
o
di
v
er
sit
y 
sh
o
w
s 
pi
c-
tu
re
s 
co
m
po
se
d 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
o
se
. 
Th
es
e 
co
m
po
sit
io
ns
 
ar
e 
n
o
t 
re
pe
at
ed
 i
n 
sit
u
at
io
ns
 
fro
m
 
ev
er
yd
ay
 
w
o
rk
,
 
w
he
re
 h
om
o
ge
n
ei
ty
 
is 
m
o
re
 p
re
se
n
t, 
w
he
th
er
 it
 is
 
re
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 
“
m
al
e 
w
hi
te
n
es
s”
 
o
r 
“
m
al
e 
bl
ac
kn
es
s”
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
du
e 
to
 t
he
 d
om
in
at
in
g 
n
at
io
n
al
 
sk
in
 c
o
lo
u
r.
 
W
o
m
en
 a
re
 
u
n
de
r-
re
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 m
an
ag
er
ia
l, 
sc
ie
n
tif
ic
 
an
d 
in
fra
-
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l w
o
rk
,
 
an
d 
o
v
er
-r
ep
re
se
n
te
d 
in
 
la
bo
ra
to
ry
 
w
o
rk
,
 
ca
llc
en
tr
e 
w
o
rk
,
 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
lo
w
 
st
at
u
s 
po
sit
io
n
s.
 
 
“
H
om
o
ge
ne
ity
” 
–
 
(S
am
e 
se
x
/S
ki
n
 
co
lo
u
r).
 T
ex
ts
 
in
 
re
po
rts
 
de
sc
rib
e 
vi
v
id
ly
 
co
m
pa
-
n
ie
s’
 
en
ga
ge
m
en
t 
in
 
hu
m
an
 
di
v
er
sit
y 
(he
te
ro
ge
n
ei
ty
), 
alb
ei
t 
m
o
st
 
re
po
rts
 
de
pi
ct
 
th
ei
r 
o
cc
u
pa
tio
na
l c
om
po
sit
io
n 
as
 
“
ho
m
o
ge
n
eo
u
s”
.
 
M
os
t m
an
ag
er
s,
 
fo
r 
in
st
an
ce
, 
ar
e 
de
pi
ct
ed
 
as
 
“
m
al
e”
 a
n
d 
of
te
n 
“
w
hi
te
” 
w
ith
 
th
e 
re
v
er
se
 
sit
ua
tio
n 
fo
r 
So
ut
h 
A
fri
ca
, w
he
re
 m
an
-
ag
em
en
t i
s 
m
ai
nl
y 
bl
ac
k.
 
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(re
tr
ie
v
ed
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3):
 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
n
o
rd
va
n
d.
dk
/O
m
N
o
rd
va
n
d/
O
rg
an
isa
tio
n/
Si
de
r/d
ef
au
lt.
as
px
33
6
Em
ph
as
ise
d 
ar
ch
et
yp
al
 m
o
tiv
es
 
 
D
e-
em
ph
as
ise
d 
ar
ch
et
yp
a
l m
o
tiv
es
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 
13
): 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
u
n
ite
dw
at
er
.
co
m
/e
B
o
o
ks
/D
I_
R
ep
or
t_
20
11
/D
I_
re
po
rt
_
20
11
.h
tm
l#
/1
0/
“
C
ha
lle
n
ge
s”
 
–
 
(In
se
cu
rit
y/
in
co
m
pe
te
n
ce
s).
 V
ery
 
fe
w
 
pi
ct
ur
es
 
ar
e 
sh
o
w
n
 
ab
ou
t 
th
e 
ac
tu
al
 c
ha
lle
n
ge
s 
th
at
 
w
at
er
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
fa
ce
 
su
ch
 a
s 
m
iti
ga
tin
g 
po
llu
tio
n,
 
cl
im
at
e 
ch
an
ge
,
 
an
d 
th
e 
v
ar
io
us
 
in
se
cu
rit
ie
s 
an
d 
in
-
co
m
pe
te
nc
es
 
th
at
 c
om
pa
n
ie
s 
ha
v
e 
to
 f
ac
e 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
p.
 T
he
se
 c
ha
lle
n
ge
s 
ar
e 
m
ai
n
ly
 
de
sc
rib
ed
 in
 
th
e 
te
xt
s,
 
an
d 
ev
en
 
w
he
n
 
th
es
e 
ch
al
le
n
ge
s 
ar
e 
de
pi
ct
ed
, t
he
y 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t t
he
 p
eo
pl
e 
w
o
rk
in
g 
w
ith
 
th
es
e 
ch
al
le
n
ge
s 
ar
e 
“
en
joy
in
g”
 
th
ei
r 
w
o
rk
 
(sm
ile
s) 
w
ith
o
u
t 
th
e 
fru
st
ra
tio
n 
o
n
e 
m
ig
ht
 
ex
pe
ct
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
e-
se
n
t. 
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3) 
p.
 4
: 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
th
am
es
w
at
er
.
co
.u
k/
tw
/c
o
m
m
o
n
/d
ow
n
lo
ad
s/a
bo
u
t u
s 
-
 
co
rp
o
ra
te
 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
/c
r
re
po
rt-
20
09
-
20
10
.p
df
“
Su
st
a
in
ab
ili
ty
”
 
–
 
(C
hi
ld
re
n
 
ha
v
e 
to
 
liv
e 
lo
n
ge
r).
 M
an
y p
ic
tu
re
s 
o
f c
hi
ld
re
n 
dr
in
ki
n
g 
w
at
er
 a
re
 d
isp
la
ye
d 
sig
ni
fy
in
g 
th
at
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
o
f ‘
su
st
ai
n
ab
ili
ty
’
 
is 
se
cu
re
 c
le
an
 
w
at
er
 
re
so
u
rc
es
 
fo
r 
fu
tu
re
 g
en
er
at
io
n
s.
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3):
 ht
tp
://
va
n
do
ga
ffa
ld
.d
k/
“
Ex
pe
rt
ise
”
 –
 
(T
ec
hn
o
lo
gy
). 
Th
e 
la
rg
es
t q
u
an
tit
y 
o
f p
ho
to
s 
sh
o
w
s 
ho
w
 
w
at
er
 c
o
m
pa
-
n
ie
s 
pr
o
ce
ss
 a
n
 
o
v
er
-
ar
ch
in
g 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
ca
l (
en
gi
ne
er
in
g) 
so
lu
tio
n
.
 
M
u
lti
pl
e 
pi
ct
ur
es
 o
f 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
ra
l 
w
o
rk
,
 
w
at
er
 w
or
ks
 
an
d 
w
as
te
w
at
er
 t
re
at
m
en
t 
pl
an
ts
,
 
“
gr
ee
n
”
 
en
er
gy
-
pr
ov
id
in
g 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
 s
u
ch
 a
s 
w
in
d 
tu
rb
in
es
,
 
so
la
r 
ce
lls
,
 
an
d 
hy
dr
op
ow
er
 w
o
rk
s 
sig
ni
-
fy
 
th
at
 
w
at
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n
 
is 
an
 
‘
ex
pe
rt
ise
’
 
th
at
 
re
qu
ire
s 
ric
h 
an
d 
so
u
n
d 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e,
 s
ki
lls
 
an
d 
in
n
o
v
at
iv
e 
le
ar
n
in
g.
 
 
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3) 
p.
 1
: 
ht
tp
://
w
w
w
.
aa
rh
us
v
an
d.
dk
/G
lo
ba
l/O
m
%
20
os
/P
ro
fil
br
o
ch
u
re
/P
ro
fil
br
o
ch
u
re
_
A
ar
hu
s_
V
an
d.
pd
f
“
Th
re
a
ts
”
 –
 
(D
ro
u
gh
t, 
st
o
rm
w
at
er
,
 
flo
o
di
n
g).
 
Se
v
er
e 
th
re
at
s 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
e 
ex
ist
en
ce
 o
f 
th
e 
w
at
er
 
co
m
pa
n
ie
s 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
ac
hi
ev
em
en
ts
 
in
 
m
iti
ga
tin
g 
th
em
 
ar
e 
ra
re
ly
 
di
sp
la
ye
d,
 b
ut
 
o
n
ly
 
de
sc
rib
ed
 te
x
tu
al
ly
.
 
G
en
er
al
ly
 
‘
ris
ks
’
 
ar
e 
de
-e
m
ph
as
ise
d 
bo
th
 te
x
tu
-
al
ly
 
an
d 
in
 
pi
ct
u
re
s 
w
he
th
er
 th
es
e 
ar
e 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
ta
l, 
fin
an
ci
al
, o
r d
ev
el
op
m
en
ta
l (
sk
ill
s 
an
d 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e).
  
Ex
am
pl
e 
fo
u
n
d 
(F
eb
ru
ar
y 
25
, 1
3) 
p.
 1
: h
ttp
://
w
w
w
.
de
n
v
er
w
at
er
.
o
rg
/d
oc
s/a
ss
et
s/C
EC
FB
C9
5-
E6
11
-
03
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APPENDIX 21: TABLE Q 
ACTOR WATER COMPANIES 
(issued by) REGULATOR   (informed by) 
(instrumented by) POLICY 
MAKER 
VOTER 
/CITIZEN 
Organising 
principles 
Capitalism, 
market 
State,  bureau-
cracy 
Democracy,  
community 
Family, 
nuclear 
Religion, 
Christian 
Profession Corporation 
Rituals 
(reinforce 
beliefs) 
Signing 
constracts 
Issuance of 
budgets and 
plans 
Voting Marriage Communi-
on 
General 
meeting 
Signing a 
contract 
Values 
(relativati-
on of) 
Accumula-
tion and 
commodi-
fication of 
human activ-
ity 
Rationalisation 
and regulation 
of human activ-
ity 
Popular 
control over 
human activ-
ity 
Motivation 
of human 
activity 
Symbolic 
construc-
tion of 
human 
activity 
Pooling of 
professional 
knowledge 
Organisation 
of productiv-
ity of human 
activity 
Basis of 
affiliation 
None. The 
market is to 
be free and 
unbound. 
Legal and 
bureaucratic 
hierarchies 
Citizen par-
ticipation 
Community 
(of indivi-
duals) 
Member-
ship in 
congrega-
tion 
Membership 
of profes-
sional com-
munities  
Membership 
of company 
organisation 
Market is si-
mulated and 
regulated. 
Basis of 
obligation 
Convert 
human activ-
ity to a price 
Convert diverse 
individual 
issues into 
consensus 
Convert 
issues into 
political 
consensus 
Repro-
duction of 
family 
members 
Convert 
issues into 
moral prin-
ciples 
Convert 
knowledge 
into field 
practice 
Convert 
labour into 
products and 
services 
Basis of 
loyalty / 
legitimacy 
Share price
(or  price of 
cost recov-
ery) 
Democratic 
participation 
Unity of 
will/belief in 
trust and 
reciprocity 
Uncondi-
tional loy-
alty to 
members 
Faith and 
sacredness 
of congre-
gation 
Personal 
expertise 
Market posi-
tion 
Authority Sharehol-
ders (or 
owners) 
Bureaucracy Community 
values and 
ideology 
Patriarchal Priesthood Professional 
association 
Board of di-
rection/  Top 
managers. 
Identity Faceless 
Social and 
economic class 
Emotional 
connection 
and satisfac-
tion 
Family 
reputation 
Associa-tion 
with deities 
(or charity 
and com-
passion) 
Association 
with quality 
of craft and 
personal 
reputation 
Bureaucratic 
roles 
Norms Selfinterest Citizenship in 
nation 
Group mem-
bership 
Member-
ship in 
household 
Member-
ship in con-
gregation 
Membership 
in guild and 
association 
Employment 
in firm Interest of 
bureaucracy 
Attention Status in 
market 
Status of inter-
est group 
Personal 
investment in 
group 
Status in 
household 
Relation to 
super-
natural 
Status in 
profession 
Status in  
(industry) 
hierarchy 
Strategy Increase 
efficiency 
profit (or 
budgetmaxi-
misation) 
Increase com-
munity good 
Increase 
status and 
honour of 
members and 
practices 
Increase 
family 
honour 
Increase 
religious 
symbolism 
of natural 
events 
Increase 
personal 
reputation 
Increase size 
and diversifi-
cation of firm 
Informal 
control 
Industry 
analyst 
Backroom 
politics 
Visibility of 
actions 
Family 
politics 
Worship of 
calling 
Celebrity 
professionals 
Organisa-
tional culture 
Economic 
system 
“Market” 
capitalism 
Welfare capital-
ism 
Cooperative 
capitalism 
Family as 
capital 
Occiden-tal 
capi-talism 
Personal 
capitalism 
Managerial 
capitalism 
Root meta-
phor 
Transaction Redistribution 
mechanism 
Common 
boundary 
Family as 
firm 
Temple as 
bank 
Network of 
profes-
sionals 
Corporation 
as hierarchy 
TABLE Q: THE LOGIC OF CSR AS BLACK FRAMED 'CHESS-FIELDS' VERSUS THE LOGIC OF NPM IN VERTICAL  GREY-
SCALED 'PILLARS' 
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